*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Strategic Partners, Inc.'s Motion for Attorneys' Fees (the “Fee Motion”). (Dkt. No. 78.) On March 4, 2020, Defendant FIGS, Inc. filed an Opposition to the Fee Motion (“Opp.”). (Dkt. No. 83.) On March 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant's Opposition (“Reply”). (Dkt. No. 84.) On Wednesday, April 29, 2020, the Court heard oral argument and took the matter under submission. (Dkt. No. 111.) Plaintiff seeks an award of $13,193.50 in attorneys' fees incurred in connection with Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant's Search for Responsive Documents and for Payment of Fees, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. In Opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff should recover no more than $4,815.53.

Having considered the parties' moving papers and evidence submitted in connection with the opening brief, opposition, and reply, along with the relevant pleadings and files in this action and the arguments of counsel, for the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS the Fee Motion in the amount of $8,914.70.

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendant's search for responsive documents and for payment of fees. (Dkt. No. 77.) Specifically, the Court ordered Defendant to conduct a reasonable and diligent search of additional custodians, and to provide supplemental responses to SPI's discovery request; but the Court declined to set an arbitrary number of custodians for Defendant's further searches or to order searches from additional custodians with information about Defendant's marketing and advertising practices. (Id. at 12, 15.) The Court also found that Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys' fees incurred in preparing the portion of the motion to compel concerning Defendant's financial data, which it belatedly produced. (Id. at 13-15.) But sanctions were not warranted for Defendant's alleged attempts to block discovery. (Id. at 14.) Finally, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file and serve a motion for reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees. (Id. at 15.)

II. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

a. Plaintiff's Position

Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the portions of the motion to compel focused on Defendant's refusal to produce financial data. (Dkt. No. 78 [Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Fee Motion (“Memo.”) ] at 3-4.) Plaintiff contends that the time it spent preparing the relevant portion of the motion to compel was reasonable based upon the time entries submitted with the Declaration of Robert Estrin (“Estrin Decl.”), which show a total of 36.6 attorney hours spent on preparing the motion to compel, amounting to $26,387.00; but Plaintiff only requests an award of $13,193.50, which is half of the total. (Memo. at 5-8.) Plaintiff maintains that its attorneys' hourly rates are commensurate with the range of fees customarily charged for attorneys of similar skill and experience in similar cases in the Los Angeles market. (Id. at 7-8; and see Estrin Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.)

*2 Plaintiff also states that it does not seek fees based on the parties' meet and confer efforts, but only on Plaintiff's compliance with the Court's discovery motion rules, including fees related to preparing the motion to compel and the required pre-motion telephonic conference. (Memo. at 4-5.) Plaintiff argues that most of its motion discussed both issues in dispute: Defendant's failure to search for documents from a sufficient number of custodians, and its failure to provide its financial information; the only exception being a few pages in which Plaintiff discussed one issue at a time. (Id. at 5 (citing Estrin Decl. ¶ 2).) Plaintiff contends that after it completed its motion in the joint stipulation format, Defendant complained of formatting issues, prompting Plaintiff to spend additional time on reformatting. (Id. at 5-6 (citing Estrin Decl., Ex. 2-3).) Days later, Defendant provided Plaintiff with the requested financial information (which it had previously maintained it could not do), forcing Plaintiff to retool its arguments in light of Defendant's late responses. (Id. at 6 (citing Estrin Decl., Ex. 4-5).) Pursuant to Defendant's request, Plaintiff also completed a request to file its motion under seal. (Id. (citing Estrin Decl. ¶ 7).) In sum, Plaintiff contends that counsel Robert Estrin expended 27.1 hours and partner Marc Jacobs expended 9.5 hours, which are documented in Exhibit 6 to the Estrin Declaration; Plaintiff seeks to recover fees for only half of that time; and this time is reasonable because of “the complexity of the issues in dispute, the number of documents filed, and the many times [Plaintiff] had to revise its portion of the [motion to compel] because of [Defendant's] requests and changes in position.” (Id. at 6-7.)

