I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Before the Court is the Joint Stipulation Regarding Discovery Dispute (“Motion”) filed by Defendant Travelers Commercial Insurance Company (“Defendant”). (Mot., ECF No. 32-1.) The Motion seeks an order: (1) imposing evidentiary sanctions precluding Plaintiff Dustin Glodney (“Plaintiff”) from producing (and subsequently relying on) at trial or in a dispositive motion any evidence or documents not yet produced on the grounds that the discovery cutoff already has passed for Plaintiff and he has failed to produce a single document; (2) awarding Defendant monetary sanctions in the amount of $4,974.90 for the fees and costs incurred in connection with the pending discovery disputes; (3) compelling Plaintiff to provide supplemental responses to Defendant's Interrogatories Nos. 8–10 on the ground that his current responses are deficient and evasive; (4) compelling Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's Interrogatories Set Two without objection on the ground that he has failed to provide a response; (5) compelling the deposition of third party Carlos Asseraf on the ground that he failed to appear for the deposition on its agreed-upon date; and (6) if the request for evidentiary sanctions is not granted, compelling Plaintiff to (a) provide responses without objection to Request for Production Set Two on the ground that he has failed to provide a response, and (b) produce documents responsive to Defendant's Requests for Production Sets One and Two, on the ground that no responsive documents have been produced. (See generally Mot.) In support of the Motion, Defendant filed the Declaration of Aaron Agness (“Agness Declaration”) and the Declaration of David Song (“Song Declaration”). (Agness Decl., ECF No. 32-2; Song Decl., ECF No. 32-3.)

Defendant filed the Motion unilaterally because Plaintiff failed to timely participate in the preparation of the Motion as required by Central District of California Local Rule [1] 37-2. (Song Decl., at ¶ 29.) Pursuant to Local Rule 37-2.2, Defendant's counsel provided Plaintiff with Defendant's portion of the Motion, along with corresponding declarations and exhibits on August 4, 2020, and requested a return by August 11, 2020. (Id., at ¶ 28, Ex. 25.) Plaintiff's counsel did not forward Plaintiff's portion of the Motion to Defendant's counsel by August 11, 2020, or at all. (Id., at ¶ 29.)

On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Declaration of Kevin M. Badkoubehi in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion re: Discovery Dispute. (ECF No. 36.) The Clerk, however, filed a Notice to Filer of Deficiencies regarding Plaintiff's filing. (ECF No. 37.) In response, Plaintiff re-filed the Declaration of Kevin M. Badkoubehi in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion re: Discovery Dispute on September 12, 2020 (“Badkoubehi Declaration”).[2] (Badkoubehi Decl., ECF No. 38.)

*2 On September 15, 2020, Defendant filed Traveler's Reply Brief in Support of Joint Stipulation Regarding Discovery Dispute (“Reply”). (Reply, ECF No. 40.) In support of the Reply, Defendant filed the Supplemental Declaration of Aaron C. Agness (“Agness Supplemental Declaration”). (Agnes Suppl. Decl., ECF No. 40-1.)

On September 25, 2020, the Court circulated to the parties its Tentative Ruling, advising that if both parties submitted on the Tentative Ruling, the Court would adopt the Tentative Ruling as its Final Order without oral argument. Both parties did not submit to the Court's Tentative Ruling. Accordingly, the Court held oral argument as scheduled on September 29, 2020.[3]

Having considered the arguments of the parties as presented in their respective filings and at the hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's Motion.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. The Claims and Defenses

This case is before the Court by way of removal, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, from the Los Angeles County Superior Court on December 12, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) It is proceeding pursuant to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on April 6, 2020. (FAC, ECF No. 20.) In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of insurance contract and insurance bad faith against Defendant, and, in addition to damages, seeks a judicial declaration regarding the rights and obligations under the insurance policy. (See generally id.) Plaintiff claims that, on November 11, 2018, Plaintiff's real and personal property—insured by Defendant—suffered damages in excess of $150,000 as a result of massive fires that erupted in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, and that Defendant wrongfully breached the insurance contract by failing to pay for covered losses. (Id., at 4–7.)[4] Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages according to proof; pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; attorneys', experts', and consultants' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813 (1985); attorneys' fees and costs; and other relief as may be just and proper. (Id., at 10.)

*3 Defendant filed an Answer to the FAC on April 27, 2020. (ECF No. 22.) In addition to denying Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant asserts a number of affirmative defenses premised upon, among other things, the allegations that Plaintiff failed to cooperate with its investigation of his insurance claim, and engaged in concealment and misrepresentations of facts under the claim. (Id., at 8–11.)

B. Discovery

1. Written Discovery[5]

On April 3, 2020, Defendant served on Plaintiff its Interrogatories (Set One) (“ROGS Set 1”) and Requests for Production (Set One) (“RFP Set 1”). (Song Decl., at ¶ 5, Exs. 5–6.) Plaintiff responded to RFP Set 1 on May 22, 2020—sixteen days after his responses were due. (Id., at ¶ 6; Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 5.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff produced no documents in connection with his responses to RFP Set 1. (Mot., at ¶ 13.)

On May 1, 2020, Defendant served on Plaintiff its Interrogatories (Set Two) (“ROGS Set 2”) and Requests for Production (Set Two) (“RFP Set 2”). (Song Decl., at ¶ 8, Exs. 8–9.) Plaintiff did not respond to this second set of discovery by the due date, and did not request an extension of time in which to do so. (Id., at ¶ 8.)

According to Defendant, having received neither Plaintiff's responses to ROGS Set 1, ROGS Set 2, and RFP Set 2, nor Plaintiff's document production in response to RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter on July 1, 2020 requesting a telephonic conference pursuant to Local Rule 37-1 in an attempt to resolve the matter informally. (Id., at ¶ 9, Ex. 10.) The parties met and conferred on July 8, 2020, and Plaintiff agreed to serve, by July 15, 2020, his outstanding discovery responses, without objections, and produce documents in response to RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2. (Id., at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's facts regarding the July 1, 2020 letter or the July 8, 2020 conference. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.)

According to Defendant, on July 8, 2020, after the conference, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel an email confirming the parties' discussion, reiterating the parties' agreement, and requesting that Plaintiff's counsel immediately notify Defendant's counsel if he believed the summary of the conference was inaccurate. (Id., at ¶ 11, Ex. 11.) As of the September 1, 2020 filing of Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff had not responded to the July 8, 2020 email. (Id., at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.)

According to Defendant, it received no discovery responses or document production from Plaintiff on July 15, 2020. On the same day, Defendant's counsel called Plaintiff's counsel twice, left one voicemail requesting a second telephonic conference, and followed up with an email confirming that Defendant had not received Plaintiff's discovery responses and document production as of that date. (Id., at ¶¶ 12–13, Ex. 12.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.)

*4 The parties agree that, on July 16, 2020, Plaintiff served his responses to ROGS Set 1 and re-served his responses to RFP Set 1. (Song Decl., at ¶ 14, Ex. 13; Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 9(2), Ex. 4.) According to Defendant, “it is unclear” why Plaintiff would re-serve his responses to RFP Set 1. (Song Decl., at ¶ 14.) Also according to Defendant, Plaintiff did not produce any responsive documents with the re-service of his responses to RFP Set 1. (Id.) Finally, according to Defendant, as of the September 1, 2020 filing of its Motion, Plaintiff had not produced a single document in the litigation. (Id., at ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's contention that he did not produce documents in connection with his May 22, 2020 service of responses to RFP Set 1 or his July 16, 2020 re-service thereof. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.) Instead, Plaintiff contends that documents responsive to Defendant's requests “were presented to Defendant prior to the [April 15, 2020] mediation hearing” and “for Plaintiff's oral testimony” at his June 16, 2020 deposition. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶¶ 6–7.) Plaintiff explains that he re-served Plaintiff's responses to RFP Set 1 on July 16, 2020 because, “[g]iven the Covid situation and working at home [he] was not 100 percent certain gone out [sic] so as a precautionary measure re-served them [sic].” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 9(2).)

