*1 This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court, and Standing Order 13-02.

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Compel [Doc. 688], filed on November 9, 2020. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Response [Doc. 703] in opposition on November 23, 2020, and Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. 707] on November 30, 2020. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Compel [Doc. 688] will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

At issue in the motion are Defendant's Requests for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 25 and 26. RFP No. 25 seeks:

[Doc. 703-1 at 5]. RFP No. 26 seeks:

[Id. at 6].

Defendant previously issued subpoenas on non-parties Bergan Clark (“Clark”) and Logan Birdsong (“Birdsong”), administrators of the Facebook group. The subpoenas sought production of “All Communications or Documents concerning the online Facebook group named ‘Kingston Coal Ash Survivors’ ... for which [Clark and Birdsong are] listed as a group administrator,” as well as their testimony on the “[a]uthentication of all documents produced in accordance” with the documents request. [Docs. 636, 637]. However, the Court subsequently denied the motions to quash filed by Clark and Birdsong, finding that requested social media information was relevant and limited in scope, as the challenged subpoenas only request communications and documents relating to the Facebook group involving the Kingston Coal Ash Survivors. [Doc. 682].

Defendant now moves [Doc. 688] to compel documents responsive to RFP Nos. 26 and 26, claiming Plaintiffs have refused to produce documents related to the Facebook group and asserts that the Court has already found that the requested information is relevant, not privileged, and proportional. Defendant maintains that in response to Plaintiffs' objections, it reiterated that the requests for production are only seeking “material related to a single Facebook group in which Plaintiffs apparently discussed their claims against Jacobs in the present litigation and their medical conditions.” [Id. at 5–6]. Defendant also claims that the discovery requests are proportional to the needs of the case because the Facebook group was only created in March of 2019 and notes that Birdsong was able to produce the requested posts before the motions to quash were filed.

Plaintiffs respond [Doc. 703] that Defendant has already obtained the entire relevant records and information concerning the Facebook group from Birdsong and Clark. Plaintiffs provide additional background that Birdsong appeared for her deposition with hundreds of pages of screenshots, as well as that Clark appeared for his deposition, searched for additional information not disclosed by Birdsong, and provided this information, including several audio files. Additionally, Plaintiffs detail that Clark was then asked on the last day of fact discovery, for the first time, to produce his private Facebook chats and messages concerning the Facebook group, and while Clark and his counsel objected, they found no responsive messages. Plaintiffs also detail that the parties conferred regarding whether Plaintiffs should attempt to produce the content of deleted posts and notifications, as well as to supplement the posts in the Facebook group since November 11, 2020.

*2 Plaintiffs allege that they object to Defendant's request for “any Facebook messages or other communications concerning the Facebook group which are in the possession of any of the Plaintiffs,” claiming that the request is “overly broad, unduly burdensome, unduly intrusive, and implicates serious privacy concerns that would be grossly disproportional to the needs of the case.” [Id. at 6]. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's discovery requests for these Facebook messages are improper because they are not sufficiently limited in scope, content or time; seek material outside the scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b); and raise serious privacy and free speech interests.

Next, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant should not be permitted to have “unfettered access” to Plaintiffs' social media accounts. [Id. at 8]. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant “assumes that all of the communications regarding the Kingston Coal Ash Survivors' private Facebook group only contain information relating to claims in this litigation.” [Id. at 9]. Plaintiffs maintain that while Defendant's requests seek private social media communications that “concern” the Facebook group, and “such requests may, on their face, seek information relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, disclosure would require that Plaintiffs ‘hand over the keys’ to their private Facebook content generally.” [Id. at 10 (quoting Locke v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, No. 5:18-CV-119-TBR-LLK, 2019 WL 430930, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 4, 2019)) ].

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's discovery requests are not narrowly tailored and seek a fishing expedition into the Plaintiffs' social media accounts. Plaintiffs assert that the requests for production fail to define what constitutes a post, document, or communication, for example, that concerns the private group. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that the discovery requests fail to explain who will review Plaintiffs' social media content to determine what falls within this scope, as well as that they do not limit the request to only those messages composed and sent by Plaintiffs. Lastly, Plaintiffs claim that the discovery requests at issue do not satisfy Rule 34, in that the information sought is not described with reasonable particularity.

