This case arises out of Defendant's alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights under California labor and wage laws. Dkt. 1-1. Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee at Defendant's Oak Hills facility and currently works as a “compounding MCO” on the production floor. Dkt. 23-8, Plaintiff Dep. at 83:12-84:11. On March 14, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Class Action Complaint against Defendant in San Bernardino Superior Court. Id. On April 18, 2019, Defendant removed the action to this Court. Dkt. 1. On April 25, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer. Dkt. 6.
On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff served a set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission on Defendant. Dkt. 28-1, Declaration of Kayvon Sabourian (“Sabourian Decl.”), ¶ 3, Exs. A, B, C.
On June 19, 2019, Defendant served Responses to the Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for Admission. Id., ¶ 4, Exs. D, E, F. In addition, Defendant produced 1,086 pages of documents, “including all of [Plaintiff]'s wage statements and time records dating [back] to March 2015, all of his personnel records, all job descriptions, disciplinary documents, leave of absence records, all relevant 3M policies, its handbook, compensation guides, training materials, and records related to the establishment of the alternative workweek.” Dkt. 29, Declaration of Maria C. Roberts (“Roberts Decl.”), ¶ 16.
On June 26, 2019, the Court vacated the Local Rule deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion for class certification. Dkt. 12.
On July 9, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendant's counsel a letter requesting Defendant amend and supplement its responses to the written discovery requests and participate in a conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 37-1. Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. G.
On July 12, 2019, the Court approved the parties' Stipulated Protective Order to facilitate discovery. Dkt. 16.
On July 15, 2019, counsel for both parties participated in a conference of counsel by telephone regarding Defendant's responses to the written discovery requests, but were unable to resolve any disputes. Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 6.
*2 On July 26, 2019, the Court issued a Scheduling Order setting a deadline to file a motion for class certification of October 14, 2019, non-expert discovery cut-off of March 13, 2020, and a deadline to file all motions (including discovery motions) of April 24, 2020. Dkt. 17.
On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff was deposed by Defendant.
[1] Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 11.
On August 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on behalf of himself and “all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant[ ] in the State of California at any time within the period beginning four (4) years prior to the filing of the action and ending at the time this action settles or proceeds to final judgment.” Dkt. 21 at ¶ 4. The FAC sets forth the following claims:
(1) Failure to Provide Meal Periods;
(2) Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods;
(3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages;
(4) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages;
(5) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;
(6) Failure to Maintain Required Records;
(7) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties;
(8) Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices; and
(9) Representative Action for Penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act.
Id. On August 29, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer to the FAC. Dkt. 22.
On August 30, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Order Denying Class Certification as to All Claims. Dkt. 23. In support of the Motion for Order Denying Class Certification, Defendant filed the following declarations: (1) Declaration of Brian Jackson (“Jackson”), Regional Human Resources Manager, dkt. 23-2; (2) Declaration of Hilda Reyes (“Reyes”), Senior Human Resources Manager, dkt. 23-3; (3) Declaration of Hannah Flor (“Flor”), Plant Human Resources Supervisor at Defendant's facility in Oak Hills, California, dkt. 23-4; (4) Declaration of Sal Briones (“Briones”), General Supervisor at Defendant's facility in Oak Hills, California, dkt. 23-5; and (5) Declaration of Maria C. Roberts, Defendant's counsel, dkt. 23-6, as well as an Appendix of Exhibits, which includes fourteen declarations from non-exempt employees of Defendant at its Oak Hills, California plant, dkt. 23-27, Exs. 20 a-n.
On August 30, 2019, upon receipt of Defendant's Motion for Order Denying Class Certification, Plaintiff served Notices of Deposition on Defendant seeking to take the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones on September 9, 6, 10, and 11, 2019, respectively. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 8, Exs. A, B, C, D.
*3 On September 4, 2019, Plaintiff noticed the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant for September 13, 2019. Dkt. 45-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. C. The Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice sets forth 33 subjects for examination. Id.