Plaintiff contends that on September 8, 2020, he served responses to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2 and amended responses to ROGS Set 1. (Id., at ¶ 13, Exs. 5–7.) Plaintiff further contends that on an unspecified date, he “then re[-]served multiple [d]ocuments responsive to Defendant's Request for Production of Documents.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also contends that he “is awaiting receipt of statements and copies of cashed checks [sic] soon as received from the financial institutions.” (Id., at ¶ 15.)

In its Reply, Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff's assertions on two grounds. First, Defendant objects to Plaintiff's assertion that he provided documents to Defendant before September 8, 2020 as “a blatant semantics game,” “not an accurate statement,” “at worst ... an intentional misstatement,” and “at best ... [the] reason that the Declaration cleverly says that ‘responsive documents’ were ‘presented for Plaintiff's oral testimony’ at Plaintiff's deposition.” (Reply, at 2, 4.) In support of its condemnation, Defendant points to Plaintiff's June 16, 2020 deposition testimony to the contrary:

(Agness Supp. Decl., at ¶ 2, Ex. 27.) Defendant further buttresses its condemnation by pointing to a discussion held on the record of Plaintiff's June 16, 2020 deposition with Plaintiff's counsel regarding the document production, also to the contrary to Plaintiff's assertions:

(Id.) Defendant explains that, in fact, the documents that Plaintiff now claims were presented to Defendant before September 8, 2020 were seventeen pages that Plaintiff “produced at the outset of the claim on January 9, 2019—i.e., well before the lawsuit was filed on October 30, 2019.” (Reply, at 4.)

*5 Next, Defendant objects to Plaintiff's September 8, 2020 document production—made up of eighteen pages—on the ground that it is “preposterous” that, in response to Defendant's twenty document requests, there are no more than eighteen pages of responsive documents, of which seventeen pages are the pre-litigation documents described above. (Id., at 5.) Defendant contends that “it is blatantly obvious that there should be more than [eighteen] documents,” especially since Plaintiff “had just finished a $200,000 remodel to the entire house” and, as such, “it is hard to fathom that there would not be any photos.” (Id., at 4, 5 n.3.) Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's counsel's statement that Plaintiff “is awaiting receipt of statements and copies of cashed checks soon” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 15) evidences that Plaintiff “does not appear to have even looked for documents responsive to the document requests, even at this late date.” (Reply, at 5.)

2. Deposition of Third-Party Carlos Asseraf

The parties seem to agree generally on the facts surrounding the deposition of Carlos Asseraf. On June 17, 2020, during a third-party deposition, Plaintiff's counsel agreed to accept service of a notice of deposition and a deposition subpoena on behalf of another third-party deponent, Carlos Asseraf. (Song Decl., at ¶ 16, Ex. 14, at 106; Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff contends that he did so “in the interest of judicial economy” and as a “matter of courtesy.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 8.) After a few exchanges between the parties' counsel regarding convenient dates, Plaintiff's counsel agreed to July 21, 2020 as the date for Mr. Asseraf's deposition. (Song Decl., at ¶¶ 17–20, Exs. 15–17; Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶¶ 9(1), 18–19.)

According to Defendant, on July 1, 2020, pursuant to the parties' agreement, Defendant's counsel served on Plaintiff's counsel an Amended Deposition Notice of Carlos Asseraf and a deposition subpoena, noticing Mr. Asseraf's deposition for July 21, 2020 at 1:00 p.m. (Song Decl., at ¶ 20, Ex. 18.) On July 17, 2020, Defendant's counsel forwarded to Plaintiff's counsel instructions for the video deposition that was to take place via “Zoom.” (Id., at ¶ 21, Ex. 19.) Defendant's counsel received a “read-receipt notification” that Plaintiff's counsel had received the July 17, 2020 email. (Id., at ¶ 22, Ex. 20.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.) Plaintiff adds that one hour prior to Mr. Asseraf's scheduled deposition, Plaintiff's counsel received something unspecified, that he “attempted to call [Plaintiff] to provide him the zoom notification for Mr. Asseraf,” that Plaintiff's counsel “was told that [Mr. Asseraf] could not make the deposition,” and that Plaintiff's counsel instructed Plaintiff “to have Mr. Asseraf immediately contact Defendant's counsel and notify him of his unavailability.” (Id., at ¶ 10.)

According to Defendant, thirty minutes before Mr. Asseraf's deposition, Mr. Asseraf contacted Defendant's counsel to advise that he had learned of the deposition only two hours earlier—having been advised of same by Plaintiff—and that he could not to attend because he had a prior engagement. (Song Decl., at ¶¶ 23–24, Ex. 21.) Plaintiff's counsel did not contact Defendant's counsel to advise that neither he nor Mr. Asseraf would appear. (Id., at ¶ 25.) Indeed, neither Mr. Asseraf nor Plaintiff's counsel appeared for Mr. Asseraf's noticed and subpoenaed deposition, causing Defendant's counsel to take a certificate of non-appearance. (Id., at ¶ 25, Ex. 22.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.) Instead, Plaintiff's counsel contends that he was “ready [sic] willing and ready [sic] to attend Mr. Asseraf's deposition on the date scheduled and was shocked and surprised that [Mr. Asseraf] was not available.” (Id., at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff's counsel adds that he “stipulated with the attorneys for Defendants [sic] for the purpose of allowing them to have the opportunity to take the needed deposition of Mr. Asseraf, in addition to receipt of the verified discovery responses and documents.” (Id., at ¶ 13.) He concludes that he has “confirmed with Plaintiff that Mr. Asseraf is available for his oral deposition anytime [during the week of September 14, 2020]”[6] and that he “sent email confirmation to attorneys for Defendant.” (Id., at ¶ 16.)

3. The Parties' Contentions Regarding Plaintiff's Efforts to Satisfy His Discovery Obligations

*6 Based on the facts set forth above, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not complied with his discovery obligations. (See generally Mot.; see generally Reply.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he “has fully complied with the discovery.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 19(2).) He asks “the Court to recognize that neither Plaintiff nor [Plaintiff's counsel's office] had any bad faith in regard to Mr. Asseraf,” and that instead they “have acted in good faith.” (Id.) He notes that “[t]here has been no prior court order by the Court compelling any form of discovery disputes and Plaintiff has in good faith as [sic] complied with all discovery responses as to [sic] the date of” the Badkoubehi Declaration. (Id., at ¶ 17.) He also notes that “[t]he Court, per [the parties'] joint stipulation has continued the discovery deadlines in favor of the Defendant” thereby “eliminating any and all prejudice toward Defendant herein.” (Id., at ¶ 18(2).)

4. The Parties' Efforts to Comply With Their Respective Pre-Filing Meet-and-Confer Obligations

According to Defendant, on July 22, 2020, Defendant's counsel participated in a telephonic informal discovery conference, as required by the Court before filing this Motion. (Song Decl., at ¶ 26.) According to the Court's records, Plaintiff's counsel neither completed his portion of the conference request form nor, as accurately recounted by Defendant, attended the conference, both as ordered by the Court on July 20, 2020. (Song Decl., at ¶ 26, Ex. 23 (citing ECF No. 27).) At this conference, Defendant raised its concerns regarding Plaintiff's failure to properly respond to Defendant's written discovery. (ECF No. 27.) Defendant also raised the issue of Mr. Asseraf's failure to appear at his noticed and subpoenaed deposition, which had transpired the day before the conference (but after Defendant's request for the conference). (Id.) In light of Plaintiff's counsel failure to appear at the conference, the Court ordered Defendant to file a discovery motion related to the written discovery and, noting that the deposition issue was not properly before the Court, ordered that Defendant would be allowed to include the deposition issue in its motion if, after complying with its pre-filing meet-and-confer obligations, the issue remained unresolved. (Id.)

