PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. KASRA SADR, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ALTON LARSEN FAMILY INSURANCE TRUST, GABRIEL GIORDANO, AND DOES 1-10, Defendants Case No. 10cv510-BTM (BLM) United States District Court, S.D. California Filed May 05, 2011 Counsel Jason P. Gosselin, Pro Hac Vice, James A. Hoffman, Pro Hac Vice, Richard M. Haggerty, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Siobhan A. Cullen, William Allen Hanssen, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff. Robert M. Traylor, Seltzer Caplan McMahon Vitek, Kasra Sadr, The Sadr Law Firm APLC, San Diego, CA, for Defendants. Gabriel Giordano, La Mesa, CA, pro se. Major, Barbara L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL *1 On September 10, 2010, Principal Life Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) served initial discovery requests on Kasra Sadr, as Trustee for the Larsen Trust. ECF No. 31. Mr. Sadr filed an initial response to these requests on October 13, 2010. Id. Principal contends that these responses were insufficient, and not fully responsive. Id. On Feburary 11, 2011, Principal filed a Motion to Compel, seeking additional responses to its interrogatories and requests for production of documents and requesting additional time to complete the deposition of Mr. Sadr. Id. Trustee opposed the motion and Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF Nos. 32 & 33. This case arises from a dispute over a life insurance policy issued by Plaintiff to the Alton Larsen Family Insurance Trust (“Larsen Trust”). ECF No. 31. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Sadr, as Trustee for the Larsen Trust, applied for and received a $10 million policy on March 12, 2008 (“Larsen Policy”). Id. In the application, Mr. Sadr declared that the Larsen Trust did not intend to borrow money to pay the premiums. Id. However, he later secured two loans in order to pay the premiums on the policy. Id. Sparten Marketing, a client of Mr. Sadr's law firm, Sadr and Barrera, provided the first loan. Id. Plaintiff seeks to have the policy declared void, claiming that the Larsen Trust has no insurable interest in the life of Alton Larsen and the application contains misrepresentations upon which Plaintiff detrimentally relied. ECF No. 31 at 7. I. Legal Standard The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allow for broad discovery, authorizing parties to obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Also, “[f]or good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Id. Relevant information for discovery purposes includes any information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” and need not be admissible at trial to be discoverable. Id. There is no requirement that the information sought directly relate to a particular issue in the case. Rather, relevance encompasses any matter that “bears on” or could reasonably lead to matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be presented in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 354 (1978). District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to limit discovery where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Limits also should be imposed where the burden or expense outweighs the likely benefits. Id. “An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). The responding party must answer each interrogatory by stating the appropriate objection(s) with specificity or by “answer[ing] separately and fully in writing under oath.” Id. at 33(b). The responding party has the option in certain circumstances to answer an interrogatory by specifying responsive records and making those records available to the interrogating party. Id. at 33(d). *2 Similarly, a party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Id. at 34(b). The responding party is responsible for all items in “the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 34(a)(1). Actual possession, custody or control is not required. Rather, “[a] party may be ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 620 (N.D.Cal.1995). II. Discussion While Plaintiff moves to compel further answers to a number of interrogatories and document requests, Plaintiff's moving papers and Trustee's opposition raise and address several additional issues. Unfortunately, the additional arguments often are not clearly defined and addressed by both parties and sometimes are intermingled with separate arguments or issues. In an effort to deal with all of the issues raised by the parties, the Court initially will address the broad disputes and then will resolve the disputes over the specific interrogatories and document requests. A. Trustee's Scope of Responsibility and Privilege Documents Trustee objects to all of Plaintiff's discovery requests, claiming that Plaintiff improperly confuses the scope of Trustee's discovery obligations. Opp. at 3-8. Plaintiff admits that the discovery requests are directed to Trustee and not to Kasra Sadr as an attorney, but responds that Trustee is improperly attempting to limit his discovery obligations by combining or switching between his various roles. Mot. at 18; Reply at 3-6. In this case, Kasra Sadr