Lyndelle T. PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants 15 CV 1795 (JBW) (CLP) United States District Court, E.D. New York Signed January 08, 2016 Counsel Gregory G. Smith, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff. Christopher Aaron Seacord, Jessica Giambrone, NYC Law Department, Lawrence J. Profeta, NYC Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants. Pollack, Cheryl L., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 On April 2, 2015, plaintiff Lyndelle T. Phillips, Esq., commenced this action against the City of New York (“the City”), Salvatore J. Cassano, Commissioner of the New York City Fire Department (“FDNY”), and First Deputy Commissioner Daniel Shacknai, alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. By letters dated September 30, and October 1, 2015, plaintiff moves to compel responses to plaintiff’s document requests and interrogatories, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 37.3 and Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By letter dated October 29, 2015, plaintiff also seeks to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment as untimely, or in the alternative, preclude defendants’ use of certain evidence in connection with the motion for summary judgment based on defendants’ alleged discovery violations. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to strike or preclude evidence is denied. However, to ensure that plaintiff has sufficient time to prepare to respond to the newly introduced evidence, discovery is reopened for 45 days, until February 23, 2016, to allow plaintiff an opportunity to seek additional information and/or conduct any additional depositions that she needs. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Following an Order issued by the district court to expedite discovery in this case, the Court, during a conference held on September 15, 2015, Ordered defendants to respond to plaintiff’s discovery requests by September 25, 2015. Although defendants produced some of the requested documents, they asked plaintiff to execute a protective order as to certain additional documents. Defendants also asked plaintiff to consent to an extension of time to allow defendants to respond to certain interrogatories, given that the individual responsible for reviewing the answers to the interrogatories was unavailable. (Def. Ltr.[1] at 1-2). Plaintiff refused to execute the proposed protective order, indicating that “it did not have on its face any ‘good cause’ reasons for protecting documents and deposition testimony.” (Pl. 9/30 Ltr.[2] at 1). Instead, plaintiff filed the first motion to compel production of the subject documents and responses to the interrogatories on September 30, 2015. Defendant served answers to the interrogatories on October 1, 2015. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr.[3] at 1). Plaintiff filed a second motion to compel production of the documents and complete responses to the interrogatories on October 1, 2015, complaining that the responses were “incomplete and without good cause for being so.” (Id.) *2 While plaintiff’s motions to compel were pending before this Court, defendants jointly moved for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s claims on October 23, 2015, relying in part upon (1) a memorandum from Muriel Goode-Trufant detailing a past investigation filed by plaintiff’s prior employees into claims of discrimination against plaintiff and the FDNY, (2) a notice of appeal filed by plaintiff Phillips to the Fire Commissioner, (3) various personnel documents, and (4) a declaration from defendant Salvatore Cassano (the “Cassano Declaration”) (collectively, the “Contested Evidence”).[4] The district judge, the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, scheduled a hearing on defendants’ summary judgment motion for November 9, 2015. In response, plaintiff moved on October 29, 2015, to preclude defendants from using the Contested Evidence in support of their motion, arguing that plaintiff had not had enough time to adequately review and respond to the Contested Evidence. On October 30, 2015, the motion to strike was referred to the undersigned, and a conference on the motion was held on November 5, 2015. A. The Subject Documents, Interrogatories, and Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff seeks the personnel file of Margo Ferrandino, who allegedly replaced plaintiff as the FDNY’s EEO Officer (Req. No. 5), along with various files and disciplinary records for John Peruggia, Kay Ellis, Donay Queenan, Robert Wallace, Michelle Maglione, Peggy Quinn-Pappa, Calvin Smith, and Robert Rampino, all FDNY employees whom plaintiff describes as comparators. (Req. Nos. 7-14). In addition, plaintiff seeks the files relating to Rodney Pepe-Sounevier, Esq., Bianca Kadzoman, Esq., MacLaughlin Harris, and Paul Sorhen, other employees who brought complaints and EEO charges against the FDNY (Req. Nos. 15-18), and information about Patrick Damas, whose job title has not been provided. (Req. No. 19). In addition to records kept by defendants Shacknai and Cassano regarding plaintiff, to which the defendants responded that there were no responsive records (Req. Nos. 21, 23), plaintiff seeks official appointment letters and press releases pertaining to Shacknai and Cassano (Req. Nos. 22, 24), written job descriptions for First Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel (Req. Nos. 33-34), and any electronically stored information supporting plaintiff’s case. (Req. Nos. 35-38). Plaintiff further seeks to compel responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 3, 8, and 10. Interrogatory 1 asks the defendants to create a chart with the information requested in the interrogatory, including the race, color, and title of all management employees who experienced certain employment actions for the period from January 1, 2006 until defendant Shacknai was no longer employed by the FDNY. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr. at 1), Interrogatory Request No. 3 seeks the “nature and the substance” of a conversation that Shacknai allegedly had with Margo Ferrandino on March 23, 2012 (id. at 2); Interrogatory Request No. 8 seeks the identity of all FDNY employees with policy making authority in 2011 and 2012 (id. at 2); and Interrogatory Request No. 10 seeks the identities of “all persons who participated in making critical decisions concerning the Vulcan’s litigation.” (Id. at 2). Finally, plaintiff seeks to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment as untimely, or, in the alternative, to preclude defendants from using the Contested Evidence in the summary judgment motion or at trial, arguing that defendants’ failure to supplement their initial disclosures and produce the Cassano Declaration runs afoul of the discovery requirements of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Compel Discovery Plaintiff alleges that defendants have failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 26 by failing to produce certain documents and failing to respond to certain of plaintiff’s interrogatories, and now seeks to compel defendants to remedy the alleged failures. Defendants raise several objections to plaintiff’s requests. *3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant parties in lawsuits broad rights to discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The recently revised Rule 26 allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Materials “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. In other words, “ ‘[r]elevance’ under Rule 26 ‘has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Crosby v. City of New York, 269 F.R.D. 267, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). However, discovery may not be used to “ ‘to explore matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Fontaine, 402 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Further, as specified in Rule 26, discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Parties who produce sensitive material in the course of discovery may move for a protective order to limit the possible dissemination of disclosed information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). While the terms of the Rule only discuss the situation where a party moves for such an order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (noting that “[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order....”), a court may enter such an order sua sponte. See, e.g., Shipkevich v. Staten Island University Hospital, No. 08 CV 1008, 2012 WL 4442621, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept 25, 2015) (finding no error in a magistrate judge’s sua sponte issuance of a protective order); Next Phase Distribution. Inc. v. John Does 1-27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (entering a protective order without a motion from the affected party). 1. Document Requests Plaintiff first asserts that defendants have wrongfully withheld certain documentary evidence. a. Personnel file of Margo Ferrandino In Document Request 5, plaintiff seeks to compel production of the personnel files of Margo Ferrandino, the individual who replaced plaintiff as the EEO Officer for the FDNY. Among other things, plaintiff seeks production of “any and all hiring records, employment applications, resumes, employment notes, demotions, promotions, salary changes/adjustments, terms of demotion, terms of separation, [and] folders maintained in individual units.” (Req. No. 5). Defendants object to this request on the grounds that the request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, not restricted in time, seeks documents that are irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims, and would involve disclosure of “confidential and private information regarding third parties who are not subject to this lawsuit.” (Def. Doc. Obj.