On July 22, 2020, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter requesting dates and times for a conference related to the Asseraf deposition. (Song Decl., at ¶ 27, Ex. 24.) On August 4, 2020, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel Defendant's portion of the Motion, along with attendant declarations and exhibits, requesting that he provide Plaintiff's portion and its attendant declarations and exhibits by August 11, 2020. (Id., at ¶ 28, Ex. 25.) As of the September 1, 2020 filing of the Motion, Plaintiff's counsel had neither responded to Defendant's July 22, 2020 letter nor provided Plaintiff's portion of the Motion. (Id., at ¶¶ 27, 29.) Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.)

This unilateral Motion followed. (Song Decl., at ¶ 29.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard Regarding Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [7] 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery in federal cases. It states:

*7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. But relevance alone does not justify discovery.

In addition to relevance, Rule 26(b)(1) requires that the discovery be proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(1). Proportionality is determined by a consideration of the following factors: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. In addition, the court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery” pursuant to Rule 26(b)(2) if:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

A requesting party that is dissatisfied with discovery responses made under the federal rules may move to compel further responses pursuant to Rule 37(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122787, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). Finally, “[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed,” as well as “the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Int'l, No. CV 03-2213-JFW(RCx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)).

In addition to moving to compel responses pursuant to Rule 37(a), a requesting party may invoke Rule 37 to request sanctions for discovery misconduct. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (for failure to comply with a court order), 37(c) (for failure to disclose, supplemental an earlier response, or to admit), 37(d) (for failure to attend deposition, serve an answer to interrogatories, or respond to a request for inspection), 37(e) (for failure to preserve electronically stored information), and 37(f) (for failure to participate in framing a discovery plan). See also Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that district courts have “a wide range of sanctions” where necessary to ensure compliance with the rules of discovery or with court orders enforcing those rules).

Due process considerations, however, counsel that the Court's use of sanctions is not unlimited. Id., at 591. The Court's discretion is limited in two ways: (1) any sanction must be “just”; and (2) the sanction must specifically relate to the specific claim or defense that was at issue in the order to provide discovery. Id.; see also Sunrider Corp. v. Bountiful Biotech Corp., No. SACV-08-1339 DOC (AJWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117347, at *99 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinnee, 456 U.S. 695, 707 (1982)). “Sanctions interfering with a litigant's claims or defenses violate due process when imposed merely for punishment of an infraction that did not threaten the rightful decision of the case.” Wyle, 709 F.2d at 591. “Rule 37 sanctions ... may be imposed where the violation is ‘due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.’ ” Allen v. Bayer Corp. (In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 460 F.3d 1217, 1233 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fair Hous. v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)). “Disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the litigant's control meets this standard.” In re: Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Fair Hous., 285 F.3d at 905).

*8 With these general principles in mind, the Court now addresses Defendant's specific discovery requests.

B. The Court DENIES Without Prejudice Defendant's Request for Evidentiary Sanctions.

Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) and Local Rule 37-4, Defendant asks the Court to preclude Plaintiff “from presenting any evidence or documents at trial or in a dispositive motion that have not yet been produced as of the date of this [Motion].” (Mot., at 16–17.) This request is premised on Defendant's allegation that, as of the September 1, 2020 filing of the Motion, Plaintiff had served only his written responses to RFP Set 1—albeit sixteen days late—and had served neither his written responses to RFP Set 2 nor any documents responsive to either RFP Set 1 or RFP Set 2—even though his responses to RFP Set 1 stated that responsive documents would be produced. (Mot., at 16; Song Decl., at ¶¶ 8, 9.)

Plaintiff contends that documents responsive to Defendant's “Request for Production”[8] “were presented” to Defendant prior to the mediation of April 15, 2020 and Plaintiff's deposition of June 16, 2020. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶¶ 6, 7.) Plaintiff also avers that he served Defendant with his written responses to RFP Set 2 on September 8, 2020. (Id., at ¶ 13.) It is unclear exactly when Plaintiff re-served documents in connection with his responses to RFP Set 2, but it appears to have been on or around September 8, 2020. (See id., at ¶¶ 13–14.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that he is awaiting additional responsive documents from his financial institutions. (Id., at ¶ 15.)

Defendant argues that the only documents received from Plaintiff before September 8, 2020 were seventeen pages that Plaintiff sent to Defendant on January 19, 2019—over nine months before the filing of the lawsuit—and that this does not constitute a proper discovery response to RFP Sets 1 and 2. (Reply, at 4.) Defendant also argues that it is “blatantly obvious” that Plaintiff's 18-page document production of September 8, 2020 (of which seventeen pages were the pre-litigation documents) cannot be complete given that Defendant served twenty document requests. (Id.)

Sanctions, including the evidentiary sanctions that Defendant seeks here, can be imposed pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) for a party's failure to obey a court order.[9] Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Rule 37(b)(2) states in relevant part:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii).

As a threshold matter, the circumstances here do not trigger Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) because Defendant has not identified “an order to provide or permit discovery” that Plaintiff has disobeyed. To the contrary, as Plaintiff aptly observes, the Court has not yet issued such a discovery order in this matter. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 17.) Defendant contends that the order Plaintiff purportedly disobeyed that subjects him to sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) is “this Court's [O]rder to provide Plaintiff's statement with respect to the Request for an Informal Telephonic Discovery Conference” and ordering Plaintiff to appear for the discovery conference. (Mot., at 17; Song Decl., at ¶ 26, Ex. 23.) Indeed, this Court did issue such an Order on July 22, 2020 (“July 22, 2020 Order”). As noted in this Court's July 22, 2020 Order:

(Song Decl., at Ex. 23.)

However, while the Court does not take Plaintiff's non-compliance with its July 22, 2020 Order lightly, non-compliance with that order does not provide the necessary predicate for Rule 37(b) sanctions because it was not an order “to provide or permit discovery.” (ECF No. 27.) Rather, it was an order that Plaintiff's counsel comply with this Court's informal discovery conference requirements and appear at a discovery conference. (Id.) Without the prerequisite of Plaintiff's failure to comply with an order to provide or permit discovery, the evidence exclusion sanction of Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) cannot be imposed.

Moreover, to the extent Defendant seeks an order excluding evidence at trial or at a dispositive motion, the Motion is not before the proper judge. Rather, requests for evidentiary sanctions are more properly presented as evidentiary objections in connection with a dispositive motion or as a motion in limine at the time of trial, both before the District Judge presiding over the case. See Hoffman v. Constr. Prot. Servs., 541 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, it is more appropriate that these matters be considered by the District Judge at the appropriate time.

*10 Finally, even if this Court were to consider this request, such a ruling, if made as requested by Defendant, would be too vague to be enforced. Defendant seeks exclusion of any documents “that have not yet been produced as of the date of [the Motion].” (Mot., at 17.) With this description alone, it is impossible for the Court to determine precisely the scope of evidence that Defendant seeks to exclude. See, e.g., William Hablinski Architecture v. Amir Constr., Inc., No. CV-03-6365 CAS (RNBx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50559, at *35–36 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2005) (denying motion in limine to exclude evidence at trial, described as “any documents, witnesses, or other testimony not properly disclosed,” because of the impossibility to determine the precise scope of the request).

For these reasons, Defendant's request for evidence exclusion sanctions is DENIED without prejudice to its renewal before the District Judge, at the appropriate time, on a document-by-document basis or as otherwise required by the District Judge.

C. The Court DENIES as Moot Defendant's Request for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Supplement His Responses to Interrogatories Nos. 8–10.

On April 3, 2020, Defendant served Plaintiff with ROGS Set 1 which contained three interrogatories that are relevant to this Motion—Interrogatory Nos. 8, 9, and 10—that generally seek information regarding Plaintiff's claimed damages. (Mot., at 8; Song Decl., at ¶ 5, Ex. 5.) Plaintiff's responses were due on May 6, 2020. (Mot., at 8.) He responded on July 16, 2020 without objections. (Id.; Song Decl., at ¶ 14, Ex. 13.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff's responses to these interrogatories are deficient in that they are “not full and complete [and] evasive.” (Mot., 8–14.) On this basis, Defendant asks this Court to compel Plaintiff to supplement his responses. (Id.)

