*1 This cause is before the court upon a Motion to Compel Production of Financial Information from Defendants Todd Garey and Otto's Express Car Wash, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), filed by Plaintiffs Otto Brands, LLC, and Otto Car Washes, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) (ECF No. 17), as well as Defendants' response in opposition to the motion to compel (ECF No. 20).

BACKGROUND

The above-styled action involves claims under the Federal Lanham Act sounding in Infringement of Registered Trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count I), Federal Unfair Competition and False Advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Counts II, IV), Cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Count III), and Unfair Competition under Florida common law (Count V) (see ECF No. 1 (Complaint)). Stated succinctly, the claims in this case center on Defendants' use of names, practices, and means of identification and marketing (e.g., logo, signage, website, etc.) in connection with the operation of a car wash business in Destin, Florida, that are alleged to be similar to the same used by Plaintiffs in connection with their operation of multiple car wash businesses in the Midwest and Southern regions of the United States, to include operations in Missouri, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas.[1] More specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants' car wash business is a “copycat car wash,” which mimics Plaintiffs' car wash businesses and practices in various ways to include use of the protected OTTO name, marks, and logo; use of a website address (domain name) that is nearly identical to Plaintiffs'; and use of substantially similar car wash prices and substantially similar services, to name a few. Plaintiffs state they served upon Defendants a cease and desist letter requesting a name change in early 2019, but Defendants declined the offer. Plaintiffs then brought this infringement action about four months after Defendants opened the Destin carwash. As relief, in relevant part, Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of Defendants' profits due to their alleged infringement and unfair competition, as well as treble damages available under 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (ECF No. 1).

*2 On August 28, 2019, Plaintiffs served upon Defendants their first requests for production of documents (“RFPs), which included ninety-three RFPs, eight of which—RFPs numbered 61 through 68—are at issue in the instant motion to compel. In these eight Plaintiffs seek financial information from Defendants, as follows: “Otto's Express' entire QuickBook files” (RFP #61); a “query, run via Your QuickBooks, regarding all sales of car washing services ...” (RFP #62); tax returns, financial statements, quarterly earnings reports, and accounting reports (RFP #63); documents reflecting the total number of car washes and/or related services (RFP #64), total number of customers who have received services from Defendants (RFP #65), and total sales' revenues (RFP #66); documents showing total dollar amounts expended on advertising, promoting, or marketing the Destin carwash (RFP #67); and “financial documents that identify pricing, profit margins and costs regarding products sold in connection with the Infringing Mark and/or the Infringing Logo” (RFP #68). Defendants objected to each of these RFPs on a variety of grounds, as follows:

(ECF No. 17-2 at 13–14). In response to RFPs ## 66 and 67, Defendants merely referred Plaintiffs to a “General Objection B” (see id. at 14), which Defendants listed near the beginning of their RFP responses (i.e., not in response to any particular RFP), and which states:

(ECF No. 17-2 at 2).[2] Defendants also referred Plaintiffs to General Objection B in response to RFPs ## 62, 64, 65, and 68 (each of these RFPs includes “Infringing Mark” and/or “Infringing Logo” in the request), in addition to the other objections noted above (see id. at 13–14).

MOTION TO COMPEL AND RESPONSE THERETO

Plaintiffs argue that the financial information they seek from Defendants is relevant to an assessment of disgorgement of profits. Plaintiffs also contend that “metrics—likely available through Defendants' automatic Point-of-Sale and/or QuickBooks files—regarding the volume of sales of car washes by Defendants since January 2019, as well as related metrics regarding the total number of customers and number of car washes conducted under the [allegedly infringing name and logo]” will shed light on the “overlap with Midwesterners visiting the Destin area on vacation” (ECF No. 17 at 8). Put another way, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants created their “copycat” car wash in a tourist area frequented by Midwesterners, to capitalize on the “fifteen years of goodwill and high repute associated with” Plaintiffs' car wash businesses in the Midwest (id.). Additionally, as to the objections based on propriety or confidential business information, Plaintiffs note that a protective order is in place in this case to facilitate, govern, and protect the exchange of any such information (id. at 10; see also ECF No. 16 (Stipulated Protective Order)). Plaintiffs also take issue with the “boilerplate” nature of Defendants' objections.