Plaintiff states that Mr. Estrin's hourly rate is $695 per hour, and Mr. Jacobs's hourly rate is $795 per hour. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff emphasizes that courts in this district have approved higher hourly rates than those of Plaintiff's attorneys, the rates accurately reflect the prevailing market rate of attorneys with their level of experience, and thus, the rates are reasonable and appropriate. (Id. at 8 (citing Estrin Decl. at ¶ 11).) Plaintiff calculates the lodestar by multiplying the reasonable number of hours billed by the reasonable hourly rate of each attorney, divided in half because half of the fees were incurred on the issue of Defendant's failure to produce its financial data; this results in total requested fees of $13,193.50. (Id.)

b. Defendant's Position

In its Opposition to the Fee Motion, Defendant contends that the Court should award no more than $4,815.53. Defendant first argues that $10,736.50 should be excluded from the total Plaintiff claims to have spent on the motion to compel ($26,387.00), reflecting time spent on tasks unrelated to the “preparation” of the motion to compel. (Opp. at 3-7.) Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover fees for preparing for and attending the December 4, 2019 pre-motion telephonic conference; formatting the motion; working on portions of the motion that did not relate to the issue of Defendant's disclosure of financial information; and filing the motion.[1] (See id.) Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's request for half of the remaining fees is excessive and unreasonable because only four thirteenths of the initial draft of the motion to compel addressed the issue of Defendant's failure to provide its unit sales information and in the revised motion (after Defendant provided the information), Plaintiff excluded or revised those portions of the motion and replaced it with a request for monetary sanctions. (Id. at 7.)

c. Plaintiff's Reply

In its Reply, Plaintiff urges that the Court should reject Defendant's attempt to reduce the amount of fees. First, Plaintiff contends that the pre-motion telephonic conference was a mandatory step attempting to resolve the discovery issues preceding the motion to compel and, so, fees in connection with the conference are compensable. (Reply at 2, 4-5.) Second, Defendant's attempt to reduce fees on the basis that Plaintiff would have had to file its motion even if it did not address the issue of Defendant's financial information “defies logic and fairness” because it assumes that, because Defendant took an improper stance concerning discovery issues preceding a motion to compel, it need not pay fees after losing the motion. (Id. at 2-3, 5-6.) Third, Defendant's attempt to reduce fees on the basis that several of Plaintiff's time entries do not relate to the issue for which Plaintiff was permitted to recovery is belied by the specific time entries, which show that the time was spent on the issue of Defendant's disclosure of financial information. (Id. at 3, 6-7.) Finally, Plaintiff reiterates that the Court should award a fee comprising half of the total hours spent on the motion to compel because Plaintiff spent half (not four thirteenths) of its time on the issue of Defendant's failure to provide financial information, and the fee request drafted after Defendant finally produced the information. (Id. at 3-4, 7-9.) Plaintiff also notes that Defendant does not challenge the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the motion to compel. (Id. at 1-2.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 37(a)(5)

*3 Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides that when a motion to compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party of attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” But the court must not order this payment if:

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

In addition, Rule 37 provides that when, as here, a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(C). Courts may apply Rule 37(a)(5)(C) “to roughly approximate the movant's level of success” when a motion to compel is decided with mixed results. Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 2017 WL 3116818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2017); SVI, Inc. v. Supreme Corp., 2018 WL 10456275, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2018).

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) refers to “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion,” whereas Rule 37(a)(5)(C) refers to “reasonable expenses for the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (C). Notwithstanding the difference in syntax, “[t]he primary difference between Rule 37(a)(5)(A) and Rule 37(a)(5)(C) is that an award is discretionary under Rule 37(a)(5)(C) [whereas under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), it is mandatory]. Ultimately, the analysis underlying a decision under either subsection is the same and the arguments pertaining to the exceptions under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) are equally applicable to the determination of whether fees and costs should be apportioned under Rule 37(a)(5)(C).” Barlow v. Herman, 2015 WL 846568, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2015); see also Blair v. CBE Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 4658731, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (“[T]he analysis underlying an award of reasonable expenses pursuant to either Rule 37(a)(5)(A) or Rule 37(a)(5)(C) is the same.”); Bal Seal Eng'g, Inc. v. Nelson Prods., Inc., 2018 WL 6258877, at *4 n. 3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (citing Blair).

B. Determining Reasonable Attorney Fees

1. Lodestar Approach to Calculate Fee Awards

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method for calculating attorneys' fee awards. A court determines the lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a particular motion by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 433. “Although the district court's calculation of an award need not be done with precision, some indication of how it arrived at its figures and the amount of the award is necessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986).

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate

In determining the reasonable hourly rate of an attorney, the Court must look to the “rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate.”).