On September 5, 2019, Defendant served objections to the Notices of Deposition of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 9, Exs., E, F, G, H. On September 5, 2019, upon receipt of Defendant's objections, Plaintiff's counsel sent an email to Defendant's counsel requesting the availability of the witnesses and Defendant's counsel for the four depositions. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. I.
On September 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses with a Joint Stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 setting forth the parties' positions. Dkt. 27, Mot.; Dkt. 28, JS.
On September 7, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent an email to Defendant's counsel again requesting the availability of the four witnesses for deposition and agreeing to depose Jackson in Austin, Texas, where Jackson works according to Defendant's objections to the notice of his deposition. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. J.
On September 10, 2019, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter stating Plaintiff was required to subpoena Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones, because they are not parties. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. M. On September 10, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent an email to Defendant's counsel in response stating he did not believe subpoenas were required for these witnesses, requesting their availability for depositions and for a conference of counsel, and asking whether Defendant's counsel would accept service on behalf of the witnesses or provide their contact information.
[2] Id., ¶ 15, Ex. N.
On September 12, 2019, Defendant served objections to the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice. Dkt. 45-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. E.
On September 12, 2019, Briones was personally served with a subpoena for his deposition on September 25, 2019. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. Q. On September 13, 2019, Reyes was personally served with a subpoena for her deposition on September 23, 2019, dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 18, Ex. O, and Flor was personally served with a subpoena for her deposition on September 24, 2019, id., ¶ 19, Ex. P. On September 16, 2019, Jackson was personally served with a subpoena for his deposition on September 27, 2019. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. R. On September 18, 2019, Plaintiff served Defendant with copies of the subpoenas for Flor, Reyes, and Briones. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 22, Exs. S, T, U.
On September 18, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 31.
On September 19, 2019, the parties filed supplemental briefs in connection with the Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. Dkt. 34, Def.'s Suppl. Brief; Dkt. 35, Pl.'s Suppl. Brief. On September 20, 2019, Defendant filed a “Response” to Plaintiff's “Improper Citation to New Legal Authority in Support of Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses.” Dkt. 38.
*4 On September 20, 2019, Defendant served objections to the subpoenas served on Jackson, Flor, Reyes, and Briones. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 23, Exs. V, W, X, Y.
On September 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones and for Sanctions, dkt. 39, and Defendant filed a Motion for Protective Order to avoid the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones, as well as the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, dkt. 40. On September 27, 2019, Defendant filed a declaration in response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Depositions. Dkt. 41.
On October 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel FRCP 30(b)(6) Deposition, dkt. 45, an Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Protective Order, dkt. 46, and Evidentiary Objections, dkt. 47.
On October 4, 2019, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Depositions. Dkt. 48.
On October 4, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's ex parte application to continue the briefing schedules on Plaintiff's motion for class certification and Defendant's motions to deny class certification and for summary judgment. Dkt. 49. The Court (1) denied Plaintiff's motion to continue the deadline to oppose the motion for summary judgment; and (2) adopted a briefing schedule on Plaintiff's motion for class certification and Defendant's motion to deny class certification continuing the deadlines for Plaintiff's motion and Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion to December 23, 2019. Id.
On October 10, 2019, Defendant filed a Reply in support of the Motion for Protective Order, dkt. 55, and an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition, dkt. 56. On October 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Compel Depositions, dkt. 57, and Evidentiary Objections, dkt. 58.
On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(b) Deposition, dkt. 61, and Evidentiary Objections,
[3] dkt. 62.
Plaintiff's Motions to Compel and Defendant's Motion for Protective Order thus stand submitted.
