By Order dated October 16, 2019 (Dkt. No. 287), the Court directed the TAM Parties to serve their objections or responses to the RFAs, reasoning that “those answers and objections would better define the issues requiring decision” and might “narrow the scope of the dispute,” and directed PIMCO to file its response to the letter-motion thereafter. Id. at 2. On October 25, 2020, PIMCO filed a letter (PIMCO Ltr.) attaching those responses and objections, as well as various exhibits,[1] and asked the Court to “compel the TAM Parties to supplement their response to the RFAs.” PIMCO Ltr. at 1. Although PIMCO did not file its letter as a letter-motion, the Court construes it as such in light of the relief sought. PIMCO argued that the TAM Parties’ many objections to the RFAs were meritless and that “even when the TAM Parties do respond, their response is technical or evasive.” Id. at 1. In PIMCO's view, its RFAs were “neither vague nor ambiguous” and were properly designed to narrow the facts in dispute, including by seeking “confirmation of the facts already stated in emails.” Id. at 2-3.[2] Finally, on October 29, 2019, the TAM Parties filed a reply letter (TAM Reply Ltr.) (Dkt. No. 294), arguing that PIMCO was improperly “using RFAs as a discovery device,” and once again seeking an order “striking the RFAs.” Tam Reply Ltr. at 1, 4.

*2 No conference is required. The TAM Parties’ letter-motion for a protective order, as well as PIMCO's cross letter-motion for an order compelling the TAM Parties to amend their answers, will be granted in part and denied in part as follows.

The purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, governing RFAs, “is to allow for the narrowing or elimination of issues in a case. The rule is not properly speaking a discovery device, rather it is ‘a procedure for obtaining admissions for the record of facts already known’ by the seeker.” Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Grp. Inc., 125 F.R.D. 372, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2253 (1970)). See also Henry v. Champlain Enterprises, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Requests for Admissions are not a discovery device much like interrogatories, demand for documents, or depositions, nor are they to be considered substitutions for them. Discovery pleadings are expected to elicit and expound upon the facts of the matters, whereas, the Requests for Admission essentially, and hopefully, limit the factual issues in the case.”) (citations omitted).

This does not mean, of course, that an RFA may only ask about matters that the propounding party believes to be undisputed. Beginning with the 1970 amendments to Rule 36, a party may not object to an RFA “solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(5). Since “[t]he very purpose of the request is to ascertain whether the answering party is prepared to admit or regards the matter as presenting a genuine issue for trial,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee note to 1970 amendments, “[a]n answer, rather than an objection, is now the only proper response if a party considers that it has been asked to admit something that it disputes.” 8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2256, at 339 (3d ed. 2010). Similarly, “the fact that an admission, provided in response to a request, may prove decisive to the case is no ground for refusal to respond.” Booth Oil Site Admin. Grp. v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 194 F.R.D. 76, 80 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Woodward v. Holtzman, 329 F.R.D. 16, 26 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[I]t is well-established that a party may not refuse to admit or deny a request even if such a response may seriously impair its case.”).

“Although a party may seek admissions as to ‘the application of law to fact,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(A), its RFAs must still be ‘simple and direct.’ ” 2 M. Silberberg, E. Spiro & J. Mogul, Civil Practice in the Southern District of New York § 22:4, at 284 (2016-17 ed.); see also Herrera v. Scully, 143 F.R.D. 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (collecting cases). Litigants are not required to answer RFAs that “contain vague and ambiguous wording that does not allow [the answering party] fairly to admit or to deny them.” Dubin, 125 F.R.D. at 376; see also Carver v. Bank of New York Mellon, 2018 WL 4579831, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2018) (denying motion to compel amended responses to RFAs that used “terminology that is either vague, ambiguous, or ... subject to dispute given that the terms are not specifically defined,” because they “are not phrased so that they can be admitted or denied without explanation, a sine qua non for a proper RFA”); Booth Oil, 194 F.R.D. at 79 (“Ambiguous and vague requests which cannot be fairly answered will not be enforced.”). “The party requesting admissions bears the burden of setting forth its requests simply and directly, not vaguely or ambiguously.” BAT LLC v. TD Bank, N.A., 2018 WL 3626428, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018); accord Henry, 212 F.R.D. at 77.

