Following our review of the motions, responses, replies, record, and the relevant governing legal authorities, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

The underlying dispute arises from Decevale's former operations manager, Luis Alvarez Villamar, allegedly defrauding the Ecuadorian company with the assistance of his coconspirators, including Cherrez. The fraudulent scheme was designed to make it appear that over $693,411,150 in securities owned by the Institute of Social Security of the Police of Decedent (“ISSPOL”) were in the custody of Decevale when they were actually moved through various accounts or companies that Cherrez controlled. Cherrez and Mr. Alvarez facilitied this scheme through several financial agreements where Decevale was one party and a Panamanian company that Cherrez controlled was the other party.

To litigate the issue in Ecuador, Decevale argues it needs certain documents from the Subpoenaed Parties, Citigroup, Inc. (“Citi”) and Lafise Securities Corporation (“Lafise”), relating to agreements with Decevale; documents signed by Mr. Alvarez; documents relating to the custody of ISSPOL's securities; and communications relating to those matters. The Subpoenaed Entities are Florida companies that share similar names as the Panamanian companies and are also controlled by Cherrez.

To obtain the documents and depose the Subpoenaed Parties, Decevale filed an ex-parte application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The application for discovery was granted by the Court on January 27, 2021 because on its face it met the statutory requirements of section 1782. [D.E. 5]. As a result, on or about February 3, 2021, the Subpoenaed Parties were served with subpoenas. Once served, the Subpoenaed Parties first moved to intervene. [D.E. 7]. Before that motion was ripe for disposition, the Subpoenaed Parties filed an expedited amended motion to intervene and to quash the subpoenas from Citi and Lafise as the Subpoenaed Parties argued it would lead to the release of their sensitive financial information. [D.E. 10].

*2 The Court denied both motions to intervene for being procedurally deficient under the Local Rules and because intervention is not required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. [D.E. 11]. The Court thus treated the motions as Rule 45 objections to the timing and scope of the subpoenas and ordered the parties to confer in good faith to try and reach a resolution on the issues. If the parties did not agree, the Court ordered Applicant to move to compel the enforcement of the subpoenas. Because the parties only agreed to the timing of the subpoenas and nothing else, Applicant filed the motion to compel. Instead of responding to the motion to compel, the Subpoenaed Parties moved to vacate the granting of the application, or in the alternative, to quash the subpoenas.

Section 1782 seeks “to provide federal court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004); see also In the Matter of Lancaster Factoring Co., Ltd., 90 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (the purpose of § 1782 is to provide “equitable and efficacious procedures in United States courts for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in foreign litigation” and to “encourag[e] foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.”) (internal citations omitted). The statute allows a district court, upon the application of an interested person, to order a person residing or found in the district to give testimony or produce documents for use in a foreign proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The statute continues:

Id.

In order to compel a party to testify or produce documents pursuant to the statute, it must first determine whether a statutory basis exists for the § 1782 application. The Eleventh Circuit has provided four such statutory bases that must be considered in making this determination: (1) the request must be made “by a foreign or international tribunal,” or by “any interested person”; (2) the request must seek evidence, whether it be the “testimony or statement” of a person or the production of a “document or thing”; (3) the evidence must be “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal”; and (4) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district of the court ruling on the application for assistance under § 1782. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2007). If these statutory requirements are met, a district court deciding the application must still make certain that the requested discovery complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Chevron Corp., 2012 WL 3636925, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012) (“For example, if the subpoena at issue is directed to a party that resides or is found in the district, same must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.”).

In addition to the statutory requirements, a district court must also consider several discretionary factors before ordering the discovery to be produced. See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264-65. These factors include: (1) whether the respondents are parties in the foreign proceeding; (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign tribunal to assistance from a United States federal court; (3) whether the discovery application conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States; and (4) whether the request is intrusive or burdensome. Id. Ultimately, district courts must exercise their discretion in ordering any production under the statute, see In re Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d 77, 79 (2d. Cir. 1997), and section 1782 authorizes – but does not require – a federal court to provide the assistance requested. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247; see also United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court's compliance with a [Section] 1782 request is not mandatory.”).

A. Timeliness

*3 Before we reach the merits of the motions, Decevale first asserts that the Subpoenaed Parties’ motions are untimely under Rule 45. Rule 45 does not include an explicit timeliness requirement, but it is settled law that a “ ‘motion to quash is generally considered timely if it is brought before the time indicated for compliance.’ ” Flynn v. Square One Distribution, Inc., 2016 WL 2997673, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Rules and Commentary).

