I. BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2019, Plaintiff Elena Ortiz, acting on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, filed a putative collective class action complaint against Defendants Pin Ups of Daytona Beach, LLC, Joseph Loguidice, and Timothy Blakeslee (collectively “Defendants”), alleging claims of failure to pay minimum wages and unlawful tip sharing, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 203. (Doc. 1). The Defendants filed their answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims on September 15, 2019. (Doc. 12). On November 18, 2019, Shaquella Weston filed a notice of consent to join, and on December 11, 2019, Ashley Marquez filed a notice of consent to join. (Docs. 37, 47). No other plaintiffs have opted into this case.[1] On March 18, 2020, the presiding District Judge dismissed the counterclaims. (Doc. 53).

At present, this case is proceeding solely on the two claims asserted by Ms. Ortiz, Ms. Weston, and Ms. Marquez (collectively “Plaintiffs”). (Doc. 53). In sum, the Plaintiffs allege that they worked for the Defendants as exotic dancers at Pin Ups, an adult entertainment club. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 1, 35-38). The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants misclassified them as independent contractors to avoid paying them federally mandated minimum wages, and that the only compensation they received was from tips from club patrons. (Id., at ¶¶ 1, 3, 40, 42-44, 46). The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants would confiscate part of their tips, and forced dancers to pay house fees or rent, and to divide tips with others who did not receive tips. (Id., at ¶¶ 2, 45). The Defendants deny all of these allegations, and assert in their affirmative defenses, among other things, that the Plaintiffs: (1) were never employees of the Defendants; (2) never performed at Pin Ups (or at least some of them did not); (3) failed to mitigate their damages; (4) failed to comply with the reporting requirements of the Internal Revenue Code; (5) did not report their income on their tax documents in a manner consistent with that of an employee; and (6) were at all times independent contractors. (Doc. 12, at 7-12).[2]

Discovery commenced in this case on December 11, 2019, and the discovery deadline is set for August 3, 2020. (Doc. 51). On February 25, 2020, the Defendants served their Requests for Production on each of the three individual plaintiffs. (Doc. 54, at ¶ 2). The Plaintiffs served their responses on April 1, 2020, and supplemented their responses on July 18, 2020. (Id., at ¶¶ 3-4). Two of the requests for production asked the Plaintiffs to provide all of their state and federal income tax returns, including all schedules exhibits, W-2 forms, 1099 forms, and other attachments, as well as all documents the Plaintiffs utilized to prepare their tax returns, for 2015 through 2020. (Id., at 4-5). The Plaintiffs have objected to producing these materials, (Id.), and on June 29, 2020, the Defendants filed the present motion to compel. (Doc. 54). The Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition (Doc. 57), and the motion is ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

*2 “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery whenever possible.” Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). To that end, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted). The scope of discovery is broad “in order to provide parties with information essential to the proper litigation of all relevant facts, to eliminate surprise and to promote settlement.” Coker v. Duke & Co., Inc., 177 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citations omitted).

“The proponent of a motion to compel discovery ... bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.” Creative Touch Interiors, Inc. v. Nicholson, No. 6:14-cv-2043-Orl-40TBS, 2015 WL 5952986, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2015) (citation omitted). A discovery request “should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.” Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also Poleon v. Lines, No. 6:14-cv-2034-Orl-40TBS, 2016 WL 1030803, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2016) (citing Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984) (if Court is in doubt concerning the relevancy of requested discovery the discovery should be permitted)).

“When the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, the party resisting it must show the lack of relevance by demonstrating that it: (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under discovery rule; or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm the discovery may cause would outweigh the presumption in favor of broad disclosure. When relevancy of a discovery request is not apparent on the face of the request, then the party seeking discovery has the burden to show its relevancy.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Russo, No. 6:11-cv-734-Orl-22GJK, 2013 WL 12158131, at *6, n.8 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2013) (quoting Zorn v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3282982, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2010)). However, information can be relevant, and therefore discoverable, even if not admissible at trial, so long as the information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Mazzoni v. Halpern, No. 6:09-cv-225-Orl-28DAB, 2009 WL 10706228, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2009) (citing Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1974)). Moreover, objections to discovery must be “plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the [discovery is] alleged to be objectionable.” Panola Land Buyers Assoc. v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)).

*3 With these standards in mind, I will now turn to the requests for production at issue.

III. ANALYSIS

The Defendants have moved to compel the Plaintiffs to respond to two requests for production:

The Defendants contend that the documents sought in these two requests for production are highly relevant as they are central to many of the issues in this case – in particular whether the Plaintiffs were ever employed by or performed work for the Defendants, and whether the Plaintiffs were properly classified as independent contractors. (Doc. 54, at 2-4). The Defendants further contend that the tax return information is also central to many of their affirmative defenses. (Id.). The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs’ objections are generic and boilerplate, and therefore are both unsupported and should be overruled. (Id., at 7-9). Last, the Defendants contend that discovery of tax returns is “routinely ordered” in FLSA wage cases brought by exotic dancers and should also be ordered here. (Id., at 13-19).

