JOYCE M. SHOCKENCY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMSEY COUNTY, et al., Defendants CIVIL NO. 04-1081 (ADM/JSM) United States District Court, D. Minnesota Filed January 19, 2006 Counsel James H. Kaster, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Nicholas G. B. May, Fabian May & Anderson, PLLP, Mpls, MN, for Plaintiffs. C. David Dietz, St. Paul, MN, for Defendants Mayeron, Janie S., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 The above matter came on for hearing before the undersigned upon plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions [Docket No. 33], defendants’ Motions for Protective Order [Docket Nos. 42, 63] and Non-party Lisa Rudenick’s Motion of Nonparty to Quash Subpoena [Docket No, 52]. Nicholas G.B. May appeared on behalf of plaintiffs; David Dietz appeared on behalf of defendants; and Thomas Plunkett appeared on behalf of Lisa Rudenick. The Court, being duly advised in the premises, upon all of the files, records and proceedings herein, now makes and enters the following Order. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions [Docket No. 33] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated forth in the Memorandum below. 2. Defendants’ Motions for Protective Order [Docket Nos. 42, 63] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated forth in the Memorandum below. 3. Non-party Lisa Rudenick’s Motion of Nonparty to Quash Subpoena [Docket No. 52] is DENIED. 4. On or before January 31, 2006, the parties shall submit a proposed scheduling order setting forth the final deadlines for discovery, non-dispositive motions, dispositive motions and trial consistent with the Memorandum below. MEMORANDUM I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs have brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Minnesota Data Privacies Act, Minn. Stat. § 13.01, et seq. See First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 40-49. As to their § 1983 claim, plaintiff John Moore (“Moore”) alleges that after he announced his decision in June or July of 2001 to run for Sheriff against defendant Ramsey County Sheriff Robert Fletcher (“Fletcher”), defendants Ramsey County, Fletcher and Ramsey County Inspector Nicholas O’Hara (“O’Hara”) retaliated by transferring him to a less desirable position within the Ramsey County Police Department and by depriving him of a variety of benefits and privileges. Id., ¶¶ 19-27. Plaintiff Joyce M. Shockency (“Shockency”), a Sergeant with the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department, claims that after she openly supported Moore’s candidacy for the position of Ramsey County Sheriff in 2002, defendants retaliated against her by switching her to a less desirable position within the Department. Id., ¶¶ 28-37. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs assert that Ramsey County, and Fletcher and O’Hara, acting in both their official and individual capacities, violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to freedom of speech and political affiliation under the First Amendment, and under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants’ conduct was part of a larger pattern of awarding Fletcher’s political supporters and punishing his opponents with tangible job duties and pay. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order (“Pls.’ Opp. Mem.”), at p. 1. At the onset of the case, the Court entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order that set certain deadlines and limits on discovery. See Docket No. 9. Specifically, the deadline for fact discovery was set for April 1, 2005; the deadline for bringing nondispositive motions, including a motion to modify the scheduling order, was set for May 6, 2005; and the parties were limited to 30 interrogatories and 40 depositions per side. *2 During the course of discovery, plaintiffs served upon defendants at least 5 different sets of interrogatories, several sets of document requests, and deposition notices for 28 people. While some discovery between the parties has taken place, defendants refused to respond outright to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Ramsey County, Sets II and III, and to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories to Fletcher, Set II, on grounds that this discovery exceeded the number of interrogatories permitted by the scheduling order. Defendants also refused to respond to plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents to Ramsey County, Set II, and objected to various document requests directed to certain people that sought production of a mirror image of their computers, hard drives and personal digital assistants.[1] Additionally, at the depositions of Fletcher, Ramsey County Deputy Chief David Metusalem (“Metusalem”) and Lieutenant Mark Pettit, counsel for defendants objected to a number of questions based on relevance and refused to permit the witnesses to answer these questions. As a consequence of defendants’ positions with respect to plaintiffs’ discovery, on March 16, 2005, plaintiffs brought a motion to compel. Defendants not only responded to this motion, they subsequently filed their own motion for a protective order.[2] In addition to these two motions, non-party witness Lisa Rudenick brought a motion to quash her deposition. In plaintiffs’ motion to compel, they sought an order (1) requiring various witnesses to testify during their depositions into areas involving Fletcher’s campaign, how it was run, and who supported Fletcher; (2) allowing relevant computers used by both plaintiffs, Fletcher, O’Hara, Metusalem, Reiter, Undersheriff George Altendorfer, and Undersheriff John Luey to be searched using key words; (3) providing additional time for plaintiffs to complete the depositions of Fletcher and O’Hara; (4) requiring defendants to produce a privilege log; (5) and awarding monetary sanctions against defendants arising out of the motion to compel. In defendants’ motion for protective order, defendants sought an order (1) striking Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Ramsey County, Set II and Set III, and Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Fletcher, Set II, as exceeding the maximum number allowed under the Court’s Order; (2) limiting the scope of depositions and other discovery to incidents occurring after June of 2001; (3) quashing all subpoenas and prohibiting any inquiry into issues related to Fletcher’s campaign; (4) postponing the deposition of Reiter; (5) quashing all subpoenas and prohibiting any request for production that asked for a mirror image of any and all computers, hard drives or personal digital assistants used from July 1, 2001 to the present date; (6) denying Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Ramsey County, Set II, unless plaintiffs articulated with some specificity how such documents were relevant to the claim or defense of any party; and (7) preventing any further discovery from defendants until the issue of qualified immunity was resolved in this case. *3 In Lisa Rudenick’s motion, she has asked the Court to quash the subpoena requiring her deposition on the grounds that she would taking a vacation during the scheduled deposition time and that the deposition would require her disclose information in violation of her Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination. In sum, plaintiffs seek broad discovery through interrogatories, document requests and depositions to discover the factual support for their claims and the defenses proffered by defendants; defendants, on the other hand, seek in the first instance, to stay discovery until the District Court can entertain their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, or in the second instance, to limit the scope of discovery. Non-party Rudenick seeks an order precluding her deposition in order to avoid incriminating herself for an alleged violation under the Minnesota Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. § 13.01 et seq., by handling Moore’s personnel records. Given this backdrop, the Court will now address the specific discovery disputes that are at issue by the motions brought by plaintiffs, defendants and Rudenick. II. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, and for good cause, discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Walker v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. Civ. 00-2604 (MJD/JGL), 2002 WL 32539635 at *1 (D. Minn., Oct. 28, 2002) (“In the context of discovery, ‘relevant’ has been defined as encompassing ‘any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ”) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). “Information sought in discovery need not be admissible at trial, so long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Burns v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. Civ. 02-254 (JRT/FLN), 2002 WL 31718432 at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2002) (citation omitted). While a relevancy objection and refusal to respond on this basis is appropriate in response to written discovery, the objection of relevancy is not a basis for instructing a witness not to answer a deposition question. “A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation enforced by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, unless a party intends to present a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(d)(4), which precludes examination that is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, an instruction not to answer is improper. 1. Deposition Testimony Plaintiffs seek an order from this Court compelling deposition testimony from Fletcher, Metusalem, and Pettit. In particular, plaintiffs complain that defendants improperly objected to questions put to these deponents regarding: (1) defendants’ knowledge of Fletcher’s supporters and opponents; (2) whether Fletcher and his supporters used any inducements such as job perks, threats or retaliation to motivate Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department personnel to campaign for Fletcher; (3) whether certain people within the Sheriff’s Department supported Fletcher; (4) what was said on the campaign trail regarding Fletcher’s discipline of Moore; and (5) the bias and relationship between witnesses. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law of Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at pp. 18-20; see also Second Supplemental Affidavit of Nicholas G.B. May (“May 2nd Supp. Aff.”), ¶¶ 3-7.[3] a. Knowledge of Sheriff Fletcher’s Supporters and Opponents *4 During the depositions of Fletcher and Metusalem, plaintiffs sought to learn the identity of persons in the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department who contributed to Fletcher’s campaign and who did not. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 3. Defendants objected to the questions on grounds that how Fletcher ran his campaign was not relevant to the suit. See May Aff., Ex. 1 (Fletcher Depo.) at pp. 146-50; Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 101-02; see also Defendants’ Response to Motion to Compel and Motion for Protective Order (“Defs.’ Opp. Mem.”) at p. 6. However, defendants did not object to questions regarding whether specific individuals within the Department contributed to Fletcher’s campaign. Id. at pp. 147-48. Plaintiffs have represented that they sought to ask Fletcher and Metulasem if they and Fletcher’s management team had knowledge of those persons who supported Fletcher politically when they made various personnel decisions. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 3. According to plaintiffs, this information sought from Fletcher and Metusalem is relevant to proving that defendants retaliated against known political opponents and rewarded known political supporters. Id. It is defendants’ position that questions regarding Fletcher’s campaign practices are not relevant to the present subject matter of this case. Discovery regarding the identity of those persons within the Ramsey County Police Department that contributed to Fletcher’s 2002 campaign may lead to relevant evidence showing that Fletcher treated plaintiffs differently from those employees that supported Fletcher’s election. Thus, Fletcher and Metusalem are ordered to provide deposition testimony to plaintiffs regarding those persons within the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department contributed to Fletcher’s campaign or campaigned for Fletcher in the 2002 election. In addition, without delving into more general areas about how Fletcher ran his campaign, plaintiffs shall be permitted to ask the deponent when he learned the identity of the supporter or opponent of Fletcher’s campaign, and how the deponent learned the identity of these individuals, as these questions may lead to discovery of information bearing on plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. b. Inducements and Threats Defendants objected to Metusalem being asked whether any kind of inducement, encouragement or other kind of persuasion was used to get members of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department to volunteer for door knocking on behalf of Fletcher. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 27-30; see also May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 4. Defendants asserted that questioning about the campaign pertains to campaign violations and not whether defendants were transferred because of their political beliefs. See Defs.’ Opp. Mem. at p. 8. Plaintiffs claimed that providing favorable benefits to employees of the Sheriff’s Department who supported Fletcher, and punishing those who did not, is relevant to this case. See Pls.’ Mem. at pp. 18-20. In addition, plaintiffs argued that they are entitled to learn whether defendants’ conduct towards plaintiffs was part of a larger pattern of awarding Fletcher’s political supporters and punishing his opponents with tangible job duties and pay, and that in order to establish discrimination, inquiry into an employer’s history and practice is relevant to determining whether the employer was more likely than not to act with an unlawful motive. See Pls.’ Mem. at pp. 1, 16. Plaintiffs have brought a claim that defendants’ actions violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by retaliating against then for opposing his reelection. See Amended Complaint, ¶ 43. A party may make a Fourteenth Amended claim by asserting they are a “class of one,” i.e., an individual who has been treated differently from others similarly situa ted without any rational basis for the disparate treatment. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563-64, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). In addition, determining if defendants’ actions were part of a larger pattern of similar conduct is relevant in a case such as this, where defendants’ conduct as it relates to others, may have served to chill the exercise of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1994); Cf., Hawkins v. Hennepin Tech. Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 155-156 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may illustrate that the asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination). Thus, discovery regarding what inducements or threats were made to employees of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department to encourage them to campaign for Fletcher or to prevent or discourage them from supporting Moore, is clearly relevant to plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants’ objections to such questions are overruled and Fletcher and Metusalem shall answer these questions. c. Information Regarding Fletcher’s Supporters *5 Plaintiffs have asked for an order from this Court to compel Metusalem to answer questions regarding whether members of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department management committee were involved in Fletcher’s campaign. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 57-59; see also May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 5. Defendants’ counsel instructed Metusalem not answer questions regarding the nature of employees’ involvement in Fletcher’s election campaigns. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 57-59. According to plaintiffs, discovering whether certain members of the Department were involved in Fletcher’s campaign is relevant to determining who received preferential treatment or who may have helped carry out the retaliation against plaintiffs. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 5. “ ‘In order to establish a claim for unlawful First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must show that [she] suffered an adverse employment action that was causally connected to [her] participation in a protected activity.’ ” Meyers v. Starke, 420 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2002)). Once the employee satisfies his initial burden, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her actions. See Duffy, 276 F.3d at 991 (citing Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 1999)). Information regarding which members of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department management committee participated in Fletcher’s 2002 campaign may lead to the discovery of information relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that such persons were involved in making personnel decisions against them in retaliation for their engagement in a protected activity. As such, Metusalem shall answer questions regarding who on the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department management committee was involved in Fletcher’s 2002 campaign. d. Questioning Regarding What was Said on the Campaign Trail Plaintiffs seek to ask Metusalem and Pettit questions regarding what was said to potential voters on the campaign trail regarding Moore. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 6. During his deposition, Metusalem testified that he showed documents regarding the discipline of Moore to potential voters while going door-to-door. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at p. 40. However, defendants objected to both Metusalem and Pettit being asked about what was said to potential voters on the campaign trail. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 50-51, 100; Ex. 11 (Pettit Depo.) at pp. 50, 55. Plaintiffs claim that evidence of Fletcher supporters touting Moore’s disciplinary issues is evidence of unwarranted discipline being imposed on Moore in retaliation for his contesting Fletcher in the 2002 election. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 6. This Court finds that defendants’ relevancy objection has no merit to the extent that plaintiffs were seeking to learn what was shown or communicated to voters by Metulasem and Pettit regarding Moore. The fact that supporters of Fletcher’s campaign were showing and discussing disciplinary records to possible voters may lead to relevant admissible evidence on the issue of whether the disciplinary action taken against Moore was in retaliation for his running against Fletcher for Sheriff in 2002. In addition, such evidence may lead to admissible evidence relating to Moore’s Data Practices claim.[4] *6 As such, Metusalem and Pettit shall answer questions about what was said by them regarding Moore (or those who accompanied them) to members of the public on the campaign trail. e. Questions Regarding Witness Bias Plaintiffs complained that defendants’ counsel would not allow them to ask witnesses questions related to their possible bias and relationship towards other witnesses in this case. See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 7. In support of this issue, plaintiffs pointed to the deposition of Metusalum, where plaintiffs’ counsel asked him if he was friends with Mark Naylon (“Naylon”), public information associate for the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 48-50. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, he was entitled to learn the nature of Metusalem’s relationship with Naylon, for the purpose of determining bias. Id. at pp. 49-50. Defendant’s counsel instructed Metusalem not to answer on the grounds that such questioning was not relevant. Id. “Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). Metusalem’s testimony regarding his relationship with Naylon may lead to admissible evidence of witness bias or sympathy, and thus was proper impeachment evidence that was not subject to exclusion on relevancy grounds. As such, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Metusalem to answer questions regarding bias and association is granted. f. Future Depositions While this Order regarding the scope of depositions has focused on deponents Fletcher, Metusalem and Pettit, this Court feels compelled to provide some guidance to the parties regarding future depositions. First, the Order should provide guidance to the parties regarding the scope of other depositions bearing on the same topics. Thus, defendants are on notice that objections regarding the identity of Fletcher’s supporters who are employees of the Sheriff’s Department, how and when Fletcher became aware of the identity of these supporters, inducements and threats to Department employees to encourage them to participate in Fletcher’s campaign or to discourage them from participating in Moore’s campaign, which Department employees were involved in his campaign, what was said or shown by Department employees to potential voters regarding Moore, and questions regarding a witness’s relationship to another witness to determine bias, shall not be grounds for instructing a witness to answer the question. Further, defendants are cautioned that an umbrella objection that how Fletcher ran his campaign is not relevant to the suit, should be examined carefully before used. If the questions about Fletcher’s campaign could lead to discovery of admissible evidence that bears on plaintiffs’ claims or defendants’ defenses, then the information sought is relevant and will be permitted. Second, this Court observes that the attorneys for both sides spent an inordinate amount of time at the depositions arguing about what are or are not relevant topics for inquiry. As a starting place, counsel should note that this Court does not look kindly on instructions to a witness not to answer based on relevancy. As a general rule, objections are supposed to limited to the form of the question, and the examination is to proceed subject to the objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Instructions not to answer are to be used for only limited purposes – e.g. to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation enforced by this Court, or to present a motion for a protective order under Rule 30(d)(4). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). On the other hand, plaintiffs are put on notice that it is important that they make good use of their deposition time with each witness. While plaintiffs may have good reason for asking the questions they put to the witnesses (e.g. to develop a background or context for later questions), given the limited amount of time provided by the Rules for depositions, this Court believes that counsel for plaintiffs could have gotten to the issue at hand more directly and possibly avoided the objections made by defendants’ attorney and resulting exchanges between counsel. 2. Discovery of Electronic Evidence *7 Plaintiffs have moved the Court for an order requiring defendants to allow relevant computers used by both plaintiffs, Fletcher, O’Hara, Metusalem, Reiter, Undersheriff George Altendorfer and Undersheriff John Luey to be searched using key words. See Pls.’ Mem. at p. 24. According to plaintiffs, the discovery requests that bear on this motion are Interrogatory Nos. 12-19 directed to Ramsey County (Set I) and Document Request Nos. 3, 7, 13, 14, and 35 served on Ramsey County (Set I). See May 2nd Supp. Aff., ¶ 8.[5] Specifically, plaintiffs sought the production of the following: 35. A mirror image of any and all computers and/or hard drives for any computer or server (including desktop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), portable, laptop and notebook computers), used by Plaintiffs, Robert Fletcher, Nicholas O’Hara, George Altendorfer and John Luey. RESPONSE: This request as [sic] objected to as overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery admissible evidence. This request is also objected to as violatitve of the right to privacy of the named individuals, and calling for information protected by the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. See May Aff., Ex. 31; see also Dietz Aff., Ex. 3 (Plaintiffs’ Subpoena to Reiter and Metusalem, Ex. A). It is defendants’ position that they have already produced the documents requested by plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs do not have a right to conduct a search of their computers. See Defs.’ Mem. at p. 9. Defendants have also suggested, as part of their motion for a protective order, that they should not be required to produce mirror images of computers or engage in the process of permitting their computers to be searched using key words when the cost of such endeavors is excessive, and when balanced against the discovery that has already taken place, the amount in controversy, and the importance of issues at stake. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants; Third Motion for Protective Order (“Defs.’ Protective Mem.”) at p. 13. “Electronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper records.” Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (string citation omitted). “As long as the data is accessible, it must be produced.” Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Further, “it is a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be emails or otherwise, are discoverable.” Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002) (citations omitted). The question however, is whether the need for the discovery outweighs the burdens and costs of locating, retrieving, and producing the information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(iii); Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2)(B) and (C) and Proposed Committee Notes (“The requesting party has the burden of showing that its need for the discovery outweighs the burdens and costs of locating, retrieving, and producing the information.”).