Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the entire court record herein, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

The facts show that Brian Neiman purchased a 355 Ferrari in 1996, and had the title placed in the name of the Plaintiff, John Martin. Neiman contacted the Ferrari dealership, voiced his dissatisfaction, and was given a new Ferrari. On March 7, 1997, the Ferrari was towed directly to a Lamborghini dealer. Neiman traded the Ferrari, along with a $145,000 cashiers’ check, for a 1997 Lamborghini Diablo Roadster from Defendant, Prestige, Inc., in Miami, Florida.

This action commenced on June 15, 1998. The named Plaintiff was Martin, yet the record shows that Neiman was the actual purchaser of the car[1]. The Complaint asserts claims against the various Defendants regarding numerous problems with the Diablo. Additionally, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff received oral and written representations from Defendants, inducing Plaintiff to purchase the automobile. Complaint at 6-7. The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff incurred damages as a result of the automobile's alleged defects. The Complaint was filed by attorney Saul Smolar, but was signed by Brian Neiman, his paralegal. The Court notes that in 1997, Saul Smolar began working out of Neiman's home, along with attorney Norman Ganz. [DE 401 at 4].

Pursuant to Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Rule 11(a) as to Plaintiff [DE 128] and Motion to Dismiss for Fraud Upon the Court and for Sanctions [DE 164], and Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Against ALUSA, ALSPA, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts and Mullin & Galloway, P.A., Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power to Sanction [DE 404], United States Magistrate Judge Linnea Johnson presided over five hearings on Defendant's Motions. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Johnson, along with Magistrate Judge Barry Seltzer, oversaw the course of discovery. Based on the hearings, Magistrate Judge Johnson issued her Report and Recommendation as to the disposition of the Motions. Magistrate Johnson recommended that: 1) Mr. Neiman be assessed a civil fine and reported to the Grievance Committee of the Florida Bar and the State Attorney's Office; 2) Mr. Smolar be found in contempt of court, and a civil fine imposed on him; 3) Mr. Smolar be suspended from the Federal Bar and his actions be reported to the Grievance Committee of the Florida Bar; 4) The District Court refer the matter to the United States Attorney's Office for examination of possible criminal violations; 5) The District Court retain jurisdiction to hear a motion by Defendants for attorneys’ fees; 6) The present action be dismissed with prejudice; and 7) The motion for sanctions against Defendants be denied.

*2 Pursuant to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, two separate objections were filed. Martin filed his own objections while Smolar and Neiman filed their objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation together. The Court notes a material misrepresentation made on the first page of Smolar and Neiman's Objections. They stated that, “[o]n Friday, February 11, 2000, the Plaintiff, the non-parties, Smolar and Neiman, and the Defendants settled the case.” Smolar and Neiman's Objections at 1. Pursuant to this information, the Court, on February 17, issued an Order [DE 452] requesting information about this representation.

Defendant Automobili Lamborghini U.S.A., Inc., responded by stating that, “[t]here has been no settlement agreement finalized or executed, though the parties have continued to discuss the matter.” [DE 458]. Defendant Exclusive, Inc. responded that, “[i]t is Exclusive's understanding that there has been no settlement agreement finalized or executed in this matter.” [DE 457].

A. Neiman

Neiman objects to paragraph 1, page 2 of the Report and Recommendation, complaining that his conduct does not merit the characterization set forth in the report. Magistrate Johnson concluded that, “Brian Neiman's conduct in this case, as in the others, constitutes a flagrant abuse of the judicial machinery and is a mockery of the judicial system.” Report and Recommendations at 2.

In 1995, seventy one percent (71%) of the gross revenues of the Law Office of Norman Ganz, P.A. was disbursed to Neiman, Inc.[2] In 1996, sixty six (66%) of the gross revenues was distributed to Neiman, Inc. Until Smolar withdrew as attorney on January 8, 1999, 36 of the 49 papers filed were admittedly signed by Neiman [DE 181]. The Magistrate concluded that Neiman had signed Smolar's name in at least four other cases. Report and Recommendations at 11. Neiman continued to sign papers, even after the issuance of a stipulation relating to his past convictions: adjusting without a license, insurance fraud, grand theft, organized fraud, and practice of law without a license. Smolar was aware of the convictions, yet allowed Neiman to sign twenty-one (21) more papers, including the memorandum that recited Neiman's criminal background. The Magistrate Judge concluded, and this Court concurs, that Neiman wrote the date of March 25, 1997 on the Bianchi Affidavit[3] [DE 397].