A party may propound interrogatories relating to any matter that may be inquired to under Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). A responding party must respond to the fullest extent possible, and any objections must be stated with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3)–(4). In general, a responding party is not required “to conduct extensive research in order to answer an interrogatory, but a reasonable effort to respond must be made.” Haney v. Saldana, No. 1:04-cv-05935-AWI-SMS-PC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93447, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010).

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's responses to Interrogatories Nos. 8–10, as set forth below, are deficient in that they are incomplete and evasive, and, as such, should be treated as a failure to respond. (Mot., at 8–12.)

Interrogatory No. 8 asks Plaintiff to “[s]tate the nature and dollar amount of each item of damage [Plaintiff is] seeking in this action.” (Song Decl., at Ex. 5, at 41.) Plaintiff responded as follows: “Plaintiff is contending special damages of $200,000. In addition, general and exemplary damages according to proof at trial.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 4, at 12.)

Interrogatory No. 9 asks Plaintiff to “[d]escribe how [Plaintiff] calculated the amounts contained in [his] response to Interrogatory No. 11.”[10] (Song Decl., at Ex. 5, at 41.) Plaintiff responded as follows: “Clean cut [sic] costs, relocation costs, repair costs. The general and exemplary damages are assessed by the court.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 4, at 12.)

*11 Interrogatory No. 10 asks Plaintiff to “[d]escribe in detail all damage to the PROPERTY which [Plaintiff] allege[s] resulted from the INCIDENT, for which [Plaintiff] claim[s] [Defendant] failed to pay.” (Song Decl., at Ex. 5, at 41.) Plaintiff responded as follows: “Plaintiff is contending special damages of $200,000. In addition, general and exemplary damages according to proof at trial.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 4, at 12.)

There is no question that Plaintiff's responses to Interrogatories Nos. 8–10 are not only unresponsive, but wholly inadequate. Indeed, individually or taken together, Plaintiff fails to identify the nature and extent of damages, let alone provide the detail requested by Defendant.

Were these Plaintiff's only responses, the Court easily would be convinced that an order compelling Plaintiff's supplemental responses would be warranted. However, on September 8, 2020—following Defendant's unsuccessful meet-and-confer efforts detailed above and seven days after Defendant filed this Motion—Plaintiff served his amended responses to ROGS Set 1, supplementing his original responses in great detail. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 13, Ex. 5.) Indeed, Plaintiff identified thirty-two items of damages and provided the dollar amount of each item as well as how each damages amount was calculated. (Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 5.) With this, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied—albeit quite belatedly—his Rule 33 response obligations as to Interrogatories Nos. 8–10, thereby mooting Defendant's request for an order compelling supplementation. In its Reply, Defendant does not contend otherwise. (See generally Reply.)

Accordingly, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant's request for an order compelling Plaintiff to supplement his responses to Interrogatories Nos. 8–10. Should Defendant identify other issues with Plaintiff's responses to these interrogatories, such will be a matter for another discovery motion, timely filed within the discovery period, after the parties satisfy their meet-and-confer and other pre-filing obligations.

D. The Court DENIES as Moot Defendant's Request for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Respond to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2.

On May 1, 2020, Defendant served Plaintiff with ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2. (Song Decl., at ¶ 8, Exs. 8–9.) As of the September 1, 2020 filing of Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff had not served his responses to this discovery. (Song Decl., at ¶ 8.) On this basis, Defendant asks this Court to compel Plaintiff's responses to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2. (Id.)

Rule 33 provides that “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Further, “[t]he responding party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the interrogatories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). “Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4).

Rule 34 provides, with respect to requests for production of documents, that “[t]he party to whom the request is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). Further,

*12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). Unlike Rule 33, Rule 34 does not contain a provision that untimely objections are waived. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. However, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a failure to object in a timely manner to discovery requests propounded under both Rules 33 and 34 results in the waiver of any objection. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”).

Here, Defendant served Plaintiff with ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2 on May 1, 2020. (Song Decl., at ¶ 8, Exs. 8, 9.) Plaintiff's responses were due thirty days later. Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A). Plaintiff did not request an extension of time in which to respond to ROGS Set 2 or RFP Set 2. (Song Decl., at ¶ 8.) As of the September 1, 2020 filing of this Motion, Plaintiff had not served his responses. (Id.)

Were this the end of the story, there is no question that an order compelling Plaintiff's responses to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2 would be warranted. However, on September 8, 2020—following Defendant's unsuccessful meet-and-confer efforts detailed above and seven days after Defendant filed this Motion—Plaintiff served his responses to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 13, Exs. 6, 7.) Neither set of responses interposes objections. (Badkoubehi Decl., at Exs. 6, 7.) From this record, but without opining on the completeness or adequacy of Plaintiff's written responses, the Court can only conclude that Defendant's request for an order compelling these responses has been mooted. In its Reply, Defendant does not contend otherwise. (See generally Reply.)

Accordingly, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant's request for an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2. Should Defendant identify other issues with Plaintiff's responses to ROGS Set 2 and RFP Set 2, such will be a matter for another motion, timely filed within the discovery period, after the parties satisfy their meet-and-confer and other pre-filing obligations.

E. The Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Defendant's Request for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Produce Documents Responsive to RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2.

Defendant claims that, as of the September 1, 2020 filing of the Motion, Plaintiff had not yet served a single document in response to its RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2. (Mot., at 13; Song Decl., at ¶ 15.) On this basis, Defendant asks the Court to compel Plaintiff to produce documents responsive to each of RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2. (Mot., at 13–15.)

A party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). A request is adequate if it describes items with reasonable particularity; specifies a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection; and identifies the manner in which electronic information can be produced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon ‘reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.’ ” Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 219 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Ill. 2004)); see also Judge Virginia A. Phillips & Judge Karen L. Stevenson, Rutter Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, California & Ninth Circuit Edition § 11:1886 (2020 ed.) (“[T]he apparent test is whether a respondent of average intelligence would know what items to produce.”).

*13 In addition to responding in writing to a Rule 34 discovery request, the responding party must either permit the requested inspection or must produce copies of the documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). “The production must then be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Id. Notably, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) was “amended to reflect the common practice of producing copies of documents or electronically stored information rather than simply permitting inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. However, where the responding party elects to produce copies of documents rather than allow their inspection, the response “must state that copies will be produced.” Id.

Defendant served RFP Set 1 on Plaintiff on April 3, 2020 and RFP Set 2 on May 1, 2020. (Song Decl., at ¶¶ 5, 8, Exs. 6, 9.) RFP Set 1 contains sixteen requests and RFP Set 2 contains four requests. Both ask that Plaintiff either produce the documents at Defendant's counsel's office—by May 6, 2020 for RFP Set 1 and June 1, 2020 for RFP Set 2—or provide true and correct copies of the documents by mail within thirty days from the date of service. (Song Decl., at Exs. 6, 8.)

Plaintiff served his written responses to RFP Set 1, without objections, on May 22, 2020. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 5, Ex. 2.) These responses were not accompanied by responsive documents, either for inspection or as copies. (Song Decl., at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff served his written response to RFP Set 2, also without objections, on September 8, 2020—after the filing of this Motion. (Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 7.) It is unclear exactly when Plaintiff served documents in connection with his responses to RFP Set 2, but it appears to have been on or around September 8, 2020. (See id., at ¶¶ 13–14.)

