Wynn v. City of Griffin, Ga.
Wynn v. City of Griffin, Ga.
2017 WL 11568639 (N.D. Ga. 2017)
June 21, 2017
Batten, Sr., Timothy C., United States District Judge
Summary
The Court denied AlliedBarton's motion for a protective order, noting that the parties were already bound by a confidentiality order which ameliorates the risk of public disclosure of the settlement agreement. The Court did not address any specific type of ESI.
DERRICK WYNN, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GRIFFIN, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants
v.
CITY OF GRIFFIN, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants
CIVIL ACTION FILE NUMBER 3:16-cv-094-TCB
United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Newnan Division
Filed June 21, 2017
Counsel
James Ward Howard, Leif Andrew Howard, The Howard Law Firm, Tucker, GA, for Plaintiff.Richard A. Carothers, Angela C. Couch, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants.
Batten, Sr., Timothy C., United States District Judge
ORDER
*1 This case comes before the Court on non-party AlliedBarton Security Services, LLC's motion for a protective order [49].
AlliedBarton is the former employer of Plaintiff Derrick Wynn. Defendants Tina Bean, Steven Heaton, and the City of Griffin, Georgia (the “City Defendants”) served a subpoena on AlliedBarton, seeking a witness under Federal Rule of Procedure 30(b)(6) who could testify to AlliedBarton's knowledge of an incident that occurred on September 25, 2014, between Wynn and Defendant William Shaw. On that day, Wynn, acting in his capacity as a security guard employed by AlliedBarton, had restrained Shaw, a patient at Spalding Regional Hospital in Griffin. Shaw accused Wynn of assaulting him, and on that basis Wynn was arrested and lost his position with AlliedBarton.[1] The subpoena seeks information concerning AlliedBarton's settlement agreement with Shaw.
AlliedBarton asserts that its settlement with Shaw is subject to a confidentiality provision, and therefore seeks a protective order preventing the City Defendants from inquiring into the terms of the settlement. AlliedBarton also argues that the information sought in the subpoena is not relevant to this case and that it is not the proper party to receive the subpoena because it has very limited knowledge of the requested topics.
Discovery is generally permitted “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Hunte v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-2069-WSD, 2014 WL 3955723, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2459 (3d ed. 2010)). Pursuant to Rule 26(c), upon a showing of good cause, a court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” “The party seeking a protective order has the burden to demonstrate good cause, and must make ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements' supporting the need for a protective order.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Se. Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429–30 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Generally, “the production of confidential third-party settlement agreements in a lawsuit already subject to a protective order is not a violation of confidentiality clauses or protective orders governing previous settlements.” Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc., No 4:12-cv-0077-HLM, 2013 WL 12090122, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2013) (citing cases). “While the ‘Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether settlement agreements are discoverable,’ the issue is not one of confidentiality, it is a question of ‘the degree of relevancy required.’ ” Id. (quoting Kipperman v. Onex Corp., No. 1:05-cv-1242-JOF, 2008 WL 1902227, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008)). As the parties in this case are bound by a confidentiality order, see [42], the risk of public disclosure of the settlement agreement is ameliorated, and the confidentiality provision alone is not enough to prevent relevant information from being discoverable.
*2 Furthermore, AlliedBarton's argument that the subpoena seeks irrelevant information is not persuasive. “The term ‘relevant’ ... is to be ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that bears on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Auto-Owners, 231 F.R.D. at 430 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The incident between Wynn and Shaw on September 25, 2014 is the genesis for all of the claims in this case and is therefore highly relevant. Similarly, any discussions of the incident between Shaw and AlliedBarton—including those memorialized in the settlement agreement—could be relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.[2] While AlliedBarton argues that the City Defendants could misinterpret the information contained in the settlement agreement,[3] that is not a valid basis for excluding relevant information from discovery.
Finally, AlliedBarton's argument that it possesses little relevant information does not support issuance of a protective order. Conversely, it highlights the low burden of designating an official to testify to the limited topics listed in the subpoena. The fact that a third-party administrator may also have discoverable information[4] is irrelevant— AlliedBarton must designate someone to testify to AlliedBarton's knowledge of the requested topics.
Accordingly, AlliedBarton's motion for a protective order [49] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of June, 2017.
Footnotes
The complaint includes a claim for tortious interference with employment.
Accord Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Nebula Glass Int'l, Inc., No. 05-60860CIV, 2007 WL 1526649, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 22, 2007) (“The Defendants' argument that a heightened standard of relevance should be applied when it comes to production of a settlement agreement in discovery is rejected. That argument is not supported by any binding or persuasive authority in this Circuit, and moreover it is simply wrong. There is nothing magical about a settlement agreement. It ultimately is just a contract between two parties. No other contract enjoys the type of ‘heightened’ protection that the Defendants require, and they do not explain just exactly why this type of contract merits such treatment. Rule 26 has no exception for settlement agreements. Therefore, the traditional post-2000 standards that apply to any Rule 26 issue apply to this document.”).
See [54] at 3 (“One can think of innumerable reasons why the amount of the settlement agreement does not necessarily accurately reflect the severity of the injury alleged in a personal injury case.”).
AlliedBarton argues that it is not a proper party for the subpoena because ESIS, a third-party administrator, handled AlliedBarton's investigation and settlement of Shaw's claim. See [49] at 6.