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Fannie Mae v. Davis

2020 WL 3550006 (E.D. Va. 2020)

January 22, 2020

Gibney, Jr., John A., United States District Judge

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Summary

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the Davises' motions to dismiss and denied Michael Davis' motion for discovery. The Court granted his first motion for miscellaneous relief and denied his second motion. The Court also noted that Michael Davis must comply with all court-imposed deadlines and the deadlines set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL D. DAVIS and MICHELLE M. DAVIS, Defendants

Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-570

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia

Filed January 22, 2020

Counsel

Abby Kelley Moynihan, Daniel Edward Joslyn, Dinh Hong Hoang Ngo, Richard Derrick Painter, McCabe Weisberg & Conway LLC, Laurel, MD, for Plaintiff.
Michael D. Davis, Columbia, VA, pro se.
Michelle M. Davis, Columbia, VA, pro se

Gibney, Jr., John A., United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

*1 This matter comes before the Court on a number of pending motions filed by the pro se defendants. (Dk. Nos. 3, 4, 8, 12, 17.) In February, 2019, the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) brought an action to quiet title against the pro se defendants, Michael D. Davis and Michelle M. Davis (the “Davises”), in the Circuit Court of Goochland County, Virginia. The Davises removed that case to this Court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Michael Davis has also filed a motion for discovery and two motions requesting miscellaneous relief. Because Fannie Mae states a plausible claim for relief, the Court will deny the Davises' motions to dismiss.

I. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT[1]

On March 28, 2007, the Davises bought property in Goochland County, Virginia (the “Property”), from Harley P. Pearsall. (Compl. ¶ 5.) The Davises financed the purchase by entering into a Deed of Trust on July 10, 2007 (the “Deed of Trust”). (Id. ¶ 8.)

On December 19, 2007, the Davises bought three acres next to the Property (the “Neighboring Property”) from Thaddeus E. Mendenhall, III. (Id. ¶ 10.) When the Davises bought the Neighboring Property, they entered into a Vacation Lot Line Agreement (the “Lot Line Agreement”) with Goochland County, Virginia, to combine the Property and the Neighboring Property “into a single tax map parcel.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

On July 30, 2012, One West Bank, FSB (“One West”) bought the Property at a foreclosure sale. One West then transferred the Property to Fannie Mae by a deed dated July 30, 2012 (the “Foreclosure Deed”). (Id. ¶ 14.) Fannie Mae “does not claim any ownership” of the Neighboring Property. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Because the Lot Line Agreement combined the Property and the Neighboring Property “into a single tax map marcel,” (id. ¶ 12), the Foreclosure Deed does not match the current tax map. (Id. ¶ 17.) Fannie Mae asserts that for the Neighboring Property “to continue under a single tax map number with [the Property] is inaccurate and causes a cloud on [Fannie Mae's] property.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Fannie Mae, therefore, seeks a declaratory judgment “to establish its exclusive rights to [the Property] as described in the Foreclosure Deed.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

The Davises removed the quiet title action to this Court[2] and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Michael Davis has filed a motion for discovery and two motions requesting miscellaneous relief. The Court will address the pending motions in turn.

II. PENDING MOTIONS

A. Motions to Dismiss

1. Legal Standard

*2 The Davises have moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion gauges the sufficiency of a complaint without resolving any factual discrepancies or testing the merits of the claims. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The principle that a court must accept all allegations as true, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must state facts that, when accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

2. Discussion

Fannie Mae asserts a quiet title claim.[3] “An action for quiet title is based on the premise that a person with good title to certain real or personal property should not be subjected to various future claims against the title.” Maine v. Adams, 277 Va. 230, 238, 672 S.E.2d 862 (2009). “A plaintiff asserting a quiet title claim must allege and prove that it has superior legal or equitable title.” Pei P'ship Architects, LLP v. Celebrate Va. S., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-48, 2013 WL 1163463, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2013) (citing Va. Code Ann. § 55-153).

Here, Fannie Mae alleges that the Property “was sold via a lawful foreclosure sale under the [Deed of Trust],” that One West transferred the property to Fannie Mae through the Foreclosure Deed, and that the Foreclosure Deed was “recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Goochland County, Virginia.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) Fannie Mae, therefore, pleads that it has “superior legal or equitable title” to the Property. See Pei P'ship Architects, LLP, 2013 WL 1163463, at *4. Accordingly, Fannie Mae states a plausible quiet title claim.

In Michael Davis' motion to dismiss, he argues that “Fannie Mae uses false documents,” (Dk. No. 4, ¶ 1), and that Fannie Mae uses “forgeries” to “perpetrate [its] fraudclosures,” (id. ¶ 2). Michael Davis, however, does not set forth any factual or legal basis to support his allegation that the underlying foreclosure sale was somehow fraudulent or invalid.[4]

*3 In Michelle Davis' motion to dismiss, she argues that Fannie Mae “outrageously chose to send process service ... to Alabama, where [she] has never been,” (Dk. No. 12, at ¶ 2), that “Bad Faith Plaintiffs are entitled to no relief,” (id. ¶ 3), that Fannie Mae “rejected many opportunities in past cases to legitimately litigate” its quiet title claim (id. ¶ 4), and that “Fannie Mae must be chastised for phony process service,” (id. ¶ 5). Michelle Davis, however, does not support her allegation of deficient service with any documents or other evidence.