[5] at 5). Defendants indicate, however, that they are willing to produce these documents subject to a protective order. Plaintiff responds that any sensitive information contained in the files could easily be redacted, rendering a protective order unnecessary. (Pl. Reply[6] at 2). The Court finds that, given the extremely low threshold for relevance under Rule 26, the personnel files of Margo Ferrandino could potentially lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Documents in Ms. Ferrandino’s file could reference the reasons for Ms. Ferrandino’s promotion to that position and possibly reference plaintiff’s termination, perhaps lending support to the theory that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct as prohibited by Title VII. Further, evidence about the hiring process and Ms. Ferrandino’s qualifications as reflected in these files could potentially lend support to plaintiff’s theory of discriminatory treatment. *4 However, given the potentially sensitive nature of information that may be contained in these files, the Court agrees that a protective order is warranted. See Duling v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 266 F.R.D. 66, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (recognizing that “courts have generally characterized personnel files as confidential and found it appropriate to enter protective orders governing their use in litigation because of the inherent potential for harm or embarrassment if the information they contain is revealed”). At this time, without knowing the extent to which these records contain HIPAA protected personal health information or other sensitive information about Ms. Ferrandino, a non-party to this litigation, it is impossible to determine whether redaction alone would be adequate or potentially render the records incomprehensible. Accordingly, the Court hereby Orders the records to be produced subject to a protective order. Plaintiffs are Ordered not to disseminate the contents of the personnel files to any person not involved in the instant litigation, or use them for any purposes beyond pursuing the claims at issue here. To the extent that the parties seek to use the documents in the course of depositions or in filings with the court, the parties are Ordered to meet and confer and agree on language for a further protective order consistent with the Honorable Eugene H. Nickerson’s opinion in Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 184 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). b. Disciplinary Actions In Document Requests 7-14, plaintiff requests copies of documents reflecting all disciplinary actions taken against John Peruggia, Kay Ellis, Donay Queenan, Robert Wallace, Michelle Maglione, Peggy Quinn-Papa, Calvin Smith, and Robert Rampino. (Req. Nos. 7-14). Plaintiff contends that these individuals are comparators, who, like plaintiff, are senior level employees who had job actions taken against them, but because they “are white senior level employees,” plaintiff claims that they “retained their jobs and salaries.” (Pl. 9/30 Ltr. at 2). Defendants raise the same objections as with Document Request 5, contending that the requests are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, not restricted in time, seek documents that are irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims, and would involve disclosure of confidential information. Defendants also claim that the plaintiff has failed to “establish that [plaintiff and the eight subject individuals] are similarly situated in ‘all material respects.’ ” (Def. Ltr. at 2) (quoting Shumway v. U.P.S., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff responds that the individuals are similarly situated, as the eight individuals are also senior managers who were also “accused of mismanaging their offices, having excessive complaints, having operational difficulty and other job actions against them.” (Pl. Reply at 2). If there is evidence in these records that demonstrates that plaintiff received harsher treatment than similarly situated white employees, even though they all received similar complaints, these records would support plaintiff’s claims of discrimination. As this disparity lies at the heart of plaintiff’s claims, these documents are clearly within the ambit of Rule 26. Defendants’ reliance on Shumway is misplaced; Shumway dealt with the standards for raising an issue of material fact for purposes of defeating a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and not with the standards for discovery under Rule 26. Given the strong presumption of relevance and preference for broad discovery, the Court finds that the question of material similarity is not appropriately decided at this stage. However, while the Court finds that disciplinary actions taken against comparable senior level employees may be relevant to plaintiff’s claims of disparate treatment, the requests should be limited to a relevant time period. Accordingly, plaintiff is Ordered to provide defendants with more specifics in terms of relevant time periods. Once the requests have been narrowed, defendants are Ordered to produce the relevant records, but subject to the same protective order detailed supra at p. 8. *5 Specifically, given the potential for embarrassment to the eight non-party individuals, the Court Orders plaintiffs not to disseminate the contents of the personnel files to any person not involved in the instant litigation, or use them for any purposes beyond pursuing the claims at issue here. To the extent that the parties seek to use the documents in the course of depositions or in filings with the court, the parties