*3 Similarly, litigants are not required to admit conclusions of law “unconnected to the facts of the case at bar,” Abbott v. U.S., 177 F.R.D. 92, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (collecting cases), or premised on disputed facts. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. NNR Glob. Logistics USA Inc., 2017 WL 11510163, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (RFAs asking Title VII plaintiff to admit that she “complained about harassment by Alex Woluewich” and that her employer “did not investigate [plaintiff's] complaint of harassment by Alex Woluewich” were improper because, inter alia, “the Court disagrees that the ‘facts’ in these two RFAs are undisputed”); Abbott, 177 F.R.D. at 93 (disallowing RFAs based on “improper hypothetical factual scenarios” rather than “the facts peculiar to this case”).

If an RFA overreaches, the answering party may seek a protective order quashing or limiting (not “striking”) the offending requests. See Carver, 2018 WL 4579831, at *1 (listing options for party served with improper RFAs); 8B Federal Practice and Procedure § 2262, at 367 (“An objection and a motion for a protective order are now the only proper means by which a request may be challenged.”).

In response to a properly constructed RFA, a party must either admit the matter, “specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). An RFA denial “must fairly respond to the substance of the matter.” Id. If it does, “no amended responses are needed,” Carver, 2018 WL 4579831, at *3, even if the propounding party believes that the matter should have been admitted. See Republic of Turkey v. Christie's, Inc., 326 F.R.D. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Bernstein v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2010 WL 4922093, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010)) (“[a]lthough defendant may disagree with these responses, that disagreement does not render the responses inadequate”); Ayazi v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2011 WL 13302243, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011) (where defendant denied certain RFAs, and plaintiff objected “on the ground that the statements are true and within defendant's knowledge,” court refused to compel amended answers, noting that “simple denials are acceptable under Rule 36”).

If the answering party's objections are unavailing, or its denial does not fairly respond to the substance of the RFA, the court may “order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). Once again, however, “[t]he requesting party may not use a motion challenging the sufficiency of a response to litigate its accuracy.” Nycomed US Inc. v. Glenmark Generics Ltd., 2009 WL 10709073, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009); accord Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 1457142, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009) (“A response can be sufficient, even if it is not ultimately determined to have been accurate.”).

Although it is “not always easy” to determine whether a party has drafted or responded to an RFA appropriately, “[t]he Court is ‘invested with substantial discretion under Rule 36’ ” to resolve such questions and control discovery accordingly. Versatile Housewares v. SAS Grp., 2010 WL 11601225, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010) (quoting Dubin, 125 F.R.D. at 373); accord In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 2020 WL 6290584, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020).

There are 39 RFAs addressed to TAM in PIMCO's Second Set of Requests for Admission. PIMCO Ltr. Ex. A. TAM has objected to all of them, on numerous grounds, but as to seven (TAM RFAs 4, 22, 28, 31, 32, 37, and 38) it has also squarely denied the request, such that “no amended responses are needed,” Carver, 2018 WL 4579831, at *3, leaving 32 TAM RFAs in dispute. As to some of the disputed requests, TAM has provided partial admissions; as to others, TAM has stated that it lacks sufficient information, after a reasonable inquiry, to admit or deny the matter. Similarly, Phoenix has objected to all 32 RFAs addressed to it, PIMCO Ltr. Ex. B, but has nonetheless squarely denied nine of them (Phoenix RFAs 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 31), leaving 23 in dispute. As to most of the disputed requests, Phoenix states that it lacks sufficient information, after a reasonable inquiry, to admit or deny the matter. As to a handful, it provides partial admissions.

*4 The TAM Parties’ objections fall generally into four categories: (1) that they should not be “required to replicate PIMCO's work,” TAM Ltr. at 3; (2) that they should not be required to “adopt various aspects of PIMCO's theory of the case,” id.; (3) that the RFAs are “vague and ambiguous,” id. at 4; and (4) that, as to TAM RFA 39, TAM should not be required to “ratify legal conclusions.” Id. The Court addresses each category in turn. Because the TAM Parties will be required to serve amended answers to some RFAs, the Court also addresses the circumstances under which they may “assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).

1. Replication of PIMCO's Work.

RFAs may appropriately be used to obtain confirmation “for the record of facts already known by the seeker.” Dubin, 125 F.R.D. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). RFAs that fall into this category generally “presuppose[ ] that the party proceeding under [Rule 36] knows the facts or has the document and merely wishes its opponent to concede their genuineness.” Pasternak v. Dow Kim, 2011 WL 4552389, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting 8B Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2253 at 324). In order to promote efficiency, however, and reduce unnecessary burden, “the facts stated within the request must be singularly, specifically, and carefully detailed,” Henry, 212 F.R.D. at 77, so that “a response can be rendered upon a mere examination of the request.” Id.; see also Herrera, 143 F.R.D. at 549 (quoting United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 1988 WL 138275 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1988)) (RFAs must be “direct, simple and ‘limited to singular relevant facts’ ”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2) (“[e]ach matter must be separately stated”).

The TAM Parties are correct that certain of PIMCO's RFAs inappropriately “demand[ ] that Phoenix carry out a research assignment that PIMCO already has completed.” TAM Ltr. at 3. Phoenix RFA 1, for example, asks for an admission that “the 2006-1 Triaxx CDO was invoiced by one of the Phoenix Entities for “Diligence Fees” of more than $50,000 per month in certain months after March 22, 2013.” If PIMCO knows which Phoenix Entity invoiced that CDO for more than $50,000, and in which months it did so, it should so specify in one or more RFAs, each of which is limited to a “singular relevant fact” – and each of which will require the answering party to check a single invoice rather than conducting a wide-ranging review of every invoice sent by every Phoenix Entity after March 22, 2013, to determine whether PIMCO's conclusion is correct. (When the instant dispute arose, PIMCO placed two such invoices before the Court, see PIMCO Ltr. Exs. H-I, but it is does not appear that these invoices, or any others, were specifically identified to the TAM Parties when the RFAs were served.) If, on the other hand, Phoenix does not know all of the instances where the Phoenix Entities invoiced the 2006-1 Triaxx CDO for more than $50,000 in a month, its use of Rule 36 to discover that information is inappropriate. Consequently, the TAM Parties are not required to admit or deny Phoenix RFA 1 or the other RFAs that share the same defect, which in this Court's view include TAM RFAs 8-16 and Phoenix RFAs 2-10.

2. Admitting or Denying PIMCO's Theory of the Case

RFAs which ask for admissions of fact (or admissions as to the application of law to fact) that are crucial to the requesting party's “theory of the case” or go to “the very heart of the dispute,” TAM Ltr. at 3, are not, for that reason alone, impermissible. See Booth Oil, 194 F.R.D. at 80; Woodward 329 F.R.D. at 26. However, the TAM Parties are correct that they should not be asked to admit or deny conclusions which are premised upon disputed assumptions, see Rodriguez, 2017 WL 11510163, at *5, and therefore cannot be “admitted or denied without explanation.” Carver, 2018 WL 4579831, at *1. Phoenix RFA 32, for example, asks for an admission that one of the Phoenix Entities “expects to receive payment out of Collateral Proceeds or pursuant to its work concerning” a specified lawsuit.

*5 In their letter-motion, the TAM Parties argue that “[v]irtually every premise of this request is in dispute.” That is an overstatement. Many of the TAM Parties’ complaints about Phoenix RFA 32 (such as their professed inability to fathom “what it might mean for a juridical entity to ‘expect to receive payment’ ”) are in reality strained vagueness objections that do not implicate any underlying disputes of fact or law. However, PIMCO's use of the undefined phrase “Collateral Proceeds,”[3] together with the disjunctive manner in which it constructed the RFA (seeking an admission as to whether Phoenix expected payment “out of the Collateral Proceeds” or “pursuant to its work” on the lawsuit) is problematic, because the parties vigorously dispute whether money recovered through litigation settlements by or for the benefit of the CDOs at issue in this action constitutes “Collateral” as that term is used in the Indentures governing the CDOs. If the RFA asked only whether Phoenix expected to be paid out of “Collateral,” Phoenix might simply deny it – since, in Phoenix's view, settlement funds are not Collateral. Similarly, if the RFA asked, in neutral terms, whether Phoenix expected to be paid “pursuant to its work concerning” the specified lawsuit, or “out of the funds recovered through” the lawsuit, Phoenix could admit or deny the matter without implicitly endorsing PIMCO's view that all such funds are Collateral. As drafted by PIMCO, however, the RFA asks two different questions, one of which, through the use of the capitalized but undefined term “Collateral Proceeds,” cannot fairly be admitted or denied without a lengthy explanation. Consequently, the TAM Parties are not required to admit or deny Phoenix RFA 32 or the other RFAs that share the same defect, which in this Court's view include TAM RFAs 1-3 and 5-7 (which would require TAM to agree with PIMCO that it is only a “purported” agent of the Issuers).