The facts show that the car was purchased with Neiman's debit card from a Merril Lynch CMA account. Neiman made all of the insurance payments for the Ferrari and Lamborghini. Martin did not make any payments. On Neiman, Inc.’s tax return, the Ferraris and Lamborghinis were declared corporate property of Neiman, Inc., and deductions and depreciations were taken on the automobiles by the corporation. Neiman claims that Martin had unfettered use of his debit card, yet Neiman forged Martin's name on the applications [DE 397]. Several experts concluded that the Merril Lynch account was not a joint account, Martin was not an owner of the account, the account was maintained solely in Neiman's name, the account showed that the expenses were the corporate expenses of Neiman, Inc., the account was used like a corporate checkbook, and that contrary to Neiman and Martin's testimony, none of Martin's deposits were entered into the account [DE 369 at 137]. Neiman, Inc.’s accountant acknowledged that the depreciation and expense deductions were taken for the Ferrari and the Lamborghini on the corporate tax returns of Neiman, Inc. The automobiles first appeared on the tax return in 1997, the Lamborghini was declared corporate property and constituted approximately 70% of the corporation's tangible assets. It was listed on the tax return twice, declared as an asset for 100% business use by the corporation. To take a depreciation each year, the party must have beneficial ownership [DE 391].

*3 On March 10, 1997, Neiman reported to his probation officer, and after the meeting asked his probation officer to come out to the parking lot to see his new Lamborghini. Apparently, Neiman told the probation officer that he “sold his Ferrari and purchased a Lamborghini.” Def. Ex. 8/3-15. The probation officer recorded the conversation in his case notes. Neiman made similar declarations to his other probation officers, and to Kenwin Daniel, Bernette Snead, Linda Boatright, Alice Fields, Joe Williams, Harold Athouriste and Janet Arvo. Neiman kept the automobile, even after Martin moved out of the residence they shared. Martin does not have a key to the car, Neiman's house or garage, and does not have possession over the car [DE 369 at 144-147]. Neiman acknowledged that he had an ownership interest in the Lamborghini in a hearing with Magistrate Judge Seltzer [DE 181].

B. Smolar

“Smolar authorized and directed Neiman to sign his signature, because Smolar was away from the office.” Neiman and Smolar Objections at 3.

The facts indicate that Smolar and attorney Norman Ganz worked together, occasionally out of Neiman's home. The style, address, phone number and almost all of the information on the letterheads were the same. Def. Ex. 8/3-2. Smolar worked with Ganz, who was sanctioned by Judge Ryskamp on May 20, 1998, in Barnett v. Doctors & Associates, Inc., where Ganz and Neiman, “repeatedly...threatened...Defendants with class actions and actions by the NAACP and EEOC that were never filed,” and they were, “nothing but terrorist (acts) threatening all kinds of things if you don't capitulate to my demands. It looks like blackmail.” Def. Ex. 8/3-3. Yet a June 15, 1998 letter was sent out threatening to initiate a class action law suit in this action, signed in Smolar's name. The letter was actually signed by Neiman.

Smolar allowed Neiman to sign thirty six (36) legal documents. Smolar asserts that the court papers were faxed or read to him over the phone and that he authorized Neiman to sign his name [DE 181]. Smolar allowed Neiman to sign documents, even though he knew Neiman had convictions for fraud (insurance and organized) and for practice of law without a license [DE 397]. Neiman even signed Plaintiff's Reply to the memorandum that recited Neiman's criminal background [DE 77 and 397]. Smolar had previously been found to be in contempt of Court for the same Rule 11 violations with Neiman, and Magistrate Judge Lynch recommended a fine and a suspension from practice before the Court by Smolar. Ingram v. SunTrust Bank South Florida, N.A., Case No. 98-7023-CIV-HURLEY. In Hudson v. Ocean Spray Cranberry, S.D. Fla., Case No. 98-6603-CIV-SEITZ, Neiman signed Smolar's name to the Complaint, Amended Complaint and a Notice of Filing Supplemental Authority.

Smolar allowed Neiman to sign the Complaint in the present case. Smolar allowed Neiman to sign a Response to Defendant's Second Request to Produce to Plaintiff, letting him raise a work-product objection, which after appeal to the District Court, was finally produced one year later. Smolar continued to allow delay, involving Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Request to Produce to Plaintiff, signed by Neiman, and was subsequently sanctioned by Magistrate Judge Seltzer [DE 207]. Smolar claims that he was not aware that he had to sign court papers, and could not allow Neiman to sign for him, on January 12, 1999 [DE 397]. Smolar was sanctioned, again, by Judge Seltzer for unjustifiably, and in bad faith, seeking to prevent State Farm, a non-party insurance company, from complying with certain subpoenas [DE 207].