Plaintiff seeks leave to conduct discovery regarding the entire putative class – “all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant[ ] in the State of California at any time within the period beginning four (4) years prior to the filing of the action and ending at the time this action settles or proceeds to final judgment.” Dkt. 21 at ¶ 4. Plaintiff conceded in his deposition that he has no knowledge of operations at any of Defendant's facilities beyond the Oak Hills facility where he worked. See, e.g., dkt. 23-8, Plaintiff Dep. at 126:16-127:7. Plaintiff, thus, seeks to rely upon the declaration of Anthony McCabe in support of his argument that the class is not limited to the Oak Hills facility where Plaintiff worked. Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., Ex. J. McCabe worked as a forklift driver at Defendant's Drug Delivery System Division located in Northridge, California from 2010 through July 2018. Id., ¶¶ 3-4. McCabe states during his final year of employment he missed most of his post-meal rest breaks, was not provided a second thirty minute meal break when he “worked shifts of 12 hours or more”, his supervisors interrupted him via walkie-talkie or his personal cell phone during most rest breaks throughout his employment, and his supervisors exclusively communicated with him on his personal cell phone when he made deliveries outside the office without reimbursing him for the costs of using his cellphone. Id., ¶¶ 5-9. In addition, Plaintiff argues his claims that his wage statements did not accurately state the total hours he worked during a pay period, the hours he worked at the shift differential rate, and his overtime shift differential rate are common to all non-exempt employees in California because Defendant's discovery responses state payroll was handled at a centralized location in St. Paul, Minnesota and wage statements were issued on behalf of “USA 3M Company.” Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., Ex. D, 5:12-13; Dkt. 28-1, Sabourian Decl., Ex. W. Plaintiff, therefore, argues precertification discovery must be permitted. Dkt. 28 at 35.
*6 Defendant argues discovery should be limited to Plaintiff's claims because a single declaration from a former employee at a different facility is insufficient to show the discovery sought will substantiate Plaintiff's class claims. Dkt. 28 at 36. Defendant further argues Plaintiff has failed to produce a declaration from an Oak Hills employee to suggest other employees within Plaintiff's facility have been treated as alleged in the Complaint. Finally, Defendant contends Plaintiff testified in his deposition “that his claims are either false or were based on his personal confusion.” Id.
Defendant also presents the declaration of Jackson, who explains Defendant “operates ten facilities in California, with vastly different operations, which function entirely independent of the others.” Dkt. 23-2, Jackson Decl., ¶ 3. Jackson explains the “facilities also have independent management which determines shift schedules and some also set break schedules, while others do not. No two 3M facilities are alike.” Id., ¶ 7. Defendant employs approximately 1,900 employees in California, dkt. 23-2, Jackson Decl., ¶ 3, and approximately 55 non-exempt employees at the Oak Hills facility, dkt. 23-5, Briones Decl., ¶ 3. Jackson also states McCabe's “statements about his alleged experience working at Northridge is both contrary to 3M's policies at Northridge and what I understand to be the practices at that plant.” Dkt. 23-2, Jackson Decl., ¶ 11.