*4 A party seeking attorneys' fees must provide “satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11 (1984). A declaration regarding the prevailing rate in the relevant community is sufficient to establish a reasonable hourly rate. Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). “When a fee applicant fails to meet its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested rates, however, the court may exercise its discretion to determine reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community.” Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., No. 08-cv-519-MMM (RZx), 2009 WL 605789 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009); see Moreno v. Empire City Subway Co., 2008 WL 793605, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (stating that if fee applicant “has submitted no evidence of the prevailing market rate for attorneys of like skill ... it is within [the court's] discretion to determine the reasonable hourly rate ... based on [the court's] familiarity with ... prevailing rates in the [relevant community]”).

3. Hours Reasonably Expended

In addition to establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party in a discovery dispute seeking attorneys' fees “bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are ... reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained.” Rucker v. Air Ventures, Haw., LLC, 2017 WL 4158201, at *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 19, 2017) (citing Tirona v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Haw. 1993)). The court reviews time records submitted by the applicant to determine whether the hours were reasonably incurred or if “any of the hours were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive,” or inadequately documented. True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 2015 WL 3453459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015) (internal citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

As noted, to calculate the lodestar, the Court must determine a reasonable fee by multiplying the “number of hours reasonably expended” by a “reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-65 (9th Cir. 1996).

A. Plaintiff's Attorney Billing Rates Were Reasonable

As an initial matter, Defendant does not challenge the rates charged by Plaintiff's attorneys or put forth any evidence suggesting that those rates are unreasonable. But even if it had, the Court finds that rates charged by Plaintiff's counsel—$695/hour for one counsel, and $795/hour for one partner—are within the range for attorneys of similar skill and experience in the Los Angeles legal market. This conclusion is well supported by the Declaration of Robert Estrin, who states that he has been a member of the California Bar since 2008, and had worked for approximately 12 years in complex litigation in areas of, inter alia, unfair competition and false advertising matters; and that Mr. Jacobs, a partner, has been a member of the California Bar since 1996 practicing in complex business litigation in areas of, inter alia, business torts, trade secrets, unfair competition, and false advertising matters. (See Estrin Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.) Mr. Estrin's declarations that his and Mr. Jacobs's rates were the prevailing market rates in the relevant community were sufficient to establish the appropriate rate of lodestar purposes. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211,1235 (9th Cir. 1991); Montano v. Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hosp., Case No. CV 12-3452-FMO (AGRx), 2015 WL 12698407, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015).

The Court must assess the reasonableness of attorneys' fees based on the prevailing market rate of the community, i.e., Los Angeles. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. Based on the evidence Plaintiff submitted and the Court's familiarity with the relevant legal market, the Court finds Plaintiff's requested hourly rates to be within the reasonable market rate for Los Angeles attorneys with comparable experience to Mrs. Estrin and Jacobs (see Estrin Decl. at ¶¶ 9-11). Bouman, 940 F.2d at 1235 (submission of declarations stating that the requested rate was the prevailing rate in the relevant community was “sufficient to establish the appropriate rate for lodestar purposes”); Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with other circuit courts that “it is proper for a district court to rely on its own familiarly with the legal market” in determining a reasonable rate). Courts in this district have found similar hourly rates to be reasonable in unfair business practices actions in Los Angeles. See, e.g., Klee v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., Case No. 12-8238-AWT (PJWx), 2015 WL 4538426, at *13 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (finding hourly rates up to $695 for senior attorneys reasonable in an unfair business practices matter); Kearney v. Hyundai Motor Am., Case No. SACV 09-1298-JST (MLGx), 2013 WL 3287996, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2018) (finding rates of $800 and $650 reasonable in unfair business practices matter); Georgino v. Sur la Table, Inc., Case No. CV 11-3522-MMM (JEMx), 2013 WL 12122430, at *23 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2013) (finding hourly rate of $675 for a partner and $500 for associate reasonable).

B. The Total Hours Billed for the Motion to Compel Are Not Entirely Reasonable

*5 Plaintiff seeks an award for half of 36.6 total attorney hours “in connection with the preparation of the motion to compel.” (Memo. at 8.; Estrin Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 6.) It asserts that “[h]alf of the fees [it] incurred in connection with its attorneys in bringing the motion to compel were spent on the issue of [Defendant] refusing to produce its financial data. Thus, [Plaintiff] only seeks half of the attorneys' fees it incurred in bringing the motion to compel.” (Memo. at 4.) In opposition, Defendant argues that several time entries must be excluded from the fee calculation, and a fee of no more than four thirteenths of the remaining hours should be awarded because only four of the motion's thirteen pages focused on the issue of Defendant's disclosure of financial information. (See generally Opp.)