C. Martin

Martin states that “this Court should conclude that Martin's claims have merit; that Martin did not commit a fraud on this Court; and that Martin was unaware of any signing rule violations by other persons, that such violations were not the result of or otherwise caused by the act or omission of Martin...” Martin Objections at 2.

*4 Martin lived with Neiman. Smolar worked out of Neiman's house. Martin contributed in creating the publicity that was part of the attempts to secure a settlement from Defendants by making false claims that a class action had been filed. Def Ex 8/17-6. Plaintiff claims that he incurred damages in the Complaint, yet Neiman, Inc. paid for all of the insurance payments and all of the repair bills. Def. Ex. 8/3-12. Martin testified that he gave Neiman all of his income for six years, without asking for any money [DE 369]. There were not any deposits in Neiman's account by Martin, or from Martin's funds. Martin also claims to have unrestricted use of the account's debit card. Martin, however, never signed a form authorizing his signing privileges [DE 397]. The Lamborghini was purchased for $145,000. Yet, Martin moved out of Neiman's house on September 20, 1998, and left the Lamborghini with Neiman. He did not even keep a set of the car keys [DE 369].

Prior to the hearing on January 28, 1999, Plaintiff signed an affidavit swearing that the affidavit was based on his personal knowledge. Martin also stated that he carefully read the Motion to Enforce Rule 11(a), he personally read and approved each court filing and each letter, Smolar obtained approval from Martin on each court filing and letter before they were submitted to the Court, the positions in the letters and files were his own, and swore that “[w]hile certain court filings and letters in this case may not have been personally singed by Saul Smolar, I personally reviewed and approved each letter and each court filing before it was sent.” Def. Ex. 11/19-8. Martin gave Neiman's address to the Court as his own, directing all of the papers to Neiman, yet his other mail was sent to his parent's or his other address [DE 339].

A. Neiman and Smolar

Neiman objects to the characterization that he was acting as Plaintiff's counsel and an undisclosed real party in interest. Smolar objects to the findings that he attempted in bad faith to extort Defendants with a false threat of class action litigation, that he aided and abetted an intentional violation of the rules, that he failed to supervise Neiman, the he blatantly obstructed discovery and he participated in a fraud on the court.

Neiman argues that he did not forge Smolar's name to the Complaint, but rather was authorized by Smolar, after Smolar read, reviewed, approved and ratified the Complaint.

The evidence of Neiman's dealings prior to the present action, and involving the present action, do not support Neiman and Smolar's explanation. Neiman purchased the automobile, or even if it is accepted that he did not, his domestic partner of six years did. Smolar's main office was out of Neiman's home. Neiman signed the Initial Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Neiman admitted to signing thirty-six (36) of forty-nine (49) documents for Plaintiff served or filed by “The Law Offices of Saul Smolar.” The evidence shows that Neiman has signed Smolar's name in other cases. They admitted that Neiman signed one pleading and six discovery requests in the Suntrust case [DE 401]. Neiman and Smolar were found to have violated Federal Rule 11 by Magistrate Judge Lynch, in the Suntrust case. Smolar claims that he wrote Reply memorandums, yet only glanced at Defendants’ Response memorandums. Additionally, Neiman and Smolars’ objections characterize Neiman's practice, by stating, “Neiman's criminal record had nothing to do with him forging documents.” Neiman and Smolar Objections at 8.

Neiman and Smolar object to the conclusions that they colluded and hid the truth and promulgated deception. Neiman also objects that he was previously found to have acted vexatiously and in bad faith in other cases. Neiman and Smolar Objections at 4.

In Barnett v. Doctors & Associates, Inc., Neiman was mentioned by name in the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Ann Vitunac, stating that Ganz “and his paralegal, Mr. Neiman, repeatedly...threatened...Defendants with class actions and actions by the NAACP and EEOC that were never filed...,” and these threats were, “nothing but terrorist acts threatening all kinds of things if you don't capitulate to my demands. It looks like blackmail.” Magistrate Judge Vitunac later stated that the repeated threats by Ganz and Neiman shows bad faith, and are “far out of bounds.” Neiman was further criticized by United States District Judge Middlebrooks for making threats of joining the NAACP in an action. Smolar did allow someone, other than himself, to sign the Complaint in Zarate v. CBS, S.D. Fla., Case No. 98-1895-CIV-MORENO. Smolar claims that the deputy clerk had told his receptionist to sign the Complaint. Therefore Smolar is either extremely irresponsible for not signing the Complaint (and 36 documents in this case) or directed another to sign his name. The Court notes that Smolar claims to not have known about Ganz's tactics and sanctions in the Barnett case, even though he shared an office with Ganz, and shared the same paralegal, Neiman.