is sued as the Trustee for The Alton Larsen Family Insurance Trust. ECF No. 1. He is not sued as an individual or as an attorney for any of the individuals or entities. In addition, Plaintiff served the interrogatories and requests for production of documents on “Defendant Kasra Sadr, as Trustee of The Alton Larsen Family Insurance Trust.” Hoffman Decl., Exhs. E & F. As a result, Mr. Sadr is required to answer all of the interrogatories and requests for production of documents in his role as Trustee. If he, as Trustee, has possession of, control over, or custody of responsive information or documents, he must provide it or them. If he created, signed, sent, received, or possessed a document in his role as Trustee, or engaged in a conversation or communication in his role as Trustee, he must produce that information or document, if responsive to a request. While Plaintiff entitles the motion to compel as a motion to compel from Kasra Sadr as Trustee and as an individual, Plaintiff has not provided any discovery directed toward Mr. Sadr as an individual. Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided any law establishing that a defendant Trustee is required to respond to discovery as both an individual and as a Trustee. Finally, Plaintiff acknowledges that it only is seeking discovery from Trustee. Reply at 3-4. Accordingly, Trustee is not required, by this Order, to produce documents or provide information that Mr. Sadr possesses or controls solely in his role as attorney or as an individual person. Moreover, Trustee is not required to search the “email mailboxes of his law partner, Brenda Barrera ...” (Mot at 5), as Plaintiff has not established that Trustee has possession, custody or control of that email account.[1] *3 Plaintiff states that during Trustee's deposition, Trustee identified additional locations that he had not searched that might contain responsive documents and asks the Court to order Trustee to conduct a thorough search of those locations. Mot. at 15. Trustee acknowledges this testimony but claims that he searched the possible location and no additional documents were discovered. Opp. at 14; Sadr. Decl. at 3-4. Trustee and his counsel are reminded that they have a duty to search for and produce all relevant documents and a failure to do so may result in the imposition of sanctions. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 & 37. The parties also disagree about the invocation of the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Mot. at 18; Opp at 8; Reply at 3-4. “The attorney-client privilege protects confidential disclosures made by a client to an attorney in order to obtain legal advice, ... as well as an attorney's advice in response to such disclosures.” United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir.1996)) (emphasis omitted). “The fact that a person is a lawyer does not make all communications with that person privileged.” United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Chen, 99 F.3d at 1501). The privilege does not apply when the attorney is serving any role other than as a provider of legal advice. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege applies. United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the discovery requests are directed to Trustee, not to Mr. Sadr as an individual or attorney, and Trustee must answer them truthfully and completely. To the extent that the Trustee possess, controls, or has custody of responsive information or documents that Trustee believes is/are protected by a privilege, Trustee must create and produce a privilege log identifying the privileged document by, at least, the Bates number, author, recipient(s), creation date, type of document, subject matter of document, and purpose of document (i.e., basis for privilege). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). B. Electronically Stored Information (ESI) In its moving papers, Plaintiff identifies four categories of ESI that it is still seeking from Trustee. Mot. at 13. In support of its requests, Plaintiff cites a letter written by James A. Hoffman. Id.; Hoffman Decl., Exh. J. However, the cited portion of the letter actually states that Trustee has a duty to preserve records, including electronically stored information, and that the information which must be preserved includes but is not limited to the four categories set forth on page thirteen of the moving papers. Hoffman Decl., Exh. J at 159. A letter reminding an opposing party of the duty to preserve evidence does not constitute a request for production of evidence or documents. Plaintiff does not identify the discovery requests that sought this information, nor the Trustee's discovery response to such a request(s). As such, there is no evidence before the Court that there was a proper request, defense objection, meet and confer efforts, and a resulting discovery dispute that requires adjudication. Accordingly, the Court is not ordering Trustee to produce the four categories of ESI set forth on page thirteen of the motion, unless the information is requested in another, properly served document request. The parties also disagree on the scope of the ESI search that Trustee must