are Ordered to meet and confer and agree on language for a further protective order consistent with the Judge Nickerson’s opinion in Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co. c. Past Complaints Document Requests 15-18 seek disclosure of “copies of all disciplinary action” for Rodney Pepe-Sounevier, Esq., Bianca Kadzoman, Esq., MacLaughlin a/k/a “Mac” Harris, and Paul Sorhen, claiming that these are records related to FDNY “employees who brought race discrimination claims and lawsuits for termination and failure to promote where the City settled the cases....” (Pl. 9/30 Ltr. at 2). Defendants raise all the same objections as listed above. The Court finds that these records may be relevant to plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, in that they may lead to the discovery of evidence of the type of work environment that plaintiff faced. While these records themselves may not be admissible at the trial itself, Rule 26 explicitly allows for discovery of evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). These prior complaints are reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, as they may identify particular actors within the FDNY or particular statements made by the defendants that would support plaintiff’s claims. Given the highly sensitive nature of a nonparty employee’s disciplinary file, however, defendants are Ordered to produce the personnel files redacted as to the name of the employee and subject to the same protective order described above. Plaintiffs are Ordered not to disseminate the contents of the personnel files to any person not involved in the instant litigation, or use them for any purposes beyond pursuing the claims at issue here. To the extent that the parties seek to use the documents in the course of depositions or in filings with the court, the parties are Ordered to meet and confer and agree on language for a further protective order consistent with the Judge Nickerson’s opinion in Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co. d. Records About Patrick Damas In Document Request 19, plaintiff seeks disclosure of “copies of all disciplinary action” taken against Patrick Damas. Nowhere in her briefing, however, does plaintiff even mention Mr. Damas, or explain the need for these records. Plaintiff is directed to clarify the basis for this request. If Mr. Damas is also an employee who has brought a race discrimination claim against the FDNY, defendants shall produce the documents subject to the restrictions placed on Requests 15-18. e. Records About Plaintiff In Document Requests 21 and 23, plaintiff seeks discovery as to all records kept by Daniel Shacknai or Salvatore Cassano about plaintiff or the subject matter of the instant lawsuit. Defendants object to these requests on the same grounds as described above. Further, however, defendants object to production of these materials on the grounds that such documents are protected by attorney-client privilege, or as attorney work product, or constitute materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. (Def. Doc. Obj. at 12-13). Subject to these objections, defendants claim that no such records exist in their control. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that at least some documents must exist, as defendants relied on some records about plaintiff in an unrelated investigation. (Pl. Reply at 3). *6 To the extent that these records exist, they would clearly be within the ambit of Rule 26’s broad discovery provisions. Defendants properly assert that any materials covered by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine would be exempt from disclosure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), (5). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A) requires, however, that a party withholding discovery on the basis that the requested information is privileged or subject to work product protection must produce a log that “describe[s] the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). Local Civil Rule 26.2(b) further “commands, inter alia, that when documents sought ... are withheld on the ground of privilege, [a privilege log] shall be furnished in writing at the time of the response to such discovery or disclosure, unless otherwise ordered by the court.” FG Hemisphere Assocs., L.L.C. v. Republique Du Congo, No. 01 CV 8700, 2005 WL 545218, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2005). Similarly, to invoke the work product doctrine, the party withholding discovery must show that the requested material is: 1) a document or tangible thing; 2) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation; and 3) was prepared by or for a party, or by his representative. McNamee v. Clemens, No. 09 CV 1647, 2013 WL 6572899, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013). Defendants’ papers do not include a privilege log, and thus there is no basis on which to evaluate the claims of attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Accordingly, defendants are Ordered to produce a privilege log and explain the grounds for asserting these doctrines or produce the records themselves. To the extent that no such records exist, defendants