ELLA J. FAUSZ PLAINTIFF v. NPAS, INC. DEFENDANT CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-00145-CRS United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky Filed January 05, 2016 Counsel Zachary L. Taylor, Nina B. Couch, Taylor Couch, PLLC, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff. John P. Boyle, Micheal S. Poncin, Moss & Barnett, PA, Minneapolis, MN, Kevin Ray Feazell, Cors & Bassett, LLC, Cincinnati, OH, Kent Wicker, Dressman Benzinger LaVelle PSC, Louisville, KY, for Defendant. Whalin, Dave, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 This matter comes before the Court to consider a motion to compel filed by Ella J. Fausz (DN 13). Fausz has filed a complaint on behalf of herself and a potential class of similarly situated persons that seek to obtain statutory damages and injunctive relief against Defendant NPAS, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, for its alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Fausz alleges that NPAS violated the Act by its failure to include certain required information in its written communications to her and the other members of the putative class as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and by its failure to disclose in the same written communications its status as a “debt collector” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). The written communications at issue relate to the efforts of NPAS to collect delinquent medical debt from the Plaintiffs on behalf of the Springview Regional Medical Center/Community Mercy Health Partners (Springview or Medical Center). Fausz alleges that NPAS failed to include a “notice of debt” in its communication as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and did not identify itself as a debt collector contrary to the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) when it contacted her on Feb. 11, 2014, seeking to collect a 2011 medical debt on behalf of Springview. NPAS in its answer denies that it is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA so that the provisions of the Act do not apply to it. Alternatively, NPAS raises the bona fide error defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) claiming that any possible violation of the Act was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error that occurred despite the existence of company procedures that were reasonably adopted to avoid such an error. Fausz seeks to recover statutory damages of up to $1,000 for herself and a statutory damage award to the putative class of the lesser of 1% of NPAS's net worth or $500,000 under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). Fausz served interrogatories and requests for production on NPAS on April 24, 2015. NPAS served its responses two months later on June 24, 2015. It objected to 7 of the interrogatories and 16 of the requests for production of documents on the basis of lack of relevance. It objected to 5 interrogatories and 10 of the requests for production on the basis of privacy, confidentiality and/or trade secret protection. Fausz certifies pursuant to Local Rule 37.1 that her counsel wrote to counsel for NPAS on June 25, 2015, to identify the deficiencies with the discovery responses made by NPAS. NPAS responded the following month on July 10, 2015. Subsequently, the parties reached agreement on the provisions of a confidentiality agreement which NPAS provided to Fausz on Oct. 5, 2015. Counsel subsequently exchanged emails concerning their discovery dispute on Oct. 20, 2015, and directly discussed the matter on the following day on Oct. 21. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the certification requirements of Rule 37(a)(1) and Local Rule 37.1 have been satisfied. *2 Despite supplemental discovery responses provided by NPAS on Oct. 22, 2015, Fausz continues to maintain that the responses are deficient. The discovery at issue falls into nine categories. The first category includes interrogatories and document requests that relate to the FDCPA compliance procedures and policies at NPAS. This category includes interrogatories 11 and 20, along with document requests 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27 and 28. The second category, requested by interrogatory 12, seeks the identity of any FDCPA compliance personnel at NPAS. The third category, interrogatory no. 14, seeks to discover NPAS's net income. Category no. 4, found in interrogatory no. 15, seeks information concerning any similar FDCPA claims or lawsuits brought against NPAS. The fifth category involves Fausz's interrogatory no. 19, which asks for information concerning the debt collection techniques and methods used by NPAS. The sixth involves document requests 8, 17 and 26. These document requests ask NPAS to provide any agreements it has with the original creditor, Springview. Category seven centers on document request no. 16, which seeks the production of any insurance agreements that may provide coverage to NPAS in the event that Fausz prevails on her FDCPA claims or those of the putative class. The next category of disputed discovery, number eight, centers on Fausz's request for various debt collection performance reports generated by NPAS including the “NPAS Champion Challenge Results Reports,” quarterly “Dash Forward Reports” for the Springfield Regional Medical Center, and monthly performance reports relating to the center all sought by document requests 30, 31, 32 and 33. Finally, with document request no. 34, Fausz seeks to obtain the ninth and final category of documents--account records of those members of the putative class from Feb. 11, 2014, to present. I. Fausz has filed her motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The current version of Rule 37(a) provides that a party may move for an order to compel an answer or to compel production if a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or fails to produce documents or permit inspection as required by Rule 34. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). For the purpose of the Rule, an answer or disclosure that is evasive or incomplete will be treated as a failure to disclose or to answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4). See, Rickles, Inc. v. Frances Denney Corp., 508 F.Supp.4, 7 (E.D. Mass. 1980) (explaining in the context of Rule 37(a) that “answers are insufficient if they fail to supply facts which are omitted from the complaint, and if they neither clarify nor narrow the broad issues posed by the complaint,” but rather are generally conclusory, ambiguous or nonresponsive.”) The party who seeks to compel discovery bears the burden to prove that the answers of its opponent are incomplete or evasive. New Orleans Regional Physician Hosp. Organization, Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed.Cl. 807, 815 (Ct. Cl. 2015) (citing Jenkins v. United States, 90 Fed.Cl. 585, 588 (2009)). Here, where the bulk of the objections raised by NPAS rest on claims of irrelevance or confidentiality, Fausz must establish first that the requested information and documents fall within the scope of matters that are relevant to a party's claim or defense within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(1), and are not otherwise subject to a valid claim of privilege or work product protection that would preclude their disclosure. The scope of discovery is set out in Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule explicitly states that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). It is well established by now that this language is broadly construed by the federal courts to include “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). See also, Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-115 (1964) (“Discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment ... to effectuate their purpose that ‘civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried out in the dark.’ ”) (quoting Hickman, 392 U.S. at 501). *3 Federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit have echoed the same viewpoint in various published decisions over the years. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 481, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Rule 26(b) to be accorded broad and liberal treatment). Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity, 88 F.R.D. 191, 194-195 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (“The general discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed.”); Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 120-121 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (same). In fact, this Court previously has written on the broad scope of discovery in Invesco Institutional (N.A.), Inc. v. Paas, 244 F.R.D. 374, 380-381 (W.D. Ky. 2007). See also, Groupwell Int'l (HK), Ltd. v. Gourmet Exp., LLC, 227 F.R.D. 348, 358-359 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (discussing Invesco). What the cited decisions confirm is that the scope of inquiry permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) is significantly broader than that permitted at trial. See Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-501 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing the scope of discovery in the context of a deposition). When faced with questions over, or disputes about, what information or documents may be obtained based on their relevancy, it is axiomatic that the trial court is afforded broad discretion to determine the boundaries of inquiry. Chrysler v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). See also, Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The court has broad discretion in determining the scope of discovery and in setting limits.”). Absent a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, its decisions regarding the scope of discovery will not be disturbed on review. Chrysler Corp., 643 F.2d at 540; Chemical & Industry Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962) (“Under the rules, the extent of discovery and the use of protective orders is clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.”). Ordinarily, once the relevancy of the requested information or documents sought by a party is established, then the focus of the court will fall on whether sufficient reasons are offered by the responding party to justify withholding these items from disclosure. The nature of the responding party's duty in such circumstances has been described by this Court previously: When the discovery material sought appears to be relevant, the party who is resisting production has the burden to establish that the material either does not come within the scope of relevance or is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm resulting from production outweighs the presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Horizon Holdings, LLC v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 211-212 (D.Kan. 2002). A party who seeks to avoid disclosure of requested materials “bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that disclosure will work a clearly defined and very serious injury...” Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackle, 108 FRD. 323, 326 (S.D.Fla, 1985) (citing Citicorp v. Interbank Card Association, 478 F.Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). Courts generally do not grant protective orders without a strong showing of good cause, and the burden of establishing good cause falls on the party who seeks such an order. Howard v. Galesi, 107 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing 8 Charles Alan Wrights & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2035 (1st ed. 1970)). See also, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 106 F.R.D. 573 (D.N.J. 1985) (“The party seeking a protective order under this section bears the burden of proving its necessity.”). *4 Invesco, 244 F.R.D. at 380. II. In the present case, we must evaluate the relevance of any item sought in the context of the provisions and legislative history of the FDCPA. Passage of the FDCPA was the result of a “serious national problem of debt collection abuse by unscrupulous debt collectors.” Courier v. First Resolution Investment Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing S. Rpt. No. 95-382 at 2 (1977)). The Act consequently is aimed at harassing, unfair or deceptive debt collection practices. Id. Under the FDCPA a plaintiff may bring civil suit against a debt collector who engages in “abusive debt collection practices.” Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 364 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e), 1692(k)). Specifically, the Act provides at § 1692(e) that a “debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” See, Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2008). Although the Act is “extraordinarily broad,” Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir. 1992), the statutory text makes it plain that liability under the FDCPA will attach only to a defendant that qualifies as a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefski, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2008). Creditors, those who offer or extend credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, are not covered by the Act. Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4)). For the purposes of the Act, the two categories - - debt collectors and creditors - - are mutually exclusive. Id. The statutory definition of debt collector found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) is a “long and somewhat convoluted” one. See, Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1996). A debt collector under the FDCPA is: Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principle purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another... [T]he term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Specifically excluded from this definition of debt collector is “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent that such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). See Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2003) (excluding from the statutory definition of a debt collector consumer creditors). The Act in a parallel provision of its statutory definition of “creditor” § 1692a(4) expressly excludes from the definition of creditor “any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). *5 As noted, these two categories of creditor and debt collector are mutually exclusive under the Act. Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577 F.3d 790, 796-97 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Schlosser, 323 F.3d at 536). The purchaser of an already defaulted debt accordingly falls within the definition of a debt collector and therefore is subject to the provisions of the Act as well as potential civil liability for its violation. See gen, Alibarandi v. Financial Outsourcing Services, Inc., 333 F.3d 82, 86 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“[U]nder § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), the classification of debt collector depends on the status of the debt, rather than the type of collection activities used.”). In other words, when a third party acquires a debt owed to another, the critical question to determine whether that third party falls within the provisions of the FDCPA will be the status of the debt as being in default, or not, at the time that it was acquired. Bridge, 681 F.3d at 360-61. The foreseeable consequence of these highly significant definitions, and the exceptions to them, is that a reoccurring battle now often arises in FDCPA cases. The defendant struggles to shoe horn itself into the creditor category, while simultaneously attempting to avoid the statutory characterization of being a debt collector. This battle in the context of an assigned debt frequently focuses on the question of whether the debt at issue was or was not in default at the time of its assignment. See, Bridge, 681 F.3d at 360-61 (noting the “unsettling trend in FDCPA claims” in which defendant seek to “escape liability by alleging that it is neither a creditor nor a debt collector and thus not subject to the FDCPA.”). One of the key challenges in resolving this statutory battle arises from the fact that unfortunately “the FDCPA does not define so key a term as ‘default.’ ” Alibrandi, 333 F.3d at 86. A debt which is merely outstanding is not automatically one that is in default as only after a debt has been outstanding for some period of time does it go into default. Skerry v. Mass. Higher Education Assistance Corp., 73 F.Supp.2d 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1999); Jones v. Intuition, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 775, 779 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (“Prior to the default period, the unpaid loan installment is considered delinquent.”). Various time periods involving federally regulated loans have been cited in Alibrandi as being helpful in the task of determining when a default has occurred. Id. at 87 (citing the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) definition of default at 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (1998) under which a debt repayable in monthly installments goes into default 180 days after delinquency). See, Telfry v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 71 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1180 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that the specific requirements of the FFELP and its regulations take precedence over any general inconsistencies with the FDCPA). Other federal regulations that define default include regulations related to farm loans under 7 C.F.R. § 762.141(a) (1999) (establishing a 30-day period after delinquency to define default) or 12 C.F.R. § 3363(c) (1999) (establishing a 90-day delinquency period for loans insured by the FDIC to define a default). Ultimately, the court in Alibrandi determined that it would look to the contractual provisions of the parties' debt agreement to determine if a definition could be found therein that would establish when a delinquent loan would be considered by the parties to be in default. With these principles in mind we now turn to the specific discover requests at issue. III. We begin our consideration of the individual discovery disputes with the first category of documents at issue - - the FDCPA compliance policies and procedures of NPAS. NPAS in its response explains that it has supplemented its document responses to provide Fausz with its “General Collection Process” and its “Non-legacy Self Pay Accounts Collections Process Flow” documents. NPAS adds that it also now has provided Fausz with “the relevant portion of its agreement with the Springfield, the original creditor on Ms. Fausz's account # T11228000634. *6 Fausz in reply insists that NPAS has not provided its FDCPA compliance proceedings, manuals and policies. Instead, what Plaintiff has received, according to Fausz, is a 4-page document entitled, “General Collection Process” a document that apparently was created by a third-party company, Parallon, with an effective date of April 1, 2014 - - a date after NPAS ceased its collection activities concerning the Fausz account on March 5, 2014. Faced with these arguments, the Court agrees with Fausz that she is fully entitled to the compliance procedures, policies, and manuals of NPAS. These items readily fall within the scope of relevant and discoverable evidence under Rule 26(b)(1) given NPAS's election to withdraw its waiver of the bona fide error defense and to assert the defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Accordingly, policies, procedures and manuals used by a nonparty that do not relate to the relevant time period at issue are not sufficient. The motion to compel is GRANTED as to interrogatories 10, 11 and 20 and request for production 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27 and 28. See, Hastings v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, Case No. 1:06-CV-418. 2007 WL 461477 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2007) (granting motion to compel the production of defendant's practice manual, procedures manual and other documents setting forth defendant's policies or practices based on its assertion of the bona fide error defense). The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to the second category in dispute - - the identity of the compliance personnel of NPAS. Fausz asserts that the identity of this individual, or individuals, is relevant to NPAS's compliance with the FDCPA. NPAS has artfully responded that no such individual exists to oversee “FDCPA compliance with regard to debts not deemed to be covered by the FDCPA.” (DN 15, p. 5). Whether the debt at issue, however, is or is not covered by the FDCPA is a matter of contention and a complex question that remains in dispute in the Court's view. Once again, the information sought is directly relevant to the potential liability of NPAS for statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(2) and the factors set forth therein. Accordingly, the motion to compel is GRANTED as to interrogatory no. 12. See, Witt v. GC Services, Limited Partnership, 307 F.R.D. 554, 566 (D.Colo. 2014) (requiring the disclosure of both the defendant's compliance personnel and its policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent errors as part of the defendant's assertion of the bona fide error defense under § 1692k(c)). We turn next to the dispute of the parties concerning disclosure of the net income of NPAS. NPAS insists that until such time as the putative class is certified by the Court, such information which is relevant only to the question of damages, should await a determination of liability. Fausz objects that the discovery schedule in the present case is not bifurcated by issues of liability and damages so that all discovery is to be completed by Feb. 1, 2016, to include discovery that relates to the putative class and potential damages (DN 17, p. 3). Fausz points out along the same lines that the parties also have a deadline of March 15, 2016, for the Plaintiff's motion for class certification, which underscores the need for completion of all discovery related to the class action status and damages prior to these two critical dates. Again, the Court is in agreement with the Plaintiff. Fausz has alleged that NPAS is a debt collector that failed to comply with the provisions of the FDCPA not only in its communications with Fausz, but in its communications with the putative class, which Fausz estimates to be as many as some 200 debtors. Should Fausz be able to establish that NPAS is acting as a debt collector within the definition of the FDCPA and that it failed to comply with the cited provisions of the Act in its effort to collect the debts at issue, NPAS would be liable for up to as much as $500,000 or 1% of its net worth, whichever amount is the lesser. Accordingly, discovery of NPAS's net income under interrogatory no. 14 is appropriate. See, Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., Case no. 11-CV-0764S, 2013 WL 4832715 at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013) (ordering the production of the defendant's net worth in an FDCPA putative class action prior to certification of the class). *7 The next category involves interrogatory no. 13 and Fausz's request for information about other FDCPA claims and lawsuits brought against NPAS within the prior 5 years. NPAS maintains that it has identified one other case in which a plaintiff has alleged that NPAS failed to abide by the provisions of the FDCPA when collecting a debt in default. Any other lawsuits or claims, according to NPAS, are not relevant and discoverable so that the matter is now moot given its identification of the other lawsuit brought by Plaintiff's current counsel against NPAS. Interrogatory no. 15 seeks the identification of “all allegations, complaints, lawsuits and claims asserted against [NPAS] within the past five years relating to unlawful, unfair or abusive debt collection practices....” Fausz explains that this information is needed for her to evaluate the nature, frequency and persistence of any potential FDCPA noncompliance by NPAS to determine whether such noncompliance, if any, was intentional thereby rendering NPAS subject to statutory damages. The Court again agrees. Plaintiff is entitled to know of all complaints, lawsuits and claims brought against NPAS within the prior five years for alleged unlawful, abusive or unfair debt collection practices. The interrogatory may not be limited simply to those suits with identical FDCPA claims to those currently before the Court. See, Trevino v. ACB American, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 612, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (plaintiff entitled to discovery of prior FDCPA claims filed against defendants where such information was relevant to the assertion of the bona fide error affirmative defense). See also, Donnelly v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 500, 504-05 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (plaintiff in a TCPA action entitled to information relating to other lawsuits or proceedings in which the defendant was charged with violating the TCPA). The Court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to interrogatory no. 19 concerning the debt collection techniques and methods used by NPAS. NPAS once again maintains that its production of the two documents mentioned above satisfies its obligation under the rules to respond to interrogatory no. 19. It also objects to the interrogatory based on confidentiality of proprietary business information. Following the parties' entry into an agreed confidentiality agreement, NPAS produced to Fausz the earlier mentioned Non legacy Self Pay Accounts Collections Process Flow document prepared by Parallon. The document, however, is not dated and appears to involve a nonparty. Fausz is entitled to know the debt collection techniques and methods used by NPAS during the relevant time period, rather than those of a nonparty used after NPAS ceased its efforts to collect Fausz's debt. See, Cox v. Sherman Capital LLC, No. 1:12-CV-01654, 2014 WL 712659 at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2014) (finding the debt collection activities of the defendant to be relevant to the FDCPA claims of the putative class and thus discoverable). Documents requests 8, 17 and 26 ask NPAS to produce its agreements with the original creditor, Springview. NPAS insists that the only agreements that are relevant are those that relate to the Plaintiff's account and the issue of whether that account was in default at the time that NPAS acquired it. Because NPAS has produced its redacted contract with the Medical Center, it concludes that no further issue remains to be resolved as to these document requests. Fausz responds that its confidentiality agreement with NPAS removes any concerns about disclosure of the redacted portions of the contract involving the Plaintiff's account. Further, she points out that the critical issue of whether NPAS satisfies the statutory definition of a debt collector under the Act, or whether it is merely a creditor and thus outside the scope of the Act, may well be resolved by NPAS's agreement with the Medical Center so that NPAS should be ordered to produce the agreement in unredacted form. The Court is in agreement with Fausz on this question. The parties have entered into a confidentiality agreement. The agreement takes into account the privacy interests of both NPAS and the Medical Center. The motion to compel therefore is GRANTED and NPAS is required to produce the agreement in its unredacted form. *8 The next category of discovery in dispute involves the Plaintiff's efforts to obtain a copy of any insurance agreement that might provide coverage to NPAS should it be held liable for violation of the FDCPA. Despite the language of Rule 26(a)(1)(iv) that requires production of “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment ...,” NPAS argues that because it has not tendered the defense of the present matter to any insurance provider the quoted provisions of Rule 26(a)(1)(iv) do not apply because no insurance carrier presently may be liable to satisfy monetary damages. Fausz responds that the Rule cannot be so limited given its requirement for disclosure of an insurance agreement under which an insurance business “may” be liable. Further, Fausz denies that she has any improper purpose for requesting this insurance information, or that she would present a claim to NPAS's insurance carrier prior to obtaining a judgment against NPAS. The issue is readily resolved by the earlier cited decision of Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, PC, 2013 WL 4832715 at *4, which rejects arguments identical to those now raised by NPAS in ordering the production of an insurance policy requested in the context of an FDCPA lawsuit. Accordingly, the motion to compel is GRANTED in this respect as well. This conclusion brings the Court to document requests 30, 31, 32 and 33 all of which relate to the efforts of Fausz to obtain various debt collection performance reports identified above, i.e., NPAS Champion Challenge Results Reports and Dashboard Reports. These periodic reports detail the status of various accounts and the performance of NPAS in collecting customers' accounts receivable for medical debts. Included in the information contained in such reports are the number of accounts placed for collection, the status of each account, the average age of accounts, the average age of such accounts at the time of placement for collection, percentages of payment/debt recover and total account balances. Fausz argues that such reports are relevant to the age and status of the accounts placed for collection and the disputed status of NPAS as a debt collector under the FDCPA, as well as, the size of the putative class and the nature, frequency and persistence of NPAS's alleged noncompliance with the FDCPA which runs to potential damages subject to recovery. NPAS insists that all of the above information “simply [is] not relevant.” (DN 15, p. 9). NPAS explains that all of the past due medical debt accounts that it has contracted with the Medical Center to collect were past due in the sense that medical services were not paid at the time they were provided, but otherwise such accounts were not “in default” so as to render NPAS subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. Accordingly, NPAS explains that regardless of how overdue payment on any particular account may be – one day, twenty days or two hundred days - - the information is simply not relevant. Therefore, the requested reports in the view of NPAS will not provide Fausz with any information relative to the determination of the putative class. The Court again disagrees. The information contained within the reports is directly relevant to critical issues both that relate to the determination of the putative class as well as the critical question of whether at the time the accounts were obtained by NPAS for collection they were in default. Such reports for the time periods requested indeed are highly relevant and must be produced to the Plaintiff. The motion to compel consequently is GRANTED in this respect. The final category of documents in dispute involves document request 34 for the account records of the individuals in the putative class. Fausz explains that these documents are needed to identify the individuals who qualify for membership in the class. The documents also are relevant according to Fausz to the issue of the frequency of the persistence of NPAS's noncompliance with the FDCPA. Because the parties have voluntarily entered into a confidentiality agreement, Fausz concludes that the privacy interests of the individuals involved are not a legitimate basis on which to preclude disclosure of the requested account records. *9 NPAS counters that the account records it is responsible for obtaining payment involve other patients of Springfield and are therefore not subject to disclosure. NPAS relies upon the privacy interests of these nonparties in maintaining the confidentiality of their medical debts. Further, it insists that the identity of putative class members at the present stage, where the class has yet to be certified, is premature. NPAS cites a substantial number of federal district court cases in support of this position (DN 15, p. 10). NPAS insists that Fausz simply does not need to know the names of the other patient/consumers indebted to the Medical Center, or the status of their medical-related debts. Accordingly, the motion to compel should be denied in this regard. The Court acknowledges that this issue of disclosure of the identity of putative class members has produced differing results in the federal courts. See gen., Godson, 2013 WL 4832715 at *1-2; Drake v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 14-CV-216DBC, 2014 WL 7408715 at *1-2 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 30, 2014) (collecting cases); Palmer v. Stassinos, No. 5:04-CV-3026RMW, 2005 WL 3868003 at *4) (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2005). Nothing in the above-cited cases prohibits the disclosure of the names and addresses of putative class members merely because class certification has not yet been obtained. In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the provisions of Rule 26 apply to the disclosure of the names and addresses of class action members where such information is established by the moving party to lead to the discovery of evidence relevant to a claim or defense in the action. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1978). Consequently, if the disclosure of the names of the putative class members would bear upon issues such as numerosity, common questions and the adequacy of representation under Rule 23, then there may indeed be instances where the names and addresses of class members are discoverable “where a party has reason to believe that communication with some members of the class would yield information bearing on these or other issues.” Godson, 2013 WL 4832715 at *2 (denying a motion to compel disclosure of the names and addresses of the putative class members where the district court concluded that such information would not assist the plaintiff in determining the appropriateness of class certification). Other courts have denied discovery requests in putative class actions that seek to obtain the names and contact information for potential class members in FDCPA actions. See, Swelnis v. Universal Fidelity, 2014 WL 1571323 (N.D. Ind. April 17, 2014) (plaintiff not entitled to names and contact information for potential class members because plaintiff only needed information sufficient to show numerosity); Charles v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 09-CV-04, 2010 WL 7132173 at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010) (acknowledging that pre-class certification discovery is occasionally necessary, but denying the motion in that particular case where the plaintiff failed to explain why such discovery was relevant to his particular case); Bird Hotel Corp. v. Super 8 Motels, Inc., No. 06-4073, 2007 WL 404703 at *2-3 (D.S.D. Feb. 1, 2007) (holding that “a certain amount of discovery is essential in order to determine the certification issue and the proper scope of a class action” but concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish any need to contact the individual members of the potential class where all members, irrespective of their identity, were subject to the same allegedly illegal fee); Robbins v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., No. 06-CV-116, 2006 WL 383352 at *5 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 2006) (denying a motion to compel where the plaintiff identified only numerosity as the relevant reason for his request to discover the identities and contact information of the putative class members). *10 Here, in her reply Fausz explains that the account records of the putative class members are relevant in her case to establish the size of the putative class under the requirement for numerosity contained in Rule 23(a)(1). She further alleges that the account records also may well bear upon the typicality of the claims of the class members, a requirement under Rule 23(a)(3). Fausz explains that any privacy concerns will be resolved first because of the parties' confidentiality agreement, and second, because Fausz is willing to have the account records of the putative class members produced with the names of the members redacted from the documents until such time as the District Court resolves the question of class certification. With that final condition, the Magistrate Judge concludes that production of the account records is appropriate. The privacy concerns raised by NPAS are fully taken into account by the confidentiality agreement and the redaction of the individual account holders' names from the account records. Issues of numerosity and typicality under Rule 23 are inevitable in the context of the present action given the Plaintiff's efforts to obtain class certification. Indeed, NPAS in its response has already broached the argument that the potential claims of the putative class members are sufficiently individual that they cannot be the basis for a class action. The Court therefore finds that the requested account records now sought by the Plaintiff in document request no. 34 are discoverable with the modifications suggested and accepted by the parties to redact the names of the various debtors found therein. The motion to compel accordingly is GRANTED to this extent. The Court shall afford NPAS 45 days from the date of entry of the present order in which to supplement its discovery production to take into account the present rulings of the Court. Appeal of this order is subject to the terms and time limitation of Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cc: Counsel of Record