The Court finds class-wide discovery appears disproportionate to the needs of the case at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Speculation is not sufficient to make a prima facie showing as required by Doninger and Mantolete that the class action requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied, or that discovery regarding all of Defendant's California facilities is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. See Erami v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, No. CV-15-7728-PSG (PLAx), 2016 WL 11520703, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016); Dittmar v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 14-CV-1156 LAB (JLB), 2016 WL 7188231, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (“Absent some factual basis for a plaintiff's claims that defendant's alleged wrongs are class-wide, plaintiffs are not entitled to class-wide discovery; and the plaintiff cannot rely on the bare allegations of the complaint to support class-wide discovery.”). In light of Jackson's declaration explaining the substantial differences between the operations at each facility, one declaration of a former employee at a single other facility, whose personal experience is not consistent with the policies at that facility, does not satisfy Plaintiff's burden to provide persuasive evidence that further discovery is likely to substantiate his class-wide allegations. See Mantolete, 767 F.2d at 1425 (finding that plaintiff's submission of two additional complaints filed against defendant in other locations with similar claims did not “provide a likelihood that discovery measures will produce persuasive information substantiating class allegations”). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to submit sufficient evidence to show his experiences, with the possible exception of his wage statements, are class-wide or that further discovery is necessary to substantiate his class claims. Moreover, as to the possible wage statement claims, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden to show how any of the discovery sought is necessary to resolve any factual issue required to determine class certification. Kamm, 509 F.2d at 210. Hence, Plaintiff's motion to compel class-wide discovery is denied without prejudice as disproportionate to the needs of the case at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
C. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS [DKT. 39] IS GRANTED AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [DKT. 40] IS DENIED IN PART TO THE EXTENT IT SEEKS TO AVOID THE DEPOSITIONS OF JACKSON, REYES, FLOR, AND BRIONES
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 governs depositions by oral examination. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. Rule 30(a)(1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). Rule 30(b)(1) provides that a party may request the deposition of another party to the litigation by serving a notice upon that party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). A party's failure to appear at that party's deposition “is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2); Paige v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 275 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
“However, a corporate employee or agent who does not qualify as an officer, director, or managing agent is not subject to deposition by notice.” United States v. Afram Lines (USA), Ltd., 159 F.R.D. 408, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Such employees must be subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
“The term ‘managing agent’ should not be given too literal an interpretation but rather should depend largely on whether the interests of the individual involved are identified with those of his principal and on the nature of his ‘functions, responsibilities and authority ... respecting the subject matter of the litigation.’ ” Tomingas v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 45 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis in original) (finding “although [witnesses] may not be ‘managing agents’ in the course of their everyday duties for the defendant corporation, they are ‘managing agents’ for the purpose of giving testimony regarding the accident investigation, a most relevant aspect of this litigation”). In determining whether a corporate employee will be determined to be a “managing agent,” courts consider the following factors: “(1) whether the individual is invested with general powers allowing him to exercise judgment and discretion in corporate matters; (2) whether the individual can be relied upon to give testimony, at his employer's request, in response to the demand of the examining party; (3) whether any person or persons are employed by the corporate employer in positions of higher authority than the individual designated in the area regarding which information is sought by the examination; (4) the general responsibilities of the individual respecting the matters involved in the litigation.” Nutrition Distribution, LLC v. Enhanced Athlete, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01491-TLN (KJN), 2018 WL 888972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2018) (quoting Calderon v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D. Idaho 2012), aff'd, 290 F.R.D. 508 (D. Idaho 2013)). Other factors include “whether the employee can be depended upon to carry out the employer's directions, and ... whether the individual can be expected to identify him or herself with the interests of the corporation as opposed to the interests of the opposing party.” Id.
*23 Moreover, “while the burden is on the party seeking the discovery to prove that the potential witness is a managing agent of the corporation, this burden is a modest one, and at least at the discovery stage, all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the party seeking the depositions.... Thus, courts have concluded that if there is at least a ‘close question’ as to the managing agent status of a potential witness, doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing the deposition, with the final determination of whether the agent has the ability to bind the corporation to be left for trial.” Id. (quoting Calderon, 287 F.R.D. at 632-33).
Plaintiff seeks to compel the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones on the grounds they failed to appear for their depositions pursuant to the notices of deposition served on August 30, 2019, or, alternatively, they failed to comply with the subpoenas served on September 12, 13, and 16, 2019.
Plaintiff noticed the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones on August 30, 2019 seeking to take their depositions at Plaintiff's counsel's office on September 9, 6, 10, and 11, 2019, respectively. Dkt. 39-1, Sabourian Decl., ¶ 8, Exs. A, B, C, D. Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to (a) serve the August 30, 2019 deposition notices with subpoenas; (b) set the depositions at a proper location; or (c) provide reasonable notice for each deposition. Dkt. 48. Defendant also argues the Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Depositions and stay discovery pending class certification and resolution of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the Court's “wide discretion in controlling discovery” because Plaintiff “has not identified any evidence he needs from the depositions to oppose 3M's motions.” Id. at 22-23.