In their response, the Plaintiffs do not address whether their objections are boilerplate. Nor do they address any of the merits of all but one of their objections. Instead, the Plaintiffs focus on whether the tax returns are relevant to any of the issues in this case, and whether there are less intrusive means by which the Defendants could obtain this same information. (Doc. 57).

A. The Objections are Boilerplate and Overruled

As listed above, the only objections the Plaintiffs asserted in their responses to these two requests for production are that they were “overly broad,” seek “confidential protected information,” are “irrelevant to the issues in this case,” are “unduly burdensome,” seek “information outside the scope of discovery,” and are “abusive.” (Doc. 54, at 4-5). The Plaintiffs did not further expound on these objections, and with the exception of the relevancy objection, do not address them in their response to the motion to compel. (Doc. 57).

These boilerplate objections are meaningless and meritless and are due to be overruled. See, e.g., Asphalt Paving Sys., Inc. v. General Combustion Corp., No. 6:15-cv-49-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 3167712, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2016) (“The Court does not consider frivolous, conclusory, general, or boilerplate objections.”); Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., No. 6:11-cv-69-Orl-19GJK, 2011 WL 6936485, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2011) (“Objections which state that a discovery request is ‘vague, overly broad, or unduly burdensome’ are, by themselves, meaningless, and are deemed without merit by this Court.”) (citations omitted); Middle District Discovery (2015) at 12 (“Objections to requests for production should be specific, not generalized .... Boilerplate objections such as ‘the request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and outside the scope of permissible discovery’ are insufficient without a full, fair explanation particular to the facts of the case.”). Therefore, with the exception of the relevancy objection, which will be discussed below, the Plaintiffs’ objections to requests for production 4 and 5 will be overruled.[3]

B. The “Less Intrusive Means” Objection Has Been Waived

*4 While the Plaintiffs spend the majority of their response arguing about the relevancy of the tax returns to the issues in this case, the Plaintiffs also raise, for the first time, an objection on the basis that the same information contained in the tax returns can be obtained through much less intrusive means. (Doc. 57, at 2, 12-14). Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants could obtain this same information via interrogatories, requests for production, and depositions. (Id.).

The Plaintiffs never raised this objection in their responses to the requests for production, and therefore they cannot raise it now. See Harvard v. Inch, Case No: 4:19cv212-MW/CAS, 2020 WL 701990, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2020) (“[B]y raising objections for the first time in their response, Defendants have waived them.”) (citing Socas v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 07-20336-CIV, 2008 WL 619322, *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2008) (finding that Plaintiff “waived the argument by mentioning it for the first time in her response to the instant motion to compel and failing to timely raise it as an objection to Northwestern's original request for production.”)); Siddiq, 2011 WL 6936485, at *3 (finding that a party that does not assert objections to discovery within time permitted waives objections and is precluded from asserting objections in response to a motion to compel”); Landstar Global Logistics, Inc. v. Haskins, No. 3:09-cv-1163-J-32JRK, 2011 WL 13176156, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2011) (same); Morock v. Chautauqua Airlines, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-210-T-17-MAP, 2007 WL 4322764, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2007) (finding that any objections, including those based on privilege, are waived if they are not asserted in the party's initial responses to discovery); Middle District Discovery (2015) at III(A)(6) (“Absent compelling circumstances, failure to assert an objection to a request for production within the time allowed for responding constitutes a waiver and will preclude a party from asserting the objection in response to a motion to compel.”).

Accordingly, I will not give any further consideration to the Plaintiffs’ objection on the basis that the information can be obtained via less intrusive means.[4]

C. The Tax Returns and Related Documents are Relevant

This brings us to the Plaintiffs’ sole remaining objection – that the tax returns and related document are not relevant to the issues in this case. The first point of contention is over the appropriate standard to apply to determine the relevancy of the Plaintiffs’ tax returns. The Plaintiffs contend that a more stringent standard applies; that is, before ordering the production of tax returns, a court must find both a compelling need for the tax returns, as well as relevancy. In support of this contention the Plaintiffs cite to numerous district court decisions from other jurisdictions, but none from within the Middle District of Florida. (Doc. 57, at 3-5). Citing to both Eleventh Circuit and other district court cases, the Defendants argue that the “compelling need” standard does not apply within this District, but rather the more broad “relevancy” standard is all that applies. (Doc. 54, at 5-7).

*5 I agree with the Defendants. A majority of courts in this District have concluded that the party requesting production of tax returns need only demonstrate that they are relevant to the issues in the case. E.g., Coach, Inc. v. Visitors Flea Market, LLC, No. 6:11-cv-1905-Orl-19TBS, 2013 WL 5770598, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2013) (applying the relevance standard in determining whether tax returns were discoverable); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ft. Myers Total Rehab Center, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-766-FtM-29DNF, 2010 WL 11507085, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2010) (“To obtain tax returns in discovery, a party must show that the tax returns are relevant as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P 26.”). And while it does not appear that the Eleventh Circuit has spoken directly on this issue, the Court has agreed that the relevancy standard is appropriate. See Erenstein v. S.E.C., 316 F. App'x 865, 869–70 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[I]n civil cases, we have not required a showing of compelling need before tax information may be obtained by a party in discovery, but instead have determined that such information need be only arguably relevant.” (citations omitted); Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's order compelling production of tax records where the information was “arguably relevant to the case”). I agree with these courts and will apply the broader relevancy standard here. And in applying that standard, I further find that production of the tax returns and related documentation is warranted because such information is at least arguably (if not directly) relevant to the central issues in this case.

Two of the key issues in this case are: (1) did the Plaintiffs ever work for or perform any services for the Defendants; and (2) were the Plaintiffs employees of the Defendants or independent contractors for purposes of determining FLSA coverage. As to the first issue, clearly tax returns would provide information identifying whether any or all of the Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants, as presumably the tax documents would identify any employers and/or sources of income. And as to the second issue, the Eleventh Circuit has provided the following guidance:

Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2013).

The Eleventh Circuit applies six factors in analyzing the economic realities test: (1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; and (6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. Id. at 1312. However, these factors only serve as guides; “the overarching focus of the inquiry is economic dependence.” Id. “More importantly, the final and determinative question must be whether the total of the testing establishes the personnel are so dependent upon the business with which they are connected that they come within the protection of FLSA or are sufficiently independent to lie outside its ambit.” Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311-12. “Ultimately, in considering economic dependence, the court focuses on whether an individual is ‘in business for himself’ or is ‘dependent upon finding employment in the business of others.’ ” Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F. 2d 297, 301-02 (5th Cir. 1975)).

*6 The Plaintiffs’ tax returns are relevant to at least two of the factors of the economic realities test, namely the third factor – the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for her task; and the fifth factor – the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship. As another district court stated: “If the Plaintiffs were claiming tax deductions for hair, nails, makeup, cosmetic surgery, etc., that fact would provide evidence as to the economic reality of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant which the Court would be required to take into consideration. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs’ tax returns would constitute the primary and most reliable source for this information.” Nesselrodte v. Divas, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-95, 2012 WL 13191331, at *6 (N.D. W.V. Oct. 15, 2012) (compelling production of exotic dancers’ tax returns and related documentation in an FLSA unpaid minimum wage action, even while applying the more stringent “compelling need” standard). As to the fifth factor, if the Plaintiffs were performing at numerous different establishments, on either a regular or sporadic basis, “that fact would tend to weigh in favor of a finding of independent contractor status, much like a comedian who performs at a wide variety of clubs. Again, the Plaintiffs’ tax returns would constitute the primary and most reliable source of this information.” Id., at *7.

I agree with the reasoning of Nesselrodte, and I also find it persuasive that several other courts, when faced with discovery motions seeking tax returns and related documentation in FLSA unpaid wages lawsuits brought by current and/or former exotic dancers, have ordered that the documents be produced. See, e.g., Rafeedie v. L.L.C., Inc., No. A-10-CA-743LY, 2011 WL 5352826, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2011) (compelling production of exotic dancer's tax returns in an FLSA unpaid compensation action because the tax returns will be relevant to assessing the economic realities test, in particular the income and deductions claimed by the plaintiff); Canada v. Hotel Development-Texas, Ltd., No. 3-07-CV-1443-D; 2008 WL 3171940, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2008) (denying motion to quash subpoena seeking tax returns from exotic dancer in an FLSA action because these materials are reasonably calculated to obtain evidence relevant to the economic realities test, in particular as to “[w]hether plaintiff earned income from outside sources during the time she worked for defendants and, if so the amount of such earnings....”).

