ESTATE OF JAMES WILLIAMS; ASASA RASHEED WILLIAMS; FAROD WILLIAMS; AASIR WILLIAMS; and BASHIR NATHANIEL AULD, Plaintiffs v. DOUGLAS COUNTY; MIKE SHULER, individually and in his official capacity; MARK WARDLAW, individually and in his official capacity; KENNY JERMANE TURNER, individually and in his official capacity; and PHIL MILLER, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-2913-ODE United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division Filed September 15, 2017 Counsel Jeffrey E. Gewirtz, Jeffrey Scott, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs. E. Charles Reed, Jr., Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, Karen Gilpin Thomas, Richard A. Carothers, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Douglas County. Karen Gilpin Thomas, Richard A. Carothers, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants Mike Shuler, Mark Wardlaw. Arash A. Sabzevari, E. Charles Reed, Jr., Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Deputy Sheriff Kenny Jermane Turner, Tim Pounds. Arash A. Sabzevari, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Phil Miller. Evans, Orinda D., United States District Judge ORDER *1 This civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the United States Constitution and Georgia law is presently before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery Production from Douglas County [Doc. 90]. Douglas County has responded in opposition [Doc. 92]. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion is denied. I. Background According to the Complaint, on the night of December 17, 2014, Plaintiff Asasa Rasheed Williams (“Mrs. Williams”) called 911 for medical assistance because her husband, James Williams (“Mr. Williams”), was having a seizure. Firefighters Mike Shuler (“Shuler”) and Mark Wardlaw (“Wardlaw”) responded and allegedly became physical with Mr. Williams. Defendant Turner, a Deputy Sheriff, then arrived as backup and allegedly tasered Mr. Williams three times. Defendants Shuler, Wardlaw, and Turner then allegedly seized and physically restrained Mr. Williams, thereby causing injury to his head and brain, which ultimately resulted in his death [Compl., Doc. 1]. On August 10, 2016, Mr. Williams' estate, Mrs. Williams, and Mr. Williams' three children (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought suit against: (1) Shuler, Wardlaw, and Turner in their individual and official capacities; (2) Douglas County, Douglas County Sheriff's Office, and Douglas County Fire Department; and (3) then-Sheriff Phil Miller in his individual and official capacity [Id.].[1] Plaintiffs initially pled thirteen claims: (1) Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) excessive force pursuant to § 1983; (3) Fourth Amendment Monell liability against “state entities and supervisors”; (4) Fourth Amendment deliberate indifference against “state entities, supervisors, state actors”; (5) violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act; (6) negligence; (7) battery; (8) false imprisonment; (9) wanton conduct; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) survival injury; (12) wrongful death; and (13) vicarious/respondeat superior/punitive liability [Id.]. They sought damages and injunctive relief [Id.]. On October 6, 2016, Defendant Douglas County filed its answer [Doc. 14]; on October 7, 2016, the Douglas County Sheriff's Office and Defendant Turner filed their answer [Doc. 15]. On January 6, 2017, Douglas County Fire Department and Defendant Wardlaw filed their answers [Docs. 28, 29]. On January 9, 2017, the Court granted a largely unopposed Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Douglas County, the Sheriff's Office, and Defendant Turner [Docs. 21, 32]. On February 15, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fire Department and Defendant Wardlaw [Docs. 30, 41]. In each of these Orders, the Court expressly clarified what appeared to remain of Plaintiffs' case: (1) all claims were dismissed against both the Douglas County Sheriff's Office and the Douglas County Fire Department as neither is a legal entity capable of being sued; (2) Douglas County remains a defendant, but it is not liable for any actions taken by the Sheriff, his Office, or his Deputy--Defendant Turner; (3) Mike Shuler remains a defendant, individually and in his official capacity, pending next steps as to his death[2]; (4) Mark Wardlaw remains a defendant only in his individual capacity, and only as to the claims for Fourth Amendment violations and excessive force pursuant to Section 1983, Fourth Amendment Monell liability, and Fourth Amendment deliberate indifference[3]; (5) Deputy Sheriff Kenny Jermane Turner and Sheriff Miller remain defendants in their individual and official capacities, but they can only be liable in their official capacities for the alleged ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations[4]; and (6) Plaintiffs may continue to seek only damages and no injunctive relief associated with their claims [Doc. 41 at 11]. *2 On June 22, 2017, Plaintiffs served Defendant Douglas County with a Request for Production of Documents [Doc. 80], to which Douglas County responded with objections on July 21, 2017 [Doc. 85]. Of Plaintiffs' fourteen requests, Douglas County has objections to ten [see Doc. 90-1]. On August 4, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel [Doc. 90], to which Douglas County responded in opposition on August 18, 2017 [Doc. 92]. This motion is now ripe for the Court's consideration. II. Motion to Compel “On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery[,]” provided it “include [s] a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Here, Plaintiffs included such a certification with their motion to compel [Doc. 90 at 2]. Furthermore, a request for the production of documents or electronically stored information is proscribed only by the scope of Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A). Rule 26(b)(1) is itself quite broad: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel compliance with nine of their discovery requests [Doc. 90], and the Court will address each in turn below. A. Request Two Plaintiffs' second request was for Douglas County to “[p]roduce all QA (Quality Assurance) documents that review uses of physical force on a citizen and include the underlying incident reports, complaints, documents, and associated audio and video of the incident, for the time period 2010 until the present” [Doc. 90-1 at 9]. Douglas County objected that it would have “to respond by acquiring or supplying documents or information which are irrelevant and immaterial to the subject matter or issues of this action, and which are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” [Id. at 10]. Plaintiffs want not only whatever QA documents might relate to the instant matter, but also “historical QA documents and the underlying information upon which they are based to investigate