With the exception of Requests Nos. 3, 11, 16, and 19, Defendant responded to each of the requests as follows:

(Badkoubehi Decl., at Exs. 2, 7.)[11] As to Requests Nos. 3, 11, and 19, Plaintiff responded as follows: “After a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Plaintiff is unable to comply with this particular request because the particular items have never existed.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not respond to Request No. 16. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl., at Ex. 2.) In neither the Introductory Statements of the written responses nor any of the specific responses did Plaintiff indicate that the production would be completed at a date different than that specified in RFP Set 1 or RFP Set 2. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl., at Exs. 2, 7.) Defendant contends that, as of the September 1, 2020 filing of this Motion, Plaintiff had not served any responsive documents. (Mot., at 13, 15; Song Decl., at ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff responds that documents responsive to Defendant's Request for Production “were presented to Defendant” before both the April 15, 2020 mediation and the July 16, 2020 oral deposition of Plaintiff. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶¶ 6–7.) Plaintiff also contends that he “then”—without stating a date, though apparently sometime on or around September 8, 2020—“re[-]served multiple Documents responsive to Defendant's Request for Production of Documents.” (Id., at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff further contends that “he is awaiting receipt of statements and copies of cashed checks [sic] soon as received from the financial institutions.” (Id., at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff attaches copies of eighteen pages of documents to the Badkoubehi Declaration which he describes as his “Production of Documents Responsive,” again failing to identify the date on which he produced these documents. (Id., at ¶ 13, Ex. 9.)

*14 Defendant confirms in its Reply that it has received eighteen pages of documents from Plaintiff. (Reply, at 4–5.) It notes, however, that seventeen of those pages were provided by Plaintiff to Defendant on January 9, 2019—more than nine months before the filing of the lawsuit. (Id.) In addition, at the hearing, Defendant advised the Court, and Plaintiff confirmed, that, as of the date of the hearing, Plaintiff still had not produced the “statements and copies of cashed checks” referenced in the Badkoubehi Declaration.

On this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to comply with his Rule 34 obligations to timely either allow the inspection of responsive documents to which Plaintiff referred in his written responses to RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2, or produce copies thereof. But that is a matter for the sanctions discussion below. Given that Plaintiff ultimately did produce some documents which he seems to claim are responsive to both RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2 (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶¶ 13–14), but that he conceded at the hearing that documents remain outstanding, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff's document production remains incomplete, at least as to the “statements and copies of cashed checks” referenced by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's request to compel the production of statements and cashed checks Plaintiff has identified as responsive but not yet produced. Plaintiff is ORDERED to produce these documents no later than October 14, 2020.

That said, the Court cannot grant Defendant's request that the Court compel the production of some unidentified set of documents Defendant believes are outstanding. (Reply, at 4 (“it is blatantly obvious that there should be more than 18 documents in response to [Defendant's] ... 20 document requests.”)) To obtain an order compelling a further production of documents, Defendant must do more than offer conclusory accusations that Plaintiff's document production is incomplete. The party moving to compel discovery carries the burden of informing the court of (1) which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why the responses are deficient, (4) the reasons the objections are without merit, and (5) the relevance of the requested information to the prosecution of the action. Brown v. Diaz, No. CV 17-0598-RGK (KS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228069, at *9–10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018) (quoting Townsend v. Imerial County, No. 12-cv-2739-WQH PCL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59205, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2014); see also United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The party seeking production of the documents [ ] bears the burden of proving that the opposing party has such control.”).) “The fact that a party may disbelieve or disagree with a response to a discovery request ... is not a recognized ground for compelling discovery, absent some indication beyond mere suspicion that the response is incomplete or incorrect.” Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, No. 1:07-cv-00367-OWW-SKO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119308, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Gary v. Faulkner, 148 F.R.D. 220, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1992)).

Here, other than as relates to the Court's order compelling Plaintiff to produce the “statements and copies of cashed checks” he identified as responsive, Defendant fails to meet its burden to compel a further production of documents responsive to its RFP Set 1 and RFP Set 2. To begin with, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has produced documents, although Defendant does not specify whether it considers the documents responsive to RFP Set 1, RFP Set 2, or both. (Reply, at 4–5.) Moreover, Defendant points to no particular document request as disputed. (See generally Reply.) Nor does Defendant identify any document, believed by Defendant to be within the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has not produced. (Id.) Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's production is incomplete must be supported by much more than the speculative assertion that “it is blatantly obvious that there should be more than 18 documents.” (Id., at 4.) While the Court does not foreclose the possibility that, in addition to the financial documents Plaintiff has advised may be forthcoming (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 15), there may be other yet-unproduced documents, the Court cannot foreclose the possibility that Plaintiff has, in fact, produced, all documents over which he has possession, custody, or control, as required by Rule 34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). Without evidence to the contrary, Defendant's claim that Plaintiff is—or might be—withholding documents, and should be compelled to produce them, fails.

*15 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's request for an order compelling Plaintiff to produce an unidentified set of documents believed by Defendant to be outstanding. Should Defendant obtain evidence that Plaintiff is, or appears to be, withholding documents responsive to RFP Set 1 and/or RFP Set 2, such will be a matter for another motion, timely filed within the discovery period, after the parties satisfy their meet-and-confer and other pre-filing obligations.

F. The Court DENIES Defendant's Request for an Order Compelling the Deposition of Carlos Asseraf.

Defendant seeks an order compelling the attendance of Carlos Asseraf at a subpoenaed deposition. (Mot., at 18–21.) In response, Plaintiff's counsel contends that Mr. Asseraf is available for his oral deposition during the week of September 14, 2020, and that Plaintiff's counsel has notified Defendant's counsel of this. (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 16.) In its Reply of September 15, 2020, Defendant does not address this fact. (See generally Reply.) Thus, it is unclear to the Court whether Defendant's request to compel Mr. Asseraf's deposition has been mooted. Nevertheless, even if not mooted, the Court cannot grant this request for the reasons stated below.

Pursuant to Rule 30, a party may depose any person by oral questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). Where a person to be deposed is not a party to the action, the non-party's attendance at deposition may be compelled by issuing a subpoena under Rule 45. Id. In addition, Rule 34 permits a party to compel such a non-party to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things, or to permit the inspection of premises. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). The command to a non-party to produce documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things “may be included in a subpoena commanding attendance at a deposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C).

To be enforceable under federal law, the subpoena must comply with Rule 45, which sets out the substantive requirements for a subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A). Rule 45(a)(1)(A) requires that every deposition subpoena state the court form which it is issued, state the title of the action and its civil-action number, specify to each person to whom it is directed the time and place set for the deposition, and set out the text of Rule 45(d) and (e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv). A subpoena commanding a deposition also must set forth the method for recording the testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(B).

Serving a subpoena requires “delivering a copy to the named person,” which is interpreted to mean personal service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). See Prescott v. County of Stanislaus, No. 1:10-cv-00592 JLT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134137, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (noting that a majority of courts interpret “delivering” to require personal service). When a subpoena requires a person's attendance, the subpoena must be served with a tender of the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). Service of the subpoena is proven by “filing with the issuing court a statement showing the date and manner of service and the names of the persons served,” which “statement must be certified by the server.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(4).

Here, the subpoena commanding the appearance of Mr. Asseraf complies with the requirements of Rule 45(a)(1)(A). It properly states, as required by Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(i), that it is issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (Song Decl., at Ex. 18, at 137.) It also states, as required by Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(ii), the title of the action as “Dustin Glodney v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company” and the case number as “2:19-cv-10503-GW-MAA.” (Id.) It commands, as required by Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), that Carlos Asseraf “appear ... to testify at a deposition to be taken in this civil action” via video conferencing with instructions to follow, on July 21, 2020 at 1:00 p.m. (Id.) Finally, it sets forth, as required by Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iv), the text of Rule 45(d) and (e) by attaching their text to the subpoena. (Id., at 139.)

