Lovely-Coley v. Dist. of Columbia
Lovely-Coley v. Dist. of Columbia
2014 WL 12942265 (D. Colo. 2014)
February 3, 2014

Kay, Alan,  United States Magistrate Judge

Protective Order
Sanctions
Cost Recovery
Failure to Produce
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Summary
The Court ordered the Defendant to provide the Plaintiff with ESI, including FMLA applications, complaints of FMLA discrimination, and other documents related to the Plaintiff's requests for leave under the FMLA. The Court also imposed sanctions against the Defendant for its failure to provide the requested documents, ordering it to reimburse the Plaintiff's fees and costs associated with the filing of the Motion and Reply in the amount of $5,000.00.
CYNTHIA LOVELY-COLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant
Civil Action No. 12-1464 (RWR/AK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia
Filed February 03, 2014
Kay, Alan, United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

*1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses and Sanctions (“Motion”) [18] and Memorandum in Support of Motion (“Memorandum”) [18-1]; Defendant District of Columbia's Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) [19]; and Plaintiff's Reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) [20]. Plaintiff Cynthia Lovely-Coley (“Plaintiff”) moves this Court to compel Defendant District of Columbia (“Defendant” or the “District”) to produce supplemental responses to discovery requests and for sanctions against the Defendant. The Court held a hearing on this Motion on January 23, 2014.
 
I. Background
On September 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint [1] alleging interference with her leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2612, et seq., and retaliation. (Complaint [1].) Plaintiff served Defendant with her First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents on June 10, 2013 and Defendant responded on July 17, 2013. (Motion, Exh. 1 [Defendant's objections and responses to discovery requests, including a request that Plaintiff clarify some of the discovery requests].) Pursuant to the trial court's April 3, 2013 Scheduling Order, discovery was set to close on August 5, 2013. (April 3, 2013 Scheduling Order [13].) During an August 7, 2013 status conference, the trial court extended the discovery deadline to September 4, 2013. (Memorandum at 2.)[1]
 
On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff clarified some of her discovery requests and notified Defendant regarding its alleged insufficient responses. (Motion, Exh. 2 [August 20, 2013 e-mail attaching a letter from Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's counsel].) Defendant indicated that it was treating Plaintiff's clarified requests as untimely new discovery requests and thus would not be providing responses. (Motion, Exh. 3 [August 21, 2013 e-mail from Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel].) Defendant later asserted that Plaintiff's discovery requests were not relevant and that was yet another reason for Defendant's refusal to respond. (Motion, Exh. 4 [August 26, 2013 e-mail from Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel].)
 
Pursuant to an October 7, 2013 Minute Order, Plaintiff was permitted until October 18, 2013 to file her motion to compel. The instant Motion was filed on October 18, 2013.
 
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b), 33(b) and 34(b) require that parties produce documents and other materials in response to the other party's discovery requests. Covad Communications Company v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 17 (D.D.C. 2009). Answers to interrogatories must be “true, explicit, responsive, complete, and candid.” Id. at 19 (citing Equal Rights Center v. Post Props., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2007)). “[A]n evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Doe v. District of Columbia, 231 F.R.D. 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2005); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) or who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production or request for admission must supplement or correct its disclosure or response ... if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, ...; or as ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)&(B). See Norden v. Samper, 544 F. Supp. 2d 43, 49 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting a party's duty to supplement discovery).
 
*2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 authorizes discovery “regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Denture Cream Products Liability Litigation, 292 F.R.D. 120, 123 (D.D.C. 2013). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “A showing of relevance can be viewed as a showing of need; for the purpose of prosecuting or defending a specific pending civil action, one is presumed to have no need of a matter not ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.’ ” Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
 
Discovery of relevant materials includes “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2003)(whether information is relevant is “a function of the relationship of the data to the [ ] central accusations of [the] lawsuit.”) “No one would suggest that discovery should be allowed of information that has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Food Lion, Inc. v. United Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2008, pp. 105-06 (1994)). Once a relevancy objection has been raised, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the information sought to be compelled is discoverable. See Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 194 F.R.D. 316, 325 (D.D.C. 2000) (citation omitted).
 
Pursuant to Rule 37, “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B) (discussing a motion to compel discovery responses.) A trial court has considerable discretion over discovery matters. United States v. Krizek, 192 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “[A] district court's decision to permit or deny discovery is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.” Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l. Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). If a motion to compel is granted or the discovery requested is provided after the motion is filed, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5).[2]
 
III. Discovery Requests
A. Discussion of Interrogatories Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17
Interrogatory No. 7 requested information about the total number employees who applied for family or medical leave over the last five years. (Motion, Exh. 1.) Interrogatory No. 8 asked for the total number of employees who were granted family or medical leave over the last five years. (Id.) Interrogatory No. 9 requested additional information about the employees named in response to Interrogatory No. 8, including their name, educational background, start date of employment and amount of leave time granted. (Id.) Interrogatory No. 10 asked for the number of male employees granted family or medical leave in the past five years. (Id.) Interrogatory No. 12 requested the number of female employees who were granted family or medical leave in the past five years. (Id.) Interrogatory No. 17 followed up on Interrogatory No. 16 (asking if the Defendant has ever received a complaint of FMLA discrimination or retaliation) and requested further information about such complaints/complainants. (Id.)[3]
 
