Martino v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
Martino v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC
2019 WL 10255236 (D. Conn. 2019)
October 30, 2019

Dooley, Kari A.,  United States District Judge

Protective Order
30(b)(6) corporate designee
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Summary
The Court granted the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order in part, ordering that the Plaintiff must identify by BATES number the documents about which she intends to make inquiry for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. The deposition must occur on or before December 1, 2019 and the Defendant must pay for the stenographer, transcript and any costs associated with the video link technology. The documents must be pre-marked and made available to the deponent in Texas.
Teresa Martino, Plaintiff,
v.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, d/b/a Mr. Cooper, Defendant
3:17-cv-01326 (KAD)
United States District Court, D. Connecticut
Filed October 30, 2019

Counsel

Jeffrey S. Gentes, Connecticut Fair Housing Center / Yale Law School, Hartford, CT, J. Livingston Pottenger, Jr., Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Aaron Arthur Fredericks, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, John Precobb, Richard C. Demerle, Pro Hac Vice, Sassoon & Cymrot, LLP, Stephanie Babin, Demerle Hoeger LLP, Boston, MA, Dana A. Jonson, Law Offices of Dana A. Jonson, LLC, Bethel, CT, for Defendant.
Dooley, Kari A., United States District Judge

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [ECF NO. 198]

*1 On October 21, 2019, the Defendant moved for a Protective Order [ECF No. 198] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C), (b)(1), and Local Rule 37 to prevent the Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition or, in the alternative, to require the Plaintiff to either depose the Defendant in Texas, the home state of its witness, or depose the Defendant by video. On October 28, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion [ECF No. 200] in which she asks the Court to order the Defendant to submit to a deposition in either New Haven, Connecticut or in Texas, and to further require the Defendant to bear the costs of the deposition, including Plaintiff's reasonable travel costs if the deposition is in Texas. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order is GRANTED in part.

By Order dated May 23, 2019, the Court imposed sanctions on the Defendant for failing to comply with the Court's orders regarding discovery after what the Court determined to be a protracted and dilatory approach to its discovery obligations. [ECF No. 171 at 4.] Recognizing that the Defendant's untimely production of records occurred after the Plaintiff had conducted a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the Defendant, the Court ordered that “if, at the conclusion of discovery, the Plaintiff determines that she would like to reconvene the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition for purposes of examination on the discovery produced after the first deposition occurred, she shall be permitted to do so at the Defendant's expense.” [Id. at 6.]

As contemplated, the Plaintiff noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the Defendant after the conclusion of discovery. However, the Notice evinces little effort on the part of the Plaintiff to limit the deposition as envisioned by the Court. The Court expressly intended an examination tailored to the documents comprised in Defendant's untimely production. But the Notice includes a list of topics that appears co-extensive with the allegations, claims and defenses contained in the operative pleadings. Plaintiff's assertion that whether the topic list is duplicative of the prior Rule 30(b)(6) notice is “irrelevant” is puzzling. In perhaps a passing nod to the Court's order, the Plaintiff seeks to depose the Defendant on, inter alia, “[a]ll documents produced by Mr. Cooper or Seterus, Inc.... in this action since July 12, 2018,” a proposed topic that is, on its face, inappropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (“In its notice or subpoena, a party ... must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination”) (emphasis added). This Court has previously observed that the resources being expended by the parties are wholly disproportionate to the needs of the case and the nature of the case and controversy. The Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition only exacerbates that discomforting chasm. And the fact that the Plaintiff will not herself incur costs, while the Defendant surely will, raises the specter of, at best, a cavalier approach to cost containment. See, e.g., Joseph L. v. Connecticut Dep't of Children & Families, 225 F.R.D. 400, 402 (D. Conn. 2005) (noting the Court's “broad discretion regarding whether to issue a protective order,” including when necessary to guard against “undue burden or expense”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C) (authorizing the Court via motion or sua sponte to limit “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” discovery or discovery that yields a “burden or expense” that “outweighs its likely benefit”).

*2 Accordingly, the Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED in part. If Plaintiff still intends to reconvene a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, she shall identify by BATES number those documents about which she intends to make inquiry. Simply because a particular document is probative of previously covered topics does not open the door to duplicative inquiry regarding those topics.

The parties also disagree on the deposition logistics. The Court's Order did not address these issues as it was unclear whether the deposition would occur at all. As such, neither party's presumptions regarding the Court's intention are founded in the record. Having now considered the party's respective positions, the Court orders as follows:

The Rule 30(b)(6) deponent may appear for deposition from Texas by video link. Requiring any travel would only drive up the already exorbitant costs of this litigation. Insofar as the Plaintiff is required to identify, by BATES number, the documents on which the deponent will be examined, these documents shall be pre-marked and made available to the deponent in Texas.

Plaintiff's examination is limited to 3 hours.

The Defendant shall pay for the stenographer, transcript and any costs associated with the video link technology.

The deposition shall occur on or before December 1, 2019.

So Ordered, this 30th day of October 2019.