First, Defendant's argument that subpoenas were required because the four witnesses are not managing agents and “do not come close to being ‘high level employees,’ ” see dkt. 48 at 24 (emphasis in original), contradicts Defendant's own argument in its Motion for Protective Order that these witnesses should not be deposed specifically because they “currently serve as high-level 3M employees.” Dkt. 40-1 at 105. Moreover, Plaintiff has satisfied his “modest” burden to show the individuals are managing agents for purposes of permitting the depositions, particularly in light of their declarations in support of Defendant's Motions to Deny Class Certification and for Summary Judgment setting forth their general responsibilities regarding the matters involved in the litigation. See dkts. 23-2, 23-3, 23-4, 23-5. For example, Jackson declared he has knowledge about the wage and hour practices at all of Defendant's facilities in California, dkt. 23-2, ¶¶ 1, 9-11; Flor declared she offered second meal period waivers to employees and conducted investigations regarding Plaintiff, dkt. 23-4, ¶¶ 5, 21; Reyes declared she offered meal break waivers to employees and updated 3M's meal break policies, dkt. 23-3, ¶¶ 7-8; and Briones declared that if an employee requested a second meal break, he could provide them one, dkt. 23-5, ¶ 9. It appears, therefore, that the witnesses' interests are aligned with Defendant and the witnesses' general responsibilities are related to the subject matter of the litigation. Hence, the Court finds Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones are managing agents for purposes of permitting the depositions and did not require service of subpoenas.
Second, Defendant's argument that the depositions were noticed for an improper location is meritless. Defendant objects to the location of the depositions on the grounds they were not set to occur at a location “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business.” See dkt. 48 at 23-24. However, Plaintiff offered to take Jackson's deposition in Austin, Texas, because it appears that is where he resides and works,
[4] and Defendant refused to meet and confer regarding possible alternative dates or locations for any of the depositions. Therefore, the deposition notices appear to comply with the travel limitations set forth in Rule 45(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c) (a witness may be commanded to attend a deposition “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person”); Dkt. 40-1 at 105, Motion for Protective Order (stating Jackson resides in Austin, Texas, Reyes works at Defendant's facility in Monrovia, California, and Flor and Briones work at Defendant's Oak Hill facility); Sabourian Decl., ¶ 29 (Defendant's Oak Hills facility is 90.4 miles in driving distance from the office of Plaintiff's counsel, where the depositions are noticed, and Defendant's Monrovia facility is 36.8 miles in driving distance from the office of Plaintiff's counsel).
*24 Third, Plaintiff provided reasonable notice for the depositions, which did not request production of documents or preparation to testify regarding anything beyond the witness's personal knowledge. While the seven days' notice for Reyes' deposition is fairly short, particularly because the seven days includes a three-day holiday weekend, courts have found seven days reasonable, and Defendant failed to meet and confer regarding any alternative dates. Moreover, there was at least ten days' notice for each of the other three depositions. See United States v. Levin, No. CR 08-00326 (A) DDP, 2010 WL 2803961, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2010) (finding that while “six to ten days' notice may seem like a relatively short period of time, given the facts of this case the Court concludes that the notice provided is reasonable”); but see Paige, 248 F.R.D. at 275 (finding two weeks was reasonable notice and noting generally “[T]en business days' notice [of a deposition] would seem to be reasonable”).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff has requested relevant discovery and Defendant has failed to timely request a protective order, the Court finds Defendant's requested stay of all discovery pending class certification and resolution of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is not warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to take up to ten depositions without leave of court regardless of whether he identifies the evidence he “needs” from the depositions, unless Defendant files a motion for protective order before failing to appear. Defendant did not move for a protective order before the party witnesses failed to appear and they were not otherwise excused from appearing for their properly-noticed depositions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2); Paige, 248 F.R.D. at 275. Hence, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones is GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Protective Order is DENIED IN PART to the extent it seeks to avoid the depositions of Jackson, Reyes, Flor, and Briones.