*3 Defendant objected to the aforementioned interrogatories “on the bases of form, foundation and relevance,” and further noted that the interrogatories were “overly broad and unduly burdensome.” (Motion, Exh. 1.) Defendant indicated that “Plaintiff does not specify whether the information requested is limited to the entire MPD, a unit or several units within that agency, or the entire District Government.” (Id.) Defendant further stated that “[it] will provide a response to this interrogatory if and when plaintiff modifies her request.” (Id.)
 
Plaintiff subsequently modified her discovery requests to specify that the information requested pertains to the Homicide Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) and the period of time runs from May 2008 through May 2013.[4] (Motion, Exh. 2.) At the January 23, 2014 hearing on this Motion, Plaintiff's counsel clarified that Plaintiff requests information about her division of the Homicide Unit of the MPD, which is comprised of about a dozen employees. Plaintiff's counsel further asserted that Plaintiff has requested information for a five year period of time so that she can “get a complete picture of the FMLA” and examine the process/procedure for submission of FMLA claims, the gender of claimants, and whether such claims are approved or denied with or without delay, for the purpose of determining whether there are any patterns. (January 23, 2014 Motion Hearing.)[5]
 
Defendant treated Plaintiff's modified discovery requests as “new discovery requests served after the close of discovery” and indicated that it “[could not] respond.” (Motion, Exh. 3.) Defendant later notified Plaintiff that “in addition to being untimely, [Plaintiff's] recent discovery requests in which [she] seek[s] information concerning the FMLA requests of MPD officers other than [herself] are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Motion, Exh. 4.)
 
1. Ruling on Interrogatories Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17
As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that Defendant's refusal to provide responses to Plaintiff's modified interrogatories (after indicating that it would do so) is unwarranted. Defendant's reliance on a claim of “lack of relevance” is also without merit. Plaintiff has modified her interrogatories to request information about employees in her division of the Homicide Unit, which negates Defendant's claims that the interrogatories are overly broad and unduly burdensome. Plaintiff has further demonstrated that the information sought may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence about the way in which FMLA requests were handled by MPD. This Court finds that the period of time at issue, May 2008 through May 2013, is however overly broad and should be narrowed to May 2008 through May 2012.[6]
 
*4 With regard to Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8, Defendant should provide Plaintiff with information about the total number of employees within her division who applied for leave (Interrogatory No. 7) and were granted leave (Interrogatory No. 8) under the FMLA.
 
With regard to Interrogatory No. 9, Defendant shall respond by providing the names of persons who received leave pursuant to the FMLA, their initial date of employment with MPD, and the amount of leave time granted. Information about their educational background need not be provided. With regard to Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 12, Defendant shall identify the gender of the persons identified in Interrogatory No. 8.
 
With regard to Interrogatory No. 17, which shall also be confined in scope to the employees within Plaintiff's division and in time to the period of May 2008-May 2012, Defendant shall provide the name, title, and gender of persons who made such complaints (referenced in Interrogatory No. 16), the date of such complaints, a brief description of the investigation of the complaint and any discipline imposed as a result of such investigation.
 
B. Document Requests Nos. 2, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28
1. Document Request No. 2
Plaintiff requested the production of “the entire personnel file, including both official files and any unofficial or informal files maintained, of any of Plaintiff's managers or supervisors from May 2010 until June 2011.” (Motion, Exh. 1.) Defendant objected on grounds of “form, foundation and relevance,” and noted that the request was “overly broad and vague” because “unofficial” or “informal” files were not defined and it asked for information about managers who were not Plaintiff's immediate supervisors. (Id.) Defendant stated that it “will produce documents from the personnel files of plaintiff's immediate supervisors if and when plaintiff modifies her request to specify which particular types of relevant documents from the personnel files she seeks and upon entry of a mutually agreeable protective order.” (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently specified that she sought “copies of the entire personnel file, including both official file and any unofficial or informal files maintained, of any of Plaintiff's immediate managers or immediate supervisors, from May 2010 until June 2011 [ ] includ[ing] all complaints, disciplinary actions, reprimands, warnings or counseling filed against each individual named.” (Motion, Exh. 2.)
 
At the January 23, 2014 hearing, Defendant's counsel explained that MPD maintains separate personnel files and disciplinary files on its employees. Plaintiff's counsel clarified that this document request relates to both Plaintiff's immediate supervisor and his/her supervisor because Plaintiff dealt with both individuals in the processing of her request for FMLA leave. Plaintiff requested the entire personnel file for both of these individuals, which this Court finds to be overly broad in the context of this civil action. During the January 23, 2014 hearing, Plaintiff, through counsel, noted that she seeks any documentation in the possession of these supervisors that is relevant to her request for leave (such as notes of conversations which might be kept in a supervisor's “informal” files) as well as information relating to disciplinary actions against these two individuals, for the period of May 2010 through June 2011.
 