*5 Neiman and Smolar allege that “[b]efore this lawsuit was filed, attempts were made to settle the claim.” [DE 401 at 4]. Neiman and Smolar dispatched three demand letters threatening a class action. Contrary to the Smolar and Neiman Objections and Martin Objections, this was not zealous advocacy. The letter demanded $1.5 million, and stated that a lawsuit was to be filed by Monday, December 1, 1997. “There will be no extensions.” Def. Ex. 8/3-2, Letter 11/6/97. On June 15, 1998, another letter was sent to Defendants, entitled “Lawsuit filed [sic] Monday, June 15, 1998- - Intent to Initiate Class Action Lawsuit.” Def. Ex. 8/3-2, Letter 6/15/98. The letter was signed by Neiman in Smolar's name. On July 1, 1998, another demand letter was sent, stating that the offer was not negotiable, and would remain open until Monday, July 6, 1998. It was threatened that an Amended Complaint and Motion for Class Certification would be filed on Tuesday, July 7, 1998. Def. Ex. 8/3-2, Letter 7/1/98. However, a class action was only threatened and never filed.

Neiman and Smolar argue that the assertions about the percentages of gross revenues of the Law Office of Norman Ganz that were distributed to Brian Neiman, Inc. have nothing to do with this case. Neiman and Smolar Objections at 5.

The payments by Ganz to Neiman, Inc. are evidence regarding Neiman's participation in Ganz and Smolar's law practices. The fact that Neiman was receiving substantially more than a majority of Ganz's revenue adds credence to the argument that Neiman did more than ministerial work for the attorneys, as claimed. Seventy-one (71%) and sixty-six (66%) percent of an attorney's revenue going to a paralegal is not consistent with the conclusion that it is merely used to compensate a paralegal making $100 per hour, nor for using a “turnkey” office. It is also relevant because, in April, 1997, one month after the automobile was purchased, Smolar started to work with Ganz [DE 401 at 4]. Neiman was Ganz's paralegal. Smolar also took over some of Ganz's clients when he left the practice of law. The payments to Neiman, Inc. may be used as circumstantial evidence of certain improprieties.

Neiman and Smolar argue that Neiman's criminal record had nothing to do with the forging of documents. Neiman and Smolar Objections at 8.

Neiman's criminal record is significant for several reasons. In determining a person's credibility, the Court often looks to a person's past indiscretions, particularly if those past acts evidence a common scheme or plan or have a signature quality. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Neiman was adjudicated guilty or pled guilty to five different offenses. Three of the offenses were felonies. Two of the felony offenses were for fraud. Neiman pled nolo contendere or guilty to two relevant crimes; adjusting without a license and five counts of the practice of law without a license. Smolar allowed a person who has a history of practicing law without a license, fraud and deceit, to oversee and sign important legal documents. Additionally, several depositions state that Neiman drafted certain affidavits without Smolar ever being involved. Deposition of Greg Batchelder at 13; Capogreco at 41; and Joe Campell at 8. Batchelder stated that his affidavit was prepared by Neiman, and that he never met Smolar. Capogreco stated that the only person he met was Neiman. Additionally, Smolar's signature was under Capogreco's signature, yet Capogreco had never met him. Lastly, Campell got with the “attorney[4]” and eventually had the affidavit sent to him through the mail. This is significant because he was not involved in getting the affidavit notarized. Neiman was also involved in altering the affidavit of Paul Bianchi. Neiman and Smolar complain that the Court overlooks that Bianchi testified that the facts of the affidavit are true. The Court, however, is concerned with the fact that Neiman dated the affidavit and altered it, either under the orders of Smolar or by his own volition, and that this practice is illegal and unethical.