Here, Plaintiff succeeded in achieving most of the aims stated in its motion to compel, except that the Court declined to order searches of documents from an arbitrary number of custodians, to order searches from Defendant's marketing and advertising executives, or to award sanctions for discovery abuses. (See generally Dkt. No. 77.) Therefore, in the following discussion, the Court endeavors “to roughly approximate [Plaintiff's] level of success.” Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass'n,, 2017 WL 3116818, at *5. Defendant challenges the reasonableness of the hours expended by Plaintiff's attorneys via two primary strategies: challenges to specific time entries, and a challenge to the proportion of time spent on the issue for which the Court permitted fee recover.

1. Defendant's Challenges to Specific Time Entries

Defendant first argues the hours spent preparing and attending the pre-motion telephonic conference should be excluded from the total hours billed. (Opp. at 3-4 (citing Ex. 6 at Page ID 24-25).) Plaintiff objects on the basis that the pre-motion conference is an essential component of the motion to compel procedure and is separate from the ordinary meet-and-confer process (for which it states it does not seek fees). Courts in this district have reasoned that Rule 37(a)(5) does not permit compensation of fees for time spent by counsel in meet and confer efforts. Pythagoras Intellectual Holdings, LLC v. Stegall, No. 08-cv-87-AG (RNBx), 2009 WL 10674788, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009) (“Pythagoras”) (declining to “construe this language [of Rule 35(a)(5)(A) ] as necessarily including attorney time expended during the meet and confer process.”); Berryhill v. Johnson, No. 11-cv-1468-AG (RNBx), 2012 WL 13020328, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2012) (“[T]he time expended by plaintiff's counsel in connection with his meet and confer efforts is not compensable [under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)]. Rather, only the time expended ... in actually preparing the moving papers here is compensable.”); see also, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Ltd., 2013 WL 5324787, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013) (“[A]ttorneys' fees are generally not awarded [under Rule 37(a)(5)(C)] in this District for time spent meeting and conferring on motions to compel.”); Matlink, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2008 WL 8504767, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (“The local rules ... require counsel to meet and confer before filing any discovery motion in an effort to resolve disputes. As such, fees associated with the initial meet and confer process logically should not always be included in the fee award.”).

While the foregoing case law is not binding, the Court is persuaded that the hours spent preparing for and attending the pre-motion telephonic conference must be excluded from the total fee award because, despite Plaintiff's assertion otherwise, the conference is part of the parties' meet-and-confer efforts. It is a regulatory requirement meant to avoid the need to prepare a motion to compel in case of a discovery dispute. See Matlink, Inc., 2008 WL 8504767, at *5. Moreover, the case law contemplates that only the time expended “in actually preparing the moving papers” is compensable under Rule 37(a)(5). Berryhill, 2012 WL 13020328, at *2. Thus, the following entries shall be excluded from the fee calculation:

(Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 24-25.) Accordingly, 3.3 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs, and 2 hours expended by Mr. Estrin must be excluded from the requested fee award.

Second, Defendant argues that the time spent formatting the motion to compel should be excluded from the fee award. (Opp. at 5.) The Court disagrees because that time was spent “preparing the moving papers.” Berryhill, 2012 WL 13020328, at *2. The Court does not find the 0.3 hours spent on formatting to be excessive. See Rothrock v. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers, 2016 WL 6395092, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (concluding that 1.5 hours spent on reviewing, revising, and formatting motion to compel was reasonable; but 3 hours doing the same for brief and uncomplicated discovery dispute was excessive). Therefore, the following entry shall be included in the fee calculation.

(Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 29.) Accordingly, 0.3 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs for formatting the motion to compel shall not be excluded from the fee award.

Third, Defendant contends that Plaintiff “is not entitled to fees associated with its work on those portions of the motion that have nothing to do with the issue of [Defendant's] unit sales breakdown, and as to which the Court did not award fees to [Defendant].” (Opp. at 5 (emphasis in original).) The Court agrees. In its February 6, 2020 order, the Court granted Plaintiff fees “incurred in bringing the portion of the Motion concerning [Defendant's] financial data.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 15.) To the extent Plaintiff includes time entries unrelated to the portion of the motion concerning Defendant's production of financial data, those entries must be excluded from the final fee calculation. Those entries include:

(Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 27-30.) Accordingly, 3.5 hours expended by Mr. Estrin and 0.50 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs must be excluded from the requested fee award.