3. Vague and Ambiguous

The TAM Parties object to multiple RFAs on the ground that the terms used therein are vague ambiguous, and undefined, including numerous ordinary English words, as well as terms that all parties herein have previously used in their pleadings, briefs, and discovery responses without difficulty. For example, the TAM parties claim that the following terms are objectionable when used in PIMCO's RFAs: “TAM” (see TAM RFAs 1-7, 17, 23-27, 31-33, 37-38; Phoenix RFAs 13-15, 23-24); “Phoenix Entities” (TAM RFAs 8, 12-16; Phoenix RFAs 1-10, 12-15, 32); “given” (TAM RFAs 23-24, Phoenix RFAs 11-12); “Phoenix Engagement Agreements” (TAM RFAs 23-24); “worked for” (TAM RFAs 25-27); “TAM's Form ADV” (TAM RFAs 29-30; Phoenix RFAs 16-18); “direct or indirect” (TAM RFAs 29-32; Phoenix RFAs 16-18); “acts as a consultant” (TAM RFA 33-34); “CDOs,” “settlement in principle,” “resolve the claims,” and “asserted by” (TAM RFAs 35-36); “funds,” “currently maintained,” “escrow account at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP,” and “third party” (TAM RFA 39); “worked or served as” (Phoenix RFAs 13-15); “Phoenix Clarification Letters” (Phoenix RFA 12); “purchase price” (Phoenix RFAs 23-24); “from the assets” (Phoenix RFAs 23-24); “founding partner” (Phoenix RFA 29); “1/0 Capital Website” (Phoenix RFAs 29-30); and “subsidiary or affiliate” (Phoenix RFA 31).

These ambiguity objections are fairly easily dismissed. Many of the challenged terms are defined in the RFAs themselves (for example, “TAM,” “Phoenix,” “Phoenix Entities,” “Engagement Agreements” and “1/0 Capital”) or in the Third Amended Interpleader Complaint (Dkt. No. 203), to which the RFAs’ definitional provisions default (for example, “CDOs,” “Form ADV,” and “Clarification Letters”). Others, as noted above, are nontechnical English words or phrases that any litigant of ordinary intelligence – not to mention the accomplished attorneys representing the TAM Parties – ought to have no difficulty understanding (for example, “given,” “funds” and “settlement in principle”). See U.S. ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles Cty., 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“When the purpose and significance of a request are reasonably clear, courts do not permit denials based on an overly-technical reading of the request.”). Moreover, as PIMCO points out, see PIMCO Ltr. at 2 n.2, TAM and Phoenix previously responded to PIMCO's First Set of Requests for Admission, id. Ex. C, without objecting to many of the same terms that they now describe as too ambiguous to permit a fair admission or denial.

Although “TAM,” “Phoenix,” and the “Phoenix Entities” are broadly defined, see TAM Ltr. Ex. 1, at 2-4, that breadth does not render the terms ambiguous in the context of RFAs now before the Court. Nor is the definition of “TAM” rendered ambiguous (or the RFAs rendered “misleading and incomprehensible,” see PIMCO Ltr. Ex. A, at 14, 17) by PIMCO's definitional assertion that TAM – which serves as the CDOs’ Collateral Manager – was “formerly known as ICP Management LLC.” TAM Ltr. Ex. 1, at 2. TAM has repeatedly acknowledged that “ICP Asset Management, LLC” is its former name, not a different entity. See, e.g., Answer, Counterclaim, and Crossclaim of Interpleader Defendant Triaxx Asset Management LLC (TAM Ans.) (Dkt. No. 211) ¶ 158 (“When the [Triaxx] CDOs were initially formed, the Collateral Manager was named ICP Asset Management, LLC (‘ICP’) and was owned by companies controlled by Thomas Priore. Triaxx Holdco acquired the Collateral Manager in 2015, under the supervision of the SEC, from the prior owner of ICP, Thomas Priore, and renamed it Triaxx Asset Management LLC.”); id. ¶ 192 (“In January of 2015, Mr. Priore sold ICP to Triaxx Holdco and ICP was renamed Triaxx Asset Management, LLC.”). TAM cannot now walk back these facts, nor claim that TAM “did not exist” prior to its name change, for the purpose of objecting to PIMCO's RFAs.[4]