[6] *8 Defendants claim that they have produced all relevant documents requested by plaintiffs, and where as here, no relevant evidence has been destroyed during the course of litigation, there is no basis for requiring a search of defendants’ computers. See Defs.’ Opp. Mem. at pp. 9-10. Thus, according to defendants, when data is kept in an accessible format, the usual discovery rules apply and they should not be required to produce mirror images of their computers or hire a third party to search their computers to verify what has already been done. Id. at p. 9. On the other hand, defendants have refused to answer any interrogatories bearing on the use of computers, and defendants have not represented that they have not deleted any electronic data dealing with the events in this matter prior to the commencement of litigation on March 1, 2004. See May Aff., Ex. 32 (Answer to Interrogatory Nos. 12-19). In fact, defendants’ counsel admitted at the hearing that no specific search had been done for deleted emails or documents, or for drafts of documents that were never sent, but were stored electronically. Thus, considering that the events underlying this matter began in the summer of 2001, this Court is not satisfied that defendants have conducted an adequate search for responsive documents and emails maintained on relevant computers.[7] However, before this Court will consider requiring defendants to retain a third party to search for relevant electronic documents and emails maintained on their computers, defendants will be given the opportunity to conduct their own search for and production of relevant documents and emails on the business computers used by plaintiffs, and the personal and business computers of Fletcher, O’Hara, Metusalem, Reiter, Altendorfer and Luey.[8] Thus, on or before February 2, 2006, defendants shall search for and produce to plaintiffs all documents and emails responsive to plaintiffs’ document requests maintained on the business computers used by plaintiffs, and the personal and business computers of Fletcher, O’Hara, Metusalem, Reiter, Altendorfer and Luey. In addition, on or before this date, defendants shall certify in writing to plaintiffs that no documents or emails maintained on these computers have been withheld because they are not accessible. If defendants make this certification, then they shall not be required to produce a mirror image of the relevant computers or hire an expert to conduct a search of these computers.[9] In the event that defendants are not able to access responsive documents or emails because this information is not kept in a manner that is reasonably accessible, then on or before February 2, 2006, (1) Ramsey County shall respond to Interrogatory Nos. 12-19 of Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories (Set I), and (2) defendants shall identify in writing the sources that may contain responsive information, but are not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost of locating, restoring and retrieving the information. Plaintiffs may then bring a motion to compel defendants to locate, restore and retrieve this information, at which time defendants will be required to show that the information sought is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, this Court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if plaintiffs show good cause, considering the limitations set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(iii). See also Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 2005. 3. Production of Investigation File *9 Plaintiffs have demanded the production of the entire investigation file into Moore’s 30-day suspension for allegedly stealing a squad door and squad lights. See Pls.’ Mem. at pp. 26-27. Defendants have represented that they have produced all of the files regarding the discipline of Moore and reproduced the files as part of their opposition memorandum. See Defs.’ Opp. Mem. at p. 11. A party is only required to produce those documents, which are within its possession or control. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34; see also VICA Coal Co., Inc. v. Crosby, 212 F.R.D. 498, 501 (S.D. W.Va. 2003) (denying a motion to compel where the party moved for documents that did not exist, while failing to provide even a scintilla of evidence that the defendant was anything less than completely truthful); Century Industries Co. v. Rosemount Inc., No. Civ. 01-103 (DWF/AJB), 2002 WL 1035455 at *2 (D. Minn. May 21, 2002).[10] Defendants’ attorney, as an officer of the Court, has represented that all responsive documents have been produced. Plaintiffs have not adequately demonstrated to this Court that defendants have withheld any files relating to the discipline of Moore. Lacking any reason to believe there are any more documents responsive to these requests, plaintiffs’ motion to compel as it relates to the investigation reports is denied. However, defendants and their counsel are reminded that they have a continuing duty under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) to timely supplement their discovery responses as information becomes available. Failure to do so may result in sanctions being imposed on defendants and their counsel. 4. Privilege Log Plaintiffs’ motion to compel a privilege log from defendants is denied as moot based on defendants’ representation that they have not objected to the production of documents on the grounds of privilege. 5. Extension of Deposition Time Plaintiffs have asked for additional time to depose defendants Fletcher and O’Hara. “Unless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties, a deposition is limited to one day of seven hours.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Rule 30(d)(2) of also provides that a “court must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(2) if needed for a fair examination of the deponent....” However a “party seeking a court order to extend the examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is expected to show good cause to justify such an order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) advisory committee note. In this case, plaintiffs asserted that Fletcher arrived at his deposition a half-hour later than noticed, and that because of a conference call to the Court, the deposition did not commence until 9:45 a.m. See May Aff., Ex. 1 (Fletcher Depo.) at p. 5; Pls. Mem. at p. 27. In addition, another conference call with this Court took an additional twenty-two minutes. Id., Ex. 14 (Conference Call Transcript) at p. 1. Further, Fletcher’s deposition ended on 4:07 p.m., as Fletcher asked to end the deposition early. Id., Ex. 1 at pp. 202, 207. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated at the deposition that he still had about two-and-half hours left on Fletcher’s deposition. Id. at p. 202. *10 In light of the late start and early termination of the deposition, and breaks for conference calls with the Court, the Court finds that there is good cause for plaintiffs’ request for an additional two-and-half hours of deposition time with Fletcher.[11] Plaintiffs have also requested additional time to depose O’Hara because defendants provided them with a large stack of documents maintained by O’Hara relating to Moore’s employment at the start of his deposition, seven months after these documents had been requested. See Pls.’ Mem. at pp 27-28. Defendants have offered no argument against allowing additional time for O’Hara’s deposition. In this case, O’Hara’s deposition should not be limited because defendants failed to timely comply with their discovery obligations. This Court finds that there is good cause to allow O’Hara to be deposed for an additional two hours in order to allow plaintiffs to ask him questions relating to documents that were delivered to plaintiffs on the day of his deposition. 5. Request for Sanctions With respect to plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with bringing the motion to compel, plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Under Rule 37(a)(4)(A), a party moving to compel discovery may recover attorneys’ fees and costs under the following conditions: If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant’s first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A). As this Court has found some of defendants’ responses and objections appropriate, this Court finds that under the circumstances of this case an award of fees and expenses is not warranted. B. Defendant’s Motion for a Protective Order Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may issue a protective order “which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” upon a showing of good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The party seeking the protective order has the burden to establish good cause for the issuance of the order and the party’s alleged harm, if a protective order is not granted, must be based on “more than stereotypical and conclusory statements.” Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter #2, 197 F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). In determining whether to issue a protective order, courts apply a balancing test to determine whether good cause has been shown, weighing the moving party’s interest in the protective order against the opposing party’s interest in obtaining the information at issue. See Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3rd Cir. 1994); Frideres v. Schiltz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 156 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 1. Request for Stay of Discovery *11 Defendants have asked for an order from this Court staying discovery to permit them to file a motion for summary judgment, in which they will assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct does not amount to a violation of the Constitution, and even if it did, plaintiffs cannot establish that it violated any clearly established constitutional right.[12] See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Third Motion for Protective Order (“Defs’ Protective Mem.”) at pp. 3-8. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982), the Supreme Court held that discovery should not be allowed until the threshold qualified immunity question is resolved in order to protect public officials from “broad-ranging discovery” that can be “peculiarly disruptive of effective government.” In a later case, the Supreme Court stated that if a claim is not dismissed on a motion to dismiss, then before a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is brought, while discovery may be necessary before the qualified immunity question can be resolved, the discovery should be specifically tailored to the question of qualified immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6 (1987). Defendants’ request for a stay of discovery is rejected for several reasons. As stated previously, this action was commenced in March of 2004. Yet, defendants waited over a year and three days before the end of discovery to request that discovery in this matter be stayed pending a ruling on qualified immunity. During this time, multiple depositions have been taken and written discovery exchanged. Any advantage that would have been gained by a stay of discovery – costs of trial or the burdens of discovery – have long since passed. Second, plaintiffs have sued Fletcher and O’Hara in their official capacities, as well as their individual capacities. See First Amended Complaint. “Qualified immunity is a defense only against a claim in one’s individual capacity.” Bankhead v. Knickrehm, 360 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added); see also Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a municipality and municipal employees sued in their official capacities may not claim a qualified immunity as a defense to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1985)). Thus, even if Fletcher and O’Hara were successful in their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, discovery against them in their official capacity and against Ramsey County would still need to proceed. Nothing would be gained by staying discovery. Third, even if the motion to stay discovery had been timely, this Court finds that much of the discovery sought by plaintiffs bears on the issue of qualified immunity, i.e. whether defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. As such, this Court denies defendants’ request to stay discovery. 2. Exceeding the Allowable Number of Allowable Interrogatories Defendants have asked for an order from this Court striking Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Ramsey County, Set II and Set III, and Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Fletcher, Set II, on the grounds that the interrogatories exceeded the amount allowed by this Court’ pretrial scheduling order. See Defs.’ Protective Mem. at p. 8. This Court’s initial pretrial scheduling order provided that “[n]o more than 30 Interrogatories (including all subparts) shall be served per side.” See June 7, 2004 Order [Docket No. 9]. The pretrial scheduling order was amended three times by stipulation of the parties, however, the number of interrogatories allowed by the Court stayed the same. See Docket Nos. 12, 27, and 32. Defendants have already answered 67 interrogatories. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have served more interrogatories than allowed by this Court’s scheduling order. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (“Pls.’ Opp. Mem.”) at p. 19. However, they state that the additional interrogatories were necessitated by the testimony that defendants gave during their depositions in January 2005 regarding why they took adverse action against plaintiffs. Id. at p. 18. In addition, in the memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs set out the relevancy of each interrogatory. Id. at pp. 26-29, 30-34. Plaintiffs now request that this Court modify the pretrial scheduling order to accommodate its additional requests given their relevant nature. Id. *12 Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: “A schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the district judge or, when authorized by local rule, by a magistrate judge.” Under the Local Rules of this Court, a Magistrate Judge is authorized to modify pretrial schedules “upon written motion and for good cause shown.” Local Rule 16.3(a). The good cause standard of Rule 16(b) “is an exacting one, for it demands a demonstration that the existing schedule ‘cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’ ” Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc. of Minnesota, 187 F.R.D. 578, 581-82 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), Advisory Committee Notes --1983 Amendment) (additional citation omitted). “[T]he question of good cause does not turn on the existence or absence of prejudice to the non-moving party.” Scheidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 630, 631 (D. Minn. 2000) (citation omitted); see also Archer Daniels Midland Co., 187 F.R.D. at 582. The relevance of additional interrogatories that plaintiffs seek to have defendants answer does not answer the question why plaintiffs waited to make their request for additional interrogatories until after defendants made their objections and brought their motion to strike. The proper procedure was to return to this Court in advance of propounding this discovery upon defendants, and not after the discovery had been served and objected to by defendants. As such, this Court grants Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Ramsey, Sets II and III, and Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Defendant Fletcher, Set II, on grounds that plaintiffs have not met their burden under the good cause requirement to increase the number of interrogatories allowed in the pretrial scheduling order. 3. Limiting Discovery to the Period Between June 1, 2001 to the Commencement of the Action Defendants have requested an order from this Court “limiting the scope of depositions and other discovery to incidents occurring after June of 2001.” See Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order. However, defendants provided no argument in their supporting memorandum of law on this issue. In addition, to the extent that defendants are seeking to limit written discovery, in violation of Local Rule 37.2, defendants have failed to identify, much less state verbatim, the specific discovery requests from which they were seeking protection. The only glimmer of information that defendants provided to support this request was at the hearing, where defendants argued that they objected to discovery seeking information on how other employees of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department were being treated from 1995 to the present. According to defendants, the relevant time frame to this action is June 1, 2001, the date that Moore announced his candidacy for Sheriff, to the commencement of the present action. Defendants argued that any other evidence is not relevant to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim. Given that defendants failed to identify what specific discovery requests they seek protection from, it is difficult for this Court to determine whether the information requested would be relevant to the claims in this case. This Court notes, however, that plaintiffs have asserted an equal protection claim. Information regarding how employees were treated under Fletcher’s tenure as Sheriff based on their political support of Fletcher may lead to admissible relevant evidence on this claim. As such, this Court denies defendants’ motion for a general protective order limiting all discovery from June 1, 2001 to the commencement of the present action. 