Defendant replies [Doc. 707] that its discovery requests are narrowly tailored to documents and communications involving the specific Facebook group, and therefore does not include all of Plaintiffs' social media accounts. Defendant maintains that this social media information is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims and notes previous citations to deposition testimony on the discussion of Plaintiffs' medical conditions in the Facebook group.

Defendant also addresses Plaintiffs' arguments that the discovery requests were not narrowly tailored. First, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs did not object to the requests on the lack of a definition of the term concerning in their responses to the RFPs. Moreover, Defendant maintains that the terms concerning, as well as communication and document, are defined in Defendant's Fourth Master Set of Requests for Production. Defendant also claims that Plaintiffs will not be unduly burdened by searching for documents responsive to these discovery requests, as the third-party administrators of the Facebook group, Clark and Birdsong, were able to produce the requested material without difficulty. Additionally, Defendant notes that after it identified certain missing materials, Clark, also represented by Plaintiffs' counsel, was able to respond within five hours.

With respect to Plaintiffs' claim that the relevant information has already been produced, Defendant asserts “it is clear from the third-party production that certain responsive documents have yet to be produced,” as “there are references in the already produced material to possible private messages involving Adkisson Plaintiffs that they have thus far refused to produce.” [Doc. 707 at 7]. Defendant produced the posts of two Plaintiffs, Julie Bledsoe and Shaun Smith, allegedly soliciting private messages in the Facebook group.

II. ANALYSIS

*3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides as follows:

The “scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad.” Meredith v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 319 F.R.D. 240, 242 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998)). Courts have cautioned, however, that “[d]iscovery requests are not limitless, and parties must be prohibited from taking ‘fishing expeditions’ in hopes of developing meritorious claims.” Bentley v. Paul B. Hall Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 7:15-CV-97-ART-EBA, 2016 WL 7976040, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 2016). “[T]he [C]ourt retains the final discretion to determine whether a discovery request is broad or oppressive.” Id. (citing Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)). Rule 26(c) states that, upon a showing of good cause, a party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order to protect the party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Further, the proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. See Gruenbaum v. Werner Enters., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Anderson v. Dillard's, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 307, 309–10 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).

“[T]here is no dispute that social media information may be a source of relevant information that is discoverable.” Georgel v. Preece, No. 0:13-CV-57-DLB, 2014 WL 12647776, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012-0307 ILG MDG, 2012 WL 6720752, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012)); see, e.g., Locke v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, No. 5:18-CV-119-TBR-LLK, 2019 WL 430930, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 4, 2019) (“Social networking site content (‘SNS’) is subject to discovery under Rule 34. To fall within the scope of discovery, SNS information must meet the relevance standard, and the burden of discovering the information must be proportional to the needs of the case.”); Terrell v. Memphis Zoo, Inc., No. 17-CV-2928-JPM-TMP, 2018 WL 3520139, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. July 20, 2018).

First, the Court notes that despite Defendant's arguments to the contrary, RFP No. 25 seeks “All posts, comments, images, messages, and any other Communications or Documents contained in all of Your social media accounts, including but not limited to Facebook, concerning the online Facebook group.” See [Doc. 703-1 at 5]. Defendant is not entitled to a blanket request to discover all of Plaintiff's social media accounts and information, which they appear to concede during their meet and confer with Plaintiffs on this issue. Additionally, Defendant has already received the documents at issue in the Facebook group by Clark and Birdsong, and the parties discussed the supplementation of the claimed missing documents and posts in the Facebook group since November 11, 2020.