perform. Mot. at 13-14; Opp. at 12-13; Reply at 6-8. A party is required to produce responsive documents whether they are in electronic form or hard copy. R&R Sails Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 251 F.R.D. 520, 524 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A). As such, and as set forth below, Trustee is required to produce all of the requested and ordered documents and information, whether the documents exist in hard copy or electronically. R&R Sails, 251 F.R.D. at 524. In that regard, Trustee is required to conduct searches designed to locate the requested or ordered documents and information. Failure to do so may result in the imposition of sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 34 & 37. Both parties state that they are still discussing the appropriate search terms and Trustee has indicated a willingness to conduct additional searches of his electronic data. Mot. at 15-16; Opp. at 15-16; Reply at 6-10. Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to continue their meet and confer efforts and to agree upon search terms that will identify the documents required by this Order. *4 Finally, Plaintiff states that the Court should require Mr. Sadr to search all available files with the search terms provided by Principal and the Court should allow a computer expert to search his system for responsive documents. This includes the email account of his former law partner, Brenda Barrera, who was shown to be involved in the procurement of funding for the Larsen Policy in documents provided by Imperial. In addition the Court should order Mr. Sadr to review his correspondence with Mr. Giordano and produce documents related to his work as a trustee for Mr. Giordano's clients. Reply at 8. Plaintiff makes this argument without defining any terms or presenting any law. For example, Plaintiff does not define “all available files.” Is Plaintiff asking Trustee to search all of Trustee's computer files and all computer files available to Trustee? Or, is Plaintiff asking Mr. Sadr to search all of the files available to Mr. Sadr as Trustee, attorney, or individual? Similarly, has Plaintiff made any effort to arrange to have a computer expert examine Plaintiff's “system”? And, does the described computer “system” refer to Trustee's system, Mr. Sadr's system, or his law firm's system? Does the Trustee have custody of or control over the email account belonging to Trustee's former law partner? Plaintiff presents no evidence on this issue. Finally, Plaintiff presents no evidence or law regarding the relevancy of Trustee's correspondence with Mr. Giordano regarding unrelated clients. Given the incredible lack of specificity and legal authority, the Court declines to grant this aspect of Plaintiff's request.[2] C. Interrogatories Plaintiff identifies six interrogatories to which it is moving to compel further answers. Mot. at 12-13. Although the Court will address each interrogatory separately, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not make any effort to clarify the requests, to discuss each request individually, or to provide legal authority justifying supplemental responses. Id. at 11-13. •In Interrogatory number 2, Plaintiff seeks the identity of each individual with specific knowledge and a detailed description of that knowledge. The Trustee identified the individuals with the requested knowledge but did not provide the requested detailed information. The Court grants Plaintiff's request in part and orders Trustee to provide a general description of the scope of each identified individual's knowledge. •In Interrogatory number 10, Plaintiff seeks all documents relating to the bank accounts identified in Interrogatory number 9. Trustee objects on a number of legal grounds. Plaintiff does not limit its request in any way. The Court finds that Plaintiff's request is overbroad in that it is not limited in any way as to time or subject matter and, as such, seeks irrelevant and potentially privileged information and constitutes an undue burden. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request to compel a response. *5 •In Interrogatory number 11, Plaintiff seeks the identity of the beneficiaries of the Larsen Trust and whether any of their interests have been transferred. Trustee stated that Plaintiff possesses the Trust document, which sets forth the beneficiaries and their interests. Trustee also stated that he “does not believe it has been in any relevant way with respect to the trust beneficiaries (i.e., Larsen family members).” This response is confusing as it appears to be missing words. Accordingly, Trustee must clarify whether “ownership of any beneficial interest in the Larsen Trust has changed at any time” and, if so, provide the details requested in Interrogatory number 11. •In Interrogatory numbers 15 and 16, Plaintiff seeks all communications between Trustee and Gabriel Giordano, Kristian Giordano, or the Larsen Trust. Trustee objects to these requests on a number of grounds, including overbreadth and attorney-client privilege. In its response, Plaintiff limited these requests to exclude Mr. Sadr's communications with these individuals relating to the legal advice he