The Subpoenaed Parties’ motions were each filed after the respective dates for compliance.[2] The Subpoenaed Parties contend, however, that Applicant was put on timely notice of their objections when they filed their first motion to intervene on February 8, 2021. Indeed, the Court treated such motion to intervene as Rule 45 objections and required the parties to confer in good faith to resolve the objections. Shortly after the parties reached an impasse in their good faith conferral, the Subpoenaed Parties filed their motions to quash. As such, the Subpoenaed Parties timely preserved their objections under Rule 45.[3] See Schaaf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2006 WL 2246146, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2006) (finding that objections filed 15 days after the date of compliance to be timely because “the plain language of Rule 45 provides for different time periods for serving objections and for filing a motion to quash.”).

B. Motion to Vacate Application

We next consider the merits of the Subpoenaed Parties’ motions to vacate the Court's order granting Decevale's application for discovery. The Subpoenaed Parties first argue that the application fails to meet all the statutory requirements of section 1782. Specifically, they both posit that the application fails to show that the evidence will be used “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Cherrez argues that he does not reside nor is found in this District. And the Subpoenaed Entities assert that they do not have any relevant information in connection with the contemplated proceedings and Applicant should be subpoenaing the Panamanian companies that have similar names. We address these attacks on the statutory requirements of § 1782 in turn.

*4 The discovery sought in a section 1782 application must be “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” To show that this statutory requirement under § 1782 is met, Applicant provides a declaration from Eduardo Carmigniani, an Ecuadorian attorney Applicant has hired in anticipation of certain proceedings in Ecuador. Mr. Carmigniani states that the requested discovery materials are for use in a reasonably contemplated civil and/or criminal proceedings in Ecuador to be filed against Mr. Alvarez. In addition, Mr. Carmigniani has noted that there is an administrative proceeding against Decevale that is presently pending before the Superintendency of Companies, Securities and Insurance of Ecuador. Applicant contends that each of these proceedings qualifies as a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.

In response, the Subpoenaed Parties assert that Applicant must show specific facts regarding when there will be a proceeding before a tribunal, not a contemplated one or one before an administrative body. This argument is unavailing and not supported by any case law. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit has found “no temporal requirement under Section 1782.” See In re Furstenberg Fin. SAS, 2016 WL 10707012, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2016) (“this Court finds that the direct criminal actions to be filed in Luxembourg against Paul constitute a foreign proceeding as within ‘reasonable contemplation’ because Applicants’ intention to file such actions is ‘sufficient indication that a proceeding in court would eventuate in which the evidence gathered can be weighed impartially.’ ”) (quoting Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014)). All that is required under section 1782 is that a proceeding be “within reasonable contemplation” and “more than speculative.” In re: Application of Bracha Found., 663 F. App'x 755, 763 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004)). Mr. Carmigniani's declaration that a proceeding against Mr. Alvarez in Ecuador will be filed once Applicant can obtain the discovery sought is thus a sufficient showing that the requested discovery will be used “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”

Because Cherrez resides in Ecuador and was not physically served in this District, Cherrez argues that he is not “found” in this District as required under section 1782. Cherrez has shown that he is a resident of Ecuador and was not personally served with the subpoena in this District. Applicant indeed served the subpoena on Cherrez's tenants at a condo he owns in Miami, Florida. In response, Applicant asserts that Cherrez waived personal jurisdiction by seeking to intervene in the action twice and that personal service is not the only means of establishing that one is “found” in this District under § 1782. The Eleventh Circuit has found that a party concedes personal jurisdiction when it intervenes in a case. See Angel Flight of Georgia, Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc., 272 F. App'x 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Even if the motion had been timely, the district court noted properly that this Court's decision in In Re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1248 (11th Cir. 2006), suggests strongly that a party may not intervene for any purpose without conceding personal jurisdiction.”). However, both Cherrez's motions to intervene were denied as unnecessary because he already had standing under section 1782. The Court instead construed them as objections to the subpoenas. As such, the general rule that a motion to intervene waives personal jurisdiction does not apply here. See In re Bayshore, 471 F.3d at 1248 (“Westgate challenges the district court's jurisdiction over its person, but by filing a successful motion to intervene, it acquiesced to such jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). In other words, not only did the Court not grant the motions to intervene, we did not consider their merits. Cherrez has therefore not acquiesced to this Court's jurisdiction.

