Phillips v. Cnty. of Riverside
Phillips v. Cnty. of Riverside
2021 WL 1566970 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
March 3, 2021

Kewalramani, Shashi H.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Protective Order
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Summary
The Court granted in part and denied in part a Motion for Protective Order regarding discovery requests by the Defendant in a class action lawsuit for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court ordered the Plaintiffs to respond to the requests, but limited the number of opt-ins that could be deposed and imposed restrictions on the length of the depositions.
Karrene Phillips, et al.
v.
County of Riverside, et al
Case No. 5:19-cv-01231-JGB-SHK
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed March 03, 2021

Counsel

D. Castellanos, Deputy Clerk, Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): None Present
Not Reported, Court Reporter, Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s): None Present
Kewalramani, Shashi H., United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [ECF NO. 105]

*1 On December 11, 2020, following an informal telephonic hearing with this Court, Plaintiffs Karrene Phillips and Clarence Woods (together with all others similarly situated, “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant Motion For Protective Order (“Motion” or “Mot.”) to limit discovery by Defendant County of Riverside (“Defendant”). Electronic Case Filing Number (“ECF No.”) 105, Mot. On December 18, 2020, Defendant filed its Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp'n”). ECF No. 106, Opp'n. Shortly thereafter, on December 30, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Reply (“Reply”). ECF No. 107, Reply. The matter stands ready for decision.
 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to respond to Defendant's discovery in accordance with the Court's instructions set forth in Section III.
 
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs commenced this action on July 2, 2019 against Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“FLSA”). ECF No. 1, Compl. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiffs for their overtime work, and seek the following relief: (1) a judgement against Defendant “for an amount equal to the overtime Defendant[ ] failed to pay at the applicable overtime rate”; (2) “[l]iquidated damages in an additional amount equal to the overtime Defendants failed to pay at the applicable overtime rate”; (3) attorney fees and costs; (4) “[a] finding that Defendant['s] violations of the law were willful and providing for a recovery period of three (3) years prior to the filing of [the] Complaint”; (5) an award of prejudgment interest; (6) leave to add additional plaintiffs; and (7) any further relief the Court deems just and equitable. Id. at 6-7.
 
Both parties have commenced discovery. See ECF No. 105, Mot. at 6 (noting that Defendant has propounded interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents); ECF No. 106, Opp'n, at 13 (noting that Plaintiffs have propounded discovery). As of the date of the Motion, Plaintiffs are a conditionally certified FLSA class of, in addition to the named representatives Phillips and Wood, “approximately 190 opt-ins who were employees of the Children's Services Division of the Defendant County of Riverside's Department of Social Services [.]”[1] Id. at 6.
 
At issue are the discovery requests propounded on the Plaintiffs—specifically, the Defendant's revised discovery requests containing 5 Interrogatories (“Amended Interrogatories”), 10 Requests for Admissions (“Amended RFAs”), and 12 Requests for Production of Documents (“Amended RFPs”) identified as Exhibits 5-7 of the Motion (collectively, the “Amended Discovery Requests”). Id. Plaintiffs note that Defendant indicated that they intend to take the depositions of the representative Plaintiffs and 40 opt-ins, though no deposition notices have been served. Id. After an informal discovery hearing on November 23, 2020 regarding the discovery dispute, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefing. ECF No. 104, Min.
 
*2 In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that, as it stands now, the Amended Discovery Requests are burdensome on Plaintiffs' counsel based on the fact that the Amended Discovery Requests were propounded to each of the Plaintiffs and that the Amended Discovery Requests themselves are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and disproportional to the needs of the case. ECF No. 105, Mot. at 9-13. Plaintiffs also argue that deposing each of the 190 opt-ins, and the representative Plaintiffs, would be unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the case. Id. at 14. Instead, the Plaintiffs propose (1) “a randomly-selected sample of 10% of the opt-ins to respond to [the Amended Discovery Requests] and be deposed[,]” and (2) limit certain requests of the Amended Discovery Requests. Id. at 10-11.
 
In response, Defendant argues that individualized discovery on the opt-in class is appropriate in FLSA collective actions, and necessary in order for Defendant to move for decertification of the class. ECF No. 106, Opp'n at 6-7, 10-12. Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs overestimate the burdensomeness of the Amended Discovery Requests. Id. at 12-13. As a compromise, Defendant proposes that (1) each of the 190 opt-in Plaintiffs respond to the Amended Discovery Requests; and (2) grant Defendant leave to take the depositions of 37 opt-ins and the two representative Plaintiffs (for a total of 39 depositions). Id. at 15. Defendant proposes that the depositions of the 37 opt-ins be limited to 4 hours on the record, while the depositions of the two representative Plaintiffs be subjected to the 7-hour limit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule” or “FRCP”). Id.
 