provided to them regarding estate planning. The requests remain overbroad and unduly burdensome as Plaintiffs do not limit them in any way as to time or subject matter. •In Interrogatory number 17, Plaintiff seeks the identity of the individual who prepared the Trust documents. Trustee responds that he “lacks information sufficient to respond to this request.” While the Court is surprised that the Trustee lacks such information, Trustee has responded under oath so no additional response is required. Certainly, Plaintiff can pursue this line of inquiry during Trustee's deposition. D. Requests for Production of Documents (RPD) Plaintiff identifies five document requests for which it believes Trustee's production was incomplete. Mot. at 14-15. Again, Plaintiff fails to address each request individually. Id. •In RPD number 1, Plaintiff seeks “any and all documents relating to the allegations made by [Plaintiff] in its Complaint.” Trustee objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, compound, and ... unduly burdensome.” The Court agrees with Trustee that the request as phrased is vague, ambiguous and overbroad. However, the Court orders Trustee to produce all documents (including correspondence and electronically stored information) relating to the creation, execution, amendment, funding, financing, operation, or performance of The Alton Larsen Family Insurance Trust and/or the Larsen Policy. •In RPD number 2, Plaintiff seeks all documents relating to Trustee's defenses to Plaintiff's claims. Trustee objects on a number of grounds including the attorney work product doctrine, overbreadth and vagueness, but then responds that such documents are provided in his Rule 26(f) disclosures and/or will be supplemented as discovered. The Court agrees with Trustee that the request is overbroad and vague but, given Trustee's answer, Trustee is reminded that he is required to supplement this response in accordance with Rule 26. •In RPD number 4, Plaintiff seeks all of Trustee's correspondence relating to the subject matter of this dispute. Trustee objects to this request on a number of grounds and provides no responsive documents. The Court overrules Trustee's relevance and burdensome objections but finds the phrase, “the subject matter of this dispute,” is vague and ambiguous. The Court therefore orders Trustee to respond to this request with the same definition as set forth in the Court's order as to RPD number 1. •In RPD number 9, Plaintiff seeks documents explaining the business or professional relationships between a number of individuals and entities involved in this case. Trustee objects to this request on a number grounds but responds that he will produce such documents if he possesses or controls them. If Trustee possesses, controls, or has custody of such documents, the Court orders him to produce them. *6 •In RPD number 10, Plaintiff seeks checks or payment records between identified individual and entities relating to the “procurement and issuance of the Larsen Policy and/or the sale of any interest in the Larsen Policy or the Larsen Trust.” Trustee objects on a number of grounds but then states that he will produce such documents if he possesses or controls them. If Trustee possesses, controls, or has custody of such documents, the Court orders him to produce them. Plaintiff presents evidence that the Larsen Trust does not have a bank account and that Trustee used a “client trust account” belonging to his law firm to engage in Larsen Trust financial business. Mot at 3-7; Hoffman Decl., Exhs. L, M, O, & R. Trustee does not dispute this allegation. As a result, the Court finds that Trustee possesses, controls, or has custody of all financial records in the Sadr & Barrera client trust accounts and Trustee must produce all such financial records relating to the “procurement and issuance of the Larsen Policy and/or the sale of any interest in the Larsen Policy or the Larsen Trust.” E. Deposition of Mr. Sadr Plaintiff states that it did not complete Trustee's deposition due to the missing discovery. Mot. at 10-11, 15-16. Trustee does not dispute that the deposition was left open. Opp. at 14-15. Accordingly, the Court authorizes Plaintiff to complete Trustee's deposition after the production of the additional discovery required by this Order and after the close of discovery. III. Conclusion Trustee is required to provide the supplemental responses and documents by May 16, 2011. IT IS SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff subpoenaed records from Trustee's law firm, Sadr & Barrera. Hoffman Decl., Exh. C. However, in this motion, Plaintiff does not move to compel compliance with that subpoena, nor was the instant motion served on or directed to Sadr & Barrera. As such, the Court is not resolving any issues relating to information subpoenaed from Sadr & Barrera. [2] The Court makes the same ruling as to the additional discovery requests set forth on page fifteen of Plaintiff's moving papers. Again, Plaintiff does not address whether the listed discovery requests were served on Trustee, whether Trustee responded to them, whether the parties met and conferred, and the scope of the remaining, actual dispute, if any.