*5 We next address whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over Cherrez because of his contacts with this forum. Applicant is correct that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Cherrez even though he was not physically served in this District. As this Court has held:

In re Application of MTS Bank, 2017 WL 3155362, at *4 (holding that the requirements of § 1782 had been met where the witness “(1) owns real property, (2) owns two automobiles, (3) pays real estate taxes, (4) owns a Florida telephone number, and (5) conducts financial transactions”).

But since our decision in MTS Bank, the Second Circuit and this District have expanded the inquiry of what construes “found” under § 1782. Not only should courts look at the respondent's contacts with the forum, but if “the discovery material sought proximately resulted from the respondent's forum contacts.” See In re Inmobiliaria Tova, S.A., 2021 WL 925517, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2021) (citing In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 530 (2d Cir. 2019)). This wrinkle also requires a § 1782 applicant to “provide additional specificity concerning the discovery it seeks” to allow a court to evaluate whether the discovery requested is connected to the forum. See In re Inmobiliaria Tova, S.A., 2021 WL 925517, at *5 (quoting In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 530 n.12).

In this case, Cherrez owns real property in this District, and has apparently registered serval motorcycles in this District, pays real estate taxes to Miami-Dade County, and maintains several phone numbers with Miami area codes. He also manages by proxy each of the Florida based Subpoenaed Entities. Nonetheless, Applicant has not shown how Applicant's contacts with this District are related to the contemplated proceedings in Ecuador against Mr. Alavarez. In other words, Applicant has failed to show with specificity that Cherrez's contacts with this District “are the primary reason that the evidence sought is available at all.” In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 530.

*6 Applicant has thus failed to show Cherrez has been “found” in this District under section 1782. Accordingly, Cherrez's motion to vacate the application is GRANTED.

The Subpoenaed Entities argue that the requested documents and underlying proceedings are not relevant to them. And that their only connection to the discovery sought are that they are managed by Cherrez. According to the Subpoenaed Entities, Applicant should instead serve subpoenas on the Panamanian companies managed by Cherrez that are referenced in Decevale's application and have similar names. The Subpoenaed Entities thus assert that the application fails to meet the statutory requirements of section 1782 because the Panamanian companies do not reside nor can be found in this District. This convoluted argument can be easily dismissed. The Subpoenaed Entities are all Florida entities with principal places of business in Miami, Florida. Accordingly, the Subpoenaed Entities reside in and are “found in the district of the district court ruling on the application for assistance.” 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a); see also In re Application of MTS Bank, 2017 WL 3276879, at *7. The statutory requirements of § 1782 have therefore been met for the Subpoenaed Entities.

Before we move on, we do address the argument regarding relevance. The threshold for relevance in connection to discovery is low. See Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 688-89 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has held that the term ‘relevant’ in Rule 26 should encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. In discussing the broad construction of the relevancy component of Rule 26, Oppenheimer Fund noted that the court should and ordinarily does interpret relevant very broadly to mean matter that is or may became an issue in the litigation.”). The requested discovery is related to Decevale, Mr. Alverez, and the ISSPOL securities. Because of Cherrez's alleged connection to the fraudulent scheme and his control of the Subpoenaed Entities, there is a showing of relevancy.

Once the statutory requirements of section 1782 have been met, district courts must also consider the four discretionary factors set forth in Intel, including: (1) whether the respondents are parties in a foreign proceeding because “the need for § 1782(a) generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant,” (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign tribunal to assistance from a U.S. federal court, (3) whether the discovery application conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States, and (4) whether the request is intrusive or unduly burdensome. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264-65. While the four factors are commonly discussed on an individual basis, they “are not stand-alone categorical imperatives” but rather “involve overlapping considerations, [which] are considered collectively by the court.” In Matter of Appl. of Action & Protection Found. Daniel Bodnar, 2014 WL 2795832, *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (quotation omitted).

*7 The Subpoenaed Entities challenge the second, third, and fourth Intel factors. We note that the first Intel factor is not at issue as the Subpoenaed Entities would not be parties in the contemplated proceedings in Ecuador. The first factor therefore favors allowing discovery.