*16 However, the Court is unable to grant Defendant's request for two reasons. First, the evidence before the Court does not support a conclusion that the subpoena was properly served and that Mr. Asseraf had actual notice of the deposition. To begin with, Defendant claims to have “served the subpoena” by emailing it to Plaintiff's counsel on July 1, 2020. (Song Decl., at ¶ 20.) But the circumstances of that service are unclear. While the evidence reveals that Plaintiff's counsel agreed to accept service of the subpoena on behalf of Mr. Asseraf (id., at ¶ 16, Ex. 14, at 106), there is no evidence that Plaintiff's counsel actually represented Mr. Asseraf on July 1, 2020, had authority to accept service on his behalf at that time, or had any type of legal relationship with him. (See generally Mot.) In addition, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's counsel ever received Defendant's July 1, 2020 email containing “service” of the subpoena. In this regard, the Court notes that the proof of service that is page two of the subpoena is neither completed nor signed (Song Decl., at Ex. 18, at 137); the proof of service indicating email service to Plaintiff's counsel's office on July 1, 2020 does not list the subpoena as one of the documents served (id., at 147–48); and, unlike another email for which Defendant provides confirmation of electronic receipt by Plaintiff's counsel (Song Decl., at ¶ 22, Ex. 20, at 152), there is no evidence that the email containing the service of the subpoena was received by Plaintiff's counsel.

In fact, the evidence appears contrary to effective service. Although Plaintiff's counsel confirms that he agreed to the July 21, 2020 deposition on behalf of Mr. Asseraf (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 19), he does not confirm that he received service of the subpoena (see generally Badkoubehi Decl.). Moreover, as Defendant admits, Mr. Asseraf called him on the day of the deposition to say that he had not known about the deposition, that he had just learned of it two hours earlier from his son (Plaintiff), and that he was unable to attend the deposition due to another obligation. (Song Decl., at ¶ 24.) As such, there is no evidence that Mr. Asseraf received the subpoena or had actual and timely notice of the deposition. Finally, there is no evidence that the required witness fees and mileage were tendered at the time of service; the relevant proofs of service do not so provide (Song Decl., at Ex. 18, at 138, 147–148), and Defendant offers no other evidence to demonstrate its compliance with this requirement (see generally Mot., Song Decl., Reply).

Second, notwithstanding these deficiencies, Defendant's request for an order compelling Mr. Asseraf's deposition is not a remedy available under the facts here. The recipient of a subpoena has several options: he or she may elect to comply with the subpoena, move to quash the subpoena based on undue cost or burden, object to the subpoena's form, or challenge the subpoena pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 45. Echostar Satellite L.L.C. v. Viewtech, Inc., No. 1:09-mc-00052-SMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22142, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010). If the recipient does not respond to the subpoena, the proponent of the subpoena may attempt to negotiate compliance, “but ultimately, [if] the recipient fails to comply without adequate excuse, the recipient is in contempt of court, and the proponent must file an application for an order to show cause why a contempt citation should not issue.” Id., at *3 (citing Alcalde v. NAC Real Estate Invs. & Assignments, 580 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).

Here, Defendant has not applied for an order to show cause. Instead, Defendant moves for an order compelling Mr. Asseraf's deposition. But a motion to compel is improper here. The only provision that permits such a motion is Rule 45(d)(2)(B), which provides as follows:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). While Defendant's subpoena does command Mr. Asseraf to produce documents (Song Decl., at Ex. 18, at 140–146), there is no evidence that Mr. Asseraf ever objected to the subpoena. And, even if Mr. Asseraf had objected, the only remedy available to Defendant under Rule 45(d)(2)(B) would be an order compelling the production of the documents sought under the subpoena, not Mr. Asseraf's attendance at the deposition.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's request for an order compelling Mr. Asseraf's deposition without prejudice to its seeking an order to show cause regarding contempt pursuant to Rule 45(g).

G. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Request for Attorneys' Fees.

Defendant seeks an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Rule 37 in the amount of $4,375.00 for the fees associated with bringing the Motion.[12] (Mot., at 21.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS this Request.

1. Defendant is Entitled to Attorneys' Fees Under Rule 37.

a. Legal Standard

A motion to compel a party to supplement its answer to an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33 on the ground that the answer is incomplete or evasive—as has been established here—is properly brought under Rule 37(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (a)(4). So too is a motion to compel a party to permit the inspection, or produce copies, of documents responsive to a Rule 34 document request—as also has been established here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). A motion to compel brought pursuant to Rule 37(a) must include “a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).

When, as here, a Rule 37(a) motion is granted or the discovery sought is provided after the filing of the Rule 37(a) motion, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, “the court must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)–(iii).

A motion for sanctions where a party fails to answer interrogatories properly served under Rule 33 or respond to document requests properly served under Rule 34—as has been established here—is properly brought under Rule 37(d). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii). A failure to comply with these discovery obligations “is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2). As with a Rule 37(a) motion, a Rule 37(d) motion must be accompanied by a certification that the moving party has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party resisting discovery to obtain the discovery without court action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(B).

*18 Where a response is served belatedly, following the filing of a motion for Rule 37(d) sanctions, the Court retains its authority under Rule 37(d) to sanction the delinquent party. As explained in Clark v. Value Options, No. CV 03-1344-PHX-EHC (HCE), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106045, at *10 (D. Az. Mar. 23, 2007):

Id., at *9–10 (alteration in original) (quotation mark omitted) (quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2991 (2d ed. 1994 & supp.).

Sanctions under Rule 37(d) may include a range of evidentiary, case dispositive, and contempt sanctions, as listed under Rule 37(b)(2)(A). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3). Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, “the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure ....” Id. (emphasis added). However, such sanctions are not permitted where the failure was “substantially justified” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.

Regardless of the nature of the discovery violation or the rule under which the discovery motion is brought, the imposition of sanctions is committed to the trial court's discretion. Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 42 (9th Cir. 1978). The “opportunity to be heard” required before the imposition of sanctions is satisfied by an opportunity to brief the issue of sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) advisory comm. notes 1993 (revising this section “to make clear that the court can consider such questions on written submissions as well as on oral hearings”); Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “opportunity to be heard” was satisfied by the opportunity to submit briefs and an evidentiary hearing after briefing would not have aided the court in its decisionmaking process.)

b. Discussion

Defendant argues that sanctions, in the form of attorneys' fees, are appropriate here because Plaintiff's “habitual abuse of the discovery process” has caused it to incur costs associated with the bringing of this Motion. (Mot., at 21–22.) Plaintiff responds that he has fully complied with his discovery obligations, that neither he nor his counsel “had any bad faith in regard to Mr. Asseraf,” and that he and his counsel “have acted in good faith.” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 19(2).) On this basis, Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendant's requests for monetary sanctions. (Id.) Despite this plea to the contrary, Plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that an award of attorneys' fees is warranted under the circumstances here.

On this issue, the Court agrees with Defendant. To begin with, Defendant fully has complied with its obligation to attempt to meet-and-confer with Plaintiff in order to resolve the dispute without court action, as required by Rule 37(a) and (d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (d)(1)(B). Defendant more than aptly supplies with its Motion the required certification of such efforts. On July 1, 2020, Defendant sent a meet-and-confer letter to Plaintiff on July 1 regarding his deficient written responses to Defendant's ROGS Set 1, ROGS Set 2, and RFP Set 2, as well as Plaintiff's failure to produce documents responsive to RFP Set 1. (Song Decl., at ¶ 9.) On July 8, 2020, the parties conferred and Plaintiff agreed to produce written responses to the outstanding discovery—without objection—as well as responsive documents by July 15, 2020. (Id., at ¶ 10.) Following the parties' July 8, 2020 conference, Defendant's counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel an email to confirm the parties' agreement, asking that Plaintiff's counsel advise immediately if he believed the summary of the parties' discussion was inaccurate, to which Plaintiff's counsel did not respond. (Id.) When Plaintiff did not serve the agreed-upon discovery responses on July 15, 2020, Defendant's counsel telephoned and emailed Plaintiff's counsel to further meet and confer regarding the discovery, to which he received no response. (Id., at ¶¶ 12, 13.) It was not until July 16, 2020 that Plaintiff served his written responses to ROGS Set 1 and re-served his previously served written responses to RFP Set 1, but still without producing any documents. (Id., at ¶ 14.)