In sum, the Davises advance no factual or legal basis to support dismissal. Because Fannie Mae states a plausible quiet title claim, the Court will deny the Davises' motions to dismiss. (Dk. Nos. 4, 12.)

B. Motion for Discovery

In Michael Davis' motion for discovery, he “seeks the production of records and documents pertaining to the relief requested in” the complaint. (Dk. No. 8, ¶ 1.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f)... or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). At the appropriate time, the Court will enter a scheduling order and will direct the parties to confer under Rule 26(f). The parties may begin discovery at that time. The Court will not entertain discovery motions before that time unless authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court will deny Michael Davis' motion for discovery. (Dk. No. 8.) Thus, the Court will deny as moot Fannie Mae's motion to strike Michael Davis' motion for discovery. (Dk. No. 9.)

C. Motions for Miscellaneous Relief

In his first motion for miscellaneous relief, Michael Davis asserts that his printer “suffered an early demise” and that he has since acquired a new printer. (Dk. No. 3, at 1.) He says that his new printer “is not a high resolution printer,” so “the quality of its printouts may be offensive to some.” (Id. at 2.) He asks the Court “to accept, without adverse consequences, the productions of [his] OKI Microline 321 printer.” (Id.)The Court cannot discern what relief the motion requests, but the Court notes that it has not had difficulty reading Michael Davis' filings. Accordingly, to the extent that Michael Davis asks the Court to accept his typed filings in their current form, the Court will grant the motion. (Dk. No. 3.)

In the second motion for miscellaneous relief, Michael Davis asserts that he “has a good, reliable mailbox at 4516 Tabscott Road, Columbia VA 23038,” (Dk. No. 17, at 1), but that he “is generally far away from the aforementioned mailbox,” (id.). He asks the Court “to accept reasonably tardy papers, without adverse consequences.” (Id. at 2.) To the extent that Michael Davis asks the Court to allow him to submit filings beyond court-imposed deadlines or the deadlines set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of this Court, the Court will deny the motion. (Dk. No. 17.) Michael Davis must comply with all court-imposed deadlines and the deadlines set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The Court DENIES the defendants' motions to dismiss. (Dk. Nos. 4, 12.)

2. The Court DENIES Michael Davis' motion for discovery. (Dk. No. 8.) Additionally, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Fannie Mae's motion to strike the motion for discovery. (Dk. No. 9.)

3. To the extent that Michael Davis' first motion for miscellaneous relief asks the Court to accept his typed filings in their current form, the Court GRANTS the motion. (Dk. No. 3.)

*4 4. To the extent that Michael Davis' second motion for miscellaneous relief asks the Court to allow him to submit filings beyond court-imposed deadlines or the deadlines set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules of this Court, the Court DENIES the motion. (Dk. No. 17.)

5. At the appropriate time, the Court will contact the parties to schedule an initial pretrial conference in this case.

It is so ORDERED.

Let the Clerk send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record and to the pro se defendants.

Date: 21 January 2020

Richmond, VA

Footnotes

[1]

The Court sets forth the facts as alleged in the state court complaint, which the Davises attached to the notice of removal. (See Dk. No. 1-1.)

[2]

In the notice of removal, the Davises invoke federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Davises, however, did not allege their state of citizenship. In its brief in opposition to Michael Davis' motion to dismiss, Fannie Mae argued that the Court should remand this case to state court because the Davises failed to allege their state of citizenship. Fannie Mae did not file a motion to remand. The Court directed the Davises to file a brief addressing the Court's jurisdiction. In response, the Davises asserted that they are “exiled non-citizen Virginians.” (Dk. No. 13, at 1; Dk. No. 14, at 1.) Notwithstanding their supposed “exiled” status, the Davises remain Virginia citizens for subject matter jurisdiction purposes. Although the parties are completely diverse, the forum-state defendant rule would generally bar the Davises from removing this case to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Fannie Mae, however, has waived its ability to seek remand based on the forum-state defendant rule by failing to file a motion to remand. See Brazell v. Waite, 525 F. App'x 878, 884 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that the forum-state defendant rule “is not jurisdictional and may therefore be waived”). Fannie Mae has since withdrawn its objection to the removal. (See Dk. No. 19.) Because the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

[3]

The Declaratory Judgment Act governs declaratory actions removed from state court. See Mabutol v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-406, 2013 WL 1287709, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2013). The Declaratory Judgment Act “confer[s] on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). A declaratory judgment “is appropriate when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Fannie Mae alleges that the Foreclosure Deed does not match the current tax map, creating a “cloud on the title of” the Property. (Compl. ¶ 16.) The requested declaratory judgment, therefore, will “clarify[ ] and settl[e] the legal relations in issue.” Coffey, 368 F.3d at 412.

[4]

The Court notes that Michael Davis has advanced similar arguments several times before this Court, none of which have been successful. See, e.g., Davis v. Samuel I. White, P.C., No. 3:13-cv-780, 2014 WL 1604270, at *5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2014) (“[T]his Court, in Davis v. OneWest Bank, held that Davis' claims against the note and deed of trust lacked factual or legal merit.”); Davis v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 3:09-cv-699, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2010).