*5 Defendant should provide Plaintiff with a copy of any information in the personnel and personal files of these two supervisors that relates to her requests for leave under the FMLA and any “complaints, disciplinary actions, reprimands, warnings or counseling” relating to their review, processing, approval or denial of FMLA requests for the period May 2010 through June 2011. Prior to the exchange of this information, Defendant shall present Plaintiff with a proposed Protective Order providing that this information shall be kept confidential and used only for purposes of this litigation.
 
2. Document Requests Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28
Plaintiff requested documents supporting Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 7 (Document Request No. 18); Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 8 (Document Request No. 19); Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 9 (Document Request No. 20); Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 10 (Document Request No. 21); Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 12 (Document Request No. 23); and Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 17 (Document Request No. 28). (Motion, Exh. 1.) Defendant responded to these document requests by incorporating by reference its responses to the applicable interrogatories. (Id.) This Court has previously noted that Plaintiff modified these interrogatories as directed by the Defendant but Defendant provided no additional information in response to the modified interrogatories, instead claiming that they were new untimely discovery requests that were not relevant to Plaintiff's lawsuit.
 
With regard to Document Requests Nos. 18, 19, 21 and 23, Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with copies of FMLA applications for the period from May 2008-May 2012 (as modified by this Court) for persons in her division of the Homicide Unit as well as documents indicating whether such applications were denied or granted. The Court notes that there are no documents associated with Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 9 (Document Request No. 20) other than the list of information responsive to Interrogatory No. 9. With regard to Document Request No. 28, Plaintiff seeks copies of any complaints of FMLA “discrimination” (including interference with FMLA and retaliation) during that same time frame and relating to that same set of employees. Defendant shall provide copies of documents responsive to Document Request No. 28. The provision of FMLA applications and FMLA complaints by Defendant shall be subject to the Protective Order.
 
C. Request for Sanctions
Plaintiff asserts that Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 “provides district courts broad discretion to sanction a party that fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” (Memorandum at 4); see Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Under Rule 37, the district court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for discovery violations.”) See also DL v. District of Columbia, 274 F.R.D. 320, 325 (D.D.C. 2011) (providing for sanctions when a party fails to supplement discovery responses). In this case, Defendant stated that it would provide responses to Plaintiff's modified discovery requests but did not follow through on that representation.
 
The Defendant's assertion that these modified requests are untimely new requests that are not relevant is without merit.[7] Accordingly, because Plaintiff was forced to file a motion to compel in order to receive discovery to which she is entitled, the Court finds that sanctions against Defendant are warranted. Attached to Plaintiff's Reply as Exhibits 1 and 2 are invoices for legal fees and costs relating to Plaintiff's preparation and filing of the Motion and the Reply, in the amount of $7,855.47. See also Reply, Exhibit 3 [Declaration of Ardra O'Neal indicating that these invoices were submitted to Plaintiff.] Because Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part, this Court awards fees and costs in the reduced amount of $5,000.00.[8] It is hereby
 
*6 ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Sanctions [18] is granted in part and denied in part. Within seven (7) days from the date of this Memorandum Order, Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with a proposed Protective Order and within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum Order, Defendant shall provide responses to Interrogatories Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 17 and Document Requests Nos. 2, 18, 19, 21, 23 and 28, with the aforementioned modifications noted by this Court. Defendant shall also provide reimbursement of Plaintiff's fees and costs associated with the filing of the Motion and Reply in the modified amount of $5,000.00, within sixty (60) days from the date of this Memorandum Order.
 

Footnotes
Defendant asserts that discovery was extended only for the purpose of taking Plaintiff's deposition. (Motion, Exh. 3 [August 21, 2013 e-mail from Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's counsel].)
Reasonable expenses should be apportioned if the motion is granted in part and denied in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C).
Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 16 affirms that Defendant did receive “complaints.” (Motion, Exh. 1.)
Plaintiff applied for family and medical leave in May of 2010 and again in July of 2010, and her leave was approved approximately two months later. (Complaint [1] ¶¶9, 14, 17.)
At the hearing, Defendant's counsel stated that there is a Special Order 91.5B that sets forth a policy/protocol for obtaining leave under the FMLA but the nature of the employee's application may vary. Defendant's counsel repeatedly noted that everything must be done through “the chain of command.” (January 23, 2014 hearing.) Plaintiff's counsel indicated that “the chain of command” has not been defined by MPD.
The Court is permitting an inquiry into a four year period of time because of the relatively small number of employees at issue in the interrogatories.
Defendant generally objected on grounds of relevance in its initial responses to the discovery requests but indicated that it would provide responses if Plaintiff's requests were clarified. (Motion, Exh. A.)
This Court notes that Plaintiff's initial discovery requests did require clarification in terms of the scope and time frame.