*19 Defendant's efforts to meet-and-confer regarding outstanding discovery was not the only instance in which Plaintiff thwarted the discovery process. On July 22, 2020, Defendant appeared unilaterally at an informal discovery conference regarding these issues because Plaintiff had not only failed to cooperate in submitting his portion of the informal discovery conference request, but also failed to appear at the discovery conference itself. (Id., at ¶ 26.) This is so despite the Court's order that Plaintiff submit his portion of the informal discovery conference request and appear. (Id., at ¶ 26, Ex. 23.) As instructed by the Court, Defendant thereafter attempted to further meet and confer with Plaintiff before filing this Motion, but Plaintiff did not respond. (Id., at ¶ 27, Ex. 24.)

Plaintiff again thwarted the discovery process when he wholly ignored Defendant's invitation to participate in the drafting of this Motion, as required by Local Rule 37-2. (Id., at ¶ 28.) Indeed, it was not until September 12, 2020 that Plaintiff finally made a showing in this discovery dispute when he filed the Badkoubehi Declaration. (See Badkoubehi Decl.)

Thus, it is beyond question that Defendant has complied with its pre-filing meet-and-confer obligations. So too, as detailed above, it is beyond question that Plaintiff has failed to comply with his discovery obligations with respect to ROGS Set 1, ROGS Set 2, RFP Set 1, and RFP Set 2. The Court next evaluates Plaintiff's purported excuses to determine whether sanctions are appropriate here.

Plaintiff's first assertion—that he has complied with all of his discovery obligations (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 17)—is simply disingenuous. At the outset, his discovery obligation was to serve timely responses to Defendant's discovery. As detailed above, this he did not do. In addition, his discovery obligation was to timely serve complete, non-evasive discovery responses. As also detailed above, this he did not do. Further, his discovery obligation was to timely allow the inspection of documents responsive to Defendant's document requests or produce their copies. Again, as detailed above, this he did not do. It is undeniable from the record that Defendant encountered resistance from Plaintiff at every turn of discovery.

In addition, Plaintiff's overarching obligation was to be forthright with his opponent and the Court. As is obvious from the above, Plaintiff resoundingly failed here. Plaintiff misled Defendant about his discovery responses and disregarded the federal and local rules at almost every turn. Although, after ignoring the statutory deadlines, he promised responses and documents by dates certain, he not only failed to meet those dates but then ignored Defendant's efforts to resolve the dispute. Moreover, Plaintiff's after-the-fact wordsmithing regarding his document production appears to not have been lost upon his opponent, and is not lost upon this Court. Plaintiff's “semantics game,” as characterized by Defendant, in describing his purported document production—that documents “were presented” to Defendant—could be viewed as misleading. Still, because Plaintiff's counsel has an ethical obligation “never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law” (see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d)), the Court will not presume that he did so here and instead will ascribe this circumstance to a poor choice of words. Nevertheless, it is notable that, at least from the evidence presented here, Plaintiff offers this explanation for the first time in response to this Motion rather than during the many meet-and-confer efforts initiated by Defendant.

Plaintiff's next assertion—that neither he nor his counsel's office engaged in bad faith and instead acted in good faith (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 19)—is questionable at best and, in any event, does not absolve him here. It can hardly be said with a straight face that failing to comply with statutory discovery deadlines, failing to respond to multiple requests to meet-and-confer, failing to adhere to one's own promised discovery deadlines, failing to cooperate in the Court's mandatory informal discovery dispute resolution process, and failing to cooperate, as required by the Court's local rules, in the preparation of this Motion, constitutes any measure of “good faith.” Moreover, neither the absence of bad faith nor the presence of good faith in connection with discovery misconduct is a basis upon which to disallow discovery sanctions. It is well-established that sanctions are appropriate even where the discovery misconduct is not found to be willful. Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 641–42 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the failure to produce may not have been in bad faith, the presence or absence of bad faith is relevant to the choice of sanctions rather than to the question whether a sanction should [be] imposed. In view of the range of sanctions available, even negligent failures to allow reasonable discovery may be punished.”). Had Plaintiff simply complied with his discovery obligations by responding to Defendant's discovery requests in a timely manner and serving complete answers and responsive documents, Defendant would not have been required to expend attorneys' fees in bringing this Motion.

*20 Plaintiff's final assertion—that his willingness to stipulate to the continuance of the discovery deadline in favor of Defendant has “eliminat[ed] any and all prejudice toward Defendant” (Badkoubehi Decl., at ¶ 18)—is misinformed and, in any event, does not preclude an award of sanctions. To begin with, the imposition of discovery sanctions under Rule 37(a) and (d), as triggered here, is prohibited only where the non-complying party has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c) or acted with substantial justification, or the imposition of such sanctions would be unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5), (d)(2), (d)(3). Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff sought, or has pending a motion for, a protective order. Moreover, notably absent from the Badkoubehi Declaration is even a minimal attempt to explain Plaintiff's conduct. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.) Indeed, there is nothing in the record that supports a finding that Plaintiff's conduct was substantially justified or that the imposition of discovery sanctions would be unjust. To the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff deliberately has undermined the discovery process by being evasive and deceptive and by failing to participate in discovery as required in a timely manner.

In any event, even if prejudice were a factor considered in the imposition of the discovery sanctions sought here, the record easily supports a finding of prejudice. Prejudice exists if the non-moving party's discovery abuses “impair the [moving party's] ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990)). Here, Plaintiff's conduct has deprived Defendant of its ability to establish even the most basic facts with any certainty and in a timely manner, thereby interfering with Plaintiff's ability to litigate its case on the merits until the filing of this Motion. Here, Plaintiff did not provide any practical information about its damages until September 8, 2020, despite Defendant's request for this information as early as April 3, 2020. In addition, Plaintiff's conduct also has caused Defendant to expend valuable resources in chasing Plaintiff's discovery responses for months.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff's conduct has forced Defendant to spend money to file this Motion, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to recover attorneys' fees as an appropriate monetary sanction.

2. The Court Awards Defendant $4,375.00 in Attorneys' Fees.

Having concluded that Defendant is entitled to the attorneys' fees it expended in bringing the Motion, the Court next turns to an evaluation of the reasonableness of the fees requested by Defendant.

a. Legal Standard

“District courts must calculate awards for attorneys' fees using the ‘lodestar’ method.” Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Although the district court's calculating of an award need not be done with precision, some indication of how it arrived at its figures and the amount of the award is necessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986).

An award of attorney's fees may be based on the affidavits of counsel, so long as they are “sufficiently detailed to enable the court to consider all the factors necessary in setting the fees.” Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); accord Sablan v. Dep't of Fin. of N. Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988) (“sufficiently detailed to provide an adequate basis for calculating the award”); Skakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1983) (“ample evidence to support the attorney's fee award”); Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1981 (“sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for the award”), vacated on other grounds, 461 U.S. 951 (1983).

*21 A party seeking attorneys' fees must provide “satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). The forum in which the district court sits generally is recognized as the “relevant community.” Shirrod v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 809 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Monster Energy Co. v. Integrated Supply Network, LLC, No. ED CV 17-548-CBM-RAOx, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216103, at *9 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (rejecting argument that reasonableness of prevailing market rate should be measured against hourly rate of out-of-state counsel, and concluding that the relevant community “is in the Central District of California”). A declaration regarding the prevailing rate in the relevant community is sufficient to establish a reasonable hourly rate. See Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). “When a fee applicant fails to meet its burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested rates, however, the court may exercise its discretion to determine reasonable hourly rates based on its experience and knowledge of prevailing rates in the community.” Bademyan v. Receivable Mgmt. Servs. Corp., No. CV 08-00519 MMM (RZx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21923, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009); See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[J]udges are justified in relying on their own knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper fees.”).