In response, the Plaintiffs cite to several district court decisions, each of which is distinguishable, and therefore unpersuasive. For example, the Plaintiffs reference Engelhardt v. Svensk Management, Inc., No. 08-62063-CIV-SELTZER, 2009 WL 10667463 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009), for the proposition that “tax returns are not relevant or discoverable under the facts of this case,” and because tax returns are “private” and contain “sensitive information.” (Doc. 57, at 1, 3). Engelhardt, however, did not involve the employee versus independent contractor issue, but rather concerned whether the “administrative exemption” applied. Engelhardt, 2009 WL 10667463, at *2. The Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 04-80521-CIV, 2005 WL 2105024 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2005) is similarly misplaced, as that case also does not address the independent contractor issue, but rather whether store managers are exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements. And to the extent that these cases apply the more stringent “compelling need” standard, I have already determined that standard does not apply.[5]

The Plaintiffs also cite to two decisions that address whether exotic dancers are either independent contractors or employees for purposes of FLSA coverage. Shaw v. Set Enterprises, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 3d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2017); and Harrell v. Diamond A. Entertainment, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Neither of these cases involve discovery disputes; rather they address motions for summary judgment, where the factual record has been fully developed. However, the standard for relevancy – which is extremely broad – is vastly different from the standard for admissibility at trial or summary judgment. See Mazzoni, 2009 WL 10706228, at *2 (noting that discovery can be relevant and discoverable even though not admissible at trial). And neither of these decisions address whether income tax returns are discoverable or relevant to the analysis of independent contractor versus employee status.[6] Cf. Agreda v. Portofino Café, Inc., No. 12-22405-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2012 WL 12874524, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2012) (compelling production of tax returns in an FLSA unpaid compensation action because the documents fit within the broad definition of relevance); Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-1985-T-17TBM; 2010 WL 11507109, at *2 & n. 4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2010) (granting motion to compel directing plaintiffs to produce their income tax returns in an FLSA action, even though the plaintiffs’ status as an independent contractor or employee is not dependent on how plaintiffs classified themselves, because information in the tax returns is not “wholly inappropriate for discovery.”); Walker v. Americare Radiographics, Inc., No. 10-60340-CIV, 2010 WL 4064022, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2010) (ordering production of plaintiff's tax returns in an FLSA unpaid overtime compensation action because “the tax records sought by Defendant fit within the broad definition of relevance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26....” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Maddow, 107 F.3d at 854)).[7]

*7 Having found that the Defendants have the better of the argument, I will grant the motion to compel as to requests for production 4 and 5. The final issue to address is the Defendants’ request for sanctions in the form of an award of costs. (Doc. 54, at 19). While close, I find that the Plaintiffs’ arguments as set forth in their response were legally supported and substantially justified. I will therefore deny the Defendants’ requests for sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(ii).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, upon due consideration, it is ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Tax Returns (Doc. 54) is GRANTED. All of the Plaintiffs’ objections are WAIVED and OVERRULED, and the Plaintiffs shall produce all documents responsive to requests for production 4 and 5 within TWENTY (20) days from the date of this Order. In all other respects (including the request for sanctions) the motion is DENIED.

I note that the discovery deadline in this case is August 3, 2020, and the dispositive motions deadline is September 4, 2020. The delayed production of these documents shall not be a basis for requesting an extension of these deadlines. Moreover, given these impending deadlines, I will not be inclined to extend the Plaintiff's time period for producing these documents absent truly exigent circumstances.

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on July 31, 2020.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional class certification on July 21, 2020. (Doc. 60). The motion is not yet ripe for consideration.

The Plaintiffs have never moved to strike any of the Defendants’ affirmative defenses.

I note that even if the objections were not boilerplate, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their objections have any merit. I do not find that a request for five years of tax returns is outside the scope of discovery, overly broad, or unduly burdensome. Nor is such a request abusive. And any concerns about confidentiality could easily be allayed by the parties entering into a confidentiality agreement (if they have not done so already). See also Doc. 54, at 10, n.5.

To the extent the Plaintiffs are trying to combine this “less intrusive means” objection within their boilerplate objections on the grounds of undue burden or abusiveness, it is not well taken. Moreover, this further proves how “meaningless” boilerplate objections are, as it leaves the Court and the opposing party to guess at exactly what the objecting party means.

The other decisions cited by the Plaintiffs throughout their response are equally unpersuasive and will not be discussed further.

In Harrell, the district court held that how an employee characterizes herself for tax purposes is not relevant to a determination of independent contractor versus employee status. 992 F. Supp. at 1353. To be sure, how an individual classifies herself for tax purposes is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the question of FLSA coverage. However, as previously discussed, tax returns can be relevant to determining at least two of the factors in the economic realities test, and therefore are discoverable. And I note that Harrell nowhere analyzes whether tax returns are relevant for these factors, or for any other reason.

I note that the Defendants also argue that the tax returns are at least arguably relevant to the issue of damages, as well as to several of their affirmative defenses. (Doc. 54, at 16-20). Because the tax returns are at least arguably relevant, and thus discoverable, with respect to the two issues discussed above, there is no need to engage in any further analysis. However, nothing in this Order should be interpreted as a determination on the further relevancy or other uses of the tax returns in this case.