*6 Neiman signed Smolar's name to twenty-one (21) discovery requests, objections and responses. Magistrate Judge Seltzer granted a Motion to Compel Production [DE 54], and the documents were produced almost one year later. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant ALUSA's Second Request to Produce to Plaintiff, signed by Neiman, objected to another discovery request. Magistrate Judge Seltzer found the objection was unwarranted, and sanctioned Plaintiff and Smolar [DE 207]. Magistrate Judge Seltzer found Plaintiff's Reply in Support of his Motion for Protective Order to be inappropriate, and struck portions of it [DE 207]. Plaintiff's Response to ALUSA's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories [DE 83] contained misrepresentations, and the Court ordered Smolar to pay sanctions [DE 207]. Additionally, Smolar and Neiman participated in thirty six (36) violations of Rules 11(a) and 26(g).

B. Martin

Martin concludes that he did not commit a fraud on this Court, he was unaware of any signing rule violations by other persons, the violations were not a result of or otherwise caused by the act or omission of Martin, and Martin was not in possession of any documents that were not produced to the Defendants.

Martin lived with Neiman. Smolar worked out of Neiman's home. The evidence shows that Neiman was the true purchaser of the automobile. “Neiman paid approximately $97,000.00 from the CMA Account for the Ferrari 355B.” [DE 400 at 7]. There are representations that the Ferrari, and subsequent Lamborghini, were gifts to Martin [DE 400 at 7]. The Court has reviewed the Complaint, and subsequent Amended Complaint, yet has not found one instance in which the claim that the automobile was a gift is disclosed. The Court notes that the ramifications of such a gift would have an effect on a breach of contract claim, calling into question the privity of contract between Martin and Lamborghini. Also, Neiman would have to have filed a Federal Gift Tax return by April 15, 1998, as mandated by 25 U.S.C. § 6019. No such tax return was filed. As mentioned above, Neiman, Inc. continually took tax deductions and depreciations on the automobile. Additionally, the Lamborghini remains on the corporate balance sheet, as an asset [DE 391]. Neiman paid all of the insurance payments and repair bills on the Ferrari and Lamborghini. Def. Ex. 8/3-12. Martin, therefore, did not incur the damages he claims in the Complaints.

Neiman also has a history of purchasing expensive cars for “others.” Neiman purchased a Mercedes 190E that was titled in his former roommate's name. When the roommate left the automobile did not, although the car remained in the roommate's name [DE 339]. Neiman maintained full possession and control, and drove the automobile. The Mercedes was traded in by Neiman for a 1993 Mercedes 300CE [DE 339]. The Mercedes 300SE was used exclusively by Neiman and Martin, yet it was titled in the name of Joan Jacqueline Martin [DE 339]. In 1999, Neiman purchased a Mercury Cougar for Roman Fayer, but the title was issued in the name of Fayer's father. Pl. Ex.42 at ¶ 6.

Additionally, Plaintiff moved out of Neiman's house, yet the Lamborghini remained at Neiman's residence. Neiman moved to a new home, and the Lamborghini went with him. Plaintiff has not had access to the automobile for over one year [DE 369]. Plaintiff claims that the insurance necessitates a covered garage, and he has access to the automobile. Yet, Plaintiff does not have a key to the car, to Neiman's home, or Neiman's garage [DE 369]. Martin, therefore, argues that the automobile is his, he has unfettered access to it, and the only reason he does not continue to use the Lamborghini is because the insurance necessitates a covered garage.[5] The evidence does not support this argument.

*7 Martin argues that he was unaware of any signing rule violations by other persons. Martin lived with Neiman for six years, and they were involved in a relationship. Smolar worked from Neiman's residence. Supposedly, the subject of the litigation surrounded Martin's automobile. Neiman and Smolar were the two parties involved in the Rule 11(a) and 26(g) violations. Additionally, Neiman signed many of the discovery documents, and Martin either aided in giving information to Neiman, or Martin was not involved in the case. Additionally, as Neiman's companion, Martin must have been aware that Neiman had a past record of fraud and practice of law without a license.

Plaintiff signed an affidavit swearing that it was based on his personal knowledge. Martin also stated that he carefully read the Motion to Enforce Rule 11(a), he personally read and approved each court filing and each letter, Smolar obtained Martin's approval on each court filing and letter before they were submitted to the Court, the positions in the letters and files were his own, and swore that “[w]hile certain court filings and letters in this case may not have been personally singed by Saul Smolar, I personally reviewed and approved each letter and each court filing before it was sent.” (emphasis added) Def. Ex. 11/19-8.

Based on the representations of his sworn affidavit that he oversaw the lawsuit, Martin is responsible for the actions of his attorneys, who delayed the production of many documents, including information regarding the ownership of the automobile, tax returns of Neiman, Inc., insurance payments, and other information. Magistrate Judge Seltzer sanctioned Plaintiff's counsel five times for their obstructive behavior [DE 207]. Magistrate Judge Seltzer also found that in the first ten months of this action, very little meaningful discovery was produced from Plaintiff [DE 207].