Before we move to the second factor, the Subpoenaed Entities ask the Court to use its discretion to vacate the application because they argue a court in Ecuador is better suited to assist Applicant with its request for discovery than this court. To support this position, the Subpoenaed Entities reference the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with Related Optional Protocol (“Convention”), of which Ecuador and the United States are signatories. Under the Convention, signatories can request assistance in obtaining information, witness testimony, and discovery for a criminal proceeding.

The Convention, however, only applies to state actors, not private companies like Applicant. Cf. United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2001) (“There is no provision for private parties, such as individual criminal defendants in the English (or American) courts, to request the production of information.... In short, it is § 1782, and § 1782 alone, that provides a potential basis for disclosing to Appellants the information now at issue.”). The Subpoenaed Entities argue that Applicant may be a private party, but it is authorized and controlled by the Superintendency of Companies in Ecuador, a government agency. But the Superintendency of Companies in Ecuador is not a party here. And Subpoenaed Entities provide no legal support, nor cite to anywhere in the Convention, that shows the Convention applies to private entities that are controlled by a government agency. Further, the Convention applies to criminal proceedings, so it would not be applicable to any civil proceeding, which is contemplated here. This District is thus the better venue to obtain discovery over the Florida entities via § 1782.

The second Intel factor examines whether the foreign tribunal “is willing to consider the information sought.” Siemens AG v. W. Digital Corp., 2013 WL 5947973, *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013). Another nation's limit on discovery “within its domain for reasons peculiar to its own legal practices, culture, or traditions ... do[es] not necessarily signal objection to aid from United States federal courts.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 261 (citing In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is no reason to assume that because a country has not adopted a particular discovery procedure, it would take offense at its use.”)). Instead, courts look for “authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of § 1782.” In re Kreke Immobilien KG, 2013 WL 5966916, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2013) (quoting Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995)). “Such proof, as embodied in a forum country's judicial, executive, or legislative declarations that specifically address the use of evidence gathered under foreign procedures ... provide helpful and appropriate guidance to a district court in the exercise of its discretion.” Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100 (footnotes omitted); Schmitz v. Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP., 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004) (denying discovery because “the German government was obviously unreceptive to the judicial assistance of an American federal court” since it requested the court to deny petitioner's § 1782 application); In re Ex Parte Application of Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that the second Intel factor weighed in favor of respondents because the Korean Fair Trade Commission's amicus brief asked the court to deny petitioner's applications and that it had no need or use for the requested discovery). “Absent this type of clear directive, however, a district court's ruling should be informed by section 1782’s overarching interest in ‘providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation and international aspects.’ ” Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100 (citation omitted).

*8 The Subpoenaed Entities contend that Applicant has failed to carry its burden of providing facts showing that Ecuadorian courts would welcome the proposed discovery. On the other hand, the Subpoenaed Entities have not presented any evidence that a court in Ecuador would reject the discovery sought in this case nor any cases where an Ecuadorian court rejected evidence obtained through section 1782. To the contrary, courts generally allow discovery for use in Ecuadorian courts under § 1782. See Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 747 F.3d at 1275 (affirming a district court's order that denied a motion to vacate an order granting a § 1782 application for discovery to be used in Ecuador). This discretionary factor thus does not favor denying discovery. See In re Kreke Immobilien KG, 2013 WL 5966916, at *1 (“In the absence of authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782, a district court should err on the side of permitting discovery.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The third Intel factor asks whether the section 1782 request “attempt[s] to circumvent foreign proof-gathering limits or other policies of a foreign country or the United States.” Intel, 432 U.S. at 264-265. “Although courts need not determine if an applicant has exhausted its discovery attempts abroad, ‘a perception that an applicant has ‘side-stepped’ less-than-favorable discovery rules by resorting immediately to § 1782 can be a factor in a court's analysis.’ ” In re: Application of Joint Stock Co. Raiffeinsenbank, 2016 WL 6474224, at *6 (quoting In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 183944, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013)). “Put differently, the § 1782 applicant's conduct in the foreign forum is not irrelevant.” In re Appl. of Gilead Pharmasset LLC, 2015 WL 1903957, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 14, 2015) (quoting In re IPC Do Nordeste, LTDA, 2012 WL 4448886, *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2012)). “This is not the same as a foreign discoverability requirement; the fact that a § 1782 application requests documents that would not be discoverable by the foreign court if those documents were located in the foreign jurisdiction is not enough to render the application a ‘circumvention’ of foreign rules. However, this factor suggests that a district court should be vigilant against a petitioner's attempt to ‘replace a [foreign] decision with one by [a U.S.] court.’ ” In re Kreke Immobilien KG, 2013 WL 5966916, at *6 (citations omitted).