In their Reply, Plaintiffs once again argue that Defendant's compromise is still unduly burdensome and disproportionate, and Plaintiffs completely oppose the imposition of class-wide written discovery requests. ECF No. 107, Reply at 4-5. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's compromise of 39 depositions is still too burdensome. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs once again reiterate that Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests and depositions be limited to only a percentage—specifically 10%—of the opt-in class members. Id. at 6.
 
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Requirements And Scope Of Discovery
Rule 26(b)(1) governs the scope of permissible discovery and provides:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
 
Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Nguyen, No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Consequently, the ability to seek discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
 
*3 “The district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., No. CV 10-3165 GHK (SS), 2015 WL 12731923, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). When considering a motion to compel, the Court has similarly broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
 
III. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the parties do not dispute whether the Amended Discovery Requests are relevant; rather, the central question of the discovery issue is whether Defendant should be permitted to seek individualized discovery from all the opt-in Plaintiffs, and whether Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests themselves should be limited.
 
The right to take individualized discovery on opt-ins in FLSA cases remains unsettled. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008). In the Ninth Circuit, courts have varied widely on permitting individualized or representative discovery in FLSA collective actions. Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc., No. 18-CV-01190-JLS-JLB, 2020 WL 3791638, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (citing to Slack v. Parball NewCo, LLC, No. 2:16–cv– 02324–KJD–CWH, 2018 WL 1472574, at *2–3 (D. Nev. Mar. 26, 2018) (collecting cases on different approaches) and Cranney v. Carriage Servs., Inc., No. 2:07–cv–01587–RLH–PAL, 2008 WL 2457921, at *2–3 (D. Nev. June 16, 2008) (same)); see also Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo Inc, No. C-13-00581-WHO (DMR), 2014 WL 7385990, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014) (same).
 
“While the decisions on individualized discovery are highly fact-specific, common considerations are the number of opt-in plaintiffs and the type of discovery being requested, with individualized discovery being permitted more frequently in cases with relatively few plaintiffs and targeted written discovery.” Slack, 2018 WL 1472574, at *3. Other considerations include purpose of collective actions, the burden of individualized discovery, the need for individualized discovery in order to decertify a conditionally-certified class, and “whether representative discovery would yield statistically significant information[.]” Ludlow, 2020 WL 3791638, at *4-5.
 
Here, Defendants seek to propound a limited set of written discovery requests—specifically, the 27 written discovery requests in the Amended Discovery Requests—on all 190 Plaintiffs because Defendant intends to move for decertification of the currently conditionally-certified class. ECF No. 106, Opp'n at 5, 15. The Court finds that a class size of 190 Plaintiffs is not so large as to prohibit the possibility of any individualized discovery. See, e.g., Coldiron v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. CV03-05865-TJH(MCx), 2004 WL 2601180, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2004) (permitting individualized discovery on all 306 opt-in plaintiffs); Abubakar v. City of Solano, No. CIVS062268LKKEFB, 2008 WL 508911, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2008) (permitting individualized discovery on 160 opt-in plaintiffs); Ludlow, 2020 WL 3791638, at *13 (permitting individualized written discovery on 115 opt-in plaintiffs). Additionally, fairness dictates that Defendant should be permitted to conduct enough discovery in order to move for decertification and defend against Plaintiffs' claim. In particular, Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests are tailored specifically to Plaintiffs' alleged incidents of unpaid overtime, which goes to the heart of the case, and the Court finds that a random sampling would not adequately allow Defendant to assess whether the individual Plaintiffs are similarly situated or to defend against Plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, one of the purposes of the discovery is to determine the particular job description of the various opt-in Plaintiffs, who appear to have had different responsibilities and different workplace requirements. ECF No. 106, Opp'n at 11. See Slack, 2018 WL 1472574, at *2-3 (permitting individualized discovery on all named and opt-in plaintiffs in order to determine whether the plaintiffs' job duties differed). Also, Plaintiffs' outright rejection of the compromise offered by Defendant provides little guidance to the Magistrate Judge as to why Defendant's compromise is unreasonable or inappropriate under Rule 26. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for a protective order to limit Defendant's discovery to only 10% of the opt-in class.
 