*6 The Court finds, however, that PIMCO's broad definition of the term “Issuers,” when used in the context of TAM RFAs 23-24 and Phoenix RFAs 11-12, makes it impossible for the TAM Parties to fairly admit or deny them. These RFAs relate to another issue that is vigorously disputed by the parties: whether TAM engaged Phoenix as agent for the Issuers or on its own behalf.[5] TAM alleges that as Collateral Manager it retained Phoenix “as agent of and on behalf of the Issuers,” and that Phoenix, once retained, also became “the Issuers’ agent,” entitled to be paid substantial fees from CDOs’ Collateral or directly from “settlement funds at the time such funds are disbursed.” TAM Ans. ¶¶ 153, 160, 168. PIMCO, on the other hand, alleges that TAM was acting (or should be deemed to have been acting) for itself, and therefore that it is responsible for paying any fees due to Phoenix under the 2011 Engagement Letters (which originally established Phoenix's compensation arrangements) or the 2014 Clarification Letters (which altered those arrangements). See Interpleader Defendant Pacific Investment Company LLC's Answer (PIMCO Ans.) (Dkt. No. 212) ¶ 132.[6] In support of its contention, PIMCO further asserts that neither TAM nor Phoenix sent copies of the Engagement Agreements or the Clarification Letters to the Issuers themselves until November 2, 2015, when copies were emailed to Evert Brunekreef, “a director for the Issuers.” PIMCO Ltr. at 3; see also id. Exs. F-G (emails between Brunekreef and Nicholas Calamari, TAM's General Counsel).

PIMCO understandably wishes to confirm this fact – or at least determine whether it is or is not disputed, which is a permissible purpose under Rule 36(a). Thus, TAM RFAs 23-24 and Phoenix RFAs 11-12 seek admissions that, prior to November 2, 2015, “the Issuers had never been given” the Phoenix Engagement Agreements or the Clarification Letters “by TAM” or “by any of the Phoenix Entities.” However, PIMCO defines the “Issuers” to include not just the Issuers themselves but also their “agents and any other person that or who is acting or has ever acted for or on behalf of each.” TAM Ltr. Ex. 1, at 3. To the TAM Parties – which claim to be “agents” of the Issuers – this definition includes them, meaning that the Engagement Letters and the Clarification Letters were “given” to the Issuers the moment they were created, whether or not Brunekreef (or any other director or officer of the Issuers) saw them at any time prior to 2015. Since TAM RFAs 23-24 and Phoenix RFAs 11-12 are constructed in such a way that neither TAM nor Phoenix could admit them, it would be bootless to compel any further response.

4. Ratification of Legal Conclusions

TAM RFA 39 asks TAM to admit “that the funds currently maintained in an escrow account at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP are not contractually owed or pledged to any party or third party.” TAM objects to this RFA on the ground that it (a) requires TAM to admit or deny a legal conclusion; (b) requires TAM to “adopt various aspect of PIMCO's theory of the case” that TAM disputes; (c) uses terms that are vague and ambiguous, including “the funds,” “currently maintained,” “escrow account at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP,” “contractually owed or pledged,” and “third party”; and (d) “purports to require [TAM] to provide information from or on behalf of persons or entities that are not parties to this action.” PIMCO Ltr. Ex. A at 25-26. In their letter-motion, the TAM Parties stress two of these objections: that the statement TAM is asked to admit “is a legal conclusion” and, “as PIMCO well knows, also is a core disputed issue in the case.” TAM Ltr. at 4.

These objections lack merit. As noted above, a party may not object to an RFA “solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial,” Fed. R. Civ. P. (a)(5), even if “an admission ... may prove decisive to the case.” Booth Oil, 194 F.R.D. at 80. Nor is an RFA objectionable simply because it requires “the application of law to fact.’ ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(A). The ambiguity objection is similarly unavailing, as none of the language used in the RFA is difficult to understand. Moreover, as PIMCO points out, see PIMCO Ltr. at 4, the identity of the “escrow account at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP” cannot be in doubt, as it is “the subject of a stipulation and order” in this action. (Dkt. No. 157.) TAM's final objection – that the RFA “purports to require [TAM] to provide information from or on behalf of persons and entities that are not parties to this action” – finds no support in Rule 36 or in the cases interpreting it. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local No. 60 Annuity Pension Fund v. Solvay Iron Works, Inc., 2017 WL 1458772, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Henry, 212 F.R.D. at 78) (“The fact that [the responding parties] are being asked to admit the authenticity of documents they did not author does not necessarily provide a basis for refusing to admit authenticity because ‘Rule 36 requires the responding party to make a reasonable inquiry, a reasonable effort, to secure information that is readily obtainable from persons and documents within the responding party's relative control to state fully those efforts.’ ”); Henry, 212 F.R.D. at 78 (“The operative words then are ‘reasonable’ and ‘due diligence.’ ”). Consequently, TAM must provide an amended response to TAM RFA 39, as well as to the remaining RFAs that are not specifically discussed above and that the TAM Parties have not yet squarely admitted or denied.