*3 In response to the motion to compel, Defendants point out that they initially produced approximately sixty pages of documents in response to Plaintiffs' first RFPs. Defendants also state that after Plaintiffs filed the motion to compel, they produced additional “documents reflecting their advertising expenditures and their monthly profit and loss statements from inception,” and they attached to their response an example (ECF No. 20 at 1). The example is a one-page document titled “PROFIT AND LOSS” from January 2019, which reflects total income (from “sales – car wash”); “costs of goods sold” (consisting of costs related to labor (wages and taxes), supplies and material, water, and electricity); expenses (related to salaries, taxes, payroll processing, credit card fees, advertising, “office,” legal/professional, IT, phone, auto, “uncategorized,” and “other miscellaneous”); gross profit; net operating income; net other income; and net income (ECF No. 20-1).[3] Defendants then argue, essentially, that Plaintiffs are entitled to no other documents.

In support, Defendants first claim that Plaintiffs' lawsuit is futile under the Dawn Donut rule (ECF No. 20 at 2–3) (citing Dawn Donut v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (a trademark registrant has no right to enjoin concurrent use of a mark if the use of the mark is “confined to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will expand his use into defendant's market”)). More particularly, Defendants assert “Plaintiffs cannot prove likelihood of confusion because they operate in a geographically separate territory from Defendants, and their supposed mark is incapable of distinguishing their services from those of others providing similar services.” (ECF No. 20 at 3). Next, Defendants contend “Plaintiffs have incurred no harm whatsoever and are not entitled to financial discovery” (id.). Citing no authority in support of this contention, Defendants again appear to make the general argument that because Plaintiffs cannot prove their case or otherwise establish “harm,” they are not entitled to the discovery at issue here (see, e.g., id. (“because ‘Otto’ is legally indistinct from ‘Auto,’ which, like ‘Express’ is a generic term in this business, anyone is free to use those terms, alone or in combination, within the context of identifying a car wash”)). Third, Defendants assert their objections are not boilerplate but also, again, interject into their argument the futility of Plaintiffs' case as a proper basis on which to withhold discovery (see, e.g., id. at 4 (stating, in support of their “irrelevancy” objections, “Customer confusion is not likely; indeed, it is extremely unlikely. Under Dawn Donut, ....”)). Defendants also argue their General Objection B is warranted, because “responding to requests asking about an “Infringing” Name or Logo would create a perception or admission that Defendant [sic] is engaging in infringing conduct, which, for a myriad of reasons, is clearly not the case” (id. at 5). Following a familiar pattern, Defendants again put forth a legal argument—that Plaintiffs are not entitled to disgorgement of profits because the parties' car washes are not “competitors”—and therefore “financial discovery ... is not relevant” (id. at 6; see also id. at 4 (“Under Dawn Donut, Plaintiffs have no right to try to enjoin Defendant from operating under its Otto's Express and Design mark and therefore have no corresponding right to try to recover damages or ‘disgorgement of profits’ ”)).

Defendants go on to discuss the specific RFPs at issue in the motion to compel and claim that the request for “a complete export of its QuickBooks files” (RFP # 61) is overbroad and irrelevant, especially in light of the discovery Defendants produced since the motion was filed (id. at 7–8). As to running QuickBooks to ascertain “sales of car washing services” information (RFP # 62), Defendants claim that doing so will not reveal the information Plaintiffs seek, and in any event, they have provided this information since the motion was filed (id. at 8). Defendants claim tax returns are irrelevant, as are the total number of car washes and customers (RFPs ## 63, 64, 65) (id. at 9–11). Last, with respect to the remaining RFPs (## 66, 67, 68), Defendants say the documents have been furnished since the motion to compel was filed, again referring the court to the PROFIT AND LOSS statements, an example of which is attached to their response (see id. at 11; ECF No. 20-1).