*4 With respect to the depositions, Defendant has offered to limit their depositions to 39 Plaintiffs—two of the representative plaintiffs and 37 of the opt-in plaintiffs. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs argue that 39 depositions is still burdensome, citing to the “constraints and demands of [the deposed plaintiffs'] jobs with the [Defendant,]” “the time required for [the deposed plaintiffs] to be adequately prepared for deposition by counsel,” and the “huge expense of time and money for the parties and their counsel.” ECF No. 107, Reply at 6. Plaintiffs, however, do not provide any persuasive authority or facts in this case that lead this Court to limit Defendant to 19 depositions.[2]
 
The Court finds that 39 depositions from a class of 190 plaintiffs—which is approximately 20% of the class—appear to be relatively reasonable and consistent with the cases that the Court has reviewed. See Ludlow, 2020 WL 3791638, at *13 (permitting 15 depositions from a 115-member opt-in class); see also Kress v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, No. CIV S–08–0965 LKK GGH, 2012 WL 4465556, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (permitting 25 depositions from a 75-member opt-in class); Hill v. R+L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, No. C 09–1997 CW (MEJ), 2010 WL 3769247, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010) (permitting 15 depositions from a 52-member opt-in class). Additionally, as the Plaintiffs appear to all reside in the same state, see ECF No. 106, Opp'n at 9, and Plaintiffs request the depositions be conducted remotely, the Court finds that the burden on Plaintiffs' counsel appears proportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for a protective order to limit Defendant's depositions to only ten percent of the opt-in class. Defendant is permitted to take the depositions of the two representative Plaintiffs and 37 opt-in Plaintiffs, for a total of 39 depositions. However, the Court will limit the depositions of the 37 non-representative opt-in Plaintiffs to only 3.5 hours, exactly half of the 7-hour limit under FRCP. The depositions of the representative Plaintiffs will be subject to the 7-hour limit under FRCP.
 
Finally, the Court turns to whether the Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests should be limited. Plaintiffs appear to seek to limit specific written discovery requests on the basis that those discovery requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, disproportionate, and for some of the requests, duplicative. ECF No. 105, Mot. at 11-14. The Court notes that the parties have not provided Plaintiffs' specific objections to the Amended Discovery Requests, and therefore the Court cannot individually assess each of the 27 discovery requests. Nevertheless, the Court finds that five interrogatory requests and ten requests for admissions are not unduly burdensome or disproportionate, particularly because it appears that the Amended Interrogatories and Amended RFAs are targeted to the instances of alleged unpaid overtime. See ECF Nos. 105-7, Amended Interrogatories; 105-8, Amended RFAs.
 
However, the Court finds that 12 requests for production of documents for all 190 opt-in Plaintiffs appear to be disproportionate and likely will impose a significant burden if each Plaintiff intends to produce documents responsive to each request. Moreover, such information from each Plaintiff appears to be duplicative and unnecessary—and Defendant does not appear to argue otherwise—for Defendant to assess whether each Plaintiff is similarly situated for decertifying the class, particularly in light of the targeted Amended Interrogatories and RFAs. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part Plaintiff's Motion for a protective order to limit Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests such that only the deposed Plaintiffs must respond to all 12 requests in the Amended RFPs, and the remaining non-deposed Plaintiffs must respond to only 6 requests in the Amended RFPs that are chosen by Defendant. All Plaintiffs must respond to Defendant's Amended Interrogatories and Amended RFAs.
 
*5 Therefore, based on the information provided and the discretion that the Court has in discovery matters, Defendant's Amended Discovery Requests are limited to the following:
1. All Plaintiffs must respond to the entirety of the Amended Interrogatories;
2. All Plaintiffs must respond to the entirety of the Amended RFAs;
3. All deposed Plaintiffs must respond to the entirety of the Amended RFPs; and
4. The remaining non-deposed Plaintiffs must respond to only six requests of the Amended RFPs, chosen by Defendant.
 
Plaintiffs retain the ability to lodge any objections to the Amended Discovery Requests as allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, Defendant is permitted to take the depositions of the two representative Plaintiffs and 37 other opt-in Plaintiffs, chosen by Defendant. The depositions of the two representative Plaintiffs shall be subject to the 7-hour limit under FRCP, while the depositions of the other 37 opt-in Plaintiffs shall be limited to no more than 3.5 hours on the record.
 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion [ECF No. 105] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 

Footnotes
The Court notes that there is a discrepancy in the number of opt-ins—Plaintiffs state that there are approximately 190 opt-ins, while Defendant states that there are 191 opt-ins. For consistency, the Court will refer to the total number of opt-ins as 190, but notes that the number is subject to change.
Plaintiffs propose depositions of ten percent of the opt-in class members, which is 19 depositions based on 190 opt-in class members.