The Subpoenaed Entities claim that there is no reason why Applicant cannot seek the desired discovery through Mr. Alvarez in Ecuador. And that Applicant either failed to attempt this discovery in Ecuador, or it attempted it and a court in Ecuador denied it. This argument fails. There is no evidence that a court in Ecuador denied Applicant's request for discovery, and there is no requirement that it must first attempt the discovery in Ecuador. See In re Application of Mesa Power Group, LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Torres, J.,) (“Nevertheless, ‘[t]o the extent that [NextEra's] argument may be read as suggesting that an interested party must meet a foreign discovery requirement, prior to being entitled to assistance under section 1782, that argument was soundly rejected by the Supreme Court’ ”) (alterations in original). In addition, the Subpoenaed Entities—all of which are Florida entities—are not going to be participants in the contemplated proceedings in Ecuador and are outside of the jurisdictional reach of the courts of Ecuador. See In re Application of Pons, 2020 WL 1860908, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2020) (“Because AMKE is not a participant in the foreign proceeding and is located in this District, it appears that AMKE is outside the jurisdictional reach of the Ecuador Family Court, and the evidence sought is likely unobtainable absent Section 1782 aid.”). As such, this factor favors Applicant.

*9 The Subpoenaed Entities’ final argument in support of their motion to vacate is that the subpoenas are a fishing expedition, duplicative, and impose an undue burden. A district court may consider whether an application contains “unduly intrusive or burdensome requests,” Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265, is “made in bad faith, for the purpose of harassment,” Euromepa S.A., 51 F.3d at 1101 n.6, or is part of a “fishing expedition,” In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988), abrogated on a different ground by Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259.

The Subpoenaed Entities suggest that the subpoenas are overbroad because they ask for “any and all documents” with little or no scope. They claim the request is duplicative because Cherrez manages each of them by proxy and Applicant has already received the information through an audit of the Panamanian companies. We reject these boilerplate arguments.[4] See Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. 747 F.3d at 1273 (finding that the respondent “failed to identify which particular discovery requests ... are unduly burdensome or to provide any specific evidence to support its blanket claim that [the respondent] should be exempted from having to comply with any and all discovery obligations due to overarching concerns about confidentiality that are stated only at the highest order of abstraction.”).

Accordingly, the discretionary factors, when considered collectively, weigh in favor of permitting the requested discovery and, thus, this Court's order granting the discovery in connection to the Subpoenaed Entities should not be vacated.

C. Motion to Quash Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)

Next, we consider whether the subpoenas issued should be quashed for violating Rule 45(d)(3)(A). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 provides that a subpoena must be modified or quashed if it “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter” or “subjects a person to [an] undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3); see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 817-18 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, a court may quash or modify a subpoena if it (1) fails to allow a reasonable time for compliance; (2) requires a person who is not a party to travel more than 100 miles from where the person resides; (3) requires disclosure of privileged or protected matter; or (4) subjects a person to undue burden.”) (footnote omitted). “Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable ‘must be determined according to the facts of the case,’ such as the party's need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d 818 (quoting Linder v. Dep't of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

To determine whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden, courts must consider at least six factors:

*10 Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818. As part of this inquiry, “[a] trial court has broad, but not unlimited, discretion in evaluating the circumstances of a case when considering quashing a subpoena on grounds of oppressiveness. It must carefully examine the circumstances presented to it and, when appropriate, consider the possibility of modifying the subpoena rather than quashing.” Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

The Subpoenaed Entities assert that the subpoenas are so broad that they will require disclosure of their protected matter; namely, their financial information. Under Florida law, a party's finances are not protected from discovery if the requesting party shows they are relevant to the underlying action. Ochoa v. Empresas ICA, S.A.B. de C.V., 2012 WL 3260324, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012). As previously discussed, the subpoenas were narrowly tailored to obtain documents relating to Decevale, Mr. Alvarez, and the ISSPOL securities. There is, thus, no question that the materials sought are relevant to the fraudulent scheme involving Mr. Alvarez. See Wajcman v. Inv. Corp. of Palm Beach, 2008 WL 11333144, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2008) (“Nevertheless, the Federal Rules set a very low threshold for relevance at the discovery stage.”). Because the Subpoenaed Entities only assert boilerplate unduly burdensome objections and the requested documents are relevant, Florida's laws regarding a right to privacy for financial information, assuming they apply instead of Federal law, do not protect the Subpoenaed Entities in this case.

D. Protective Order Under Rule 26

Finally, we address the Subpoenaed Entities request for a protective order under Rule 26. “Rule 26(c) allows the issuance of a protective order if ‘good cause’ is shown. In addition to requiring good cause, this circuit has also required the district court to balance the interests of those requesting the order. A ‘district court must articulate its reasons for granting a protective order sufficient for appellate review.’ ” McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk Cty., 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429–30 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Rule 26(c) provides that upon a showing of good cause, a court ‘may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’ The party seeking a protective order has the burden to demonstrate good cause, and must make ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements’ supporting the need for a protective order.”) (citations omitted).

“A non-party seeking a protective order has the initial burden of showing that the information sought is confidential and that the disclosure of that information might be harmful. Once the non-party has established both prongs, the party seeking to compel the disclosure must show that the discovery sought is both relevant to the pending action and necessary.” Coty Inc. v. C Lenu, Inc., 2010 WL 5392887, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2010) (citing American Standard, Inc. v. Humphrey, 2007 WL 1186654, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr.19, 2007) (noting that “the party resisting discovery ... has the burden to show that the information sought by [the p]laintiff is confidential and that disclosure would be harmful” and that “[o]nly after such a showing is made does the burden shift to the party seeking the discovery to show the information sought is relevant and necessary.”)) (citations omitted).

*11 It is well settled that “[t]he litigant seeking the protective order must articulate the injury with specificity.” United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 152, 158 (D. Del. 1999) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that a party seeking a protective order must show not just speculative harm but must make a “particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 187 F.R.D. at 158 (“ ‘Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples,’ do not support a showing for good cause.”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)). “In other words, the party seeking the protective order must show good cause by demonstrating a particular need for protection” because “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Trinos v. Quality Staffing Servs. Corp., 250 F.R.D. 696, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Corp., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973).

The Subpoenaed Entities just parrot the same argument that they have a right to privacy to their financial information but under Rule 26 instead of Rule 45. Again, this boilerplate argument fails due to any lack of specificity provided by the Subpoenaed Entities.[5] Accordingly, the Subpoenaed Entities motion is DENIED.

For the same reasons we find that Cherrez's motion is Granted and the Subpoenaed Entities’ motion is Denied, Applicant's motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Subpoenaed Entities shall comply with the subpoenas and produce the subpoenaed documents within ten (10) days from the date of this Order and appear for their depositions at a mutually agreeable date within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Cherrez does not need to comply as he is not “found” under section 1782.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 20th day of May, 2021.

The Honorable Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. referred the motion to compel to the Undersigned Magistrate on March 19, 2021 and the motions to vacate on April 5, 2021. [D.E. 14, 18].

The motions were each filed on March 30, 2021, and the dates for compliance regarding depositions were respectively: EHYB (February 24th), Penderton and Argonaut (February 25th), Lafise (March 2nd), Citi (March 8th), Cherrez (March 12th), IBCorp (March 15th), and ICS (March 17th). The production deadlines were even earlier at five business days prior to each deposition date.

Applicant also argues that we should throw out the motions before reaching their merits because the Subpoenaed Parties violated the Local Rules of this District. The Subpoenaed Parties may have committed minor infractions, but they should not be dispositive here. For instance, an email dated March 1, 2021 shows that Applicant was on notice that the motions to quash would probably be filed if an agreement was not reached and the motions can be construed as responses to Applicant's motion to compel. And while the Subpoenaed Parties admit they failed to mention the parties’ agreement on the time frame of the subpoenas in technical violation of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), this violation does not merit denial of the motions. Going forward, however, all motions and filings by the Subpoenaed Parties must comply fully with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida, and the Practices and Procedures of this Court or sanctions may be appropriate.

Because we have vacated the application for Mr. Cherrez, the duplicative argument is mostly moot. There is also no indication that the audit revealed relevant information the Florida entities may have.

The Subpoenaed Entities reframe the same argument one more time but in relation to the subpoenas for Lafise and Citibank. This argument fails for the same reason as the other two.