5. Lack of Knowledge or Information

*7 In amending, the TAM Parties may once again avail themselves of the “lack of knowledge or information” option set forth in Rule 36(a)(4), if warranted. However, they may not avoid committing themselves to an admission or denial that “fairly responds to the substance of the matter” merely by asserting in conclusory terms – as they have done dozens of times thus far – that “after reasonable inquiry, the information known to or readily obtainable by [the answering party] is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny this Request.” Rule 36(a)(4) requires the answering party to state “in detail” why it cannot truthfully admit or deny a request. And “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable inquiry’ and what material is ‘readily obtainable’ is a relative matter that depends upon the facts of each case.” T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 174 F.R.D. 38, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, if – for example – TAM can confirm that neither it nor its affiliates promised or pledged the funds in the escrow account to anyone, but is uncertain as to whether some other party may have done so, it should so state. See, e.g., Ayazi, 2011 WL 13302243, at *2 (requiring defendant DOE to amend its answer concerning teaching certifications issued to plaintiff and to explain any inability to answer fully: “For example, if defendant[ ] lacks such information because certification is not within its purview, it must make this clear in its amended responses. Without such information, the Court is constrained to find that defendant's response to Request for Admission 1 is insufficient.”).

For the reasons set forth above, the TAM Parties’ letter-motion for a protective order (Dkt. No. 282) is GRANTED IN PART, as is PIMCO's cross-motion to compel amended answers. The TAM Parties must promptly serve amended answers, consistent with this Order, to TAM RFAs 17-21, 25-27, 29-30, 33-36, and 39, and Phoenix RFAs 13-18, 23-24, 29, and 32. All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

SO ORDERED.

When PIMCO first filed its opposition letter (Dkt. No. 290), it redacted four exhibits, as well as discussion of those exhibits in in the letter itself, and requested a corresponding sealing order. (Dkt. No. 291.) By Order dated October 30, 2019 (Dkt. No. 295), the Court found that only one of the exhibits qualified for sealing, and directed PIMCO to file unredacted versions of the other three exhibits, along with a less-redacted version of its October 25 opposition letter, which it did that same day. (Dkt. No. 296.)

Also on October 25, 2019, plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee (the Trustee), “join[ed] in PIMCO's request that the Court deny the TAM parties’ motion for a protective order” and compel further responses to the RFAs. (Dkt. No. 292.) Since the Trustee did not serve the RFAs, however, it has no standing to seek an order compelling the TAM Parties to respond to them. Neither does defendant Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (GS&Co.), which “join[ed] PIMCO in this request and in this letter.” PIMCO Ltr. at 1. See, e.g., Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. PriceWaterhouse-Coopers LLP, 2009 WL 72165, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2009) (holding “the non-Bayer Defendants do not have ... standing to move to compel answers to the Bayer Defendants’ interrogatories”).

PIMCO provides a definition for a different phrase, “Collateral Recoveries,” see TAM Ltr. Ex. 1, at 2, but does not use “Collateral Recoveries” in Phoenix RFA 32.

Neither a change of name nor a change of ownership alters the legal identity of an LLC. See SR Inter. Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Properties, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A] limited liability company ... is a ‘separate legal entity’ distinct from the members who own an interest in the LLC.”); accord Focus Fin. Partners, LLC v. Holsopple, 2020 WL 6266915, at *17 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2020).

The Issuers are Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1, Ltd., Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-2, Ltd., and Triaxx Prime CDO 2007-1, Ltd. All are exempted corporations formed under Cayman Islands law.

The Engagement Letters and the Clarification Letters are attached to the TAM Answer as Exs. G-I and L-N, respectively. Each letter runs between Phoenix, which was then called ARAM Phoenix Real Estate Solutions Ltd., and one of the Issuers, “c/o ICP Asset Management, LLC.” As noted above, “ICP Asset Management, LLC” is TAM, under its former name.