LIBERTY INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS INC., Plaintiff, v. FIRST MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY and TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendants No. 3:17-cv-3029-M United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division Filed March 11, 2019 Horan, David L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AWARDING FED. R. CIV. P. 37(A)(5)(A) FEES *1 Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company (“TLIC”) and The Travelers Indemnity Company (“TIC”; collectively, “Travelers”) filed a Motion to Compel Supplement Interrogatory Answers from Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Liberty”), see Dkt. No. 39 (the “MTC), seeking an order overruling Liberty's objections to TLIC's Interrogatory Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 17 and requiring Liberty to provide substantive answers to these four interrogatories within a period of 10 days of the Court's order granting the MTC, see id. at 4-8. Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn referred the MTC to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary, and for determination under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). See Dkt. No. 47. In a November 29, 2018 Order, the Court granted the MTC and orders that Liberty must, by December 14, 2018, serve on TLIC's counsel complete answers – without objections – to Interrogatory Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 17 in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33's requirements. Dkt. No. 68 at 4. The Court also explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) provides that, if a motion to compel is granted, or if the requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees,” except that “the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). After carefully considering the parties' briefing, the Court finds and concludes Travelers did not file the MTC before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action. But the Court will grant Liberty until December 19, 2018 to file a response to otherwise explain why the Court should not enter an order requiring it or its counsel to pay Travelers, as required by Rule 37(a)(5)(A), the expenses, including attorneys' fees, that Travelers incurred in drafting and filing the MTC and reply. Travelers may then file a reply in support of an award of expenses under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) by January 3, 2018. Id. at 4-5. Then, on December 27, 2018, the Court entered the following Electronic Order: Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. (“Liberty”) has not filed a response why the Court should not enter an order requiring it or its counsel to pay Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company (collectively, “Travelers”), as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A), the expenses, including attorneys' fees, that Travelers incurred in drafting and filing the Motion to Compel Supplement Interrogatory Answers from Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. [39] (the “MTC”). In the absence of a response, and, where the Court has already found and concluded that Travelers did not file the MTC before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action, the Court determines that Liberty's objections and incomplete answers were not substantially justified and that no other circumstances make an award apportioning the reasonable expenses for the MTC unjust. The Court therefore ORDERS, under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. must pay Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company the expenses, including attorneys' fees, that they incurred in drafting and filing the Motion to Compel Supplement Interrogatory Answers from Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. [39] and the reply in support [64]. Plaintiff's counsel and Defendants' counsel are directed to meet face-to-face and confer about the reasonable amount of these attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). By no later than January 17, 2019, the parties must file a joint report notifying the Court of the results of the conference. If all disputed issues as to the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company have been resolved, Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company's counsel must also send an agreed proposed order to the Court at Horan_Orders@txnd.uscourts.gov by January 17, 2019. If the parties do not reach an agreement as to the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded, Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company must, by no later than February 7, 2019, file an application for attorneys' fees and costs that is accompanied by supporting evidence establishing the amount of the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (as described above) to be awarded under Rules 37(a)(5)(A). The fee application must be supported by documentation evidencing the “lodestar” calculation, including affidavits and detailed billing records, and citations to relevant authorities and must set forth the itemized number of hours expended in connection with the recoverable attorneys' fees described above as well as the reasonable rate(s) requested. See Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2002). If an application is filed, Plaintiff must file a response by February 28, 2019, and Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company must file a reply by March 14, 2019. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L. Horan on 12/27/2018.) (Entered: 12/27/2018) *2 Dkt. No. 69. Travelers and Liberty then filed a Joint Conference Report that explained that [c]ounsel conducted a face-to-face conference on Monday, January 14, 2019 at the offices of Travelers' counsel. No agreement could be reached as to the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded, but the parties have agreed to continue discussions. Dkt. No. 73 at 1. Travelers has now filed an Application for Fees, see Dkt. No. 78 (the “Fee Application”), which Chief Judge Lynn has referred to the undersigned for a hearing, if necessary, and for determination, see Dkt. No. 80. The undersigned has authority to enter a nondispositive order granting attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Merritt v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (per curiam). In the Fee Application, Travelers explained that the Court provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to be heard, but Plaintiff failed to respond. Doc. 69. Travelers is therefore entitled to the reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred to draft the Motion and reply as ordered by the Court. Id. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is the Affidavit of Wm. Lance Lewis, which includes the information requested by the Court, including the lodestar calculation, detailed and redacted billing records, the itemized number of hours expended, and the reasonable rates requested. See Doc. 69; Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2002). Subject to same, Travelers asks the Court to award Travelers $4,005.00 for drafting the Motion and reply. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Travelers requests that this Court grant Travelers' Application for Fees, award Travelers $4,005.00 for drafting the Motion and reply under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), and grant Travelers such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled. Dkt. No. 78 at 1. Liberty filed a response, contending: 1. On November 29, 2018, the Honorable Magistrate Judge granted The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories (the “Motion to Compel”), ordering LIUI to provide complete answers without objections to four (4) related interrogatories propounded by The Travelers Lloyds Indemnity Company (“Travelers Lloyds”). The Honorable Magistrate Judge further found that The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company (collectively “Travelers”) did not file the Motion to Compel before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action and awarded to Travelers “the expenses, including attorney's fees, that Travelers incurred in drafting the and filing the [Motion to Compel] and reply.” 2. On February 7, 2019, Travelers filed their Application for Fees, seeking $4,005.00 in fees allegedly associated with the filing of the Motion. Dkt. No. 78. .... 3. The fees Travelers seek go beyond “the expenses, including attorney's fees, that Travelers incurred in drafting the and filing the [Motion to Compel] and reply.” They consist of fees incurred for “consulting with Travelers, preparing the Motion to Compel (the “Motion”), communicating with Plaintiff's counsel in an effort to avoid having to file the Motion, revising the Motion after Plaintiff supplemented its document production and produced materials Travelers contended were responsive to its requests for production, analyzing Plaintiff's response to the Motion, and preparing a reply in support of the Motion.” Dkt. No. 78 at Ex. 1, par. 4. Any award of fees in this case, if any, should be limited to those incurred in drafting and filing the Motion to Compel and subsequent reply as directed by the Court. *3 4. The fees incurred in connection with reviewing Plaintiff's supplemental document production and then revising the Motion to Compel before it was filed based on these responses are particularly inappropriate to be awarded in connection with Plaintiff's Motion to Compel because: (a) the Motion to Compel addressed only four (4) interrogatories and did not address any alleged deficiencies in Plaintiff's responses to Travelers' requests for production; and (b) review of Plaintiff's supplemental document production was necessitated by the facts and issues in this case, not by Plaintiff's alleged insufficient interrogatory responses. 5. Finally, an award of all of the fees sought by Travelers would be unjust under the facts of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). As noted in Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Compel, the information requested by Travelers in the Interrogatories made the subject of the Motion to Compel was made available to Travelers in Plaintiff's responses to similar interrogatories served by Travelers immediately following a discovery conference between counsel in this case as well as in the parties extensive summary judgment briefing, in which the parties included and relied upon much of the documentation referenced in Plaintiff's original interrogatory responses which Travelers contended was insufficient. While Plaintiff recognizes that the Court has previously concluded that these factors did not preclude the granting of Travelers' motion to compel, they clearly bear on the alleged reasonableness and necessity of the Motion to Compel under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, whether an award of the full amount of fees sought in connection with the filing of the Motion to Compel would be unjust. 6. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that Travelers' Application for Fees be denied. Dkt. No. 88 at 1-3. And Travelers filed a reply, asserting: A. Liberty already waived its right to contest the Court's order awarding Travelers its attorneys' fees and the Court already rejected the arguments Liberty raises. By failing to file a response as to why the Court should not award Travelers its expenses and fees by December 19, 2018 as ordered, Liberty waived its right to assert that an award of the fees sought by Travelers would be unjust. Moreover, the Court has already rejected the arguments Liberty again raises in its response, including that Liberty was somehow relieved of its obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not have to provide sufficient answers to TLIC's interrogatories because the information was purportedly available in other places. The Court previously concluded this was insufficient and that Liberty did not (and could not) address the information sought in TLIC's interrogatories in Liberty's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, arguments the Court has already rejected do not establish that an award of Travelers' fees would be unjust. B. Travelers is entitled to the fees it seeks because the fees were incurred due to Liberty's continued gamesmanship. Liberty contends the fees Travelers has requested go beyond the fees Travelers incurred in drafting and filing its motion to compel and reply. According to Liberty, Travelers is only entitled to recover fees for drafting these pleadings. Among other things, Liberty contends that Travelers is not entitled to recover fees for time Travelers' counsel spent obtaining client approval to file the motion to compel, conferring with Liberty on the motion to compel after it was filed, or analyzing Plaintiff's response in order to draft a reply in support of the motion. It is difficult to see how Travelers' counsel could have filed a motion to compel without client approval or drafted a reply without first reviewing Liberty's response. Further, Travelers is not seeking reimbursement of fees it incurred to draft the initial correspondence it provided to Liberty disputing the sufficiency of Liberty's discovery responses (see Doc. 39-1 at 12) or conferences that occurred in September 2018. Travelers is only seeking fees it incurred due to actions taken by Liberty after the parties' September 19, 2018 conference on the motion to compel. *4 Liberty also argues that Travelers is not entitled to reimbursement for fees Travelers incurred to draft a portion of the motion to compel that was not included in the version filed with the Court. Travelers sent Liberty a letter on September 13, 2018, identifying several issues with Liberty's interrogatory answers and responses to Travelers' requests for production. See id. When Liberty failed to respond, Travelers' counsel drafted a motion to compel that addressed all of the issues Travelers identified. Nearly a month after the parties conferred, Liberty produced supplemental documents, which required Travelers to review those materials and revise the arguments in the motion to compel filed with the Court. If not for Liberty's gamesmanship, Travelers would not have incurred these additional fees or had to revise the motion to compel. Travelers is therefore entitled to the full amount of the fees it seeks. Dkt. No. 89 at 1-3. Legal Standards “This Court uses the ‘lodestar’ method to calculate attorney's fees.” Heidtman v. Cnty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Fender v. Zapata Partnership, Ltd., 12 F.3d 480, 487 (5th Cir. 1994)); Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours an attorney reasonably spent on the case by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the market rate in the community for this work. See Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012). “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11 (1984)). The relevant legal community is the community in which the district court sits. See Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002). The party seeking reimbursement of attorneys' fees bears the burden of establishing the number of hours expended through the presentation of adequately recorded time records as evidence. See Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court should use this time as a benchmark and then exclude any time that is excessive, duplicative, unnecessary, or inadequately documented. See id. The hours remaining are those reasonably expended. See id. There is a strong presumption of the reasonableness of the lodestar amount. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010); Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. After calculating the lodestar, the Court may either (1) accept the lodestar figure or (2) decrease or enhance it based on the circumstances of the case, taking into account what are referred to as the Johnson factors. See La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989). The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of taking the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) the monetary amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and duration of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 448 F.2d at 717-19; see also Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. Because the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable, it should be modified only in exceptional cases. See Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457. Further, the lodestar amount may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor that was already taken into account during the initial calculation of the lodestar, see Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800, and the lodestar calculation may take into account several Johnson factors, see Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 503 n.8 (5th Cir. 2013). *5 Additionally, a party seeking attorneys' fees may only recover for time spent in preparing and prosecuting the actual discovery motion – that is, the “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). This includes time spent on additional briefing and any oral argument or hearing and can include “ ‘fees on fees’ for the time expended in filing a motion for attorneys' fees.” Wysocki v. Dourian, No. 2:17-cv-333-JAD-NJK, 2017 WL 4767145, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2017); accord Schneider v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 13-4094-SAC, 2018 WL 3068172, at *3 (D. Kan. June 21, 2018). The Court recognizes that the analysis set forth above, and particularly the interplay of the lodestar analysis and the Johnson factors, may have called into question. See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552-53; S&H Indus., Inc. v. Selander, No. 3:11-cv-2988-M-BH, 2013 WL 6332993, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2013). But, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, without comment or reference to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perdue, has continued to utilize the approach laid out by this Court. See Black, 732 F.3d at 502-03; but see In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 663-64 (5th Cir. 2012) (analyzing whether any changes brought about by Perdue apply to bankruptcy attorneys' fees calculations); but see also In re ASARCO, L.L.C., 751 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 2014) (following Pilgrim's Pride). And the Fifth Circuit, in a recent published opinion, has rejected the argument “that Perdue clearly disfavors applying the Johnson factors to determine a fee award and instead requires the use of only the lodestar.” Combs v. City of Huntington, Tex., 829 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2016). The Court of Appeals explained that [w]e agree that Perdue requires courts to first calculate the lodestar; indeed, this has long been our practice. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. 4552 (LULAC) v. Roscoe Ind. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The method by which the district court calculates an attorneys' fees award is well established. The district court first calculates the ‘lodestar.’ “). But Perdue does not, as Combs contends, make it impermissible to then consider any relevant Johnson factors. Perdue cautions against the sole use of the Johnson factors to calculate a reasonable attorney's fee but nowhere calls into question the use of relevant Johnson factors to make this determination. Indeed, Perdue expressly allows adjustments “in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.” 559 U.S. at 554, 130 S. Ct. 1662. .... And though the lodestar is presumed reasonable, it may be adjusted where it “does not adequately take into account a factor that may be properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554, 130 S. Ct. 1662. .... Perdue, consistent with the Court's frequent pronouncements, explains that lodestar enhancements are to be rare. .... In sum, the district court should begin by calculating the lodestar: the reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable rate. The district court may then determine whether any other considerations counsel in favor of enhancing or decreasing the lodestar. In light of the “strong presumption” that the lodestar represents a sufficient fee, enhancements must necessarily be rare. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553-54, 130 S. Ct. 1662. *6 Id. at 393-95. Perdue, then, did not change the landscape of calculating attorneys' fees awards in the Fifth Circuit. Accordingly, the analysis below will take into account the necessary factors when determining the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded under Rule 37(a)(5). Analysis Traveler's Fee Application is supported by the Affidavit of Wm. Lance Lewis, which incorporates his firm's records. See Dkt. No. 78-1. Mr. Lewis explains: 2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. I am a shareholder in the firm of Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C. and at all times I have been an attorney of record in this matter on behalf of The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company (collectively “Travelers”). 3. I am an attorney licensed to practice law by the Supreme Court of Texas since 1990 and am a member in good standing with the State Bar of Texas. I am admitted to practice in United States District Court for the Southern, Northern, Western and Eastern Districts of Texas. The majority of my practice has been and continues to be devoted to civil litigation, a percentage of which concerns matters such as this dispute over coverage issues under primary and excess commercial general liability policies. As such, I am familiar with the reasonable fees charged by attorneys in Texas, including attorneys in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, for work similar to that involved in the claims asserted in this action. 4. I have prepared this Affidavit for the purpose of testifying regarding the amount of the award for reasonable attorney's fees. The fees incurred by Travelers are based on contemporaneously kept time records related to this litigation as reflected in the attached Exhibit A. My law firm has spent time consulting with Travelers, preparing the Motion to Compel (the “Motion”), communicating with Plaintiffs counsel in an effort to avoid having to file the Motion, revising the Motion after Plaintiff supplemented its document production and produced materials Travelers contended were responsive to its requests for production, analyzing Plaintiffs response to the Motion, and preparing a reply in support of the Motion. 5. The billing rate for attorneys working on this matter is $225.00, and a total of $4,005.00 in reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees have been incurred to draft and file the Motion and reply in support of the Motion. This represents approximately 17.8 total hours of legal services provided. Travelers has paid or will pay such fees for attorneys' services in this case. 6. I have considered the Johnson factors to determine the amount of the award for reasonable attorney's fees to Travelers.' The hourly rates charged by the Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C. are, in my opinion, customary among lawyers practicing in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division in cases of this sort. The fees charged are reasonable in light of the Johnson factors, including but not limited to the time limitations imposed, the amount in controversy and the anticipated results. Based upon the foregoing considerations, the amount of $4,005.00, in my opinion, would be reasonable and necessary for attorney's fees incurred by Travelers for drafting the Motion and a reply in support of the Motion in this case. *7 7. The bases for my opinions include my experience, skill and training as an attorney together with the information specifically related to the discovery disputes at issue in the Motion and reply. In rendering my opinions, I relied upon the pleadings and discovery generated in this action and the rulings of the Court. Dkt. No. 78-1 at 2-4 of 11. The billing records that Mr. Lewis submitted reflect the work that attorneys performed. The records include a narrative description of the work done and the number of hours that it took to complete the work. The Court has carefully reviewed these records and is persuaded that the fees incurred in connection with issues with Liberty's responses and objections to requests for production that were remedied before Travelers filed the MTC go beyond what the Court has ordered, and so the Court will not award fees for the time incurred on September 19, 2018 (1.90 hours) and October 16, 2018 (1.70 hours and .80 hours and .50 hours). But the Court finds that the other hours that Mr. Lewis attributes to tasks necessary for drafting and filing the MTC and the reply in support are reasonable and necessary and not excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented and therefore were reasonably expended for the tasks for which the Court has determined that Travelers should be awarded attorneys' fees. It appears that Mr. Lewis asks for fees for 17.8 hours when the attached records reflect a total of 19.4 hours. See Dkt. No. 78-1 at 6-11 of 11. Because it appears that Mr. Lewis already requested only partial fees for some of the time entries, the Court will reduced his requested 17.8 hours by the 4.90 total hours for the time entries listed above. And, for the reasons that Travelers explains in its reply in support of its Fee Application, the Court is not persuaded by Liberty's assertion that the fees sought for those 12.9 hours go beyond the work for which the Court has ordered fees to be paid. The Court finds that rate of $225.00 per hour is reasonable and within the market rate for attorneys handling this type of litigation in the Dallas area. And the Court agrees with Travelers that Liberty's argument against an award of any fees as unjust is both untimely and ultimately unpersuasive, as the Court has previously determined. The Court therefore finds the appropriate lodestar here to be calculated as 12.9 hours at $225.00 an hour for a total of $2,902.50. The Court has considered the Johnson factors but notes that the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable and should only be modified in exceptional cases. Here, the Court notes that Travelers does not seek an enhancement of its attorneys' fees. And the Court finds that there are no other exceptional circumstances. Conclusion The Court GRANTS Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company's Application for Fees [Dkt. No. 78] and ORDERS that Plaintiff Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. must, by April 10, 2019, pay Defendants The Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company their reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,902.50 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A). SO ORDERED.