their claims that the County is not properly supervising its employees in utilizing physical force on citizens as alleged in the Complaint” [Doc. 90 at 14]. While Douglas County maintains that there is no QA document about the incident in question [Doc. 92 at 4], that response does not address the requested historical QA data. Nonetheless, the Court finds this request too broad, and Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request number two. B. Request Three Plaintiffs' third request was for Douglas County to “[p]roduce all incident reports from January 1, 2014 to January 1, 2015 in which either R5 or E7 responded to calls with the terms ‘seizures’ or ‘convulsions’ as the medical condition. Produce any follow up written documentation regarding such reports, as well as associated audio and video of the circumstances” [Doc. 90-1 at 10]. In addition to its standard response as cited above that Plaintiffs' request is irrelevant, immaterial, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Douglas County also claims “Plaintiffs can identify calls to which R5 or E7 responded from the documents already produced” [Doc. 92 at 4]. These documents apparently contained over 1200 pages. *3 The Court agrees with Douglas County that if it has already turned over the relevant pages in response to a prior request and if Plaintiffs could glean the information they seek from the prior disclosure, that should be sufficient. Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request number three. C. Request Four Plaintiffs' fourth request was for “[a]ll reports, compilations or summaries analyzing or categorizing different types of medical conditions for which individual citizens called for assistance (i.e., non-fire calls), this includes statistics or tracking or trends of specific medical conditions occurring in Douglas County, broken down by condition, from 2010 to present” [Doc. 90-1 at 11]. Douglas County also states that “there are no documents responsive to Request No. 4” [Doc. 92 at 5]. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request number four. D. Requests Six, Seven, and Eight Plaintiffs' sixth request was for Douglas County to “[p]roduce each and every report or complaint of excessive force or misconduct that was brought to the attention of Douglas County administrators by you, for investigation since 2010, and produce documents concerning results and or referral of said incident” [Doc. 90-1 at 12]. Their seventh request was identical for every report or complaint “brought to the attention of the State Attorney or GBI” [id. at 13], and their eighth was for those “brought to the attention of the United States Attorney, or to any federal agency” [id. at 14]. Plaintiffs' motion to compel explains that all three requests “regard historical claims of excessive force lodged against Douglas County and its actors. Plaintiffs are entitled to reports or complaints of excessive force or misconduct and documents concerning results and or referral of said incidents as part of an investigation into their Monell claims” [Doc. 90 at 23]. Douglas County maintains that these requests are excessively broad, and the Court agrees. The Court also notes that Douglas County “is not aware of any responsive documents relating to the Douglas County Fire Department” [Doc. 92 at 6]. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to requests six, seven, and eight. E. Request Nine Plaintiffs' ninth request seeks “[a]ny and all protocol or guidelines regarding Douglas County Fire Department and/or Emergency Medical Services' transfer of individuals to Douglas County Sheriffs Office” [Doc. 90-1 at 14]. Douglas County apparently uses a publically-available guide responsive to this request [Doc. 92 at 7]. Instead of its standard objection that request nine was “irrelevant and immaterial” [Doc. 90-1], Douglas County could just have volunteered that guide at the time of Plaintiffs' initial request. Nonetheless, if there are no other documents responsive to the request, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request nine. F. Request Ten Plaintiffs' tenth request seeks “[a]ll documents referencing or summarizing disciplinary action taken against Douglas County Fire Department and/or Emergency Medical Services workers who had complaints of excessive force lodged against them from 2010 to 2014” [Doc. 90-1]. Douglas County has represented that “[t]here are no documents responsive to Request No. 10” [Doc. 92 at 7]. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request ten. G. Request Fourteen *4 Plaintiffs' fourteenth request is as follows: “With regard to document entitled ‘00019--001279--2017_04_18 All Seizures_Redacted’ you provided, provide same information, but add in time the call started, and the time the incident ended” [Doc. 90-1 at 18]. Plaintiffs apparently “seek to evaluate the durations of incidents to compare with national data of such situations as just one factor in determining if there is a custom and policy of ending seizure/convulsions calls early by force rather than utilizing the ‘contain but don't restrain’ approach to seizures recommended by The Epilepsy Foundation and physicians worldwide which requires waiting for patients to return to their normal senses rather than tackling, restraining, handcuffing, hogtying, and/or Tasering” [Doc. 90 at 22]. Douglas County responds that it has “previously produced over 1200 pages of documents containing information on at least 6300 calls from 2007 to 2016” and that it would have “to pull individual records relating to each separate call at great time and expense” [Doc. 92 at 8]. The Court agrees with Douglas County that Plaintiffs' request here is duplicative and carries a burden far outweighing the purported benefit of Plaintiffs' theory. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied as to request fourteen. III. Conclusion Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' motion to compel [Doc. 90] is DENIED. SO ORDERED, this 14 day of September, 2017. Footnotes [1] Plaintiffs also brought suit against Taser International, Inc., but have since voluntarily dismissed these claims with prejudice [Doc. 17]. [2] Plaintiffs have apparently failed to properly serve Mr. Shuler's non-party representative according to the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) as detailed in this Court's Order of January 9, 2017 [Doc. 32]. It would thus appear that neither Mr. Shuler nor his estate is a proper party to this case at this time. [3] The Court notes that Plaintiffs pled Monell liability against “state entities and supervisors” and deliberate indifference against “state entities, supervisors, actors” [Doc. 1]. Without evidence to indicate whether Defendant Wardlaw is or is not such an “entity,” “supervisor,” or “actor,” the Court cannot yet say whether these claims apply to him. [4] The same observation that the Court made in footnote 4 above applies to Defendant Turner as well.