APPLICABLE LAW

*4 Motions to compel discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Westrope, 730 F.2d 729, 731 (11th Cir. 1984). Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the scope of discovery. That rule provides in relevant part that

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Requests for production of documents are governed by Rule 34. The requesting party may serve an RFP “within the scope of Rule 26(b)” to produce (or permit inspection of) documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Each request “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). With respect to responses and objections, the Rule provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2).

Additionally, as made clear by the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, boilerplate objections are not proper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. As can be seen, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires the responding party to “state with specificity the grounds for objection to the request, including the reasons” (emphasis added).[4] As such, courts have concluded that boilerplate objections are insufficient and may be deemed waived. See, e.g., Polycarpe v. Seterus, Inc., No. 6:16-cv-1606-ORL-37TBS, 2017 WL 2257571, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2017) (collecting cases and noting that “generalized objections are inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all .... Their use obstructs the discovery process, violates numerous rules of civil procedure and ethics, and imposes costs on litigants that frustrate the timely and just resolution of cases .... Objections which state that a discovery request is vague, overly broad, or unduly burdensome are, by themselves, meaningless, and are deemed without merit”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Liguria Foods, Inc. v. Griffith Labs., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 168, 184 (N.D. Iowa 2017) (“The key requirement in both Rules 33 and 34 is that objections require ‘specificity.’ ”); Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., No. 6:11cv69–Orl–19GJK, 2011 WL 6936485, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2011) (“[o]bjections which state that a discovery request is ‘vague, overly broad, or unduly burdensome' are, by themselves, meaningless, and are deemed without merit by this Court.”) (quoting Milinazzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 691, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2007)).

*5 Additionally, as the Polycarpe court noted, the revised Rules “leave no place for so-called “General Objections” to interrogatories and requests for production except in those rare cases where the same objection specifically applies to every interrogatory or request.” Polycarpe, 2017 WL 2257571, at *1; see also Liguria Foods, Inc.., 320 F.R.D. at 186 (“generalized objections are inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all”) (quoting Jarvey, Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They are Used, Why They are Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 Drake L. Rev. 913, 916 (2013)).

DISCUSSION

Initially, Defendants' contention that their objections are not boilerplate is simply without merit. To be sure, their responses to RFPs ## 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 68 are “textbook examples” of boilerplate objections. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. ETourandTravel, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-827-ORL-36, 2014 WL 1250034, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2014) (“Defendants' objections that Plaintiff's discovery is overly broad, oppressive, vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, compound, irrelevant, ... [and] impermissibly seeks trade secret and privileged information ... are of the boilerplate, one size fits all variety, which this and other courts routinely reject”) (citations to nine cases omitted). Defendants' added reference to Rule 26—that the requests are “drastically disproportionate to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1)”—does not change the court's view, as this reference merely tracks the introductory language of the Rule and includes no mention or discussion of any of the six proportionality factors set forth in the body of the Rule. “[A] party seeking to resist discovery on [disproportionality] grounds still bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that the discovery fails the proportionality calculation mandated by [Rule 26(b)(1)] by coming forward with specific information to address—insofar as that information is available to it—the [six proportionality factors listed in the Rule].” Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun “Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 591–92 (N.D. Tex. 2017).[5] The boilerplate nature of these objections, alone, is a sufficient basis on which to overrule the objections to RFPs ## 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 68, or to otherwise deem them waived. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2014 WL 1250034, at *4.

That leaves Defendants' responses to RFPs ## 66 and 67. As discussed above, in response to these RFPs Defendants simply referred Plaintiffs to General Objection B. This court need not decide whether the practice of referring a party seeking discovery to a general objection is acceptable (though it likely is not in this instance (see, e.g., Polycarpe, 2017 WL 2257571, at *1; Liguria Foods, Inc., 2017 WL 976626)), because here the General Objection itself is improper. Defendants failed to respond to any extent to the RFPs solely because of terminology used in the RFPs, claiming responses would “create a perception or admission that Defendant [sic] is engaging in infringing conduct.” If Defendants truly feared that discovery responses to these RFPs could be construed as admissions, Defendants could have easily fashioned qualified responses. That is, Defendants could have clearly stated that they do not admit to using an Infringing Mark or Infringing Logo and at the same time provided responsive documentation showing sales revenue (RFP #66) and advertising/marketing expenditures (RFP # 67) for the Destin car wash. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection to part of a [RFP] must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.”). Moreover, General Objection B leaves unanswered the question of whether any responsive materials exist and are being withheld. Id. (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”). The objections to RFPs ## 66 and 67 are improper and overruled.