are Ordered to produce affidavits from Shacknai and Cassano to that effect. f. Appointment Letters and Press Releases Plaintiff next seeks all appointment letters and press releases for the respective appointments of Shacknai and Cassano to the positions of First Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner of the FDNY, respectively. (See Document Requests 22, 24). Defendants initially objected to these requests on the grounds that they are vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, but they have subsequently agreed to produce the documents upon execution of a protective order. (Def. Ltr. at 3). As such, the motion to compel as it relates to these requests is now moot, and the parties are Ordered to meet and confer on an appropriate protective Order. g. Job Descriptions In Requests 33-34, plaintiff seeks written job descriptions for the positions of First Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel. In support of these requests, plaintiff offers one sentence in his papers, stating only with respect to defendant Shacknai that “the documents are needed to show that Shacknai was a policy maker.” (Pl. 9/30 Ltr. at 2). Again, although defendants initially objected to these requests, they have subsequently agreed to produce this information. (Def. Ltr. at 3). As such, the motion to compel as it relates to these requests is now moot. h. Electronically Stored Information Finally, in Document Requests 35-38, plaintiff requests the following electronically stored information: copies of all email messages between “managers” at FDNY, and all electronic calendars for Cassano, Shacknai, and Donay Queenan for the period between June 1, 2010 and June 30, 2012. Defendants object to this request as vague, ambiguous, overbroad, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. (Def. Doc. Obj. at 19-20). Plaintiff responds that defendants previously consented to the production of relevant ESI. (Pl. Reply at 3). Although plaintiff has not offered any justification for seeking this information, to the extent that communications between managers at the FDNY who supervised or oversaw plaintiff’s work make reference to the plaintiff, these emails could possibly provide evidence of discriminatory attitudes held by plaintiff’s supervisors. However, because plaintiff has failed to define who she means by “managers,” has not specified a time period for which she seeks these records, and has asked for “all” emails, rather than just those which referenced her, the Court denies the request as overbroad and disproportionate to the needs of the case. *7 With respect to the calendars of Cassano, Shacknai, and Donay Queenan, it is unclear what the daily schedules of these three individuals would show about the allegedly discriminatory conduct that occurred between 2011 and 2012. Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient explanation to justify production of these calendars. Accordingly, plaintiff’s requests for email communications between “managers” and for the calendar information of Shacknai, Cassano, and Donay Queenan are denied. 2. Interrogatory Requests Plaintiff next claims that defendants’ responses to her interrogatories are incomplete. a. Interrogatory No. 1 – Chart of Management Employees Interrogatory Number 1 seeks to have the defendants create a chart with the race, color, and title of all FDNY management employees who were terminated, demoted, promoted, transferred, reprimanded, re-hired, or given a salary adjustment for the period from January 1, 2006 until the date defendant Shacknai was no longer employed by the FDNY. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr. at 1; Def. Int. Obj.[7] at 3-4). Defendant objects to this interrogatory as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Def. Int. Obj. at 4). Plaintiff counters that this data is already collected and stored electronically by the FDNY, and the burden on defendants would thus be minimal. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr. at 1). Plaintiff further explains that she only seeks information about employees in management levels M1-M4. (Pl. Reply at 3). Upon review of the documents, the Court agrees that, as written, this request is overly broad. Plaintiff does not define what constitutes a “management employee,” and makes no effort to limit the information requested to those employees who were similarly situated to plaintiff. The broad scope of the request seems to encompass many of the employees at the FDNY, the majority of whom have no involvement in this matter. Further, it seems that this interrogatory seeks to have defendants create a new document, which is an improper use of the discovery process. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So, 271 F.R.D. 13, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “[a] responding party has only a limited obligation to organize requested documents in the manner preferred by the requesting party, and the Federal Rules evince a concern that discovery tools not be used to unduly shift the burden of analyzing evidence from the requesting party to the responding party”). As such, the plaintiff’s request to compel a response to this interrogatory as written is denied. However, to the extent that plaintiff seeks information about potential comparators, plaintiff is directed to more specifically describe the individuals about whom the information is requested. b. Interrogatory No. 3 – Conversation between Shacknai and Ferrandino Interrogatory Number 3 seeks the “nature and the substance” of a conversation that Shacknai allegedly had with Margo Ferrandino on March 23, 2012. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr. at 2; Def. Int. Obj. at 4). Defendant has declined to respond to this interrogatory, contending that it is vague, ambiguous, incapable of reasonable response, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants also “adamantly” deny that any such conversation ever took place. (Def. Ltr. at 4). *8 Defendants have provided a response to this interrogatory, denying that the conversation took place; thus, there does not appear to be any further information for this Court to compel. Moreover, even if there had been a conversation, this interrogatory seeks narrative information that is more appropriately sought at a deposition. See Kennedy v. Contract Pharmacal Corp., No. 12 CV 2664, 2013 WL 1966219, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2013) (holding that “issues [that are] narrative in natue ... should be pursued at a deposition”); E*Trade Fin. Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, AG, No. 05 CV 902, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82428, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2006) (holding that “[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs seek long narrative explanations of underlying assumptions and methodologies, they have not shown that interrogatories are a more practical means of discovery than depositions”); Rivers v. Safesite Nat'l Bus. Records Mgmt. Corp., No. 94 Civ. 5323, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12438, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1995) (striking defendants’ interrogatories because they “call[ed] for repeated detailed narratives of the events at issue in [the] case”). Accordingly, given defendants’ denial that such a conversation occurred, plaintiff’s request to compel a further response to Interrogatory Number 3 is denied. Plaintiff is, however, free to explore this issue at a deposition. c. Interrogatory No. 8 – FDNY Policymaking Employees Interrogatory Number 8 seeks the identity of all FDNY employees who had “substantial policy discretion in determining important agency matters for the FDNY” in 2011 and 2012. (Pl. 10/1 Ltr. at 2; Def. Int. Obj. at 8). Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it asks defendants to render a legal conclusion. (Def. Ltr. at 3). Plaintiff does not respond to this objection in her Reply. The Court finds that, as written, this interrogatory is far too vague and ambiguous to satisfy the requirements of Rule 26. The subjectivity of what exactly constitutes “substantial policy discretion” and “important agency matters” renders this request too speculative for response. Therefore, the Court denies plaintiff’s request to compel a response to this interrogatory. d. Interrogatory No. 10 – Vulcan Litigation Finally, Interrogatory Number 10 seeks the identities of “all of the employees at FDNY who made the ‘key’/significant legal decisions (such as whether or not to settle the case) regarding the Vulcans [sic] litigation before Judge Nicholas Garaufis in the EDNY.” (Def. Int. Obj. at 8). Defendants object to this request as vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, incapable of reasonable response, and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. (Id. at 9). Defendants further argue that the information requested would implicate the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and/or the privilege afforded to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. (Id.) Plaintiff in turn argues that this information is necessary because plaintiff testified in the Vulcan litigation, in which Judge Garaufis Ordered that no witness in the Vulcan litigation was to be subjected to discrimination. (Pl. Reply at 4). The Court agrees with defendants that, as written, this request is ambiguous at best. The inherent ambiguity in the phrase “ ‘key’/significant legal decisions” renders this request far too discretionary to be enforced. As such, plaintiff’s request to compel an answer to this interrogatory is denied. B. Motion to Strike/Preclude Evidence Plaintiff moves to strike the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety, or in the alternative to preclude defendants from using the Contested Evidence in their motion for summary judgment and at trial. Plaintiff’s sole argument in support of the motion to strike is that the motion for summary judgment was not timely filed. (Pl. Mem.[8] at 5). In support of the motion for preclusion, plaintiff argues that preclusion is required because defendants failed to disclose the Contested Evidence prior to filing the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 4). Both arguments are considered in turn. 1. Motion to Strike the Summary Judgment Motion *9 In this circuit, “[t]he resolution of a motion to strike is left to the sound discretion of the district court.” Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Restaurants LLC v. Got–A–Lot–A–Dough, Inc., No. 07 CV 2303, 2008 WL 4861968, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (citing EEOC v. Bay Ridge Toyota, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)). While an untimely filing may be grounds for striking certain documents, courts have noted that “[s]trong public policy favors resolving disputes on the merits.” Purisima v. Tiffany Entmt., No. 09 CV 3502, 2013 WL 4500699, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (quoting American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996)). A motion to strike on the grounds of untimely filing will thus be denied unless there is a “strong reason for doing so.” Figueroa v. RSquared NY, Inc., No. 14 CV 4390, 2015 WL 3936256, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2015) (quoting Sibley v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 304 F.R.D. 125, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). “As a result, courts in this district and elsewhere routinely deny motions to strike answers where a defendant has shown that the untimely submission was inadvertent and caused no harm to the plaintiff.” Purisima v. Tiffany Entmt, 2013 WL 4500699, at *4. Plaintiff dedicates just one paragraph of her briefing to the motion to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment and cites no case law or statutory authority in support of her position. Instead, she argues that defendants failed to timely file the motion for summary judgment with the court, requiring that the motion be stricken. During a telephone conference held before the undersigned on September 15, 2015, defendants were Ordered to file their motion for summary judgment by October 16, 2015. (See Docket No. 18). On October 16, 2015, defendants filed a letter request for an extension of time to file, requesting an additional week to finalize the motion. (See Docket No. 25). Due to an administrative error, the motion was not ruled upon. Defendants proceeded to file the motion by October 23, 2015, the deadline they had requested. (See Docket Nos. 27-31). Given that defendants’ motion for summary judgment was only rendered untimely because of an internal administrative error, and in light of plaintiff’s failure to allege any particular harm or prejudice that would befall her should the motion proceed, the Court finds that there is no reason to strike the motion at this phase of litigation. As such, plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ summary judgment motion is denied. 2. Motion to Preclude Evidence Plaintiff next seeks to preclude defendants from using the Contested Evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment and at trial, arguing that defendants should be precluded from relying on the Contested Evidence because of their failure to timely disclose it to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the memorandum from Muriel Goode-Trufant, notice of appeal filed by plaintiff Phillips to the Fire Commissioner, and various personnel documents were all in defendants’ possession but not disclosed prior to the filing of the motion for summary judgment. (Pl. Mem. at 7). Although the Cassano Declaration was prepared specifically in support of the motion for summary judgment and thus would not ordinarily be subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26, plaintiff argues that it should be precluded because it “relied in large part on the [Contested Evidence],” citing specific examples where the Cassano Declaration referenced materials not disclosed during discovery. (Id. at 8-11). Where parties fail to provide the necessary documents during the course of discovery, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords a court broad discretion in crafting an appropriate remedy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(C) (noting that, aside from the expressly permitted sanctions of preclusion, awarding of attorneys’ fees and costs, and jury instructions, a court may “impose other appropriate sanctions” for failure to comply with Rule 26). In this circuit, “it is well-recognized that ‘preclusion ... is a drastic remedy and should be exercised with discretion and caution.’ ” Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, No. 03 CV 3209, 2008 WL 5378365, at * 12 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008) (quoting Morgenstern v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 04 CV 0058, 2008 WL 4449335, at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008)). In determining whether preclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy for failure to disclose certain evidence, courts consider the following four factors: (1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the disclosure requirement; (2) the importance of the precluded evidence; (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (4) the possibility of a continuance. Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 296 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the principle to documentary evidence). Since preclusion is an extreme sanction, courts must look at the actual difficulties the violation causes, and consider less drastic remedies before granting the preclusion. Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 1988). As such, even where the Patterson factors all point in favor of preclusion, a court may, in its discretion, decline to exclude evidence. Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F. 3d at 297. *10 Here, defendants have explained their failure to disclose by pointing out their attempts to negotiate a protective order with the plaintiff. (Def. Mem.[9] at 5). Plaintiff, in response, points out that defendants could have moved the Court for a protective order before the close of discovery, arguing that plaintiff’s refusal to sign a voluntary protective order is not sufficient justification for the late disclosure. (Reply Mem.[10] at 1). Although plaintiff’s refusal to sign a protective order is incomprehensible to the Court, defendants did not seek to have this Court issue such an order. Further, insofar as the Contested Evidence was known to defendants and used in the motion for summary judgment, defendants cannot claim that they did not believe it to be relevant for discovery. As such, the first Patterson factor weighs slightly in favor of the plaintiff. The other three factors, however, all weigh in favor of admission of the evidence. Plaintiff herself concedes the importance of the Contested Evidence at numerous points in her briefing. (See, e.g., Pl. Mem. at 8 (claiming that Cassano “base[d] his decision to terminate plaintiff on this report [contained in the Contested Evidence]”); Pl. Mem. at 9 (describing another piece of evidence as “an important contested issue in this case”)). The Court also finds that these materials may be particularly pertinent to this case; to the extent that defendants will need to establish any nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s termination, the Contested Evidence will be highly relevant. Further, beyond making a series of conclusory statements, plaintiff has pointed to no specific prejudice she will suffer from allowing the Contested Evidence to be considered, particularly in light of Judge Weinstein’s decision to stay the summary judgment briefing schedule pending resolution of the instant motions. Given the Court’s decision to reopen discovery, plaintiff will be given additional time to explore and respond appropriately to the new evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to strike is denied in its entirety. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court grants plaintiff’s motion to compel as to Document Requests 5, 7-14, and 15-18, subject to a protective order limiting the documents’ dissemination to the parties in the instant litigation, and limiting their use for the claims at issue here. To the extent that defendants have not produced responsive documents to Document Requests 21 and 23 on the grounds of privilege, defendants are Ordered to produce a privilege log explaining the basis for such an assertion. Defendants are Ordered to respond to these requests by January 22, 2016. The Court finds as moot Document Requests 22, 24, 33, and 34. The Court denies the motion as to Document Requests 19, 35, 36, 37, 38, and as to all Interrogatory Requests. Plaintiff may serve amended document requests and interrogatories addressing the issues addressed above. Plaintiff’s motion to strike and exclude evidence is denied in its entirety. To allow plaintiff to respond to the new evidence, discovery is hereby reopened for 45 days, until February 23, 2016. SO ORDERED. Footnotes [1] Citations to “Def. Ltr.” refer to defendants’ Response in Opposition to the Second Motion to Compel Discovery, filed on October 6, 2015. [2] Citations to “Pl. 9/30 Ltr.” refer to plaintiff’s Letter Motion to Compel Documents and Interrogatory Answers, filed September 30, 2015. [3] Citations to “Pl. 10/1 Ltr.” refer to plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel Discovery, filed on October 1, 2015. [4] The Court notes that this motion was premature, as several discovery issues were outstanding. [5] Citations to “Def. Doc. Obj.” refer to Defendants’ Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Request for Documents, attached to plaintiff’s Letter Motion to Compel Documents and Interrogatory Answers, filed on September 30, 2015. [6] Citations to “Pl. Reply” refer to the Reply to the Response in Opposition to the Motion to Compel, filed on October 7, 2015. [7] Citations to “Def. Int. Obj.” refer to Defendants’ Responses and Objections to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories, attached to plaintiff’s Second Motion to Compel Discovery. [8] Citations to “Pl. Mem.” refer to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative to Exclude Certain Evidence, filed on October 29, 2015. [9] Citations to “Def. Mem.” refer to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative to Exclude Certain Evidence, filed on November 14, 2015. [10] Citations to “Reply Mem.” refer to the Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative to Exclude Certain Evidence, filed on November 20, 2015.