Defendant contends that two additional time entries must also be excluded from the fee calculation as unrelated to the issue of Defendant's failure to provide financial information: 0.70 hours by Mr. Estrin on December 23, 2019 to “Review [Defendant's] portion of joint statement regarding [Plaintiff's] motion to compel to determine counter-arguments”; and 1.10 hours by Mr. Jacobs on December 23, 2019 to “Review and analyze defendant's portion of the joint statement in opposition to the motion to compel.” (Opp. at 6.; Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 31-32.) The Court disagrees. Defendant agreed to provide the requested financial information to Plaintiff on December 23, 2019. (See Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 31; see also Dkt. No. 67-1 at 17-20.) The remaining time entries from that day, including the two entries challenged by Defendant, show that Plaintiff spent the rest of that day retooling its motion to compel based on Defendant's late promise to disclose its financial data. (See Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 31-32; see also Reply at 6-7 (stating that Plaintiff spent the entire time on December 23, 2019 on the issue of Defendant's unit sales).) Therefore, the two hours reflected in these entries that Plaintiff spent revising the motion based on these late disclosures were reasonable. Accordingly, 0.70 hours expended by Mr. Estrin, and 1.10 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs will not be excluded from the fee award.

*7 Fourth, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover fees for the actual filing of the motion. Defendant is correct. “Activities that can be classified as secretarial or clerical in nature,” such as filing, “cannot be recovered as attorney's fees under the lodestar methodology.” Keith v. Volpe, 644 F. Supp. 1312, 1215-16 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (disallowing recovery for time spent on filing, document organization and other clerical matters); Jones v. Corbis Corp., Case No. CV 10-8668-SVW (CWx), 2011 WL 4526084, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011), aff'd, 489 F. App'x 155 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (disallowing recovery of paralegal billing entries for research regarding filing procedures, obtaining transcripts, assembling and organizing documents pertaining to exclusion of evidence, and other “clerical tasks”). However, a review of the specific time entries with which Defendant takes issue reveals that Plaintiff performed additional tasks besides filing:

(Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 32.) The Court finds that the time spent filing the motion to compel and related documents must be excluded from the fee award. But to the extent the time entries show that Plaintiff spent time emailing, reviewing, editing, and finalizing the motion and supporting documents, the Court finds that recovery for 3 hours expended by Mr. Estrin is reasonable.

Considering the foregoing calculations and the specific time entries to which Defendant does not specifically object, the Court calculates that Plaintiff's remaining time entries reveal 21.3 hours expended by Mr. Estrin, and 5.7 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs on the motion to compel. At the respective attorneys' rates, Plaintiff therefore asserts that its attorneys accrued $19,335 ((21.3 x 695) + (5.7 x 795)). Therefore, in assessing the parties' remaining arguments, the Court works from this figure, not the $26,387 Plaintiff claims its attorneys spent on the motion, or the $15,650.60 Defendant claims Plaintiff spent after excluding all of the time entries it challenges above.

2. Defendant's Challenge to Fees Based on the Proportion of the Motion that Addressed the Issue of Its Disclosure of Financial Information

Plaintiff argues that it is reasonable to recover half of its total accrued fees because it spent half of its time working on the motion on the issue of Defendant's failure to disclose its financial information ($19,335 / 2 = $9,667.50). In opposition, Defendant argues that no more than four thirteenths of the total accrued fees should be awarded because only 4 pages of the 13-page draft of the motion addressed the issue of Defendant's financial information ($19,335 / 13 x 4 = $5,949.23). The Court finds Defendant's arguments unpersuasive and declines to apply Defendant's proposed equation to calculate the fees to which Plaintiff is entitled because Plaintiff's approach ignores that procedural history of the motion. Instead, to determine the appropriate recovery for that time, the Court has conducted an independent and thorough review of the time that Plaintiff claims it spent on the portion of the motion at issue.

Plaintiff's time entries show that before December 23, 2019 (the day that Defendant agreed to provide its financial information), Mr. Estrin spent 2.8 hours reviewing documents and doing research before drafting the motion to compel (see Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 26-27), 10.4 hours drafting and editing its portion of the motion and related documents (see id. at 27-28), and 0.7 hours communicating with other counsel at the firm and opposing counsel regarding transmission of Plaintiff's portion of the motion (see id. at 29-30). The entries also show that Mr. Jacobs spent 2.7 hours reviewing Mr. Estrin's work and communicating with Plaintiff about the motion. (See id. at 28-30.) The Court finds that the time spent by both attorneys was reasonable and not excessive, given their experience, the complexity of the legal issues, and the nature of the discovery matters in dispute. The Court further finds that a fee award representing half of total fees incurred in connection with these time entries is warranted because Plaintiff expended roughly half the time on the issue of Defendant's failure to provide the requested financial information. Accordingly, the Court finds reasonable for the time spent on this issue an award equaling half of 13.9 hours expended by Mr. Estrin (6.95 hours), and half of 2.7 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs (1.35 hours).

*8 Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff may only recover four thirteenths of the total time it alleged to have spent on the motion is unavailing and overly mechanical based simply on page numbers. True, four pages in the initial thirteen page draft of the motion focused solely on the issue of Defendant's failure to produce the requested financial information. However, Plaintiff also discussed the issue elsewhere in the draft, including, as Plaintiff observes in its Reply, in: the three-page introduction; its two-paragraph summary of its communications with Defendant; the request for sanctions; and the Relief Sought. (See Reply at 8-9.) Therefore, the Court is persuaded that roughly half, rather than four thirteenths, of the initial draft of the motion to compel was dedicated to the issue of Defendant's failure to produce financial information.

Defendant's “four thirteenths” assertion also ignores the fact that Plaintiff spent considerable time after Defendant agreed to produce the requested financial information reworking the motion in light of that disclosure and preparing a request for reasonable expenses. Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees for time reasonably expended on a motion for attorneys' fees. Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1990). An inflated request for a “fees-on-fees” award may be reduced to an amount deemed reasonable by the Court. See Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 904 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

The Court finds that the time spent by Plaintiff reworking the motion to compel to include a fees request was inflated because some time entries from December 23 and 24, 2019 appear redundant. The relevant time entries include a cumulative 7.4 hours expended by Mr. Estrin on teleconferencing with opposing counsel; revising the motion to compel in light of Defendant's agreement to disclose the financial information; reviewing Defendant's response to Plaintiff's motion to determine counter-arguments; researching the sanctions issue; emailing with opposing counsel regarding the documents to be filed; and reviewing, editing, and finalizing the motion and supporting documents. (See Estrin Decl., Ex. 6 at Page ID 31-32.) It also includes a cumulative 3 hours spent by Mr. Jacobs on reviewing the revised motion; attending to Defendant's revised positions and conferring with Mr. Estrin; reviewing and analyzing Defendant's opposition; reviewing the revised motion to compel after Defendant withdrew its objections; and reviewing Defendant's counsels' declarations. (See id.) Many of these time entries reflect substantially similar or duplicative tasks. Accordingly, the Court finds that a reduction of fees by 20 percent for these time entries is reasonable, i.e., 5.92 hours expended by Mr. Estrin and 2.4 hours expended by Mr. Jacobs. Additionally, the Court finds it reasonable to award Plaintiff half of fees incurred for the reduced hours because Plaintiff seeks only half of the fees incurred in preparing the motion and its time entries reflect that roughly half of the time on December 23 and 24, 2019 was spent on the issue of responding to Defendant's late disclosures of financial information and including the request for reasonable fees.

Accordingly, the Court declines to award fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(C) for half of the 36.6 hours of Mrs. Estrin's and Jacobs's time and reduces the total “reasonable attorney hours” accordingly to result in a total compensable hours for Mr. Estrin of half of 19.82 hours rather than 27.1; and for Mr. Jacobs of half of 5.1 hours rather than 9.5.

C. Calculating the Lodestar

Applying the lodestar method using the reduced attorney hours as outlined above, the Court multiplies the reasonable attorney rates by the hours reasonably billed in bringing the motion to compel as follows:

*9 Name Estrin Jacobs TOTAL Requested Hours 27.1 9.5 36.6 Court Reduction -7.28 -4.4 -11.68 Total Compensable Hours 19.82 /2 5.1 / 2 12.46 Rate $695 $795 Fees Awarded 6,887.45 2,027.25 8,914.70

Thus, the Court concludes that a total award to Plaintiff of $8,914.70 comprises reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the motion to compel. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (C). Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Plaintiff's Fee Motion is GRANTED in the amount of $8,914.70. Defendant shall pay this fee award to Plaintiff's counsel within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.