4. Deposition of Kris Reiter *13 Defendants have asked for an order postponing the deposition of Kris Reiter on the grounds that she was undergoing a complicated pregnancy. Defendants provided this Court with no medical documentation or even an affidavit from Reiter or a doctor indicating that the status of Reiter’s pregnancy prohibited her from being exposed to a deposition. This Court therefore denies defendants’ motion for a protective order as it relates to postponing the deposition of Kris Reiter.[13] 5. Electronic Discovery Defendants have asked this Court to prohibit any request for production that asks for a mirror image of any and all computers, hard drives or personal digital assistants from July 1, 2001 to the present date. For the reasons stated forth in Section II.A.2 of this Order, defendants’ motion for protective order as it relates to electronic discovery is denied. 6. Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Ramsey County, Set II Defendants to date have refused to respond to Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Ramsey County, Set II. Defendants have asked this Court to order that plaintiffs cannot propound these requests to them unless plaintiffs specifically articulate how the requests are relevant to the claims or defenses of any party. However, defendants’ memorandum of law only discusses (without even specifically identifying the offending document requests) Request Nos. 5-10. See Defs.’ Protective Mem. at p. 10. These requests were as follows: 5. Any and all documents which evidence every transfer or position change within the Sheriff’s Department from 1995 to the present date. 6. Any and all documents, including transfer logs, which relate in any way to the transfer of prisoners from January 1, 1995 to the present. 7. All authority to detain forms for all individuals apprehended by the Apprehension Unit from August 1, 2001 to the present date. 8. All signatory sheets related to all off duty work approved by the sheriff’s department from January 1, 1995 to the present date. 9. All documents related to off duty work performed by any sheriff’s department law enforcement officer, including all documents in the possession of Dave Metusalem’s three ring binder as described in his deposition. 10. All documents related to the following individuals, including, but not limited to, personnel files, contracts, agreements, payroll records, earnings records, timesheets, daily logs, work schedules, End of the Year Summaries, training records, testing records, benefit documents, performance reviews, work schedules, disciplinary documents, correspondence, memoranda, email, promotional records, job assignment records, test results, applications, union records, investigatory records and any “personal” file kept on these individuals kept by any other employee of the county: Kris Rieter, Robert Pavlak, Donald Sazma, David Metusalem, Don Rindall, Bruce Jerome, George Altendorfer, John Luey, Eric Bradt, Mike Burke, Ken Grosinger, Brad Camitch, Joe Chioden, Linda Chioden, Greg Barr, Doug Biehn, Kelly Buchanan, Richard Clark, Penny Druker, Sonya Eastham, Peter Eastman, Greg Engfer, Steve Engstrom, George Frederick, Robert Goritz, William Harvel, Cory Hendrickson, Travis Hendrickson, Jeff Henrisen, Michael Horton, Gary Hoven, Martin Hoven, Kevin Johnson, Thomas Johnson, Ronald Knafla, Kurt Krinke, John LaRoque, Joel Leonard, Dori Martinez, John Maslowski, Mark Naylon, Jeff Ogilvie, Nicholas O’Hara, Ryan O’Neill, Thomas Paget, Craig Palmer, Ron Petrusson, Mark Pettit, Jeff Ramacher, Dan Ruettimann, Ty Sheridan, Terry Soukkala, Joann Springer, John St. Germain, Mark Souchy, Todd Thompson, Daniel Thorson, Dickey Turner, Ka Vang, Su Vang, Susan Vang, Benet Witzman. *14 See Dietz Aff., Ex. 1. Based on a 1978 case out of the Southern District of West Virginia, Miller v. Board of Education of the County of Lincoln, 450 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. W. Va. 1978), defendants argued as to Document Request Nos. 5-10 that “evidence regarding other people in positions totally unrelated is not relevant to the conduct at issue here. Plaintiff’s requests go far beyond any relevancy standard.” See Defs.’ Mem. at pp. 9-10. The Court will now proceed with addressing Request Nos. 5-10. a. Request No. 5 Plaintiffs seek all evidence regarding employee transfers from 1995, the year that Fletcher started as Ramsey County Sheriff to the present. Plaintiffs assert that this evidence goes to show that since the beginning of Fletcher’s tenure as Sheriff, there has been a pattern of favoritism or retaliation based on political affiliation and is intended to rebut the defendants’ explanation for various transfers. To the extent that Document Request No. 5 seeks documents regarding transfers dating back to 1995, and prior to Moore’s announcement of intention to run against Fletcher, the request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at trial. The specific issue in this case is whether defendants retaliated against Moore and Shockency for Moore’s decision to run against Fletcher for Sheriff. The broader issue is whether defendants rewarded those employees who supported Fletcher’s candidacy for Sheriff and punished those employees who did not. Thus, the triggering event is the 2002 Sheriff’s election and it is the conduct of defendants that took place after Moore announced his intention to run for this position to the present that is relevant to this suit. As such, defendants’ motion for protective order for Request No. 5 is granted to the extent that plaintiffs have requested documents dating back to 1995. However, it is denied as it relates documents regarding transfers which occurred from June 2001 to the present, b. Request No. 6 Shockency alleged that she was retaliated against for supporting Moore’s candidacy for Sheriff and that she was transferred from the Patrol Division to the midnight Transportation Unit. See First Amended Complaint, ¶ 29. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants’ proffered reason for transferring Shockency was that a need existed on the midnight shift for the Transportation Unit and that she was transferred to fill that void. See Pls.’ Opp. Mem. at p. 21. According to plaintiffs, the documents evidencing prisoner transport, including transfer logs, will show that defendants’ proffered reason for transferring Shockency was pretext. Id. If Shockency is able to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse action that was causally connected to a protected activity, then the burden will shift to defendants to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. See Duffy, 276 F.3d at 991 (citation omitted). Documents relating to the transfer of prisoners during the midnight shift may provide evidence that the defendants’ proffered reason for transferring Shockency was in fact a pretext. However, this Court finds that the time frame requested by plaintiff to be too broad. Needs of the Transportation Unit dating back to 1995, will not assist the trier-of-fact in determining whether the proffered reason for the change of Shockency’s position in January 2003 was a pretext. As such, the Court will limit the time frame for Request No. 6 to January 1, 2001 to the present. This will give plaintiffs an adequate amount of probative evidence (two years prior to her transfer) to determine whether there was really a need to move Shockency to the midnight Transportation Unit based on the volume of transfers. c. Request No. 7 *15 Plaintiffs have asked for all “authority to detain forms” from defendants from August 1, 2001 to the present. It is plaintiffs’ position that these forms will show that the disciplinary actions taken against Moore by O’Hara for failing to record arrests and for not making enough arrests were unwarranted. Specifically, “these documents will demonstrate that Moore was making appropriate arrests and that O’Hara – who already had access to the documents – knew his discipline was unwarranted.” See Pls.’ Opp. Mem. at pp. 21-22. The Court agrees that such evidence may lead to evidence regarding Moore’s First Amendment retaliation claim. However, Request No. 7 is not limited to the forms generated for arrests that Moore made or in which he had involvement, and plaintiffs have given no explanation as to why they need the forms for arrests not involving Moore. Therefore, defendants shall be required to produce only the authority to detain forms from August 1, 2001 to the present for any arrest made by or involving Moore. d. Request Nos. 8 and 9 Request Nos. 8 and 9 ask for documents related to off duty work performed by members of the Ramsey County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiffs’ argue that “[t]hese documents will demonstrate that off duty work is given exclusively to Fletcher’ political supporters.” See Pls.’ Opp. Mem. at p. 22. Plaintiffs have alleged defendants’ conduct toward plaintiffs was part of a larger pattern of awarding Fletcher’s political supporters and punishing his opponents with tangible job duties and pay. As such, these requests are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. However, for the same reasons discussed by this Court with respect to Document Request No. 5, to the extent that these document requests seeks documents regarding off duty work dating back to 1995, and prior to Moore’s announcement of intention to run against Fletcher, the request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at trial. As such, defendants’ motion for protective order for Request Nos. 8 and 9 is granted to the extent that plaintiffs have requested documents dating back to 1995. However, it is denied as it relates documents regarding transfers that occurred from June 2001 to the present. e. Request No. 10 Plaintiffs seek the employment records of over 50 individuals they claim were either given preferential treatment by defendants for their support of Fletcher or were the subject of retaliation by defendants because they did not support him. See Pls.’ Mem. at p. 22. The “production of non-party employee files ‘is not a step which the Court should lightly undertake.’ ” See Cardenas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Nos. Civ. 99-1421(JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 244640 at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2003) (quoting Raddatz v. The Standard Register Co., 177 F.R.D. 446, 448 (D. Minn. 1997). However, discovery of the personnel information of non-parties may be had, subject to a suitable protective order, if the requesting party articulates a need for the materials and ties the need to their claims. Id.; see also Onwuka v. Federal Express Corp., 178 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Minn. 1997) (“[T]he proper balance, between the privacy interests of non-party third persons, and the discovery interests of a party litigant, is to assure that only those portions of the pertinent personnel files, which are clearly relevant to the parties’ claims, are open to disclosure and, then, subject to an appropriate Confidentiality Order as the circumstances require.”). This Court finds that some of the documents sought about these various nonparties are relevant to plaintiffs’ claims, and other parts of the Request are simply too tenuous and burdensome to warrant their production to plaintiffs. Therefore, defendants shall only be required to produce the following documents for the persons listed in Request No. 10: • Documents evidencing the person’s background and qualifications; • Contracts and agreements executed by the person with the Department or County; *16 • Payroll records and end -of-year summaries for the period of June 2001 to the present showing assignment and pay for overtime, hazard duty, assignment of positions of “acting” sergeant and lieutenant for each person; • Daily logs maintained by each person from June 2001 to the present; • Documents evidencing what training was received by each person from June 2001 to the present; • Performance reviews, disciplinary documents, promotional records and job assignment records for each person from June 2001 to the present; • Applications for positions from June 2001 to the present. As to the other categories of documents sought by plaintiffs in Request No. 10, defendants’ motion for a protective order is granted. f. Document Request Nos. 1-4, 11-22 Defendants provided no argument in support of their motion for a protective order with respect to Document Request Nos. 1-4, 11-22. Lacking any explanation, this Court cannot divine the basis of their motion as it relates to these requests. “[J]udges are not like pigs hunting for truffles....” Medalen v. Tiger Drylac U.S.A., Inc., 269 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1129 (D. Minn. 2003) (citation omitted). Therefore, defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied as it relates to Document Request Nos. 1-4, 11-22. 7. Depositions Defendants have asked for an order from the Court precluding the depositions of a “ ‘designee of the Fletcher Volunteer Committee’, and a bar owner regarding gambling on his property in July 2003 and ‘any golf tournaments ... affiliated with from January 1999.’ ” See Defs.’ Protective Mem. at p. 10. The only assertion as to why a protective order is needed as to these depositions is that the information is not relevant, however, no reason is given as to why the information sought lacks relevancy. Nor does this Court know with certainty to which depositions defendants are referring.[14] As stated previously, the party seeking a protective order has the burden to establish good cause for the issuance of the order and must be based on “more than stereotypical and conclusory statements.” Miscellaneous Docket Matter #1, 197 F.3d at 926 (citations omitted). Since defendants have not given this Court an explanation as to why this information lacks relevance or for that matter, which depositions it wants quashed, this Court denies defendants’ motion for a protective order as to these depositions. C. Motion to Quash Nonparty Subpoena Non-party Lisa Rudenick (“Rudenick”) has asked this Court to quash the subpoena for her deposition on the grounds that the deposition would require her to disclose information in violation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.[15] *17 To assert the privilege against self-incrimination, an individual must be faced with “substantial hazards of self-incrimination.” California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429, (1971). For the privilege to have effect, the fear of self-incrimination must are “real and appreciable” and not merely “imaginary and unsubstantial.” Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968) (citations omitted). Further, the individual asserting the privilege must have “reasonable cause to apprehend [such] danger from a direct answer” to questions asked of her. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citation omitted). “The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself--his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to decide whether [her] silence is justified....” Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. Rudenick believed that she could be held criminally liable under Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (“MGDPA”), Minn. Stat. § 13.01, et seq. for handling portions of Moore’s personnel file.[16] In particular, it is alleged that in the Fall 2002, Rudenick was shown a copy of the questionnaire that Moore sent to a woman that resulted in his facing disciplinary action in the Fall of 2001. See Affidavit of Nicholas G.B. May in Opposition Motion to Quash, ¶¶ 3-4; see also Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Non-party Lisa Rudenick’s Motion to Quash Subpoena at p. 2. At the hearing, Rudineck argued that she may have violated Minn. Stat. § 13.05, subd. 4, which provides in relevant part: Private or confidential data on an individual shall not be collected, stored, used, or disseminated by government entities for any purposes other than those stated to the individual at the time of collection .... (Emphasis added). However, under the MGDPA, materials reflecting a disciplinary action for which there has been final disposition, are not private information: (a) [T]he following personnel data on current and former employees, volunteers, and independent contractors of a state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision and members of advisory boards or commissions is public: * * * (5) the final disposition of any disciplinary action together with the specific reasons for the action and data documenting the basis of the action, excluding data that would identify confidential sources who are employees of the public body; * * * (b) For purposes of this subdivision, a final disposition occurs when the state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision makes its final decision about the disciplinary action, regardless of the possibility of any later proceedings or court proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 13.43, subd. 2 (emphasis added).