*4 Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs should be required to provide “any Facebook messages or other communications concerning the Facebook group which are in the possession of any of the Plaintiffs.” [Doc. 703 at 6]. Courts have recognized that social networking site (“SNS”) content may be subject to discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, and “[g]enerally, SNS content is neither privileged nor protected by any right of privacy.” Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-CV-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL 555759, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (citing Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012)). However, this discoverability does not grant parties “a generalized right to rummage at will through information that [an opposing party] has limited from public view,” and the party seeking private social media information must still establish under Rule 26 that the requested discovery is relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. T.C on Behalf of S.C. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, No. 3:17-CV-01098, 2018 WL 3348728, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2018) (internal quotation omitted). “Consequently, courts have denied blanket requests for the contents of social media accounts and instead required that parties bring narrowed requests for information related to the issues in the case.” Terrell, 2018 WL 3520139 at *4.

Defendant maintains that “certain responsive documents have yet to be produced” due to “references in the already produced material to possible private messages involving Adkisson Plaintiffs.” [Doc. 707 at 7]. Defendant points to a third-party in the Facebook group posting “Anyone know which lawyer is representing the workers?”—to which Plaintiff Julie Bledsoe responded, “Please private msg me.” See [Doc. 707–4]. Additionally, Defendant notes that a third party posted in the Facebook group that his mother has brain issues and works for TVA, had her health insurance cut and issues with her disability, and was going to be terminated, and then asked for a number to an attorney “that isn't afraid to fight this.” See [Doc. 707–5]. Plaintiff Shaun Smith then responded, “Message me.” [Id.].

Ultimately, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet the “threshold showing that the requested information is likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012). The Court finds that the alleged private message with Plaintiff Shaun Smith does not relate to the subject matter of the lawsuit, and Plaintiff Julie Bledsoe merely provided the name of Plaintiffs' counsel to an individual who is not alleged to be a plaintiff against Defendant in any case. The produced Facebook posts do not demonstrate Plaintiffs “soliciting private messages concerning the subject matter of this lawsuit,” contrary to Defendant's argument. [Doc. 707 at 7].

Defendant previously pointed to deposition testimony that Plaintiffs discussed their claims and medical conditions in the Facebook group, thus establishing its relevancy. Additionally, Defendant claims that the previously produced SNS posts from the Facebook group show Clark, a group administrator, coaching cleanup workers about what to advise their doctors regarding exposure to toxins. However, Defendant cannot support its belief that Plaintiffs were discussing their medical conditions or the instant lawsuit in private Facebook messages, other than the two above-referenced posts. See, e.g., Salvato v. Miley, No. 5:12–CV–635–Oc–10PRL, 2013 WL 2712206, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2013) (holding that the mere hope that party's “private text-messages, e-mails, and electronic communication might include an admission against interest, without more, is not a sufficient reason to require [him] to provide Plaintiff open access to his private communications with third parties”); Jackson v. Deen, No. CV412–139, 2013 WL 1911445, at *16 (S.D. Ga. May 8, 2013) (denying as overbroad defendant employer's request for plaintiff's text messages with other employees because discovery “is not so liberal as to allow a party to roam in the shadow zones of relevancy and to explore a matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so”) (quoting Collins v. Worley Catastrophe Response, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-528, 2012 WL 1447592, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2012)).

*5 Additionally, the applicable discovery requests seeking “All Documents and Communications concerning the online Facebook group named ‘Kingston Coal Ash Survivors,’ ” as well as all “messages” and “any other Communications” in Plaintiffs' social media accounts concerning the Facebook group are overly broad and not narrowly tailored, with respect to the request for private Facebook messages. See [Doc. 703-1 at 5, 6]. Again, contrary to Defendant's arguments, the request for productions are not limited to Plaintiffs' medical conditions or the instant lawsuit. Although the Court previously found the production of the Facebook group postings proper, such a request is overly broad with respect to Plaintiffs' private Facebook messages.

Therefore, “Defendant is engaging in a fishing expedition since, at this time, it has nothing more than suspicion or speculation as to what information might be contained in the private messages.” See Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat. Title Agency of Nevada, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-788-JCM, 2007 WL 119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (although addressing the release of release of all private email messages on Plaintiff's Myspace.com account); see also Tompkins, 278 F.R.D. at 388 (holding “there must be a threshold showing that the requested [private Facebook page] information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” as “[o]therwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engage in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff's Facebook account”).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Compel [Doc. 688] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER: