*1 THIS CAUSE comes before the court on Plaintiffs Douglas Kuber, individually, and Rebecca Kuber and Rachel Gross as trustees under Douglas Kuber 2008 Family Trust’s Motion for Sanctions, filed on December 27, 2019. (DE 173). On January 9, 2020, Defendants Berkshire Life Insurance Company (“Berkshire”) and the Guardian Life Insurance Company (“Guardian”) (collectively “Defendants”) responded and Plaintiffs replied on January 15, 2020. (DE 187; DE 200). For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.

This is a case about the denial of disability benefits under two insurance policies: the Berkshire Individual Disability Income Insurance Policy (“Berkshire Policy”) and the Guardian Whole Life Insurance Policy (“Guardian Policy”) (collectively “the Policies”).[1] Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Kuber is entitled to benefits and a waiver of premiums under the Policies due to his mental and physical disability. However, Defendants argue that even if Mr. Kuber is disabled under the terms of the Policies, which they do not concede, he should still be unable to recover. Defendants arguments in this regard hinge on Mr. Kuber’s felony conviction for wire fraud. Defendants argue that Mr. Kuber’s last occupation was as a felonious “investment manager,” which is not an occupation covered by the Policies. Defendants also argue that Mr. Kuber’s criminal activity caused him to be legally disabled from working before he became physically and mentally disabled.

The present Motion relates to the adequacy of the answers given by Defendants’ 30(b)(6) corporate representative, Aidan Kavanagh, at his November 19, 2019 deposition. The majority of Plaintiffs’ Motion focuses on the sufficiency of Kavanagh’s response to questions regarding Defendants’ basis for its contention that Ms. Kuber actually knew of Mr. Kuber’s fraudulent scheme.[2] (See DE 173 at 5-7). Plaintiffs further contend that Kavanagh refused to answer questions on two other topics: 1) the factual basis for Defendants’ contention that Mr. Kuber “used Kuber Law Group as part of the conspiracy to defraud”; and 2) the factual basis for the allegation that Ms. Kuber was “acting in an individual capacity rather than as a trustee when she applied for the Life Policy.” (DE 173 at 7-8). Apparently, Plaintiffs’ counsel became frustrated with the adequacy of Kavanagh’s responses, prompting counsel to abruptly end the deposition and file the present Motion. (Id. at 8).

Ordinarily, “[a]ll disputes related to discovery shall be presented to the Court by motion (or, if the Court has established a different practice for presenting discovery disputes, by other Court-approved method) within (30) days from the ... date of the deposition in which the dispute arose.” Local Rule 26.1(g)(1)(b). However, in this case Magistrate Judge Brannon entered an Order Setting Discovery Procedure, which governs. That Order requires the Parties to confer on discovery disputes before bringing them to the Court’s attention. (DE 35). If no resolution is reached, the party seeking relief is required to bring the dispute to Judge Brannon’s attention within fourteen days. (Id.).

*2 Plaintiffs have not followed this procedure. Initially, Plaintiffs take the position that they conferred with Defendants at the Kavanagh deposition. (DE 200 at 6). Under this theory, Plaintiffs should have brought this dispute to Judge Brannon’s attention by December 3, 2019 (14 days after the deposition) at the absolute latest. Plaintiffs did not do so but contend that they were justified in their untimely action because they were not yet in possession of Kavanagh’s deposition transcript. I do not find this to be good cause justifying the delay. There is no reason why Plaintiffs needed the transcript before bringing this seemingly urgent dispute to Judge Brannon’s attention. In fact, Plaintiffs believed that the issues raised in the deposition were so urgent that they attempted to contact Judge Brannon during the deposition. (DE 173 at 7). Additionally, Plaintiffs state that they received the deposition transcript on December 9, 2019, which is still almost three weeks prior to when this Motion was filed. Thus, even accepting Plaintiffs’ reason for their delay, they should have promptly notified Judge Brannon of their dispute after receiving the transcript.

In sum, Plaintiffs could and should have brought this to Judge Brannon’s attention at the earliest possible time so that a ruling regarding the adequacy of the deposition answers could have been rendered. Regardless of the ruling rendered, the solution would not have been the exclusion of Kavanagh’s deposition testimony on specified topics—the relief Plaintiffs’ seek by way of the present Motion. Instead, it would have been a substantive ruling regarding the sufficiency of Kavanagh’s deposition answers and Judge Brannon could have entered an order with guidance to the Parties regarding the scope of the deposition.

Finally, even without these procedural defects, the Motion would be denied on its merits. “[A]lthough a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent must be adequately prepared, the inadequacies in a deponent’s testimony must be egregious and not merely lacking in desired specificity in discrete areas.” Lebron v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 16-24687, 2018 WL 4258269, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018). I have reviewed the challenged portions of Kavanagh’s deposition and do not find that Kavanagh acted with the degree of bad faith that would justify limiting his testimony.[3]

Finally, Defendants request fees for preparing their response to this Motion. (DE 187). Under Rule 37(a)(5)(C), a court should award attorney’s fees to the party defending a motion to compel if the motion is denied and the moving party’s position was not substantially justified. Such sanctions are also appropriate when a party fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also Advisory Comments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (“The proposed change ‘. provides in effect that expenses should ordinarily be awarded unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his point to court.”). As discussed, Plaintiffs filed this Motion for Sanctions (without properly conferring with Defendants) instead of filing a proper motion requesting that Kavanagh be compelled to answer questions during his deposition. By taking that course of action, Plaintiffs failed to follow Judge Brannon’s order regarding discovery procedures and unnecessarily brought this dispute in the form of a motion for sanctions. Because Plaintiffs filed this meritless motion without following the procedures in Judge Brannon’s order, I find that Defendants are entitled to the requested attorney’s fees.

Defendants are directed to file an affidavit supporting their fee request within fourteen days of this Order. The affidavit shall only include the fees associated with preparing the response to this Motion. Once the affidavit is filed, I will assess the reasonableness of the claimed fees and enter a subsequent order awarding Defendants fees.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

SIGNED in Chambers in West Palm Beach, Florida, this 27 day of January, 2020.