Martin also furnished Neiman's address to the Court as his own, while acting pro se. Magistrate Judge Seltzer found this address to be false, and had to Order the federal marshal to serve a copy of an Order directly upon him [DE 214]. Additionally, Martin continued to deceive the Court regarding the issue of ownership. Martin claimed to have purchased the vehicle, and later stated that the automobile was a gift. These contradictory assertions facilitated in the delay and uncertainty in this case.

The matter before the Court was prompted by the evidence presented to the Magistrate Judge, to enforce Rule 11(a), to dismiss the action for fraud on the court, and for attorney's fees and costs relating to the motions. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Magistrate Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida, the above-captioned cause was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson for appropriate disposition of all pretrial discovery motions, all non-case dispositive motions filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, 13, 14 and 15, and all motions that relate directly to these motions, such as motions for extension of time, motions for reconsideration, motions for sanctions, and motions for mental or physical examinations. The Rule 11(a) and 26(g) violations were also under her jurisdiction.

The motions before Magistrate Judge Johnson directly stem from her enumerated powers. Magistrate Judge Johnson based her findings from the hearing on the aforementioned motions, and made her recommendations accordingly. Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(e), the statute setting out a Magistrate Judge's ability to hold someone in contempt, states that, “[i]n a proceeding before the magistrate, any of the following acts or conduct shall constitute a contempt of the district court ... 1) disobedience or resistance to any lawful order, process...3) failure to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any pertinent document...5) any other act or conduct which if committed before a judge of the district court would constitute contempt....”

*8 Neiman, Smolar and Martin continuously disobeyed Magistrate Seltzer and Magistrate Johnson's Orders, they continuously failed to timely produce pertinent documents, and they continued their actions of attempting to deceive the Magistrate by altering their stories[6] and presenting outrageous claims. Magistrate Johnson oversaw this conduct during the aforementioned hearing, and found that Neiman, Smolar and Martin's behavior in the hearing, coupled with their rampant disregard for this Court's rules, procedures and ethics throughout the case, necessitated a decisive action, which the statute allows.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Magistrate Johnson filed her report and recommendations to this Court for a final decision. This Court then made a de novo determination of the entire case file. Any Orders for Sanctions or Contempt will be issued by the District Court, which are well within its “inherent powers,” based on the parties’ actions throughout the course of the action, and from the hearing on the Motion to enforce Rule 11(a), motion to dismiss the action and motion for attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the motions.

“ ‘Inherent powers’ describes ‘the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’ ” In re Roger Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir. 1991); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). “Such powers are ‘essential to the administration of justice.’ ” In re Roger Novak, 932 F.2d at 1406; Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987). The Court understands, however, “[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” In re Roger Novak, 932 F.2d at 1406; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980). “Recognition and application of such power is ‘grounded first and foremost upon necessity.’ ” In re Roger Novak, 932 F.2d at 1406; United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (1988). If the Court determines that the Rules are insufficient to deal with the apparent bad faith of the parties, “the court may safely rely on its inherent power.” Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).

A. Dismissal

Martin objects to Magistrate Judge Johnson's Recommendation that the cause should be dismissed. Martin, Neiman and Smolar violated Rules 11(a) and 26(g) thirty-six (36) times. The evidence and record indicate that Neiman was not merely performing the ministerial action of signing Smolar's name on a document when Smolar was out of the office. Neiman performed duties as an attorney in Smolar's name. Additionally, Martin, Neiman and Smolar were consistently found to be in disregard of this Court's Orders concerning discovery and disclosure. A Court may “dismiss a case for failure to comply with the pleading rules. Although this is a severe sanction, its imposition is justified when a party chooses to disregard the sound and proper directions of the district court.” Friendlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985); Maddox v. Shroyer, 302 F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 825 (1962).

Rule 11 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. states that “a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name...An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.” Rule 26(g) Fed.R.Civ.P. states, “g) Signing of Disclosures, Discovery Requests, Responses, and Objections. 1) Every disclosure... shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name...The signature of the attorney...constitutes a certification that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made.” Violations of Rule 11(a) and Rule 26(g) allow the Court to impose appropriate sanctions.