“In addition to establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party in a discovery dispute seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained.” McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, No. 2:17-mc-157-AB (KSx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227704, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2018) (quotation marks omitted). The prevailing party should make a “good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–434 (1983), superseded on other grounds by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act, as recognized, e.g., in Vasquez v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. 3:16-cv-2749-WQH-BLM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57272, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020). The court has discretion in determining the number of hours that reasonably were expended by counsel. See Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). The court reviews time records submitted by the applicant to determine whether the hours were reasonably incurred or if “any of the hours were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive,” or inadequately documented. True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219-HSG (DMR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70620, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015).

b. Discussion

Defendant seeks $4,375.00 in attorneys' fees as follows:

(Song Decl., at ¶ 30; Agness Decl., at ¶ 2.)

Assessing the reasonableness of each attorney's hourly rate here is difficult because of the dearth of information provided. Other than the declarations of its two counsel as to the rate charged per hour, Defendant provides no information regarding the prevailing market rate for similar work by similar attorneys. (See generally Agness Decl., Song Decl.) Nor does Defendant provide information regarding the background and experience of counsel for whom fees are sought and the rates charged by attorneys of similar caliber in the current marketplace. Plaintiff, on the other hand, does not challenge the reasonableness of Defendant's hourly rates. (See generally Badkoubehi Decl.)

*22 Still, the Court exercises its discretion to rely on its own knowledge of reasonable and proper fees in the relevant community, the district in which it sits. Based on its experience regarding the prevailing rates in this district, and based on its review of decisions from courts sitting in this district regarding reasonable rates, the Court finds that the hourly rates sought by Defendant—$200.00 for a Los Angeles-based associate and $255.00 for a Los Angeles-based partner—are well within the range of rates charged by comparable law firms for partners and associates of similar skill, reputation, and experience. See, e.g., Dish Network L.L.C. v. Jadoo TV, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-9768-FMO (KSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221869, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (finding $280 for associate and $375 for partner to be reasonable rates in the Los Angeles legal market); Nguyen v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 8:17-cv-00423-JVS-KESx, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226622, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (approving a blended associate/partner hourly rate of $260).

At the hearing, Plaintiff agreed with the Court that the hourly rates requested by Defendant are reasonable. Plaintiff's only objection related to the award of attorneys' fees, stated at the hearing for the first time,[13] is regarding the reasonableness of Defendant's claimed hours. Plaintiff argued that, “given the circumstances” and “the documentation” provided by Defendant, 20.5 hours of attorney time is excessive. Plaintiff's attempt to clarify, upon the Court's inquiry, “the circumstances” that purportedly warrant a deduction in the hours claimed by Defendant, is unclear. As best as the Court understands, Plaintiff seems to be arguing that, because Plaintiff ultimately produced documents and responses and acted in “good faith,” and because “the vast majority” of the documents Defendant submitted with its Motion were attachments, including the eighteen pages of documents that Plaintiff produced, 20.5 hours is excessive.

As detailed above, the fact that Plaintiff may have complied with some of his discovery obligations, and purportedly did so in “good faith,” informs (if at all) only the question of whether attorneys' fees should be awarded in the first instance, not their amount. Plaintiff's second argument, which focuses on the number of hours expended by Defendant in preparing its filings, indeed is a closer call. However, as discussed below, this argument fails.

Assessing the reasonableness of Defendant's hours expended on this Motion is difficult from the record presented here. To begin with, the hours requested by Defendant are inadequately documented in that they are not supported by timesheets. (Song Decl., at ¶ 30; Agness Decl., at ¶ 2.) At best, Defendant proffers evidence through its counsel's declarations of 20.5 hours (id.), but these hours are impermissibly block-billed, making it difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular activities. See, e.g., Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (“reducing requested hours because counsel's practice of block billing ‘lump[ed] together multiple tasks, making it impossible to evaluate their reasonableness’ ” (discussing and quoting Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (holding that applicant should “maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims”); Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district court may reduce hours to offset “poorly documented” billing).

*23 But Plaintiff does not make this argument. Instead, while he appears to concede that the hours claimed by Defendant are, indeed, related to the making of the Motion, as required by Rule 37, his argument is only that 20.5 hours is excessive for this work, claiming that “the vast majority” of the Motion was comprised of exhibits. This argument is without merit as it ignores the time used to write the arguments, select and mark the appropriate exhibits, review and make sense of the Badkoubehi Declaration, and write a reply thereto. Not only is Plaintiff's argument conclusory, but it is wholly devoid of any factual support for his proposition that it should have taken less hours to prepare the Motion and its accompanying declarations and exhibits, and the Reply and its accompanying declaration and exhibit. This shortcoming becomes even more evident as Plaintiff failed to propose a number of hours that he believed to be reasonable.

Indeed, the Court concludes that Defendant's claimed hours are reasonable. Although the Court could discount these hours because of their block-billed nature, the Court notes, in exercising its discretion and based on its own experience, that a total of 20.5 attorney hours is reasonable as the number of hours spent preparing a Rule 37 motion. See, e.g., Dish Network, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221869, at *17 (finding reasonable and awarding 16.1 hours for the preparation of a motion to compel); Natural-Immunogenics Corp. v. Newport Trial Grp., No. 15 CV-02034-JVS (JCGx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225879, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (finding reasonable 56.75 hours of attorney time—nine hours by two supervising partners and the balance by three associates—for preparing a motion to compel).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's request for its reasonable expenses in the making of this Motion, in the form of attorneys' fees, in the amount of $4,375.00.

H. The Court DENIES Defendant's Request for the Costs It Incurred in Connection with Mr. Asseraf's Deposition.

Defendant seeks an award of $599.90 for the costs it incurred in taking the certificate of non-appearance of Mr. Asseraf at his July 21, 2020 deposition. (Mot., at 22). The Court cannot grant this request.

Defendant appears to argue that it is entitled to these costs pursuant to Rule 37. (Id., at 21–22.) The only provisions of Rule 37 through which a party could obtain an award of its reasonable expenses for the failure of a non-party deponent to appear at deposition are Rule 37(a) and (d). Neither apply here.

Rule 37(a) allows a court to award the reasonable expenses incurred by a party that successfully brings a motion to compel answers by a deponent who “fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i), (a)(5). Although Mr. Asseraf indeed was subpoenaed under Rule 45 to answer questions asked under Rule 30, which governs the conduct of depositions by oral examination, he did not fail to answer a question, as contemplated by Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i). Rather, he failed to appear altogether. Defendant offers no authority, and the Court is aware of none, establishing that Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i) is triggered under this circumstance. Moreover, Defendant did not prevail in its motion to compel Mr. Asseraf to attend his deposition because, as discussed above, such a motion is not available to enforce a Rule 45 subpoena that does not seek documents. In any event, Rule 37(a) permits the award of reasonable expenses only on notice to the affected person (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1)), and upon an opportunity to be heard (Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)), and here, there is no evidence that Mr. Asseraf received either notice of Defendant's Motion or an opportunity to be heard.

Nor does Rule 37(d) help Defendant here. Rule 37(d) permits the imposition of sanctions, including a party's reasonable expenses, for the failure of a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent—or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or Rule 31(a)(4)—to appear at that person's deposition after being served with proper notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i). However, Mr. Asseraf is not a party to the lawsuit and both Rules 30(b)(6) and 31(a)(4) govern the deposition of an organization—not of an individual, as is Mr. Asseraf. Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), 31(a)(4). Indeed, there is no provision of Rule 37 that would allow the Court to award Defendant the costs it incurred in taking the statement of non-appearance at Mr. Asseraf's deposition. See Sali v. Corona Reg'l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that “none of the ... sanctions available under Rule 37 are available against [a] nonparty.”)

*24 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's request for an award of the $599.90 it incurred in connection with Mr. Asseraf's deposition.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows: