RICKY J. JOHNSON, GDC ID # 1124129, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF DUANE PIPER, in his individual and official capacities, TED PAXTON, Former Sheriff, CAPT. SMITH, LT. FEE, SGT. HUGHES, OFFICERS GAY, HOBBS & COLE, TONYA SIMMONS MARTIN, Defendants CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-00173-RWS-JCF United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Gainesville Division Filed February 23, 2017 Fuller, J. Clay, United States Magistrate Judge MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER AND FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 Plaintiff, a state prisoner who asserts claims concerning his treatment at the Forsyth County Detention Center (“FCDC”), has sued the following Forsyth County Sheriff's Office (“FCSO”) officials: former Sheriff Ted Paxton and current Sheriff Duane Piper; Capt. Charles Smith, Lt. Andrew Fee and Sgt. Larry Hughes; and Officers William Gay, Christopher Hobbs and James Cole; and he has also sued Tonya Simmons Martin (“Simmons”).[1] (See Doc. 8; see also Docs. 78, 80). Defendants Piper, Paxton, Fee, Hughes, Smith, Gay, Hobbs and Cole (the “Sheriff's Office Defendants”) have filed a joint Motion For Summary Judgment. (Doc. 80). Defendant Simmons has filed a separate Motion For Summary Judgment. (Doc. 78). Also before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider Appointment Of Counsel (Doc. 72); Plaintiff's Second Motion To Compel Discovery (Doc. 76); Sheriff's Office Defendants' Motion For Leave To File Supplemental Summary Judgment Brief (Doc. 83); and Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Defendant Affidavits (Doc. 99). The Court has allowed the following of Plaintiff's claims to proceed: 1. his access-to-courts claims against former Sheriff Paxton in his individual capacity and against current Sheriff Piper in his individual and official capacities — alleging the denial of access to the FCDC library and the loss of his legal documents, and challenging the FCDC postcard-only policy; 2. his medical deliberate indifference claim against current Sheriff Piper in his official capacity and against Lt. Fee, Sgt. Hughes and Simmons for denying him the hernia surgery that had been scheduled for July 12, 2013; 3. his claim that current Sheriff Piper, Capt. Smith, Lt. Fee and Sgt. Hughes retaliated against him by placing him in the maximum isolation (“Max-Iso”) unit at the FCDC; 4. his claim that Officers Gay, Hobbs and Cole retaliated against him by filing disciplinary reports (“DRs”); and 5. his conditions-of-confinement claim against current Sheriff Piper in his official capacity and against Capt. Smith, Lt. Fee and Sgt. Hughes regarding the conditions in the Max-Iso unit. (Doc. 12 at 10; see Docs. 6, 8). I. Preliminary Matters A. Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider Appointment Of Counsel (Doc. 72) On August 11, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 60), stating: Although Plaintiff is hampered in the pursuit of his claims by his incarceration (see Doc. 60 at 5-6), that is true for any prisoner who seeks relief in a civil action. This case involves no exceptional circumstance, or novel or complex legal or factual issue, warranting the appointment of counsel for Plaintiff at this time. (Doc. 71 at 6). Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the undersigned “did not consider Plaintiff's argument that he is having difficulty in the discovery process due to Defendants attorneys [sic] intentional abuse of th[at] process,” nor did the undersigned make factual findings to support the conclusion that this case lacks sufficient complexity to warrant the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 72). *2 As explained below, there are no potential discovery responses from Defendants that might alter the outcome of this case, in which all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. And, despite proceeding pro se while imprisoned, Plaintiff has done an excellent job of presenting the merits of his claims and of arguing the fine points of the law. (See, e.g., Docs. 76, 88, 88-1, 98). Accordingly, this case does not warrant the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Smith v. Belle, 321 Fed. Appx. 838, 846 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel for plaintiff because “an examination of [plaintiff's] filings throughout the litigation reveals that, while he was not schooled in the law, he was able to present adequately the ‘essential merits’ of his position to the district court,” and, “perhaps most importantly, [his] case did not present any novel or complex issues of fact or law so as to require the appointment of counsel”). The Belle court did not make specific findings regarding the novelty and/or complexity of the issues in the case — reaching its assessment instead by simply relying on the facts and legal issues before it. See generally id.; see also Patton v. Rowell, 16-10492, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832, at *8-9 (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017) (“[Plaintiff] contends that the district court erred by not appointing counsel to represent him in this case.... ‘Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right. It is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.’ Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990). For example, in Fowler [the Eleventh Circuit] denied the appointment of counsel because the ‘plaintiff's claims [we]re relatively straightforward and involve[d] incidents which took place in the prison, most of which plaintiff witnessed himself.’ Id. This case [Rowell] does not present ‘exceptional circumstances.’ Instead, it is akin to Fowler, with a straightforward set of alleged facts in a well-developed area of law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel for [plaintiff].”). Likewise, here, all but one of Plaintiff's claims involves “a straightforward set of alleged facts in a well-developed area of law,” see Rowell, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832, at *9, to wit, access to the courts, medical deliberate indifference, First Amendment retaliation and conditions of confinement. Indeed, Plaintiff has done remarkably well in presenting evidence supporting his claims and in pointing to the Defendants' alleged lack of evidence to support their summary judgment motions. (See Docs. 88, 88-1, 88-3). And finally, even if the law concerning Plaintiff's claim regarding the FCDC's postcard-only policy is not as well-developed as in the other areas of law relevant to this case, this lack of development leads to the straightforward conclusion, as discussed below, that the Defendant Sheriffs are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities from Plaintiff's postcard-only claim. And the undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff has no other form of relief available to him on this claim. For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider Appointment Of Counsel (Doc. 72) is DENIED. B. Plaintiff's Second Motion To Compel Discovery (Doc. 76) On June 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery (Doc. 56), which the Court dismissed because Plaintiff failed to certify that he had conferred with Defendants in good faith before filing the motion (see Doc. 71). In that motion, Plaintiff argued that the Sheriff's Office Defendants had not properly responded to his requests for the following: (a) all court orders concerning Plaintiff's production for trial; (b) dates and times for all Plaintiff's transports to and from the FCDC, and names of the officers involved; (c) names of the FCSO officers involved in the seizure and inventory of Plaintiff's property during his transports to and from the FCDC; (d) names of the FCDC officers in charge of incoming and outgoing mail; (e) classification procedures for Max-Iso placement; (f) policy directives and instructions regarding the FCDC law library; (g) policy directives and instructions regarding FCDC disciplinary proceedings; (h) policy directives and instructions regarding the search and seizure of inmate property; (i) policy directives and instructions regarding inmate recreational programs and activities, including for Max-Iso inmates; (j) all grievances filed by Plaintiff while at the FCDC; (k) all inter-office memos concerning Plaintiff's treatment at the FCDC; (l) all security video of the booking area during Plaintiff's transports to and from the FCDC, in particular when he returned from court on January 18, 2011; (m) all security video of the Max-Iso unit during the time Plaintiff was housed there, in particular the cell search conducted on July 25, 2013; and *3 (n) all inmate grievances against, and supervisor disciplinary reports concerning, each remaining Defendant. (Doc. 56 at 2-10). In his second motion to compel, Plaintiff states that he has satisfied the requirement that he confer in good faith with Defendants (Doc. 76 at 1-2), and he therefore seeks to resubmit all the grounds to compel discovery set out in his first motion, and to add the following: (a) Defendants failed to submit initial disclosures, which has prevented him from amending his lawsuit to add or delete Defendants; (b) he “has reason to believe” that, despite Defendants' denial, there exists video of his return from court on January 18, 2011, when his legal materials were lost; (c) Defendants have failed to produce their oaths of office; (d) it appears that Simmons may have fabricated her contention that she did not arrange for Plaintiff's transfer to Augusta State Medical Prison (“ASMP”) in July 2013 and may have failed to respond properly to his request for all inter-office memos regarding his medical treatment, which might reveal the fabrication; and (e) Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiff's request for admissions and second request for documents and interrogatories, due to their alleged untimeliness, but that untimeliness should be excused due to Plaintiff's pro se status. (Id. at 2-7; see Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 5-7). The Sheriff's Office Defendants respond that if Plaintiff's second motion to compel is not a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his first one, it is untimely because he filed it more than 14 days after the close of discovery. (Doc. 84 at 1 n.1). They argue that, in the alternative, if Plaintiff's motion is one seeking reconsideration, it does not meet any of the criteria for such a motion, and, moreover, his wide ranging discovery requests are inappropriate in this “nominal damages case.” (Id. at 2-3). Based on the proposed disposition of this case, as outlined below, the Court finds that the discovery materials Plaintiff seeks are no longer relevant. In other words, even if Defendants were to respond to all of Plaintiff's discovery requests in a manner that would satisfy Plaintiff's motions to compel, Defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff's Second Motion To Compel Discovery (Doc. 76) is therefore DENIED. C. Sheriff's Office Defendants' Motion For Leave To File Supplemental Summary Judgment Brief (Doc. 83) On September 27, 2016, Defendants Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith moved for leave to file a supplemental summary judgment brief addressing Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim — which brief they also filed on September 27 — just one day after the deadline for filing summary judgment motions. (Doc. 83; see unnumbered Docket Entry for Sept. 7, 2016). Plaintiff objects because the motion was filed outside the period for filing summary judgment briefs, and Defendants have not shown good cause for granting the motion based on excusable neglect. (Doc. 86); see FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The Eleventh Circuit has noted four factors to be used in assessing a claim of excusable neglect: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Glover v. City of Pensacola, 372 Fed. Appx. 952, 955 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993), and ruling that district court abused its discretion in “refusing to entertain any motion for an out-of-time filing, .... [b]ecause Plaintiffs' error did not involve a failure to understand unambiguous procedural rules[; instead,] Plaintiffs arguably made a mistake of fact” (internal quotations omitted)). *4 Counsel for Defendants Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith asserts that until he read the summary judgment materials filed by Simmons on September 26, 2016, he had simply failed to note that the District Court had declined to follow the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim. (Doc. 83 at 1-2; see id. at 2 n.1 (noting that the “large number of defendants and claims has contributed to [counsel's] confusion”)). Although this explanation for the delay is not particularly compelling, Defendants filed their supplemental brief only one day after summary judgment motions were due, and the Court discerns no prejudice to Plaintiff and no adverse impact on these proceedings arising from that brief delay. See Glover, 372 Fed. Appx. at 955 & n.6. The Court also finds that Defendants' motion is simply a good-faith attempt to correct an oversight, rather than a request to excuse their counsel's failure to understand an unambiguous procedural rule. See id. Defendants Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith's motion to file a supplemental summary judgment brief (Doc. 83) is therefore GRANTED. D. Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Defendant Affidavits (Doc. 99) Plaintiff has moved to strike all, or portions of, the Wilson, Fee and Hughes declarations and the Simmons affidavit. (Doc. 99). Plaintiff argues: (1) although Wilson and Hughes declare that Plaintiff was sent to ASMP on July 11, 2013 in response to a Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC” or “GDOC”) production order, they have failed to produce a copy of that order, in violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1); (2) although Fee and Hughes deny knowledge of Plaintiff's transfer to ASMP on July 11, 2013, Smith's response to Plaintiff's July 24, 2013 grievance suggests otherwise, stating “we sent you there for the procedure you requested”; and (3) not only has Simmons not supported her assertion that she had no knowledge of Plaintiff's transfer until after it occurred, but her affidavit is contradicted by evidence Plaintiff has placed into the record. (Id. at 2-4). The Sheriff's Office Defendants respond, citing cases, that “law enforcement officers are entitled to rely upon information and/or requests from other law enforcement agencies, without some additional piece of paper to that effect.” (Doc. 102 at 1-2). Simmons responds that “Plaintiff seeks to strike [her] Affidavit ... because he requested his medical records from [ASMP] and was told they did not have any, [and therefore] her Affidavit was false. Such a basis for a motion to strike is misplaced and should be denied.” (Doc. 101 at 2-3; see id. at 1-2 (citing McNair v. Monsanto Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1298 (M.D. Ga. 2003) (“A motion to strike is only appropriately addressed toward matters contained in the pleadings. Affidavits submitted in support of a motion are clearly not within that category. It is well established that it is sufficient for the party opposing the motion to register its objection to the movant's affidavits by way of the material submitted in opposition to the motion. The court will then implicitly, if not explicitly, rule upon [the] objections in its consideration of the motion.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)))). In his reply (Doc. 103), Plaintiff raises concerns about the attachment to the Sheriff's Office Defendants' response (see Doc. 102-1 (an email to the FCSO, among others, regarding Plaintiff's July 2013 transport to ASMP)) because these Defendants were obligated to produce that document during discovery; and because the document is not, as Defendants suggest, a production order for Plaintiff's transfer to ASMP, but rather merely an “authorization to transport” Plaintiff there. (Id. at 4). But, as set forth below, this Court has considered Plaintiff's objections to the Defendants' asserted factual support for their summary judgment motions, including his contention that they failed to provide the “missing” production order upon which they purport to rely. The Motion To Strike Defendant Affidavits (Doc. 99) is therefore DENIED. II. Summary Judgment Review A. Summary Judgment Standard *5 To prevail on a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment on such a claim is proper “if the [summary judgment] movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “[Former] Rule 56(c) [now Rule 56(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, a court must “view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable” to the non-movant. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “A court need not permit a case to go to a jury, however, when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relies, are implausible.” Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 285 F.3d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). And “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is warranted. Apcoa, Inc. v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 906 F.2d 610, 611 (11th Cir. 1990). The movant may do so by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has properly supported the summary judgment motion, the non-movant then must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” i.e., that the evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict in the non-movant's favor. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted); see also Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that “non-moving party must come forward with significant, probative evidence” (emphasis added)). “[C]onclusory assertions ... [without] supporting evidence are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). B. Qualified Immunity: Individual Capacity “Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “To be even potentially eligible for qualified immunity, the [government] official has the burden of establishing that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” O'Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). It is apparent from Plaintiff's pleadings that all Defendants acted within the scope of their discretionary authority regarding the matters at issue here, a proposition that Plaintiff does not dispute. *6 “Once a government official demonstrates that he is potentially entitled to qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the official is not actually entitled to it.... [by showing] that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Hayes, 378 F.3d at 1206; see Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (same, citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002), and Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Whether the plaintiff has successfully done so “is a question of law [to be decided by] accepting the facts alleged as true and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in plaintiff's favor.” Snider v. Jefferson State Cmty. College, 344 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2003). The facts alleged must plausibly show a constitutional right “clear enough that any reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.... The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). In general, to determine whether a public official had “fair and clear notice” that his or her actions violated the Constitution, a court in this Circuit examines “case law existing at the time of the violation” — “decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the pertinent state” — involving facts “similar to the case at hand.” Id. at 1331 & n.9 (internal quotations omitted). “In rare cases, the words of a federal statute or federal constitutional provision may be so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful.” Id. at 1331 (internal quotations omitted); see Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same). But “[w]hile some broad statements of principle in case law are not tied to particularized facts and can clearly establish law applicable in the future to different sets of detailed facts, more often, the facts are so material to the violation at issue that such generalized principles are insufficient.” Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1331 (internal quotations omitted). As the Supreme Court recently reminded the federal courts: We have repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citations and internal quotations omitted). C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Official Capacity When a Georgia sheriff functions as an arm of the state, he enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from a § 1983 claim for money damages or other retrospective relief brought against him in his official capacity. See Purcell v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a Georgia sheriff “functions as an arm of the State [not the County] when promulgating policies and procedures governing conditions of confinement” at a county jail, and, therefore, the sheriff was “entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from [a] suit [for money damages] in his official capacity”). The same immunity applies to sheriff's deputies when carrying out the state functions of a Georgia sheriff. See Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A [Georgia] deputy's functions are derived from the sheriff's functions, so the deputy's performance of [a sheriff's] function is also a state function.”); Owens v. Turner, 5:15-CV-12 (CAR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128614, at *16 & n. 55 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2016) (“[S]heriff's deputies are entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity against official capacity claims as a sheriff.” (citing Howell v. Houston Cnty., Ga., 5:09-CV-402 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95938, at *84 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2011), to the effect that “deputies are entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as sheriffs because, under Georgia law, sheriff's deputies are employees of the sheriff” (citing, in turn, Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1342 n. 32 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)); see also Morgan v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 1:05-CV-1576-JOF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44994, at *16-17 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2007) (“[W]hen a sheriff is acting as an arm of the state, his deputies are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for money damages in their official capacities.”). *7 As the Court noted earlier, however, this Eleventh Amendment official capacity immunity may not extend to the provision of medical care to county jail inmates. (See Doc. 8 at 8-9); but see Skelton, 840 F.3d at 1336 (reversing denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to deputy sheriff because “the sovereign immunity of Georgia extends to a deputy sheriff who denies a dietary request of an inmate in a county jail”); see id. at 1339-41 (noting similarity between Georgia sheriff's duty to provide medical care to county jail inmates and his or her duty to provide food to those inmates; also noting that “[t]he Georgia Court of Appeals has never construed [the relevant state statute] to mean that a sheriff acts on behalf of the county when he provides medical care”). D. Mootness It is undisputed that Plaintiff was transferred to state prison on August 9, 2013, after his Forsyth County convictions and sentencing. (See Ex. F to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 70-72). And although Plaintiff argues that he may be returned to the FCDC at some unspecified time because he has a motion for new trial pending before the trial court (see Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 12), it also appears that he has spent no more than 18 days at the FCDC — 6 in September 2014, 8 in February 2015 and 4 in June 2015 — during the 43 months since his Forsyth County convictions. (See Proof of Custody, Ex. A to Decl. of Chad Evers, Doc. 80-9 at 3-4). In these circumstances, there is no genuine issue for trial regarding whether Plaintiff's claims for prospective relief are moot. They are. See Jones v. Holloway, CV 310-090, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52118, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 20) (“An inmate's claim for injunctive relief against prison officials is ordinarily subject to dismissal for mootness when the prisoner is transferred to another prison and is no longer under the control of the prison officials against whom injunctive relief is sought.” (citing Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985)), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52115 (S.D. Ga. May 16, 2011); see also McKinnon v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The general rule is that a prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.”); Mann v. McNeil, 360 Fed. Appx. 31, 32 (11th Cir. 2010) (same). E. Administrative Exhaustion The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). [This] exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” This provision entirely eliminates judicial discretion and instead mandates strict exhaustion, “irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.” Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), and Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001)); see Bettencourt v. Owens, 542 Fed. Appx. 730, 733 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). “The PLRA seeks to eliminate unwarranted interference with the administration of prisons in order to afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs. Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1217 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). *8 There is no futility exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that “the judicially recognized futility and inadequacy exceptions do not survive the new mandatory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA,” and “there is no longer discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement”); Concklin v. Libero, CV213-012, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163327, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 12) (noting that “even when the prisoner is seeking relief not provided for under the grievance process, exhaustion is still a prerequisite to his filing suit”), adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163099 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2013). “[U]nless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred.” Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157-58 (internal quotations omitted); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (U.S. 2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”). When presented with “a defense of failure to properly exhaust available administrative remedies under the PLRA,” courts in this Circuit treat the defense “as a matter in abatement.” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). Doing so involves a two-step process: First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant's motion to dismiss and those in the plaintiff's response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff's version of the facts as true. If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.... If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step, where the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true, the court then proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion. The defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Once the court makes findings on the disputed issues of fact, it then decides whether under those findings the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies. Id. at 1082-83 (citations omitted); see Porter v. Sightler, 457 Fed. Appx. 880, 882 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, which is treated as a matter in abatement .... And because exhaustion is nothing more than a precondition to an adjudication on the merits, the district court may resolve factual disputes if the parties have had a sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” (internal quotations omitted)). 1. Plaintiff's FCDC Grievances And Appeals The history of Plaintiff's grievance activity is disputed. Defendants list the following grievances, including one grievance appeal, as the entirety of that activity: 1. On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the lack of response to his requests for “copies, law library access, and postage for legal work.” (Ex. C-8 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 47). 2. On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the FCDC policy that required him to use a post card to write to his attorney. The grievance response indicates that he was provided a stamped envelope for that purpose. (Ex. C-5 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 44). 3. On April 28, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the return of a letter sent to him by his mother, rather than its being placed in his property bin and his being given “notice of the mail in question,” as required by FCDC policy. (Ex. C-7 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 46). 4. On April 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a grievance appeal regarding his lack of access to the FCDC law library, despite his having a court order allowing him access. He was told that he needed to “get a current court order,” which, he was advised, his court-appointed lawyer could obtain for him. (Ex. C-6 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 45). *9 5. On May 5, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the DRs he received on May 3 & 4, 2012, resulting in his being handcuffed and taken to holding each day, and alleged that FCDC officers were “taunting and agitating [him] due to [his] recent complaint to internal affairs regarding the misconduct of Mr. Joseph Whirlow.” Plaintiff also complained about the incorrect date on Officer Gay's narrative of the events that led to the seven May 3 DRs. (Ex. C-10 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 49). 6. On May 4, 2013, Plaintiff grieved his lack of access to all of his legal materials. Lt. Neville noted in response that Plaintiff had “4 large bags” of materials and that Plaintiff had agreed to be “placed into a Max Isolation cell for 24 hours to allow him to get his legal papers in order” in file folders provided to Plaintiff for that purpose. (Ex. E-2 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 66). 7. On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the conditions in Max-Iso since his placement there “for the express purpose of accessing [his] legal material.” In particular, he complained that the “lights are on 24-7 & never turned off.” He suggested that his continued confinement in Max-Iso was in retaliation for his filing a civil action in federal district court. Lt. Fee advised Plaintiff that it was his “responsibility to advise [FCDC officers] when [he was] done with [his] legal concerns and [they would then] move [him] into population.” Sgt. Hughes reviewed the grievance and Lt. Fee's response. (Ex. C-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 43). 8. On or about May 15, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the opening of his legal mail outside of his presence. Lt. Fee explained that the mail was opened because Plaintiff's name was not visible on the outside of the letter at the time of its receipt. (Ex. C-9 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 48). 9. On June 8, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the lights being on constantly in Max-Iso, where he had been housed since May 3, 2013. He was told that the lights were never turned off, for the security of the facility. (Ex. C-2 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 41). 10. On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the cancellation of his surgery and his transfer to state prison on July 10, in violation of a court order that he not be transferred to state prison during the period before his August 2013 trial. Lt. Fee responded that he would need to see the court order in question. Sgt. Hughes reviewed the grievance and response. (Ex. C-1 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 40). 11. On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the documents missing from his legal materials due to his transfer to Hall County and then to state prison. Lt. Neville noted in response that on July 30, 2013, Plaintiff had been moved to M1 cell and allowed full access to all of his legal papers. (Ex. E-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 68). 12. On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance expressing his thanks for having received the remainder of his legal materials, although noting that there were still some folders missing. (Ex. C-3 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 42). 2. The FCDC Grievance Procedure Major Wilson, the FCDC Jail Administrator (Wilson Decl. ¶ 2), states the following in his declaration in support of the Sheriff's Office Defendants' motion for summary judgment: 1. An attempt was made to include all grievances that might apply to the various claims asserted in [Plaintiff's] federal lawsuit. Grievances that apply to other matters (such as one complaining about the amount of peanut butter on a sandwich) are not included. Also, materials designated by [Plaintiff] as requests (by marking the box “request form”) are not included because those are not grievances. (Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added)). *10 2. All inmate grievances filed by inmates at the Jail are retained in the Sheriff's Office files relating to the individual inmate. My review of the pertinent inmate grievances reveals that [Plaintiff's] only appeal regarding any grievance reflected in attachment C is the one from April 28, 2012, which appears to have been designated as a grievance and later as a “grievance appeal.” (Id. ¶ 7). 3. If an inmate is housed outside of the Forsyth County Jail, the inmate can still file a grievance or appeal by sending the grievance or appeal to the Forsyth County Jail. If the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office receives the grievance, we answer the grievance and send it back to the inmate's current housing location, so that the response can be provided to the inmate. (Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added)). 4. Every inmate is offered a copy of the Inmate Handbook when he or she is booked into the Jail. Furthermore, all detention officers at the Jail who deal with inmates are trained to provide information and forms regarding the Jail's grievance process. (Id. ¶ 4). In the FCDC Inmate Handbook, there is a section titled H.) Grievance, which provides the following: Any inmate shall be entitled to communicate legitimate complaints (grievances). All grievances shall be in writing, on the standard Inmate Grievance form, and may be given to any staff member for prompt transmittal to the Watch Commander. If the grievance being filed is beyond his/her scope of authority to address, the grievance will be forwarded to the Asst. Detention Division Commander, and if necessary to the Detention Division Commander.... All grievances must fully describe the FACTUAL basis and circumstances of the alleged incident or situation, and will include a SPECIFIC COMPLAINT. The inmate must sign any grievance he or she generates, or the grievance will be considered anonymous, and therefore invalid. Decisions made by a Watch Commander or the Asst. Detention Division Commander may, if you feel it is necessary and conforms with applicable guidelines, be appealed to the Detention Division Commander. Any grievance (or appeal of decisions regarding such) which is directed to the Sheriff, will be filed and forwarded to his office through the Detention Division Commander's office, and up through his/her chain of command. Failure to follow this procedure may invalidate any grievance, appeal, or legal recourse you might otherwise feel you may be entitled to. (Ex. B to Wilson Decl. at B16-B17, Doc. 80-1 at 38-39). 3. Plaintiff's Response Regarding His Grievance History Plaintiff disputes, in part, these alleged facts. Plaintiff states that he “does not recall being offered an Inmate Handbook[,] nor was he informed of any appeal grievance process by any Jail staff.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 21, Doc. 88 at 29). He notes that there is no documentation that he ever received a handbook, and he also notes that the handbook mentions “applicable guidelines” for a grievance appeal without explaining what those guidelines are. (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 9). Plaintiff asserts that there is no separate grievance appeal form and that no response to any of his grievances informed him of his appeal rights. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that he simply had no way of knowing what the appeals process involved, making it impossible for him to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the denial of his grievances. (Id. at 9-10). *11 Plaintiff disputes Major Wilson's statement that he filed only one grievance appeal by providing examples of two other such appeals. (Id. at 8-9; see Doc. 88-3 at 51, Pl.'s Ex. 44 (Plaintiff's Aug. 6, 2009 grievance appeal regarding an alleged assault by Deputy Sotor);[2] id. at 52, Pl.'s Ex. 45 (Plaintiff's Aug. 10, 2009 grievance appeal regarding alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, i.e., his hernia)). Plaintiff argues: “The fact is [that he] filed numerous grievances, appeals [and] complaints that put Defendants on notice of the issues, and an adequate opportunity to address them.” (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 9). Plaintiff has provided no copy of any of these alleged grievances, appeals or complaints. And, citing two kiosk messages he sent while at the Hall County Detention Center (“HCDC”) on March 28, 2011 and September 30, 2011 (see Doc. 88-3 at 3-4), Plaintiff asserts that he tried to file grievances while in Hall County, “only to be informed that facility would not hear them.” (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 10). Plaintiff also relies upon the alleged futility of the grievance process to resolve his complaints; the debilitating conditions in Max-Iso — “the inability to sleep and loss of focus and headaches” — that made it “impossible” for him to “think[ ] about a grievance appeal process [he] was unaware of”; and, finally, the alleged threat from Capt. Smith that Plaintiff would receive “charges of making false statements if [he] continued making those claims[,] which effectively rendered any administrative remedy unavailable.” (Id. at 10-11). 4. Administrative Exhaustion: Analysis Despite Plaintiff's general assertion that he filed grievances, complaints and appeals other than those provided by the Sheriff's Office Defendants, there is no evidence of any such filing relevant to the claims now before the Court. The Court discredits Plaintiff's bare assertion to the contrary.[3] See Porter, 457 Fed. Appx. at 882 (“[B]ecause exhaustion is nothing more than a precondition to an adjudication on the merits, the district court may resolve factual disputes if the parties have had a sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)). As for Plaintiff's alleged ignorance of the grievance procedures at the FCDC, and in particular of the grievance appeal procedure, it is apparent from the undisputed record before the Court that Plaintiff was aware of those procedures and capable of filing grievances, and appeals therefrom — which he did on multiple occasions, although only one grievance appeal that is relevant here. (See Doc. 88-3 at 51, Pl.'s Ex. 44 (Aug. 6, 2009 grievance appeal regarding an alleged assault by an FCSO deputy); id. at 52, Pl.'s Ex. 45 (Aug. 10, 2009 grievance appeal regarding alleged medical deliberate indifference)). Plaintiff's citation in his Sur-Response (Doc. 98 at 15) to Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2007), is also unavailing, because that case stands for the proposition that a grievance procedure that is “unknown and unknowable is unavailable; it is not capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotations omitted). But, as the undisputed record demonstrates here, the FCDC grievance procedure, including the appeal procedure, was not unknown to Plaintiff — indeed, he used it many times. *12 And, as noted above, the alleged futility of the FCDC grievance procedure is no warrant to excuse Plaintiff's failure to avail himself of that procedure. See Hawk, 159 F.3d at 1325. Plaintiff's transfers to other facilities also do not relieve him of the administrative exhaustion requirement. See Smith v. LeBlanc, 1:07-CV-124 (WLS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23347, at *11-12 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 15) (recommending dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of administrative exhaustion: “[T]he facts establish that [he] failed to file or pursue any type of out-of-time grievance regarding the events underlying this lawsuit once he was transferred into the custody of the GDOC. Although [he] maintains that the GDOC grievance procedure does not allow for the filing of grievances regarding non-GDOC facilities and offenses, there is no indication that [his] ability or opportunity to mail a letter or grievance to the Dougherty County Jail was foreclosed.”), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23411 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2011); see also Chatham v. Adcock, 3:05-CV-0127-JTC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72523, at *44, 75 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing claim for lack of administrative exhaustion because “Plaintiff might have attempted to pursue [his administrative] remedies after his transfer through the use of the United States mail,” but he did not), affirmed by 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13731 (11th Cir. June 24, 2009). Finally, at least with respect to all of his claims except for his Max-Iso claims, his medical deliberate indifference claim and his DR retaliation claim against Officer Cole, Plaintiff may not rely upon his alleged disorientation as a result of his detention in Max-Iso or upon the alleged threat from Capt. Smith, both of which occurred well after the specific events that are relevant to Plaintiff's other claims. The Court concludes that Plaintiff clearly satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement only with respect to his alleged lack of access to the FCDC law library in April 2012, regarding which he filed a grievance appeal. Further, as discussed below, even assuming that there had been a genuine issue of material fact to whether the grievance appeal procedure was actually available to Plaintiff for his Max-Iso claims, his medical deliberate indifference claim and his DR retaliation claim against Cole, those claims fail on the merits. F. Summary 1. Plaintiff's transfer to state prison moots any claim for prospective relief. 2. Under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff may not obtain damages from any Sheriff's Office Defendant sued in his official capacity, except perhaps on Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claim. 3. Plaintiff may not obtain damages from any Defendant sued in his or her individual capacity on any claim from which the Defendant enjoys qualified immunity. 4. Plaintiff may not obtain relief on any claim for which he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies that were available to him at the FCDC. III. Background And Factual Overview A. Plaintiff's Litigation History The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff pled guilty in the Superior Court of Hall County on July 15, 2008, and received two concurrent 10-year sentences for theft by receiving, as well as a 20-year sentence, 10 years to serve, for burglary. Johnson v. Bryson, 2:15-cv-138 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2016), Doc. 18. On July 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, and, after declining to accept the trial court's offer to appoint counsel on his behalf, he appeared pro se at the October 16, 2008 hearing on his motion. Id., Doc. 8-1 at 1-2; Doc. 18 at 2-3, 21 et seq. The trial court denied the motion on November 7, 2008, and Plaintiff filed a pro se notice of appeal on December 3, 2008. He filed a motion for appointment of counsel on December 23, 2009, which was granted, and he proceeded with counsel until the Court of Appeals of Georgia denied his appeal on March 6, 2012.[4] Id., Doc. 8-1 at 2-3; Doc. 9-3 at 2; Doc. 9-8 at 6, 45. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied Plaintiff's pro se petition for certiorari review on October 15, 2012. See id., Doc. 9-9. *13 The Court also takes judicial notice that on May 9, 2012, Plaintiff first raised the claims he raises here about law library access, the loss of his paperwork and the postcard-only mail policy at the FCDC, in the case of Johnson v. Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2:12-cv-108 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2014), which this Court dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to truthfully complete the section of his complaint inquiring about his prior prisoner lawsuits.[5] Id., Docs. 40, 46. In that May 2012 case, Plaintiff named only Sheriff Paxton among those Defendants who remain in this case, which Plaintiff initiated on July 14, 2014 by executing his complaint. (See Doc. 1). Major Wilson, whom Plaintiff also sued in both actions, has been dismissed from this case. (See Docs. 8, 12). B. The Relevant Periods Of Plaintiff's FCDC Detention It appears undisputed that from January 1, 2010 through August 9, 2013, when Plaintiff was transferred to state prison after his Forsyth County convictions, he was housed at the FCDC during the following time periods: (1) in 2010: January 12-19 and April 21-May 3; (2) in 2011: March 9-29; (3) in 2012: January 31-February 10 and April 10-May 14; and (4) in 2013: April 30-June 27 and July 22-August 9. (See Proof of Custody, Ex. A to Decl. of Chad Evers, Doc. 80-9 at 3-4; Ex. F to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 70-72). Although Plaintiff was a state prisoner during this time, as a result of his Hall County convictions, he was often transferred to Forsyth County for court proceedings. (See Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 5-8, Doc. 88 at 3 & n.1). During those transfers, he was usually housed in Hall County. He was convicted in August 2013 by a Forsyth County jury on one count of burglary and four counts of theft by taking, and he was sentenced on August 8, 2013 to a combined 40-year term of imprisonment. He was transferred to state prison on August 9, 2013. (See Ex. F to Decl. of Tom Wilson, Doc. 80-1 at 70-72). IV. Plaintiff's Access-To-Courts Claims, Including His Postcard-Only Claim “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). But an access-to-courts claim may not proceed without an allegation of “actual injury regarding prospective or existing litigation” — such as “missing filing deadlines or being prevented from presenting claims” — while “in the pursuit of specific types of nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and challenges to conditions of confinement.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 369 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court's own precedents, including Bounds, do “not establish a freestanding right of access to the courts, meaningful or otherwise”). *14 A plaintiff may not prevail on an access-to-courts claim if he “has failed to demonstrate that the confiscation of his legal materials[, for example,] resulted in the loss of a nonfrivolous claim — i.e., actual injury.” Miller v. Conway, 1:12-CV-91, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57529, at *20, 24 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28) (granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's access-to-court claim, and quoting Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006), to the effect that a “litigant asserting an access claim must also prove that he has a colorable underlying claim for which he seeks relief”), adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57011 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2013); see also Dennis v. Schwarzauer, 496 Fed. Appx. 958, 959 (11th Cir. 2012) (“To assert an access-to-the-courts claim, the plaintiff must possess a non-frivolous, arguable underlying cause of action, the presentation of which was prevented by the defendant. Indeed, the plaintiff must describe the underlying cause of action specifically enough in the complaint to show it is more than hope.”). The three claims discussed under this heading have been allowed to proceed against former Sheriff Paxton in his individual capacity and against current Sheriff Piper in his individual and official capacities.[6] (See Doc. 12 at 10). The sheriffs argue in support of summary judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to not only these three claims but with respect to all of the claims now before the Court. (Doc. 80-11 at 3-6). They contend, in fact, that Plaintiff has admitted as much in one of his responses to interrogatories. (Id. at 5). The sheriffs argue further that these three access-to-courts claims are time-barred with respect to any Defendant to this action other than former Sheriff Paxton, and in particular are time-barred with respect to current Sheriff Piper under the two-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims arising out of events in Georgia. (Id. at 2-3); see Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that Georgia's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 actions brought in federal district court, based on events that occurred in Georgia). The sheriffs appear to acknowledge that Plaintiff's complaint in this action, executed on July 14, 2014, renews his May 2012 complaint, under the Georgia renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, because it was filed within six months of the dismissal of the earlier action. (Doc. 80-11 at 2-3). They argue, however, that Plaintiff may proceed on the three access-to-courts claims that he first raised in his May 2012 action only against a Defendant remaining here whom he named in that action, and only Sheriff Paxton qualifies as such a Defendant. (Id. (quoting Gish v. Thomas, 691 S.E.2d 900, 906 (Ga. App. 2010) (“Long-standing and well-settled precedent establishes that in a renewal action the cause of action must be substantially the same as in the original action [and t]here must also be a substantial identity of essential parties.” (internal quotations omitted)))). The sheriffs also argue that Plaintiff's claims for prospective relief are moot due to his August 2013 transfer to state prison (id. at 6-7); that they cannot be held liable vicariously, based on their supervisory status alone, although that is the only basis alleged against them in their individual capacities (id. at 9-10); and that they are entitled, in their individual capacities, to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims (id. at 22-24). A. Denial Of Access To The FCDC Library *15 In allowing Plaintiff's law library claim to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his July 2008 guilty plea in Hall County and then appealed the denial of that motion to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, proceeding pro se until July 2010 and again after March 2012. Because the FCDC prohibits the use of its law library or legal research materials without a court order, Plaintiff obtained a court order in 2008 and again in October 2009, but each time he [was] returned to the FCDC he [was] denied access to the library [without] a newly obtained court order. Plaintiff asserts that because he was denied access to the law library and/or research materials at the FCDC, except for “a few occasions in 2009” between midnight and 2 a.m., “he was unable to adequately challenge his Hall County conviction.” He claims that an adequately presented challenge stood a reasonable chance of prevailing, given the success he obtained in March 2014 in a state habeas proceeding in Ware County. (Doc. 6 at 3-4 (citations omitted)). Regarding the merits of Plaintiff's access to law library claim, the sheriffs argue that the claims must be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff had legal counsel to represent his interests in th[e Hall County] criminal matter [at issue]; (2) Plaintiff got to use the law library on various occasions; (3) Plaintiff cannot show that lack of law library access hindered him from presenting a meritorious argument; (4) Plaintiff's brief confinement at the Forsyth County Jail did not trigger any federal law library access right; and (5) the Jail's policy on inmate law library access did not violate the First Amendment. (Doc. 80-11 at 11-12). The sheriffs note that “Plaintiff's discovery responses indicate that he was represented by counsel in his only relevant case (the criminal case in Hall County), even on appeal,” and they also note that Plaintiff “cannot detail a non-frivolous argument in his Hall County criminal case that was deterred by lack of law library access during his short stay(s) at the Forsyth County Jail.” (Id. at 12, 13). The sheriffs note further that the Sheriff's Office Proof of Custody attached to the Declaration of Chad Evers (Doc. 80-9 at 3-4) shows that “Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Forsyth County Jail for approximately 30 days total between May 10, 2010 and the failure of his appeal [from his Hall County convictions] in February 2012” — the Court counts 36 such days — and Plaintiff has admitted that he had access to law libraries at other facilities during that time period. (Doc. 80-11 at 14-15). Plaintiff responds that in July 2008, he was proceeding pro se in an attempt to withdraw his Hall County guilty pleas, for which a hearing was held on October 16, 2008, but he was denied access to the FCDC law library during that time and thus was unable to prepare properly to argue in support of his motion to withdraw his plea, which ultimately failed. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ II. 1-2, Doc. 88 at 13). Plaintiff states that although he obtained a court order in October 2009 requiring FCDC officials to grant him access to the FCDC law library for two hours each day (see Pl.'s Ex. 19, Doc. 88-3 at 24), he was repeatedly denied access to the law library because FCDC officials improperly interpreted the order to apply only to the specific period of detention during which Plaintiff had obtained the order (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ II. 3-9). Plaintiff states that he “also experienced serious difficulties in [his] pending [Forsyth County] trial involving attorney issues” that he raised “with the indigent defense TriPartite Committee[,] which denied [his] grievance on July 19, 2013.” (Id. ¶¶ II. 10-11; see Pl.'s Ex. 22, Doc. 88-3 at 27). Plaintiff asserts that had he “not been denied access to the legal library during [his] several transfers and incarcerations[, he] would have succeeded on [his] grievances, appeals, petitions and suits. At a minimum the odds of success could have been substantially increased.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ II. 12). *16 In reply, the sheriffs note that in an FCDC memo from Lt. Neville, dated May 2, 2012, Plaintiff was in fact given access to the law library in response to the only grievance that he fully exhausted by filing a grievance appeal on April 28, 2012. (Sheriffs' Reply Br., Doc. 96 at 5 n.5 (citing Pl.'s Ex. 21, Doc. 88-3 at 26 (“Inmate Ricky Johnson [ ] has been granted law library access for two (2) hours per week for the remainder of his stay here at the [FCDC].”)). B. Confiscation And Loss Of Plaintiff's Legal Materials In allowing Plaintiff's loss-of-legal-materials claim to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: On January 15, 2011, Plaintiff was returned to the FCDC to appear for a hearing on his “Plea in Bar.” The Forsyth County Superior Court continued the hearing so that Plaintiff and his counsel could review evidence that Plaintiff had obtained, allegedly establishing “his innocence to the pending outstanding charges of commercial burglary & theft by receiving stolen property.” But when Plaintiff returned from court, his legal materials, including the evidence he had obtained, were seized by an unknown FCSO deputy, and the evidence disappeared. On February 9, 2011, the trial court ordered the FCSO to locate the missing materials. At a hearing on the matter, FCSO deputies stated that they had given the materials to a Hall County Sheriff's Office transport officer, but that officer denied ever receiving them. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he seizure and ‘loss’ of [this] evidence was clearly deliberate & intentional.” He claims that the evidence “would have exonerated [him]. Instead, the Plea in Bar was denied & the case remains pending.” Plaintiff blames the loss of his legal materials on the inadequate training of FCDC personnel in handling such materials and the inadequate FCDC facilities for storing and tracking them. He claims violations of his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 6 at 4-5 (citations omitted)). The sheriffs argue that this claim is timely only with respect to Sheriff Paxton, and it fails because Sheriff Paxton “had no role” in the incident, and Plaintiff's “papers were not lost as a result of any policy or order” of the sheriff. (Doc. 80-11 at 17-18). They note further that the paperwork was not intentionally withheld — it simply could not be located. (Id. at 18). Plaintiff responds that on January 18, 2011, upon his return from court, FCDC deputies “removed/seized [his] legal material [—] includ[ing] receipts, bills of sale, and affidavits of ownership for property seized from [Plaintiff] and necessary to defend from charges of theft by receiving.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ II(b). 1, Doc. 88 at 16). Plaintiff recalls that Defendant Smith testified at a court hearing, called in order to determine the whereabouts of the missing material, that it had been located and given to Hall County Transport Officer Howard; but Howard testified that he never received the material, and there is no paper trail establishing what happened to it. (Id. ¶¶ II(b). 2-7). Plaintiff claims that the loss of this material “crippled [his] defense.” (Id. ¶ II(b). 8). Plaintiff argues that the Court should ignore Defendants' claims that they were not personally involved, because they failed to provide, in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests, the names of the officers who were involved, and, moreover, the loss could have been avoided had Sheriff Paxton “maintained an adequate property room with meaningful record logs providing accountability and also qualified persons properly trained.” (Id. ¶ II(b). 10; see Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 5-7 (arguing that Defendants' failure to comply with his discovery requests has “hindered [his] ability to identify each responsible party,” and that this Court “should not grant summary judgment against [Plaintiff, because his] discovery requests have not been answered”); see id. at 20 (noting that it was only after a court hearing was ordered on the subject of Plaintiff's lost paperwork that the FCDC changed its policy regarding the seizure of inmate materials, instituting the use of a logbook to track inmate property); see also Pl.'s Ex. 47, Doc. 88-3 at 54 (FCDC logbook policy directive, dated Mar. 9, 2011)). *17 Plaintiff also argues that his law library and postcard-only claims “are ongoing and systemic,” and thus not time-barred. (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 8). C. The FCDC Postcard-Only Policy In allowing Plaintiff's challenge to the FCDC postcard-only policy to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: Plaintiff also challenges the FCDC policy of requiring that prisoner mail be by postcard only. He asserts that this policy has not only had a chilling effect on his ability to complain to the outside world about his conditions of confinement at the FCDC, but it also has interfered with his legal mail to such an extent that he was required to rely on the assistance of his 75-year-old mother to file his petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of Georgia to challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his Hall County guilty plea. (Doc. 6 at 5-6 (citations omitted)). The sheriffs argue that this claim is timely only with respect to former Sheriff Paxton, and it fails because the postcard-only policy excepts incoming legal mail, photographs and newspapers, and Plaintiff “cannot show harm” from the policy. (Doc. 80-11 at 16; see Ex. A to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 8-14). The sheriffs note that when Plaintiff was asked to identify any mail he could not send or receive due to the policy, he “provided absolutely no substantive information.” (Id.). Finally, they claim qualified immunity from this claim because there is no clearly established law prohibiting a postcard-only policy such as the policy at the FCDC. (Id. at 17). Plaintiff responds that the FCDC returned mail from his mother at a time when she was “the only person who could – or would – gather evidence, documents and various other materials to assist [him] in his legal efforts.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ III. 1, Doc. 88 at 19). Plaintiff states that the non-postcard mail returned to his mother was not placed in his property, as required by FCDC procedure, and he notes that Defendants have provided no evidence of a security concern justifying the postcard-only limitations on inmate mail and no evidence regarding a less restrictive alternative that would protect both the security of the FCDC and the First Amendment rights of FCDC inmates. (Id. ¶¶ III. 2-7). D. Access To Courts: Analysis In Plaintiff's May 2012 complaint, he alleges the following. “During [his] various trips to [the FCDC, he] was a pro se appellant in matters relating to [his] Hall County conviction.” Johnson, 2:12-cv-108, Doc. 1 at 4. He was provided FCDC law library access in 2009, but not on subsequent trips to the FCDC. When the appeal from his Hall County convictions was denied in February 2012, he filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and then a notice of intent to petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for certiorari review. Id. After filing the notice, he was transferred to the FCDC the next day, where his lack of access to the law library hindered his ability to “adequately and competently develop and raise important issues in [his certiorari] petition.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also alleges that his legal materials — which were lost after he returned from a Forsyth County hearing on January 15, 2010[7] — were crucial to his defense to the Forsyth County charges on which he was later convicted, and that his “attorney was coming to review [them] with [him],” but, of course, never got the chance to do so. Id. at 5-6. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the FCDC's postcard-only policy caused a letter from his mother to be returned as undeliverable. Id. at 6-7. *18 In his July 2014 complaint, filed in this action, Plaintiff alleges that because he was denied access to the FCDC law library, his “pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea [in Hall County] was denied, his appeal was denied, and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied as well.” (Doc. 1 at 6). He alleges that after he pled guilty in Hall County, in July 2008, he was without counsel with respect to those proceedings until July 2010, and again after March 2012. (Id. at 4, 6). 1. Access To Courts: Administrative Exhaustion The following grievances, selected from Plaintiff's grievances that are of record in this case, arguably concern his access-to-courts claims: 1. On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the lack of response to his requests for “copies, law library access, and postage for legal work.” (Ex. C-8 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 47). 2. On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the FCDC policy that required him to use a post card to write to his attorney. The grievance response indicates that he was provided a stamped envelope for that purpose. (Ex. C-5 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 44). 3. On April 28, 2012, Plaintiff grieved the return of a letter sent to him by his mother, rather than its being placed in his property bin and his being given “notice of the mail in question,” as required by FCDC policy. (Ex. C-7 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 46). 4. On April 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a grievance appeal regarding his lack of access 47 to the FCDC law library, despite his having a court order allowing him access. He was told that he needed to “get a current court order,” which, he was advised, his court-appointed lawyer could obtain for him. (Ex. C-6 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 45). 5. On or about May 15, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the opening of his legal mail outside of his presence. Lt. Fee explained that the mail was opened because Plaintiff's name was not visible on the outside of the letter at the time of its receipt. (Ex. C-9 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 48). 6. On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the documents missing from his legal materials due to his transfer to Hall County and then to state prison. Lt. Neville noted in response that on July 30, 2013, Plaintiff had been moved to M1 cell and allowed full access to all of his legal papers. (Ex. E-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 68). 7. On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance expressing his thanks for having received the remainder of his legal materials, although noting that there were still some folders missing. (Ex. C-3 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 42). Only the three April 2012 grievances and the one April 2012 grievance appeal concern the specific claims that Plaintiff has raised in his complaints, either in his May 2012 action or in this July 2014 action. Plaintiff has not claimed in his complaints, or otherwise, any harm arising from the matters mentioned in the three 2013 grievances. As noted above, see Sect. II. E., there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to any of his access-to-courts claims, including his postcard-only claim, other than his request for law library access in April 2012. He has not. 2. Access To Courts & The Postcard-Only Policy: Merits a. Access To Courts But, regardless of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to these first three claims, they fail on the merits anyway. In order to prevail on an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been denied the opportunity to present a viable claim to the courts, one that it is reasonably likely would have changed the outcome of a complaint about his conditions of confinement — of which there are none at issue here — or the course of a criminal proceeding or appeal or a post-conviction challenge to a conviction. See Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290 & n.10 (holding that an access-to-courts claim may not proceed without an allegation of “actual injury regarding prospective or existing litigation” — such as “missing filing deadlines or being prevented from presenting claims” — while “in the pursuit of specific types of nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and challenges to conditions of confinement”). *19 Plaintiff's vague assertions about how things might have been different in his Hall County and Forsyth County criminal proceedings and appeals had he been given access to the FCDC law library do not establish a genuine issue of material fact in this regard. Plaintiff may not prevail on his access-to-courts claims without “demonstrat[ing] that the confiscation of his legal materials [or the denial of access to the FCDC law library] resulted in the loss of a nonfrivolous claim — i.e., actual injury.” Miller, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57529, at *20; see also Schwarzauer, 496 Fed. Appx. at 959 (“To assert an access-to-the-courts claim, the plaintiff must possess a non-frivolous, arguable underlying cause of action, the presentation of which was prevented by the defendant. Indeed, the plaintiff must describe the underlying cause of action specifically enough ... to show it is more than hope.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiff has not done that. Indeed, his access-to-courts claims rely entirely upon his hope that things could have turned out better. (See Pl.'s Decl. ¶ II. 12, Doc. 88 at 15 (arguing that if he had been given access to the FCDC law library, “[a]t a minimum the odds of success could have been substantially increased.”)). In recently affirming summary judgment against a plaintiff bringing access-to-courts claims similar to Plaintiff's, the Eleventh Circuit explained the prejudice requirement as follows: [A]lthough [appellant] claims that he suffered harm—e.g., the missing of deadlines for certain pretrial motions, ignorance of requirements for other motions, and the inability to brief the merits of his pretrial double jeopardy claim—during the period of time that he wanted counsel in his criminal case (from March to December of 2011), he has not explained how the outcomes of disputed matters would have been different with a better law library or lesser restrictions. Stated differently, he has not explained how he had colorable claims for relief that he could have asserted but for the alleged lack of access to the courts. See Alvarez v. Att'y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Alvarez can hardly claim that he was denied the opportunity to present [certain constitutional claims] to a court when he has no such colorable claims in the first place.”); Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (“a litigant asserting an access claim must also prove that he has a colorable underlying claim for which he seeks relief”). [And] we are not persuaded by [appellant's] contention of prejudice in his habeas cases. [He] contends that he was not able to conduct research on the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254 with respect to seeking federal collateral relief before pursuing direct relief in the state system. Again, however, [he] has not shown that his habeas corpus petitions would not have been dismissed (or would have been successful) had he been able to perform more legal research. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1266; Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1226. Daker v. Warren, 660 Fed. Appx. 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation altered) (“For purposes of this appeal, [the court] assume[d], without deciding, that [appellant] demonstrated the inadequacy of the law library and research materials and the unreasonableness of the restrictions placed on him. But that [was] not enough for [him] to avoid summary judgment on his access to courts claim. He must also [have] show[n] that he suffered injury, i.e., that the deficiencies hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” (internal quotations omitted)). Like the plaintiff in Daker, Plaintiff here has failed to show that he suffered injury attributable to the lack of access to the FCDC law library, the loss of his legal materials in January 2011 or the postcard-only policy at the FCDC. Plaintiff executed and filed his first complaint raising access to courts claims on May 9, 2012, so that any claim concerning events that predate May 9, 2010 is barred by the two-year limitations period for a § 1983 action. Plaintiff cannot proceed on a claim arising from his alleged lack of law library access in 2008, during the pendency of his motion to withdraw his Hall County guilty pleas, because that claim is time-barred. And, indeed, an inmate has no right of access to a law library if he has declined the appointment of counsel on his behalf. See Smith v. Hutchins, 426 Fed. Appx. 785, 789 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Because [plaintiff] voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, [he] had no constitutional right to access a law library and other legal resources during his pre-trial detention.” (quoting Edwards v. United States, 795 F.2d 958, 961 & nn.1, 3 (11th Cir. 1986) (“When counsel is offered, the alternative of a library is not mandatory.” (internal quotations omitted)); Peck v. Skolnick, 3:09-cv-0381-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91478, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2010) (rejecting as inadequate plaintiff's access-to-courts claim because his exercise of the right to represent himself at trial entailed “acknowledgment of the risks and dangers of self-representation,” which “include the obvious limitations on a detained or incarcerated defendant's access to legal research material and tools”). *20 The undisputed record shows that during the time period relevant to his Hall County appeal, Plaintiff was housed at the FCDC for only 35 days, from April 10 to May 14, 2012. Although Plaintiff was without counsel in his Hall County proceedings after the denial of his direct appeal on March 6, 2012, he has not shown that he missed a deadline or was unable to develop a viable claim in his pro se petition for certiorari review, filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia, based on his lack of access to the law library or to the regular mail. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that, with his mother's assistance, he was able to timely file his petition for certiorari review. (See Doc. 1 at 12). Again, the Court may not accept speculation on Plaintiff's part as to how he may have been harmed. To survive summary judgment, he was required to provide at least some specific example of how he was in fact harmed — such as a legal argument that he could not make because he could not research the relevant law during the time period at issue. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff asserts only that had he “not been denied access to the legal library during [his] several transfers and incarcerations[, he] would have succeeded on [his] grievances, appeals, petitions and suits. At a minimum the odds of success could have been substantially increased.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ II. 12). Plaintiff cites Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that “the seizure or destruction of a prisoner's legal file is a denial of meaningful access to the courts.” (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 19). But Wright concerned a district court's frivolity dismissal of the plaintiff's access-to-courts claim, without requiring a response from the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit opined: “The allegation that prison officials seized [plaintiff's] pleadings and law book and destroyed other legal papers clearly states a claim of denial of access to the courts.” Wright, 795 F.2d at 968. But, as the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Daker demonstrates, alleging enough to state a claim for relief and showing that summary judgment for the defendant is unwarranted are two different tasks. Plaintiff accomplished the former, but not the latter.[8] With respect to his Forsyth County criminal proceedings, Plaintiff has not explained how Sheriff Paxton was responsible for the loss of his materials in January 2011 or how the loss changed the course of those proceedings. His bare assertion that the loss mattered is not enough to avoid summary judgment. Indeed, Plaintiff admits that he had counsel during that time, and the Court is struggling to understand why the only copy of the allegedly crucial lost documents was in Plaintiff's possession, and not his attorney's, to enable his attorney to make a copy for safekeeping and then another copy for Plaintiff. Former Sheriff Paxton, the only proper Defendant to Plaintiff's first two access-to-courts claims, is entitled to summary judgment on these claims. b. The Postcard-Only Policy With respect to his postcard-only claim, Plaintiff may not obtain prospective relief, as noted above, see Sect. II. D., although he may obtain damages from the sheriffs in their individual capacities, also as noted above, except that the Sheriffs enjoy qualified immunity from the claim, see Sect. II. B.[9] This is so because there is no controlling caselaw that would have placed the sheriffs on notice that they were violating a clearly established constitutional right by restricting inmate mail to postcards only, with the exceptions noted for legal mail, photographs and newspapers. (See Doc. 80-11 at 16; Ex. A to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 8-14). Indeed, district courts, including two in this Circuit, have upheld postcard-only policies similar to the one at issue here. See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1296, 1301 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (approving, after a bench trial, jail policy “restricting all non-privileged mail to postcards only”); Althouse v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 12-80135-CIV-MARRA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18602, at *2, 21-22 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2013) (approving, on summary judgment review, jail policy that “provides, in pertinent part, that ‘[a]ll incoming mail, except legal mail and other specially approved items, must be in postcard form’ ”); see id. at *8 n.4 (listing cases in which “courts have upheld the constitutionality of similar postcard only policies in the face of First Amendment challenges”). *21 Based on the relevant holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Eleventh Circuit, or lack thereof, Plaintiff's allegations regarding the postcard-only policy do not show a constitutional right “clear enough that any reasonable officer would understand that [the postcard policy] violates that right.” See Morton, 707 F.3d at 1282 (internal quotations omitted); see also Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (“The dispositive [qualified immunity] question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”). The sheriffs are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim for damages arising from the postcard-only policy at the FCDC — and thus they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. V. Plaintiff's Medical-Deliberate-Indifference Claim In allowing Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claim to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a hernia in October 2008 while housed at the FCDC, at which time the FCDC doctor recommended surgery, but he was “immediately transferred” to the custody of the [GDC]. Plaintiff notes that since then he has returned to the FCDC over twenty times to resolve his outstanding criminal charges. He alleges that doctors in 2010 and ... [again] in June 2013 [ ] recommended surgery, but each time, “instead of receiving the surgical procedure,” he was returned to GDC custody shortly thereafter, and his scheduled surgery was cancelled. Indeed, despite a court order issued on June 20, 2013 that he not be returned to the GDC, he was returned there on July 10, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that he came back to the FCDC one week later, and then he was returned to the GDC on August 9, 2013, after his trial. Plaintiff ... notes that he has experienced unnecessary pain and suffering over a five-year period, during which time his hernia “became grossly enlarged and painful.” He asserts that Lt. Fee and Sgt. Hughes arranged for his transfer to the GDC in July 2013 and ... his scheduled surgery [was canceled] “without permission or consultation” with him. (Doc. 8 at 14-15 (citations omitted)). Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claim has been allowed to proceed against current Sheriff Piper in his official capacity and against Lt. Fee, Sgt. Hughes and Simmons. (See Doc. 12 at 10). The Eighth Amendment prohibits indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs so deliberate that it “constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). “To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) defendant's deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between the defendant's indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 Fed. Appx. 456, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009)). “A ‘serious medical need’ is one that is diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for medical treatment.” Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). “In the alternative, a serious medical need is determined by whether a delay in treating the need worsens the condition.” Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307. “To satisfy the subjective element of [a] deliberate indifference [claim, a] ... Plaintiff must prove three things: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted) (noting that subjective knowledge requires that defendant “ ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [ ] must also draw the inference’ ” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added in Bozeman)); see also Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010). But “[w]hether a particular defendant [to a deliberate indifference claim] has subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm is a question of fact ‘subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’ ” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). *22 “A core principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the area of medical care is that prison officials with knowledge of the need for care may not, by failing to provide care, delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate care, cause a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain resulting from his or her illness.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “prison officials may violate the Eighth Amendment's commands by failing to treat an inmate's pain”). In determining whether a delay in treatment rises to the level of deliberate indifference, relevant factors include: “(1) the seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether the delay worsened the medical condition; and (3) the reason for the delay.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. Negligence, however, even rising to the level of medical malpractice, does not constitute deliberate indifference. McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1254; see also Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that it is well-settled that “medical malpractice—negligence by a physician—is insufficient to form the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference”), amended by 205 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2000); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[m]ere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition is an insufficient basis” for a deliberate indifference claim). As long as the medical treatment provided is “minimally adequate,” a prisoner's preference for a different treatment does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Harris v. Leder, 519 Fed. Appx. 590, 595 (11th Cir. 2013) (“ ‘Federal and state governments ... have a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they are punishing by incarceration.’ ” (quoting Thigpen, 941 F.2d at 1504)). A. The Sheriffs' Summary Judgment Brief Current Sheriff Piper argues that because he is an official of the State of Georgia, not of Forsyth County, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claim against him, especially in light of Plaintiff's status as a state prisoner during the relevant time period, making the state, not the county, responsible for his health care, and making the sheriff a state official for purposes of providing health care to Plaintiff. (Doc. 80-11 at 7-9 (arguing that, under the Eleventh Amendment, Sheriff Piper's status as a state official bars all of Plaintiff's claims for money damages against him in his official capacity); see id. at 6-7 (arguing that Plaintiff's transfer to state prison in August 2013, after his Forsyth County convictions, moots Plaintiff's claims for prospective or declaratory relief with respect to his FCDC detention)). B. Officers Fee, Hughes And Smith's Summary Judgment Brief FCDC Officers Fee, Hughes and Smith have filed a separate summary judgment brief, arguing first that Plaintiff's claims against them are unexhausted and therefore barred. (Doc. 80-12 at 4-7). They also argue that they cannot be held liable for delaying Plaintiff's hernia surgery, scheduled for July 2013, because Plaintiff began complaining about his hernia in 2008, while in state prison, so that “[o]bviously the hernia was not an emergency medical need,” and because Plaintiff received hernia surgery in October 2013, at the Augusta State Medical Prison (“ASMP”), after his Forsyth County convictions and permanent transfer to state prison. (Id. at 9-10). Fee and Hughes note that they played no decision-making role in Plaintiff's July 2013 transfer to ASMP, which was the result of a GDC “production request, which sent Plaintiff to a separate medical appointment in Augusta.” (Id. at 10-11). “Plaintiff was a [GDC] inmate, and the prison transfer request qualified as an appropriate reason to defer the conflicting, non-emergency hernia appointment in Forsyth County.” (Id. at 11). Finally, Fee, Hughes and Smith argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their alleged involvement in Plaintiff's medical care, which consisted only of responding to Plaintiff's grievances. (Id. at 11-13). C. Simmons' Summary Judgment Brief *23 Simmons states that her position at the FCDC was as a “medical assistant/health information technician, [and she] did not provide diagnoses or treatment to Plaintiff and had no involvement with the actual medical services” he received. (Doc. 78-1 at 5). In June 2013, Plaintiff was referred for an outside surgical consult regarding his hernia, and thereafter Simmons scheduled the “la[par]oscopic left inguinal hernia repair” that the consulting physician recommended, to be performed on July 12, 2013. (Id. at 5-6). But because Plaintiff was transferred to ASMP on July 11, 2013, Simmons contacted the GDC nurse care manager, who instructed her to send via fax “the information regarding Plaintiff's hernia surgery to the appropriate person” within the GDC, which Simmons did, along with cancelling Plaintiff's July 12 surgery. She states that she had “no further involvement with Plaintiff's medical care.” (Id. at 6). Simmons argues that the record “is devoid of any evidence that [she] was in any way involved” in Plaintiff's transfer to the GDC the day before his scheduled surgery. (Id. at 8). “Indeed, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that [she] received notice of the transfer from jail security staff in the late afternoon prior to the transfer the following morning,” and that she did not “conspire[ ] with jail staff to cancel [Plaintiff's] surgery.” (Id.). D. Plaintiff's Response Plaintiff responds that he sustained his hernia while emptying a mop bucket at the FCDC prior to his transfer to state prison, which transfer occurred on October 29, 2008, the same day he was first recommended for hernia surgery. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 4-5, Doc. 88 at 3; see Pl.'s Ex. 1, Doc. 88-3 at 1). The same series of events also occurred in 2009 — he was recommended for surgery and promptly transferred to state prison.[10] (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 6-7; see Pl.'s Ex. 2). This happened again in July 2013 — he was scheduled for laparoscopic hernia surgery at a local clinic on July 12, 2013, but he was transferred to ASMP on July 11, then to Ware State Prison on July 16 — after “yet another evaluation” — and FCSO officials picked him up from Ware on July 19. (See Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 12-23; Pl.'s Exs. 6-13, 15). He grieved the matter at the FCDC on July 24, 2013. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ I. 24). But the copy of that grievance included in Plaintiff's exhibits (Pl.'s Ex. 16, Doc. 88-3 at 21) shows a response from Capt. Smith that is not shown on the copy included in the Sheriff's Office Defendants' exhibits. (Comp. Doc. 88-3 at 21 with Doc. 80-1 at 40; see Doc. 88 at 8 n.3). In Plaintiff's version, Smith states that “we sent you there for the procedure you requested to be done.” (Doc. 88-3 at 21). Plaintiff states that — despite a June 20, 2013 Superior Court of Forsyth County order that he not be returned to state prison prior to the completion of his trial, scheduled to begin on August 5, 2013 (Pl.'s Ex. 12) — on July 11, 2013, two FCSO deputies retrieved him from the HCDC, where he had been boarded out on June 28, 2013, telling him that they were taking him to his hernia surgery appointment, but instead took him to ASMP. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 14-17). ASMP personnel had no idea why Plaintiff was there — because neither his administrative nor his medical file accompanied Plaintiff, in violation of GDC procedures (see Pl.'s Ex. 14, Doc. 88-3 at 14-19) — but he was not there for hernia surgery. Instead, Plaintiff was evaluated again; transferred to Ware State Prison; and then back to the FCDC on or about July 19, 2013. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 18-23, Doc. 88 at 6-8). *24 Plaintiff notes that the medical records he has obtained from the GDC show that a medical consult was not ordered for him until July 12, 2013, the day after he arrived at ASMP, which he contends exposes as false Defendants' claim that they were fulfilling a GDC production order by taking Plaintiff to ASMP. (Id. ¶¶ I. 28, 37, Doc. 88 at 9, 11; see Pl.'s Exs. 17-18, Doc. 88-3 at 22-23). Plaintiff's request for a trial continuance due to his medical condition was denied. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ I. 30, Doc. 88 at 10). In October 2013, the DOC transferred him to ASMP “for hernia repair.” (Id. ¶ I. 31). ASMP “did not have the facilities to conduct laparoscopic surgery,” which Plaintiff asserts is the “accepted community standard for hernia repair.” (Id. ¶¶ I. 32-33). Plaintiff's surgery “did not go well,” requiring extra time to heal and leaving him with a permanent scar. (Id. ¶ I. 34). In 2014, Plaintiff was returned to ASMP for another surgery, because the first surgery had caused excessive scrotal swelling. (Id. ¶¶ I. 35-36). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions in cancelling his July 12, 2013 surgery, he experienced “over one year of additional pain and discomfort and permanent scarring in [his] groin and scrotum areas that [he] would not have suffered if it were not for” those actions. (Id. ¶ I. 39, Doc. 88 at 12). Plaintiff rightly points out that there is no GDC production order in the record to serve as a basis for Defendants' explanation as to why they took him to ASMP on July 11, 2013, in defiance of a Superior Court of Forsyth County order. (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 13-14, 33). Plaintiff argues that the FCSO's longstanding pattern of transferring him instead of providing his needed hernia surgery reveals the Defendants' intention to deprive him of the medical care he required, and which the FCSO was required to give him — thereby revealing their deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, and implicating the sheriffs' supervisory liability. (Id. at 12-14, 15-17). Plaintiff also contends that Simmons' claim that she faxed Plaintiff's medical information to ASMP is belied by the fact that the Intrasystem Transfer Form for Plaintiff's transfer to ASMP on July 11, 2013, indicates that Plaintiff's medical records were not available. (Id. at 34-35; see Pl.'s Ex. 15, Doc. 88-3 at 20). In reply, Fee, Hughes and Smith note that the same form indicates that Plaintiff himself thought that he had been brought to ASMP “for [his] hernia to be checked.” (Doc. 95 at 4). E. Medical Deliberate Indifference: Analysis 1. Medical Deliberate Indifference: Administrative Exhaustion On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the cancellation of his surgery and his transfer to state prison instead, in violation of a court order that he not be transferred to state prison during the period before his August 2013 trial. (Ex. C-1 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 40). It appears that Plaintiff did not appeal the response he received to this grievance and thus did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his medical deliberate indifference claim. The Court does not find convincing any of the excuses Plaintiff has given for not completing the administrative grievance process with respect to this claim. It is not clear whether Plaintiff was housed in Max-Iso, and for how long, after his return to the FCDC in late July 2013. It appears that he may have been removed from Max-Iso on July 30, 2013. (See Ex. E-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 68). Thus, his assertion that his mental state as a result of the conditions in Max-Iso prevented him from filing grievance appeals is not compelling in this regard. And, to the extent the Court accepts as true Plaintiff's assertion that Capt. Smith threatened him in late July 2013, in connection with Smith's July 29, 2013 denial of Plaintiff's attempt to appeal his DR convictions (see Pl.'s Ex. 42, Doc. 88-3 at 49), it does not appear that Plaintiff was greatly intimidated by Smith with respect to the grievance process, at least, inasmuch as he filed another grievance on July 30, 2013 (see Ex. C-3 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 42). Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, Plaintiff was transferred to state prison on August 9, 2013, from where — without the alleged headaches from the constant illumination in Max-Iso and without the alleged intimidation by Capt. Smith — Plaintiff could have, but did not, complete the grievance process with respect to the events about which he had grieved in July 2013, including the cancellation of his surgery. See Adcock, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72523, at *44 (dismissing claim for lack of administrative exhaustion because “Plaintiff might have attempted to pursue [his administrative] remedies after his transfer through the use of the United States mail,” but he did not). 2. Medical Deliberate Indifference: Merits *25 But even if the Court deems the exhaustion requirement satisfied, Plaintiff's claim fails because he has not presented medical evidence that he suffered harm as the result of the two-to-three month delay in his hernia surgery. To prevail here, Plaintiff must not only show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; he must also present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the alleged indifference caused him injury. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003). Delay in providing “diagnostic care and medical treatment known to be necessary” can qualify as deliberate indifference. H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.”). That delay, however, must be “tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and [the Eleventh Circuit] require[s] an inmate who alleges a delay-based Eighth Amendment claim to “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Simmons v. Monserrate, 489 Fed. Appx. 404, 406-07 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim, in part because, “importantly, [plaintiff] has not proffered any ‘verifying medical evidence’ to establish the detrimental effect of a delay in medical treatment”). “To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that the delay attributable to the defendant's [alleged] indifference likely caused the plaintiff's injury” and, as noted above, “must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Lee, 405 Fed. Appx. at 458-59 (emphasis added) (citing Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1329; Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188). Plaintiff simply has not demonstrated, with verifying medical evidence, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether — between July 12, 2013, the date of his scheduled, but cancelled, laparoscopic surgery, and the unspecified date in October 2013 when he received hernia surgery at ASMP — he experienced a worsening of his condition or such severe discomfort as to constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Dennis v. Steele, CV512-048, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137769, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2014) (recommending summary judgment for defendant because “Plaintiff has presented no verifiable medical evidence which indicates that any delay in receiving medical attention after the incident at issue had a detrimental effect on his seizure disorder”), adopted by 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152432 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2014); Youngs v. Consol. Gov't, 4:09-CV-141, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129, at *12 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2011) (noting that plaintiff “has not [ ] presented any evidence to demonstrate that the several-hour delay in medical treatment caused the[ ] injuries” at issue; and granting summary judgment to defendants because “even if Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that the individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent to [a] serious medical need, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine dispute on causation. [And w]ithout causation, there can be no claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.” (citing Mann, 588 F.3d at 1306-07)). *26 And that Plaintiff received what he describes as a less preferred form of hernia surgery, and the complications that allegedly followed, are not enough for him to recover on his deliberate indifference claim. A prisoner is not entitled to the most advanced medical care available. As long as the care he has received is “minimally adequate,” his preference for a different treatment does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Harris v. Leder, 519 Fed. Appx. 590, 595 (11th Cir. 2013) (“ ‘Federal and state governments ... have a constitutional obligation to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they are punishing by incarceration.’ ” (quoting Thigpen, 941 F.2d at 1504) (emphasis added)). Because Plaintiff's medical care at the GDC was at least minimally adequate, Defendants Piper, Fee, Hughes and Simmons are entitled to summary judgment on his medical deliberate indifference claim. VI. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims A prisoner has a right to use a detention facility's grievance procedure without fear of retaliation. It is an established principle of constitutional law that an inmate is considered to be exercising his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when he complains to the prison's administrators about the conditions of his confinement. See, e.g., Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). It is also established that an inmate may maintain a cause of action against prison administrators who retaliate against him for making such complaints. Id. To prevail, the inmate must establish these elements: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the administrator's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech. See Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005). Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted); see id. at 1276 n.15 (citing Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006), to the effect that the “First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for a redress of grievances are violated when a prisoner is punished for filing a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment”). But “[t]o establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was ‘subjectively motivated to discipline’ the plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights.” Burns v. Warden, USP Beaumont, 482 Fed. Appx. 414, 417 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278). [And a]lthough [the Eleventh Circuit has] yet to hold in a published opinion that a close temporal proximity between protected speech and an adverse action may serve as circumstantial evidence of causation in a prisoner's First Amendment retaliation claim, [it has] determined in another type of retaliation case that temporal proximity is relevant to proving causation. Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 Fed. Appx. 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2014). In employment retaliation cases, for example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “in the absence of any other evidence of causation,” a three-month proximity is insufficient to establish causation. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (“If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.”); Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that, by itself, three and one-half months was insufficient to prove causation). *27 Edmondson v. Bd. of Trs., 258 Fed. Appx. 250, 254 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding, in employment retaliation case, that because the protected activity “occurred in early 2004” and the alleged adverse action “did not occur until October [and December] 2004, .... [t]hese instances lack the temporal proximity to establish a causal connection”; and affirming summary judgment for defendant). A prisoner also has a right to engage in activity protected by the First Amendment without fear of transfer to a different detention level or facility. For an inmate to prevail on a retaliatory transfer claim, he must establish that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the defendant's retaliatory act adversely affected the protected conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory act and the adverse effect on the conduct. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005). Once the plaintiff establishes that the protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the harm, the burden of production shifts to the defendant. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008). The defendant can prevail on summary judgment if [he] can show [he] would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity. Id. Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 2013). [And a]ny possible causal connection between the protected activity ... and the harm ... is severed [if] the harm is not in reaction to any protected activity, but directly due to an improper activity.... [E]ven if some impermissible reason had entered into [a defendant's] decision-making process ..., [plaintiff's retaliation claim fails if he] ... would have been [transferred or disciplined] anyway .... O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2011). A. Plaintiff's Placement In The Max-Iso Unit In allowing Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: Plaintiff alleges that when he was returned to the FCDC on May 1, 2013 for trial, he was offered the choice of (1) having his legal materials placed in the property room, with limited availability for his review of those materials, or (2) being placed in a Max Iso cell and having full access to his materials. Because of the previous loss of his legal materials, Plaintiff chose the Max Iso option. Plaintiff alleges that because of the intolerable conditions in Max Iso, which is reserved for incorrigible or mentally ill inmates and used mainly for disciplinary purposes, the choice he was offered was a form of retaliation for his exercise of his First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 8 at 20 (citations omitted)). Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim has been allowed to proceed against current Sheriff Piper, Capt. Smith, Lt. Fee and Sgt. Hughes. (See Doc. 12 at 10). 1. The Sheriffs' Summary Judgment Brief Sheriff Piper argues that Plaintiff was placed in Max-Iso because he chose to be there, in order to be able to review his voluminous legal papers, and he could have been transferred at any time he agreed to comply with FCDC policy regarding the limitation on the volume of personal documents for an inmate in the general population. (Doc. 80-11 at 18-20). 2. Officers Fee, Hughes And Smith's Summary Judgment Brief Officers Fee, Hughes and Smith argue as follows: *28 Plaintiff's housing assignment was triggered by [his] own choice, rather than through some retaliatory decision. [He] would have been allowed to have legal paperwork in the general population, just not all of the voluminous materials that he wanted to have all the time. However, he could have the voluminous materials in the “max iso” area. That is not the exercise of a “First Amendment” right, but rather a decision to be housed in a particular area to accommodate his desire to have more property access than other prisoners. In other words, Plaintiff's claim fails ... for lack of any pertinent First Amendment “speech.” [And] Plaintiff was free to leave “max iso” any time he wanted to forego the special treatment he was given and instead be treated like any other inmate with regard to personal property in his cell. That plainly is not an “adverse action,” much less one that would deter an inmate of “ordinary firmness” from requesting special treatment such as Plaintiff got in this case.... Finally, [Fee, Hughes and Smith] were not involved in the decision to house Plaintiff in the “Max” unit. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish personal involvement or a causal relationship, crucial elements of his claim. For all these reasons Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. (Doc. 80-12 at 8-9). They argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their “most extensive involvement, if any, with the claims against them were responses to Plaintiff's grievances.” (Id. at 12). 3. Plaintiff's Response Plaintiff responds that the retaliation against him began shortly after he filed, on April 24, 2012, “an internal affairs complaint against Joseph Whirlow for making false statements before a Magistrate to obtain a warrant for [Plaintiff's] arrest.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 4, Doc. 88 at 25; see Pl.'s Ex. 27, Doc. 88-3 at 32-33). Plaintiff alleges that upon his return to the FCDC on April 30, 2013, for his trial (see Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 11, Doc. 88 at 26; Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 23), “the harassment began immediately with the seizure of [his] legal material again, and his placement in Max Isolation to gain access to it. The [DRs] began again as well.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 12). Plaintiff acknowledges that he agreed to go to the Max-Iso unit on May 4, 2013, but “for only 24 hours so [he] could gain access [to his legal materials] to prepare for [his] trial and to get it organized.” (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 23). He alleged in a grievance he filed on May 14, 2013, that his Max-Iso detention was retaliation for his filing a civil suit in federal district court. (Id.). He notes that prior to his return to the FCDC for trial, he had been provided with extra containers for his legal materials. (Id. at 23-24; see Pl.'s Exs. 49-50, Doc. 88-3 at 57-58). He argues, accordingly, that the stated reason for his placement in Max-Iso — to provide him access to his legal materials — was a cover for the true purpose, retaliation, and notes that Defendants have produced no evidence of any other FCDC inmate facing such a “Hobson's choice.” (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 24-25). Finally, he notes that there is no incident report otherwise justifying his assignment to Max-Iso, which he characterizes as a form of punishment.[11] (Id. at 25). 4. Max-Iso Retaliation: Analysis *29 Plaintiff filed two grievances regarding his placement in Max-Iso: 1. On May 4, 2013, Plaintiff grieved his lack of access to all of his legal materials. Lt. Neville noted in response that Plaintiff had “4 large bags” of materials and that Plaintiff had agreed to be “placed into a Max Isolation cell for 24 hours to allow him to get his legal papers in order” in file folders provided to Plaintiff for that purpose. (Ex. E-2 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 66). 2. On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the conditions in Max-Iso since his placement there “for the express purpose of accessing [his] legal material.” In particular, he complained that the “lights are on 24-7 & never turned off.” He suggested that his continued confinement in Max-Iso was in retaliation for his filing a civil action in federal district court. Lt. Fee advised Plaintiff that it was his “responsibility to advise [FCDC officers] when [he was] done with [his] legal concerns and [they would then] move [him] into population.” Sgt. Hughes reviewed the grievance and Lt. Fee's response. (Ex. C-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 43). Because Plaintiff did not appeal the outcome of either of these two grievances, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in this regard. This failure is especially noteworthy because it appears to be undisputed that Plaintiff was told that if he wished to leave Max-Iso, he needed only to inform FCDC officials of his desire to do so. Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim should be dismissed on this basis. But even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, he has not shown that he was placed in Max-Iso in retaliation for filing complaints or grievances. FCDC records show that Plaintiff had not filed a grievance previously in almost exactly one year — on May 5, 2012 — and, as noted above, he filed his previous lawsuit against Forsyth County on May 9, 2012, also almost one year before his placement in Max-Iso on May 4, 2013. And Plaintiff has acknowledged that he agreed to be placed in Max-Iso in order to be able to review his extensive legal materials.[12] (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 23) Given the undisputed lapse in time of one year and the otherwise non-retaliatory basis for Plaintiff's placement in Max-Iso, as well as the undisputed fact that he could have asked to be returned to general population at any time, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the causation element of Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim, which requires “a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech.” See Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1276. “To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was ‘subjectively motivated to discipline’ the plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights.” Burns, 482 Fed. Appx. at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting Mosley, 532 F.3d at 1278). But here, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants would have allowed him to leave Max-Iso at any time upon his request. Plaintiff has simply not shown that his Max-Iso placement was based on a subjective motive to discipline him. See id. *30 In addition, most of the cases holding that temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action is evidence of “a causal relationship,” i.e., a retaliatory motive, concern lapses in time of days or weeks, not a full year. See Edmondson, 258 Fed. Appx. at 254 (noting that delays of 3 months and 3 & 1/2 months are too great to establish causation); Harrington v. Wells, 2:13-cv-103, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152602, at *20-21 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2015) (citing cases that involved “close temporal proximity”; but also citing Smith v. Bell, 06-60750, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29014, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2008), aff'd by Smith v. Belle, 321 Fed. Appx. 838 (11th Cir. 2009), in which the district court stated that “there can be no assumption that eighteen months after a police officer is called names by an arrestee, that the officer's alleged false testimony at a trial where a defendant is partially acquitted meets the casual connection requirement. There must be a greater temporal proximity or other evidence of a causal connection to link the protected conduct occurring [eighteen] months prior to the adverse action, as would be the case i[n] most retaliation type analyses.”)). This Court sees no relevant difference in this regard between the 12-month lapse of time at issue here and the 18-month lapse in Bell. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, a delay of even 3 months is generally too long to establish a causal connection, in the absence of any other evidence of causation, which is absent here. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim. B. Plaintiff's Disciplinary Reports In allowing Plaintiff's DR retaliation claims to proceed, the Court noted that he had alleged the following: Plaintiff [ ] claims that in early 2012, when he was filing grievances regarding the alleged violations of his rights at the FCDC, Officers Gay and Hobbs “engaged in a pattern of harassment by making false claims” that Plaintiff had violated various rules of conduct and by writing up charges against Plaintiff, all of which were dismissed. He further alleges that upon his return to the FCDC for trial, he was again harassed with false disciplinary charges, written by Officer Cole on July 25, 2013, although he was found guilty of three of the four charges Officer Cole wrote. Plaintiff sought to appeal those decisions based on alleged procedural violations, but Capt. Smith denied Plaintiff an appeal hearing. (Doc. 8 at 21 (citations omitted)). Plaintiff's DR retaliation claim has been allowed to proceed against Officers Gay, Hobbs and Cole. (See Doc. 12 at 10). 1. Officers Gay, Hobbs and Cole's Summary Judgment Brief Officers Gay, Hobbs and Cole recite the following allegedly undisputed facts: In May 2012, Defendants William Gay and Christopher Hobbs were detention officers assigned to supervise inmates at the Forsyth County Detention Center. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 2; Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶ 2. On May 4, 2012, Deputy Hobbs observed two separate incidents where [Plaintiff] was verbally abusive toward medical staff at the Jail. Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. A. The incident resulted in two disciplinary charges, which were “dismissed” without any statement about the reason. MSJ Ex. 1 - Declaration of Tom Wilson at ¶ 9 & Ex. D-12 through D-13. Defendant Hobbs' decision to initiate disciplinary charges was based only on [Plaintiff's] conduct as detailed above. Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶ 5. On May 5, 2012, Defendant Gay was involved in an incident where [Plaintiff] violated a number of Detention Center rules that applied to inmates. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 3. On that occasion [Plaintiff] disobeyed officer orders, went into an area designated as off-limits for inmates, and was verbally belligerent with Officer Gay. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 4 & Ex. A. Defendant Gay's decision to initiate disciplinary charges was based only on [Plaintiff's] conduct as detailed above. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 5. The incident led to seven disciplinary charges, which resulted in Plaintiff being convicted and disciplined with 48 hours of isolation; the sentence was suspended subject to no other disciplinary incidents in the future. MSJ Ex. 1 - Declaration of Tom Wilson at ¶ 9 & Ex. D-3 through D-9. Plaintiff withdrew his appeal request. Declaration of Tom Wilson at ¶ 9 & Ex. D-2. *31 In July 2013, Defendant James Cole was a detention officer assigned to supervise inmates at the Forsyth County Detention Center. James Cole Decl. at ¶ 2. During a cell search in July 2013, certain contraband items were discovered in Plaintiff's cell. James Cole Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. A. The items were sugar packets, twelve altered flex pens, a broken half of a fingernail clipper, two packages of carbon paper and what appeared from my experience to be an improvised device for creating tattoos. James Cole Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. A. All of these items were contraband and [Plaintiff's] possession of these items violated the rules of the Forsyth County Detention Center. James Cole Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. A. The incident resulted in four disciplinary charges, three of which resulted in convictions, and one of which was “dismissed” because the hearing officer could not “determine if the item in question is a “tattoo item” in an of itself.” MSJ Ex. 1 - Declaration of Tom Wilson at ¶ 9 & Ex. D-1; Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) at 9 (admitting Plaintiff was found guilty three of the charges). Before [Plaintiff's] misconduct and initiation of disciplinary charges, Defendants Gay, Hobbs and Cole were not aware of any type of complaint or lawsuit by [Plaintiff] against any officer with the Forsyth County Sheriff's Office. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 6; Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶ 6. Regardless of any prior complaint by [Plaintiff], these Defendants would have taken the same disciplinary actions in regard to [Plaintiff]. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 7; Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶ 7. These Defendant were not involved as decisionmakers in the various disciplinary adjudications regarding [Plaintiff]. William Gay Decl. at ¶ 8; Christopher Hobbs Decl. at ¶ 8. When required to detail the specific evidence and basis for his claims against these Defendants, Plaintiff provided no more than conclusory allegations. Plaintiff's Responses to Interrogatories at response 17-19; Doc. 58 at 15-16. Plaintiff's only grievance relating to disciplinary charges was filed on May 5, 2012, where he complained about unidentified officers allegedly “taunting” him in retaliation for his complaint against a “Mr. Joseph Whitlow.” Wilson Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. C at C-10. Plaintiff did not file an appeal of that grievance. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 7. (Doc. 80-13 at 2-4 (footnotes omitted)). Gay, Hobbs and Cole argue that Plaintiff's claims are unexhausted and thus barred from merits review (id. at 5-6), and Gay and Hobbs argue that Plaintiff's claims against them are time-barred (id. at 6-7). Gay, Hobbs and Cole also argue that Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits because (1) his disciplinary convictions bar his claims; (2) he cannot show a lack of probable cause for any of the disciplinary charges against him; (3) he cannot show that he was deterred from filing other administrative grievances or lawsuits; and (4) he cannot show a retaliatory motive because Defendants were unaware of Plaintiff's alleged First Amendment-protected speech and they would have acted the same regardless. (Id. at 7-13). They also assert qualified immunity because they “filed disciplinary charges based on clear misconduct. No binding authority holds such conduct to be clearly unlawful.” (Id. at 14). 2. Plaintiff's Response Plaintiff states that on May 3, 2012, for the first time during his tenure at the FCDC, he was the subject of an incident report, authored by Defendant Gay, and he was handcuffed and taken to a holding cell for the rest of the day. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ V. 5-6; see Pl.'s Ex. 28, Doc. 88-3 at 34). Based on this incident report, Plaintiff received seven DRs, five of which were dismissed. (Pl.'s Decl. V. ¶ 7; see Pl.'s Exs. 28-32, Doc. 88-3 at 35-39). Plaintiff states that he filed his May 2012 complaint on May 5 (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 8), although court records show that he executed both his complaint and financial affidavit on May 9, 2012, see Johnson, 2:12-cv-108, Docs. 1, 2. On May 4, 2012, based on comments Plaintiff allegedly had made, Defendant Hobbs wrote two DRs, which were dismissed. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 9, Doc. 88 at 26; see Pl.'s Exs. 33-34, Doc. 88-3 at 40-41). On May 5, 2012, Plaintiff wrote a grievance about the alleged harassment by Gay and other FCDC officers. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 10; see Pl.'s Ex. 35, Doc. 88-3 at 42). On May 14, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to state prison, and he returned to the FCDC on April 30, 2013. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 11, Doc. 88 at 26). *32 On May 28, 2013, Officer Sorrells wrote a DR because Plaintiff allegedly had disrupted morning chow. (Id. ¶ V. 13; see Pl.'s Ex. 36, Doc. 88-3 at 43). On July 25, 2013, Defendant Cole wrote four DRs, one of which was dismissed. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 14; see Pl.'s Exs. 37-40, Doc. 88-3 at 44-47). Plaintiff was found guilty on DRs 2 and 4, and he appealed. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 16). Defendant Smith called Plaintiff into his office and “stated that he was sick of [Plaintiff] making retaliation claims against his officers and if [Plaintiff] did it again he would charge [Plaintiff] with making false statements.” Smith denied the appeal on July 29, 2013. (Id.; see Pl.'s Ex. 42, Doc. 88-3 at 49). Also on July 29, Plaintiff received another DR, from Officer J. Morris, for misusing a fellow inmate's PIN code for the telephone, but the DR was dismissed after Plaintiff explained that he had not yet received his own PIN code. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 17; see Pl.'s Ex. 43, Doc. 88-3 at 50). Plaintiff states: “In sum, prior to filing my complaint against Mr. Whirlow and the initial 1983 suit[,] I received zero [DRs] over a period spanning 2005 until 2012. After my complaint & the preparation thereof[,] I received a total of 18 [DRs] in a time span of one year.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 18, Doc. 88 at 28; see Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 15). Plaintiff notes that Defendants Gay and Hobbs wrote him up for comments he allegedly made, i.e., for exercising his First Amendment right of free speech, and both DRs were dismissed. (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 27). He also notes that Defendants Gay and Cole wrote him up for major violations — Gay, for inciting a disturbance; and Cole, for possessing a tattoo item — which could have had serious consequences for Plaintiff upon his return to state prison, although those DRs were also dismissed. (Id. at 28-29). Plaintiff accuses Cole of possible perjury in claiming that he was unaware of any complaint that Plaintiff had filed, because in March 2011, Cole provided a statement in connection with the loss of Plaintiff's legal materials. (Id. at 29; see Pl.'s Ex. 48, Doc. 88-3 at 56).[13] Plaintiff notes, finally, that the two DRs for which Plaintiff received punishment were upheld without a fair hearing or any investigation into the events at issue, just as his appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with the criteria outlined in FCDC policy, despite Plaintiff's having no way of knowing what those criteria were. (Id. at 30-31). As noted above, Plaintiff states that the DR retaliation against him began shortly after April 24, 2012, when he filed an internal affairs complaint against FCSO Officer Joseph Whirlow. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 4, Doc. 88 at 25; see Pl.'s Ex. 27, Doc. 88-3 at 32-33; see also Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 18, Doc. 88 at 28 (“In sum, prior to filing my complaint against Mr. Whirlow and the initial 1983 suit[,] I received zero [DRs] over a period spanning 2005 until 2012. After my complaint & the preparation thereof[,] I received a total of 18 [DRs] in a time span of one year.”); Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 15). 3. DR Retaliation: Analysis a. DR Retaliation: The Undisputed Facts On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff received seven DRs from Defendant Gay, and on May 4, 2012, he received two DRs from Defendant Hobbs, and as a result of the underlying incidents on those two days, he was handcuffed each day and taken to holding for the rest of the day. On May 5, 2012 he grieved the DRs he had received on May 3 & 4 and alleged that FCDC officers were “taunting and agitating [him] due to [his] recent complaint to internal affairs regarding the misconduct of Mr. Joseph Whirlow.” (Ex. C-10 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 49). The following narrative supported Gay's DRs: *33 At 1745 on May [3rd], 2012, I (Deputy Gay) was in tower when the intercom of F-cell came on. I came over the intercom and stated “Tower, what is your emergency?” [Plaintiff] came on and said “It is not an emergency, we just wanted the channel changed, we have been watching the same movies all day.” I replied “Negative, that is not an emergency.” [Plaintiff] then said to one of the other inmates “No, I want to see who this douchebag is.” [Plaintiff] came up to the glass, put his hands on the glass, and looked through. After backing away, [Plaintiff] said “Oh, its that faggot motherfucker. I informed Deputy Eaton of the incident, and he responded to F-cell where he pulled [Plaintiff] out in to the hallway, placed handcuffs on [him] and escorted him to the holding cell. Once in holding, [Plaintiff] told Deputy Eaton that he would pursue a federal lawsuit against the county. Nothing further to report. (Ex. D-11 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 60). Five of the seven Gay DRs were dismissed by Lt. Neville, who enforced the other two. (Exs. D-3–D-9 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 52-58). The following narrative supported Hobbs's DRs: On 05/04/2012, I (DS1 Hobbs) was escorting medical to “F” Cell to talk with [Plaintiff, who] was asked to step into the hall way so the medical staff could ask him some questions. During their conversation [Plaintiff] became a little agitated toward medical. At the end of their conversation [Plaintiff] became more agitated and told medical to “shut up” as he was walking back into his cell. [Plaintiff] was then handcuffed and escorted up to holding. While [I was] escorting [Plaintiff] to holding, we passed another member of the medical staff who was not part of the original conversation. [Plaintiff] also became agitated toward that member of the medical staff as well. [Plaintiff] was placed into holding where the handcuffs were removed. (Ex. D-15 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 64). Both Hobbs DRs were dismissed by Lt. Neville. (Exs. D-12–D-13 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 61-62). On July 24, 2013, the day before he received four DRs from Defendant Cole on July 25, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the cancellation of his surgery and his transfer to state prison on July 10, in violation of a court order that he not be transferred to state prison. (Ex. C-1 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 42). The following narrative supported Cole's DRs: On 07/25/2013, at 1425, I (Deputy Byars), Deputy Burke, Deputy Cole and Deputy O'Kelly patted down (35) thirty-five inmates from F cell and escorted them to the recreation yard. While conducting a full county swap [sic], the following contraband was found: (1) one brown paper bag that was half filled with sugar packets, (12) twelve altered flex pens, (1) one broken half of a fingernail clipper, (1) one improvised devi[c]e for tattooing and (2) two (10) count packages of carbon paper. The broken fingernail clipper, the improvised tattooing device as well as the carbon paper belonged to [Plaintiff]. All county issued Items were removed, washed and returned to the inmates. At 1523, all inmates were returned to [F] cell without incident. Nothing further to report. (Ex. A to Cole Decl., Doc. 80-8 at 5). Only one of the four Cole DRs was dismissed, because the hearing officer could not determine if the confiscated item in question was “a ‘tattoo item’ in and of itself.” (Pl.'s Ex. 38, Doc. 88-3 at 45). b. DR Retaliation: Administrative Exhaustion Plaintiff did not appeal the denial of his May 5, 2012 grievance concerning the seven May 3, 2012 Gay DRs and the two May 4, 2012 Hobbs DRs, nor did he grieve the four July 25, 2013 Cole DRs. Thus, Plaintiff once again failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, this time with respect to his DR retaliation claims. For the reasons noted above, see Sect. IV. E. 1., the Court does not credit Plaintiff's contention that he was deterred by Capt. Smith's threat to charge him with making false statements, which he alleges prevented him from grieving the July 2013 Cole DRs. Plaintiff's DR retaliation claims should be dismissed on this basis. c. DR Retaliation (Gay, Hobbs): Time Bar *34 And the retaliation claims against Gay and Hobbs are also time-barred. Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on July 15, 2014, but Gay and Hobbs wrote their disciplinary reports on May 4 and 5, 2012, more than two years earlier. A two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims arising out of events occurring in Georgia. See Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003). “The statute of limitations on a section 1983 claim begins to run when the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). There is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff was aware of the basis for his DR retaliation claims against Gay and Hobbs as soon as the reports were written and heard at the FCDC in May 2012. He was, as his May 5, 2012 grievance establishes. Gay and Hobbs are thus entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's DR retaliation claims. d. DR Retaliation (Cole): Merits Finally, the claim against Cole fails on the merits. When a prisoner has been found in violation of prison rules as a result of a DR filed against him, he generally cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on the DR at issue. “A prisoner who claims that the defendant's retaliatory conduct was writing false disciplinary reports cannot maintain that claim if, after he is given due process, he is ‘convicted’ of the behavioral violation alleged in the reports and there is ‘evidence to sustain the conviction.’ ” Moton v. Walker, 545 Fed. Appx. 856, 860 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Finch, 637 F.3d at 1215). Three of Cole's four DRs were upheld, and a fourth was dismissed only because the hearing officer could not positively identify the item in question as a tattoo device. Plaintiff argues that he was not provided his due process rights at the hearings on these DRs.[14] Plaintiff states that although he explained to Defendant Fee at the hearing “that video of the cell search would prove Defendant Cole found nothing – another officer did,” and he “requested to see the alleged contraband; to call witnesses; and also requested to question [ ] Cole[,] Defendant Fee refused these requests.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ V. 15, Doc. 88 at 27; see Doc. 88-3 at 44-47). Plaintiff states that he appealed the guilty findings on two of the DRs, at which point Defendant Smith called Plaintiff to his office, and when Plaintiff explained to Smith his “concern about the Officers harassing and retaliating against [him] for filing the initial 1983 suit,” Smith threatened to charge him with making false statements if he continued to make “retaliation claims against his officers.” Smith denied the appeals. (Id. ¶ V. 16; see Doc. 88-3 at 49). If Plaintiff was denied his due process rights at the hearings on the Cole DRs and in his attempt to appeal two of the DRs, which appears to be undisputed, that denial would obviate the conclusion that his convictions on three of the four Cole DRs precludes his retaliation claim against Cole. But, even so, his claim that Cole wrote the DRs in July 2013 in retaliation for Plaintiff's May 2012 complaint suffers from the same lack of temporal proximity as his Max-Iso retaliation claim, as discussed above, see Sect. VI. A. 4; see also Edmondson, 258 Fed. Appx. at 254 (noting that delays of 3 months and 3 & 1/2 months are too great to establish the causation element of a retaliation claim). And Cole's sworn denial of any knowledge of any of Plaintiff's complaints until Plaintiff filed his July 2014 complaint (see Cole Decl. ¶ 6, Doc. 80-8 at 2) is undisputed by any credible rebuttal evidence from Plaintiff. This denial suggests that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding a possible subjective motive on Cole's part to discipline Plaintiff by filing false DRs, and, coupled with the lack of temporal proximity, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding a possible causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected activity and Cole's adverse action. See Burns, 482 Fed. Appx. at 417. For these reasons, Cole is also entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's DR retaliation claims. VII. Plaintiff's Max-Iso Conditions-Of-Confinement Claim *35 For there to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment constituting cruel and unusual punishment, “[f]irst, there must be, objectively speaking, conduct by public officials sufficiently serious to constitute a cruel or unusual deprivation–one denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Second, there must be a subjective intent by the public officials involved to use the sufficiently serious deprivation in order to punish.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Negligence does not suffice to satisfy this standard.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). “Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,” “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotations omitted); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (noting that “[t]he Constitution ... does not mandate comfortable prisons”) (internal quotations omitted). But to prevail on an Eighth Amendment challenge to his conditions of confinement, a prisoner “need not await a tragic event before seeking relief, [although] he must at the very least show that a condition of his confinement poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A prison official cannot be found deliberately indifferent unless he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In allowing Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim to proceed, the Court noted that Plaintiff had alleged the following: Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to inhumane conditions in the Max Iso unit, including lights that were on 24 hours per day; no recreation, sunlight or fresh air; and no access to puzzles, games or books that are available to inmates housed elsewhere. Plaintiff alleges that he spent over three months in Max Iso and now suffers from various ailments induced by his stay there, including insomnia, migraine headaches, a diminished ability to concentrate, claustrophobia and shortness of breath. Plaintiff asserts that he would not have needed to choose the Max Iso option if the FCDC had provided him with law library access. (Doc. 8 at 21 (citations omitted)). Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim has been allowed to proceed against current Sheriff Piper in his official capacity and against Capt. Smith, Lt. Fee and Sgt. Hughes. (See Doc. 12 at 10). Sheriff Piper does not address this claim in his original summary judgment brief. (See Doc. 80-11 at 18-20 (addressing only Plaintiff's claim that he was placed in Max Iso in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights)). The same is true for Fee, Hughes and Smith. (See Doc. 80-12 at 7-9 (same)). A. Piper, Fee, Hughes And Smith's Supplemental Brief But in a joint supplemental brief, Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith allege the following facts: Sheriff's Office records document [Plaintiff's] housing in the isolation unit in 2013. Tom Wilson Decl. at ¶ 12 & Ex. E. At that time [Plaintiff] had voluminous materials that would not fit within a normal jail-issued container. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 12 & Ex. E at E-1. [Plaintiff] agreed to be housed in the isolation area so that he could have continuous access to all of his voluminous property. Wilson Dec. at ¶ 12 & Ex. E. Plaintiff was free to go to general population where he would have been allowed to have the same amount of property as any other general population inmate. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 12.... While housed in the “isolation” area, Plaintiff filed grievances complaining about the lights being on, a complaint about some of his paperwork, and that he wanted certain privileges. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 6, Ex. C at C-2, C-3 & C-4. None of the grievances mentioned conduct by any of these Defendants. When [Plaintiff] submitted a grievance about his privileges in May 2013, Lieutenant Fee responded to the grievance. That was Defendant Fee's most direct role with Plaintiff's housing in the “max isolation” unit. Andrew Fee Decl. at ¶ 7 & Ex. C. In his response, Lieutenant Fee explained that [Plaintiff] could leave the “max isolation” unit any time he was ready to return to a general population housing unit. In that case he would have been subject to the same paperwork access rules as any other general population inmate. Andrew Fee Decl. at ¶ 7. Sergeant Hughes reviewed the response to the grievance and signed as the reviewing officer. *36 Plaintiff did not file an appeal of any grievance relating to his housing and conditions of confinement. Wilson Decl. at ¶ 7. The Jail's grievance system, including the ability for inmates to appeal, was detailed in the Inmate Handbook. Declaration of Tom Wilson at ¶ 4 & Ex. B at B-16 – B-17. (Doc. 83-1 at 2, 3-4). Fee, Hughes and Smith argue that Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id. at 4-6). They also argue that Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief fail because he has suffered no physical injury as a result of his Max-Iso confinement, and his claims for prospective relief fail because he has been transferred to state prison. (Id. at 6-7). Sheriff Piper argues that, as a state official, he is immune in his official capacity from Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief. (Id. at 7). All four Defendants argue that because Plaintiff voluntarily chose Max-Iso confinement, he “cannot establish an intention to punish, or ‘deliberate indifference’ to some alleged serious risk of harm, or personal involvement, or a causal relationship between any Defendant and his housing conditions.” (Id. at 9). They also argue that “Plaintiff's complaint [ ] about lights being on, lack of sunlight, lack of fresh air and lack of outdoor recreation.... are not objectively serious enough” to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 9-10). And, finally, they assert qualified immunity from Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims because “the Eleventh Circuit [has] indicated that qualified immunity is almost always appropriate for individual jail officials sued for supposedly illegal conditions of confinement.” (Id. at 10-11). B. Plaintiff's Response Plaintiff states that in Max-Iso he “was subjected to a windowless cell, permitted no recreation outdoors, no fresh air or sunlight, 24 hour per day full illumination, and excessively cold temperatures.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ IV. 2, Doc. 88 at 21). He alleges that it would have been a simple matter to turn off the lights for his cell without affecting the rest of Max-Iso, but his request for that courtesy while he reviewed his documents was refused. (Id. ¶¶ IV. 4-5). He alleges that due to his prolonged exposure to high-intensity lighting, he suffers from insomnia and claustrophobia, and he has difficulty focusing. (Id. ¶ IV. 6). C. Max-Iso Conditions: Analysis Plaintiff filed the following grievances concerning the conditions in the Max-Iso unit: 1. On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the conditions in Max-Iso since his placement there “for the express purpose of accessing [his] legal material.” In particular, he complained that the “lights are on 24-7 & never turned off.” He suggested that his continued confinement in Max-Iso was in retaliation for his filing a civil action in federal district court. Plaintiff also mentioned that he had temporarily been denied access to a shower, a telephone, television and recreation, but that denial (at least with respect to the first three items) had since been corrected. Lt. Fee advised Plaintiff that it was his “responsibility to advise [FCDC officers] when [he was] done with [his] legal concerns and [they would then] move [him] into population.” Sgt. Hughes reviewed the grievance and Lt. Fee's response. (Ex. C-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 43). *37 2. On June 8, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the lights being on constantly in Max-Iso, where he had been housed since May 3, 2013. He was told that the lights were never turned off, for the security of the facility. (Ex. C-2 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 41). Plaintiff did not file an appeal from either grievance, nor did he grieve any condition in Max-Iso other than the lights being on 24 hours per day and possibly the lack of recreational opportunities. He thus has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all of his Max-Iso conditions claims, which should be dismissed on that basis. For the reasons stated above, see Sect. V. E. 1., the Court finds wanting Plaintiff's assertion that his mental condition while in Max-Iso was such that he could not focus on the need to file a grievance appeal. It appears that Plaintiff was in Max-Iso from May 4 to June 27, 2013 — a period of 55 days, or 8 weeks (see Proof of Custody, Ex. A to Decl. of Chad Evers, Doc. 80-9 at 3-4) — and perhaps for some time between July 22 and August 9, 2013 (see id.), although it is unclear where Plaintiff was housed during this latter period, which included his trial and sentencing. (See Ex. E-4 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 68 (On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff grieved the documents missing from his legal materials due to his transfer to Hall County and then to state prison. Lt. Neville noted in response that Plaintiff had been moved to M1 cell on July 30, 2013 and allowed full access to all of his legal papers.)). Given these undisputed facts, it appears that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's Max-Iso conditions claims. The brief, eight-week duration of Plaintiff's stay in Max-Iso, with perhaps another week or two after his return to the FCDC in late July 2013, mitigates against a finding that there is caselaw putting Defendants on clear notice that Plaintiff's detention there violated his Eighth Amendment rights. “Absent a court ruling, [the Eleventh Circuit] would expect a reasonable government official to ‘know’ that overall conditions of confinement are clearly unconstitutional only in a truly extreme case.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1567 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). It is arguable, however, that 24-hour high-intensity illumination is such an extreme case. See Obama v. Burl, 477 Fed. Appx. 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 2012) (reversing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal of plaintiff's claim that “the constant lighting in isolation caused [him] inability to sleep, emotional distress, and constant headaches”; remanding to district court for further consideration of the claim; and citing Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996), to the effect that there is “no legitimate penological justification for requiring inmates to suffer physical and psychological harm by living in constant illumination”); Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 681, 683-84 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming—because “exercise is no longer considered an optional form of recreation, but is instead a necessary requirement for physical and mental well-being”—denial of qualified immunity to prison guards on inmate's claim that “for just over 6 months ... [he] was denied all out-of-cell exercise”; but noting that the length of time without the opportunity for exercise is critical in assessing the constitutionality of the denial). *38 Even so, there appears to be no case from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court of Georgia putting these Defendants on notice that the conditions in Max-Iso violate the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates who spend short periods of time there. Based on the relevant holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Eleventh Circuit, therefore, Plaintiff's allegations regarding the conditions in Max-Iso do not show a constitutional right “clear enough that any reasonable officer would understand that [the postcard policy] violates that right.” See Morton, 707 F.3d at 1282 (internal quotations omitted); see also Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (“The dispositive [qualified immunity] question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”). But even if the Court concludes that Plaintiff has done enough to administratively exhaust his claim regarding the 24-hour illumination in his cell and perhaps also his claim regarding the lack of access to recreation, fresh air and sunlight — and that Defendants do not enjoy qualified immunity from Plaintiff's Max-Iso conditions claims — Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that these conditions caused him harm. Indeed, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record, and there appears to be none, that he ever mentioned to anyone at the FCDC or in state prison the symptoms he alleges he experienced as a result of his Max-Iso detention. Moreover, as noted with respect to Plaintiff's Max-Iso retaliation claim, it is undisputed that Plaintiff could have left Max-Iso at any time, merely by making a request to do so, and thus there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants subjectively intended to inflict gratuitous harm upon Plaintiff. See Adams, 221 F.3d at 1257 (“there must be a subjective intent by the public officials involved to use the sufficiently serious deprivation in order to punish”). Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants' intent to punish Plaintiff — i.e., there is no evidence of such an intent — Piper, Fee, Hughes and Smith are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Max-Iso conditions claims. VIII. Conclusion Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact with regard to any of his claims, they should be dismissed as a matter of law. See Bailey, 284 F.3d at 1243; Chanel, Inc., 931 F.2d 1477. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider Appointment Of Counsel (Doc. 72), Second Motion To Compel Discovery (Doc. 76) and Motion To Strike Defendant Affidavits (Doc. 99) are DENIED; and the Sheriff's Office Defendants' Motion For Leave To File Supplemental Summary Judgment Brief (Doc. 83) is GRANTED. IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Tonya Simmons Martin's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) and Sheriff's Office Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) be GRANTED; and that this action be DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to withdraw the reference to the Magistrate Judge. SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of February, 2017. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff initially sued other Defendants as well, but they have been dismissed from this action. (See Docs. 6, 8, 12). [2] Plaintiff raised a claim regarding this alleged assault in his May 2012 complaint, but the Court dismissed it as time-barred. (See Johnson, 2:12-cv-108, Docs. 8, 11). [3] Plaintiff's assertion — that the Sheriff's Office Defendants have misled the Court by stating that they have filed all of Plaintiff's FCDC grievances and appeals, even though they omitted his 2009 grievance appeals — is not well-taken. (See Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 11). The Wilson Declaration states that the Sheriff's Office Defendants have filed only those grievances relevant to Plaintiff's claims. (See Wilson Decl. ¶ 6, Doc. 80-1 at 4). Plaintiff's 2009 grievance appeals are not relevant to any of his claims now before the Court. [4] Plaintiff's assertion that counsel was appointed in July 2010 (see Doc. 1 at 4), several months after he filed his motion for appointment of counsel, appears undisputed. [5] The Court summarized Plaintiff's three relevant claims in 2:12-cv-108 as follows: Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to the FCDC law library, to a means of making copies, and to postage, which impeded his ability to file a petition for certiorari review in the Georgia Supreme Court after his appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals, ostensibly regarding his Hall County conviction, was denied in February 2012. He notes that previously, on October 16, 2009, he obtained a court order to force the Forsyth County Sheriff to provide him access to the FCDC law library for two hours per day. Plaintiff also claims that on January 5, 2010, his attorney in his Forsyth County criminal case asked to continue a hearing regarding Plaintiff's speedy trial motion so that he could review evidence that Plaintiff had obtained, allegedly establishing his innocence of the theft by taking charges. “The trial court granted the continuance for two weeks for the express purpose of reviewing the material.” Upon Plaintiff's return from court, however, his legal materials, including the evidence he had obtained, were seized by an FCSO deputy, and the evidence ultimately disappeared. At a hearing on the matter, FCSO deputies stated that they had given the materials to Hall County transport officers, but those officers denied ever receiving them. Plaintiff claims that the loss of this evidence caused the denial of his speedy trial motion. Plaintiff also challenges the FCDC policy of requiring that prisoner mail be by postcard only. Johnson, 2:12-cv-108, Doc. 40 at 2. [6] Former Sheriff Paxton served as Forsyth County Sheriff from 2001 through December 2012. (Paxton Decl. ¶ 2, Doc. 80-2 at 1). It appears that current Sheriff Piper began his tenure as Forsyth County Sheriff in January 2013. [7] In his 2012 complaint, Plaintiff stated that his legal materials were lost in January 2010, although he consistently states in his pleadings in this case that they were lost in January 2011. The January 2010 reference appears to be an inadvertent misstatement. [8] Plaintiff attempts to rescue his access-to-courts claims by noting that he was involved in other lawsuits during the relevant time frame, including two § 1983 actions in this Court. (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 17). But Plaintiff has never argued that his inability to prosecute or defend in these matters derived from his lack of access to the courts. Indeed, he merely listed these actions in his 2014 complaint (see Doc. 1 at 16-17) to remedy his failure to do so in his 2012 complaint. [9] Although, in April 2012, Plaintiff grieved the return of his mother's non-postcard letter to him, rather than its being placed in his property bin, alleging a violation of FCDC policy (see Ex. C-7 to Wilson Decl., Doc. 80-1 at 46), he has not raised a separate First Amendment claim in this regard. [10] Plaintiff spent very little time at the FCDC in 2010 and 2011, but at some point during that time he was diagnosed with the hepatitis C virus (“HCV”). (Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ I. 8-10). On February 1, 2013, Hays State Prison medical personnel “determined it would be ‘[b]etter to observe stable hernia which has been present for years until after HCV treatment.’ ” (Id. ¶ I. 10; see Pl.'s Ex. 6, Doc. 88-3 at 6). [11] Plaintiff also characterizes the alleged interference with his medical treatment, with his access to the courts and with his legal materials as retaliatory (Pl.'s Resp. Br., Doc. 88-1 at 27), but, as the sheriffs correctly point out, Plaintiff may not raise new claims in a brief filed in response to a motion for summary judgment. (See Sheriffs' Reply Br., Doc. 96 at 2 n.2 (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.... Liberal pleading does not require that, at the summary judgment stage, defendants must infer all possible claims that could arise out of facts set forth in the complaint.”))); see also Long v. Kirby, 2:11-CV-00294-RWS-JCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37558, at *47 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2014) (quoting Welch v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (N.D. Ga. 1997), to the effect that “Plaintiff cannot change its theory of the case (in an effort to avoid summary judgment) after Defendant moves for summary judgment.” (internal quotations omitted)), adopted by 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37076 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2014). [12] Plaintiff does state at one point in his pleadings that he did not “voluntarily” go into Max-Iso, but rather was forced to do so because of his “alleged excessive legal material.” (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ IV. 8, Doc. 88 at 23). But everything else of record in this case, including Plaintiff's own pleadings, indicates that Plaintiff did agree to go into Max-Iso, albeit on a temporary basis; and the evidence of record also indicates that he could have left Max-Iso at any time, had he chosen to do so. Plaintiff does not dispute this latter point. [13] Defendant Cole points out, however, that the J. L. Cole who gave the March 15, 2011 statement about the loss of Plaintiff's legal materials is not Defendant Cole, but another FCDC officer. (See Cole, Gay and Hobbs Reply Br., Doc. 94 at 3). [14] There is no suggestion in Plaintiff's pleadings that he has brought, or intended to bring, a separate due process claim on this basis.