*9 Rule 11 compliance is measured with an objective standard, a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988); Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1998). The Court finds that numerous violations of Rule 11 in this action could not seem reasonable to any competent attorney. “Once a violation of Rule 11 is established, the rule mandates the application of sanctions.” Id. at 876. “[T]he district court is vested with considerable discretion in determining the ‘appropriate’ sanction to impose on the violating party.” Id. at 877. However, “the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purpose should be imposed.” Id. at 878.

Additionally, the Court is vested in similar discretion in relation to violations of discovery requests and orders. Malaueta v. Suzuki Motor Company, Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993). “[T]he severe sanction of a dismissal or default judgment is appropriate only as a last resort, when less drastic sanctions would not ensure compliance with the court's orders.” Id. at 1542.

The present action involves vast violations of Rule 11 and 26. Additionally, there are allegations of fraud on the court. “A ‘fraud on the court’ occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense,” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989), and it “implies a direct insult of the court's dignity and authority.” Skinner v. White, 505 F.2d 685, 689 (11th Cir. 1974).

Martin, Neiman and Smolar have alleged several different claims as to who owns the Lamborghini. These stories include that Martin purchased the car, Neiman purchased the car for Martin, and Neiman actually has an ownership interest in the car. Martin, Neiman and Smolar participated in thirty six pleading and discovery violations. Additionally, Neiman drew up affidavits, and in one documented case, altered an affidavit.

“[A] district court may dismiss a case only ‘when circumstances make such action appropriate,’ Link, 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962), ‘and after ‘thoughtful consideration of all the factors involved’ in a particular case.” Aoude, 892 F.2d at 118.

The Court in striking all of the violating pleadings and discovery, pushes this action into complete disarray. Many of Magistrate Judges Seltzer and Johnsons’ determinations and Orders were based on the assumption that all of the information Plaintiff gave was honest, proper and conformed with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These assumptions were faulty. To re-evaluate and re-hear the issues, motions, responses, and discovery requests would cause a case which was filed nearly two years ago, to essentially start from the beginning. Plaintiff has been sanctioned several times for other discovery violations. Plaintiff did not show up to seven depositions, before being specifically ordered by a Judge and sanctioned appropriately. The Court notes that Smolar attempted to sign and re-file several of the violating documents. However, Smolar was not the attorney of record at the time, thereby violating Rule 11 again when he resubmitted the documents.

Additionally, how can this Court determine this case on the merits when the proper party in interest has yet to be disclosed? Martin, Neiman and Smolar have perpetrated a tremendous fraud on this court. This Court is satisfied through clear and convincing evidence that Neiman, and not Martin, is the true owner of the Lamborghini. The Court notes that a registered certificate of title establishes a presumption of ownership, but the presumption can be overcome by competent evidence. Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, 47 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1950); Sterling v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 600 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The Ferrari was purchased by Neiman. Neiman traded in the Ferrari[7] for a Lamborghini and paid $165,000 with a check from his bank account. The Lamborghini remained at Neiman's home, even after Martin moved out. Neiman told others that the Lamborghini was his. Neiman paid the insurance and repair fees on the automobile. Neiman's corporation listed the automobile as an asset, and took a depreciation and deduction on it. Neiman has a history of purchasing automobiles and placing title in other peoples names. Neiman has made declarations to the Court that he has an ownership interest in the car. Therefore, the Court determines that Martin, Neiman and Smolar perpetrated fraud on the Court. Their behavior is so egregious, inexcusable and destructive that no lesser sanction other than dismissal with prejudice would be adequate. See Oliver v. Gramley, 200 F.3d 465, 466 (7th Cir. 1999).

*10 Martin, Neiman and Smolar claim that they attempted in good faith to settle the claim before the action was filed. These “good faith” attempts included three vicious demand letters threatening class action law suits, and offering strict deadlines in which to accept the terms of the settlement. Similar tactics were employed by Norman Ganz, who happened to be sharing an office with Smolar and employing Neiman. The tactics used by Ganz and Neiman were described as extortion by several District Judges.

Neiman maintains that he and Smolar are “remorseful about the rule violations and long ago stopped the offending conduct. They have both been forthright in voluntarily acknowledging the conduct. They have demonstrated that by their change in conduct that this Court does not need to fine them to make them comply with this Court's rules.” Smolar and Neiman Objections at 30. Yet, on the first page of their Objections, Neiman and Smolar make a material misrepresentation to this Court that, “[o]n Friday, February 11, 200, the Plaintiff, the non-parties, Smolar and Neiman, and the Defendants settled the case.” Neiman and Smolar Objections at 1.

Smolar maintains that as soon as he was made aware of his rule violations, he stopped having his paralegal sign documents for him. Southern District of Florida Administrative Rule 1 charges that all Attorneys must have a knowledge of the rules. Smolar's claim that he was unaware of the Rules of Civil Procedure either makes him an incompetent lawyer, or a person who would be dishonest to this Court. Both cases cause him to be dangerous as a practicing attorney.

The Court notes that it does not discuss, in great detail, testimony from Neiman, Smolar or Martin. The Court finds that based on the record, and the observations made by Magistrate Judge Seltzer, and Magistrate Judge Johnson, who presided over the hearings, that their testimony is not very credible. Neiman has three felony convictions and several convictions of crimes of dishonesty. Additionally, Neiman recently pled nolo contendere on five counts of practicing law without a license[8]. Neiman also altered his story several times in relation to this case. Neiman's bias in this case is apparent; he dated Martin for six years, Smolar works out of his home, he wants the money from the lawsuit, and now he does not want to be fined or possibly found guilty for a crime. Martin is also not reliable. He has obvious bias in this case, beginning with his relationship with Neiman. Martin would also be helped financially if his claim is successful. Additionally, he does not want to be caught perpetrating fraud on this Court. Smolar is also not credible. He claims he does not know the rule of Civil Procedure that requires a person to sign their own name. He is biased, in that he works out of Neiman's home and has some professional relationship with him. Smolar does not want his legal career jeopardized by any adverse findings.

*11 This Court has determined, by viewing the entire court file, through thoughtful consideration of all of the factors involved, that the only way to cure the harm Martin, Smolar and Neiman caused is to dismiss this case. This determination took into account the Rule 11(a) and 26(g) violations, the fraud on the court, and this Court's inherent powers.

Accordingly, it is.

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Report and Recommendation [DE 432] of Magistrate Judge Linnea R. Johnson, dated January 31, 2000, is hereby ADOPTED;

2. Saul Smolar and Brian Neiman's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge [DE 449] are hereby OVERRULED;

3. Plaintiff John Martin's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the U.S. of the Magistrate Judge [DE 451] are hereby OVERRULED;

4. Defendant's Motion to Enforce Rule 11(a) [DE 128] is hereby GRANTED;

5. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Fraud on the Court and for Sanctions [DE 164] is hereby GRANTED;

6. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions against ALUSA, ALSpA, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts and Mullin & Galloway, P.A. [DE 404] is hereby DENIED;

7. Saul Smolar, Brian Neiman and John Martin shall be assessed the following sanctions: A) The case shall be dismissed; B) Smolar, Neiman and Martin have Joint and Several Liability for Defendant's attorney's fees and costs for the entire action; C) This action will be directed to the Federal Bar and to the Grievance Committee of the Florida Bar in regard to Saul Smolar's actions; D) This action will be directed to the State Attorney and United States Attorney to determine if any legal violations are present, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1951;

8. This Court shall retain jurisdiction for Defendants’ attorneys’ fees in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(3). Defendants shall submit a verified affidavit and application for attorneys’ fees to this Court within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. The Court notes that the application must contain a breakdown of each participating attorney's hours, activities and rate per hour. The application for attorneys’ fees is referred to Magistrate Judge Linnea Johnson for determination of such;

9. Smolar and Neiman are Ordered to Show Cause why they should not be held in contempt of this court for representing to the Court that the case was settled, contrary to the claims of Defendants;

10. The Clerk of this Court is directed to deny all pending motions as moot; and

11. This case is closed.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 6 day of March, 2000.

Neiman and Martin were in a relationship, and lived together. Smolar and Neiman Objections at 3.

Neiman, Inc. is a corporation whose sole shareholder is Brian Neiman.

This evidences another fraud on the Court by Neiman.

The Court notes that the “attorney” is never identified, and it is not known to whom he is referring.

The Court takes judicial notice that common sense dictates that the upkeep and insurance on a Lamborghini would severely affect Martin's yearly salary of $30,000 to $40,000.

One example of changing their story involves the ownership of the Lamborghini. There have been declarations that the automobile was purchased by Martin, that the automobile was purchased by Neiman for Martin, that Neiman has some ownership interest in the automobile, etc.

Neiman actually traded in the Ferrari for a second Ferrari, which he had towed directly to the Lamborghini dealer.

“A nolo contendere plea where adjudication is not withheld or where there is subsequently an adjudication of guilt is a conviction under Florida law.” United States v. Drayton, 113 F.3d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1997).