[17] In this case, the final disposition of Moore’s disciplinary action regarding the questionnaire, allegedly shown to Rudineck, occurred in late fall of 2001. However, the questionnaire at issue was not allegedly shown to Rudineck until the fall of 2002. In other words, the questionnaire that was the source of Moore’s disciplinary action was public information under the MGDPA at time it was allegedly handled by Rudineck. As such, she could not face any criminal repercussions from her involvement with the questionnaire and therefore, her Motion to Quash Subpoena is denied. D. Pretrial Scheduling Order *18 This Court’s April 29, 2005 Fourth Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order stayed the dates for discovery, non-dispositive motions, dispositive motions and trial pending a ruling on the above outstanding motions. Given this Court’s ruling, the parties shall meet and confer to develop a revised proposed scheduling order setting the final deadlines for discovery, non-dispositive motions, dispositive motions and trial. On or before January 31, 2006, the parties shall submit to this Court their joint proposal. If the parties cannot agree on dates, then on or before January 31, 2006, each party shall submit their own proposed scheduling order with an explanation by letter as to why they believed the Court should adopt their requested deadlines. Footnotes [1] These requests are covered by Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories to Ramsey County, Set I, Interrogatory Nos. 12-19, Plaintiffs’ Document Requests to Ramsey County, Set II, Request Nos. 3, 7, 13, 14, and 35, and subpoenas directed to Kristine Reiter (“Reiter”) and Metusalem. See Affidavit of Nicholas G.B. May (“May Aff.”), Exs. 31-32; see also Affidavit of David Dietz (“Dietz Aff.”) in Support of Motion for Protective Order, Ex. 3 (Plaintiffs’ subpoenas directed to Reiter and Metusalem, Ex. A). [2] The hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to compel took place on March 30, 2005. On March 29, 2005, defendants filed a Notice of Motion for Protective Order, setting the hearing for their motion for April 25, 2005. [Docket No. 42]. At the March 30 hearing this Court asked counsel for defendants if he had conferred with counsel for plaintiffs in connection with his motion, as required by Local Rule 37.1. Counsel for defendants stated that no such conference had taken place. The Court then ordered the parties to meet and confer to see if they could resolve the issues outlined in defendants’ motion for protective order. According to counsel for plaintiffs, while counsel did have a phone conference on April 4, 2005 pursuant to this Court’s order, for all intents and purposes, the meet and confer as contemplated by the Local Rules did not take place, as counsel for defendants was not willing to discuss most of the issues raised by his motion for protective order. See Affidavit of Nicholas B. May dated April 18, 2005. [Docket No. 70]. [3] Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their motion to compel did not quote those particular portions of the depositions for which plaintiffs were seeking relief, as required by Local Rule 37.2. Consequently, the Court required plaintiffs’ counsel to submit an itemization of those questions, answers, and instructions that plaintiffs found objectionable. In addition, the Court requested plaintiffs’ counsel identify the specific Interrogatories and Document Requests which related to their request for computer discovery. [4] Many of the questions posed to Metusalem that were objected to by defendants dealt with whether Kris Reiter, Fletcher’s campaign manager and wife, was with Metusalem on the campaign trail. See May Aff., Ex. 7 (Metusalem Depo.) at pp. 35-37, 45-46, 51-52. It is not clear whether plaintiffs are still seeking responses to these questions. Nevertheless, the Court observes that If Reiter was on the campaign trail with Metusalem, that she may have witnessed or have participated in the distribution of Moore’s disciplinary records to the public. Learning such information is not only relevant, but would help to narrow the questioning during her deposition. [5] According to defendants, the subpoenas and document requests directed to Reiter and Metusalem, are also at issue. See Defendants’ III Motion for Protective Order [Docket No. 63]; see also Dietz Aff., Ex. 3 (Plaintiffs’ subpoenas directed to Reiter and Metusalem, Ex. A). [6] Both the proposed amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2)(B) and (C) and the proposed Committee Notes are discussed in the Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 2005, which is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf#page=114. [7] This Court is not suggesting that documents or emails maintained on computers were destroyed or deleted for some nefarious purpose; only that documents, emails and other electronic data often are not retained in the ordinary course of business. [8] At a minimum, such a search must go back at least until June 2001, and possibly before this date, depending on the content of the discovery request directed to defendants. [9] If plaintiffs subsequently develop evidence to suggest that this certification was not accurate, they may renew their motion to compel electronic discovery and move for sanctions. [10] The court in Century Industries found: Defendant’s counsel, as officers of the court, have represented to the Court that the full documents have been produced. Plaintiffs have offered no concrete basis to believe that Defendant’s counsel have misrepresented themselves to the Court; rather Plaintiffs would have the Court disregard the attorneys’ representations to the Court solely on the basis of rank speculation. The Court declines to do that, and Magistrate Judge Boylan’s decision not to compel production of documents which, according to Defendant, do not exist is not clearly erroneous. 2002 WL 1035455 at *2. [11] To the extent that plaintiffs believe that they require any additional time with Fletcher, the Court finds that it is premature to award additional time considering plaintiffs have yet to spend the time given by this Order. In the event plaintiffs find that they require more time, then counsel for plaintiffs shall advise counsel for defendants during the deposition what topics need to be covered and the amount of time needed to conclude the deposition. If an agreement cannot be reached between the parties, then counsel shall contact the Court to resolve the issue. If the Court cannot be reached, then plaintiffs’ counsel shall state on the record the topics need to be covered and the amount of time needed to conclude the deposition, and defendants’ counsel shall state on the record the grounds for objecting to any additional deposition time. A motion for additional time may then be presented to the Court. [12] “ ‘Government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758, 766 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). [13] As this motion was argued on April 25, 2005, and this decision is now being issued approximately nine months later, this Court also assumes that the request may now be moot. [14] If these depositions pertain to non-parties, defendants may not even have standing to object to the depositions. Nova Products, Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[A] party ordinarily lacks standing to quash a subpoena directed at a nonparty unless the party is seeking to protect a personal privilege or right.”) (citations omitted); Donahoo v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 211 F.R.D. 303, 306 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“The law is clear, absent a claim of privilege, a party has no standing to challenge a subpoena to a nonparty.”) (citation omitted). [15] Rudenick also requested that the subpoena be quashed as the April deposition date interfered with her planned vacation. This issue is now moot considering that this Court stayed all discovery pending the issuance of this Order. See Fourth Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order [Docket No. 76]. [16] The MGDPA provides that “[a]ny person who willfully violates the provisions of this chapter or any rules adopted under this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Minn. Stat. § 13.09. [17] Minn. Stat. § 13.09, subd, 2(b) also states: “[A] final disposition occurs when the state agency, statewide system, or political subdivision makes its final decision about the disciplinary action, regardless of the possibility of any later proceedings or court proceedings.”