*6 A final point bears mention. The undersigned does not always resolve motions to compel based solely on the form of objections to discovery requests. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Hallam, et al., No. 3:19cv3210 (N.D. Fla.) (ECF No. 13, Order (Feb. 10, 2020) (reaching merits of discovery dispute despite boilerplate objections, noting the court's—and parties'—obligations “to construe, administer, and employ [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ ” of every action action)) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). In other words, this court excuses failures to comply with Rule 34 in some circumstances, but the court declines to do so here for a number of reasons.

First, the court reviewed all of Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' first RFPs, of which there are ninety-three. In addition to the eight at issue here—which are unquestionably improper, as explained at length supra—the court found repeated and numerous improper objections throughout. To illustrate, in response to RFP #1, which requested “Otto's Express's complete corporate book,” Defendants stated “Objection; utterly irrelevant and harassing. There is absolutely no useful purpose served by production of Otto's Express's corporate book.” (ECF No. 17-2 at 3). Defendants then referenced their response to RFP #1 (and only that response) in responding to RFPs ## 2, 3, and 4 (id.). Thereafter, Defendants provided boilerplate or otherwise improper objections to about forty RFPs, including the following objections: (1) vague, overbroad, “grossly overbroad,” and/or “not proportional” or “drastically disproportional” to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1) (with no mention/analysis of the proportionality factors), in response to RFPs ## 6, 8, 10, 13, 28, 43, 45, 47, and 78; (2) “non-sensical,” “totally non-sensical,” or unintelligible, in response to RFPs ## 19, 20, 22, 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 80, 81, 82, and 85; (3) “see General Objection B,” in response to RFPs ## 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 75, 80, 81, 83, and 84; or (4) “calls for work product,” in response to RFPs ## 89, 90, 91, and 92 (without providing a privilege log[6]). Even though these numerous objections are not at issue in the motion to compel, they clearly are improper, they constitute the great majority of Defendants' RFP responses, and the court has considered Defendants' response as a whole in declining to reach the merits of this dispute.

Second, in instances where Defendants actually produced responsive documents, originally, in response to Plaintiffs' RFPs (a total of approximately fifty-one documents), they did so while at the same time asserting objections to the underlying RFPs and noting that the document production was “[n]otwithstanding and without waiving th[o]se objections” (see ECF No. 17-2 at 6 (responses to RFP ## 22, 25)). This, too, is improper:

*7 Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 487 (N.D. Tex. 2014); see also, e.g., Liguria Foods, Inc., 320 F.R.D. at 187 (reaching same conclusion).

Third, Defendants assert arguments in response to the motion to compel that turn on the contention that Plaintiffs cannot prove their case, and as such Defendants should not have to produce various items of discovery. This is an invalid basis on which to withhold discovery. If Defendants have reason to file a motion to dismiss, they should file one, and if they obtain a stay of discovery while it is pending then so be it. But no such motion has been filed. What has been filed is a scheduling order, issued by the district court, setting forth the parties' discovery obligations (ECF No. 14), which is based in part on the parties' joint report, in which Defendants agreed discovery was necessary (see ECF No. 13 at 2).[7] As such, Defendants are required to participate in discovery—regardless of their view of the strength or soundness of Plaintiffs' claims—unless or until the district court says otherwise.

Considering all of the foregoing circumstances, the court finds it appropriate to overrule the objections at issue here rather than resolve them on their merits. Put simply, the objections fail to comply with the specificity and other requirements of Rule 34, and for that reason they are deemed waived or, alternatively, overruled.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of February 2020.