Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the issuance of subpoenas in federal civil actions. The breadth and limits of discovery set forth in Rule 26 are applicable to nonparty discovery under Rule 45. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 Amendments to Rule 45 (noting that the 1970 amendments “make it clear that the scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and other discovery rules”); see also Barrington v. Mortg. IT, Inc., No. 07-61304-CIV, 2007 WL 4370647, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Rule 26 permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case .... Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The term “relevant” is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). So, “[w]hile Rule 45 does not specifically identify irrelevance as a reason to quash a subpoena, it is generally accepted that the scope of discovery allowed under Rule 45 is limited by the relevancy requirement of the federal discovery rules.” Jordan v. Comm'r, Miss. Dep't of Corrections, 947 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that federal courts in this circuit have uniformly applied this principle). As such, “a subpoena issued under Rule 45 should be quashed to the extent it seeks irrelevant information.” Id.

Under Rule 26(c), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). The moving party has the burden to demonstrate good cause and must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements” supporting its need for the protective order. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429-30 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citation omitted). In deciding whether a movant has established good cause, a court balances the respondent's interest in obtaining the discovery against the movant's stated harm that would result from allowing the discovery. Celentano v. Nocco, No. 8:15-cv-1461-T-30AAS, 2016 WL 4943939, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2016). Good cause represents the “sole criterion” for assessing the propriety of a protective order, and “it generally signifies a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.” In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987).

*2 Here, Defendant's arguments are well-taken. Plaintiff has failed to establish that the three types of information sought in the subpoena to which Plaintiff objects are irrelevant.[1] Moreover, the Protective Order in place in this case ensures that the confidential information to which Plaintiff refers is protected from public disclosure or improper use. Finally, to the extent that the Protective Order does not satisfy HIPPA requirements and non-party Practice EHR believes modification is needed to provide it reasonable assurance that the parties have a qualified protective order in place prior to responding to the subpoena, Defendant represents that it will seek modification of the Protective Order to specifically address HIPPA. As such, Plaintiff has not established entitlement to an order quashing the subpoena or good cause warranting a protective order.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoena to Practice EHR, LLC and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 31) is DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on October 22, 2020.