The undersigned addresses each of the motions, in turn.

I. Defendant's Motion to Compel Email Correspondence Contained in Plaintiff's Expert, Terry MacLaughlin, File

The Defendant has filed a Motion seeking to compel the Plaintiff to produce emails from the file of Plaintiff's expert Terry MacLaughlin (“MacLaughlin”) in compliance with the Subpoena for Deposition Duces Tecum that was issued by the Defendant in advance of MacLaughlin's October 24, 2017 deposition, ECF No. [82]. The Plaintiff has filed a Response to the Motion, and the Defendant has filed a Reply, ECF Nos. [85] [91].

In the Motion, the Defendant contends that although the Plaintiff prepared a privilege log identifying the email correspondence at issue as work product privileged, those documents are discoverable pursuant to Federal Rule 26(b)(4), which provides, among other things, that communications identifying facts or data that a party's attorney provided to its expert, which the expert considered in forming his or her opinions, are discoverable, ECF No. [82] at 3. The Defendant further contends that communications identifying assumptions that a party's attorney provided to its expert, which the expert relied on in forming his or her opinions to be expressed, are also discoverable. The Defendant thus contends that the Plaintiff has improperly asserted blanket work product protection for all emails between counsel and Plaintiff's expert even when those communications reflect the facts and/or data provided to MacLaughlin to form the basis of his opinions.

In Response, Plaintiff contends that pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(C), all communications between a party and that party's expert are protected from disclosure expect for those that fall into the three enumerated categories identified in that Rule.[1] Plaintiff argues that the emails attached to draft reports and/or the emails that attach case materials do not contain facts, data or assumptions considered or relied upon by the expert, and thus are not discoverable. Plaintiff further contends that many of the emails identified by the Defendant are from MacLaughlin to Plaintiff's Counsel and thus are not discoverable because they were not sent from Plaintiff's Counsel to his expert, as required by the Rule. Plaintiff further asserts that he has produced all of the emails related emails to those emails that are listed in the privilege log that contain opinions or assumptions relied upon by MacLaughlin in reaching his opinions.

*2 In Reply, Defendant generally reiterates the same legal analysis as advanced in the Motion, and identifies a number of specific privilege log entries that Defendant contends are examples of those emails that are subject to disclosure.

Rule 26(b)(4) entitled “Trial Preparation: Experts.” provides in relevant part,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4)(B) and (C). Rule 26(b)(3)(A) and (B), in turn provide,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) and (B). Thus, in tandem, Rules 26(b)(3) and (b)(4) provide protection from disclosure of certain documents related to the trial preparation of experts. Specifically, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) expressly provides protection for drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2) regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) similarly provides protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert witnesses except, in relevant part, to the extent that the communications: 1) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or, 2) identify the assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.

In 2010, Rule 26 was amended in several ways relevant to the resolution of the instant Motion. First, as outlined above, the drafters added Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) to protect draft expert reports and attorney-expert communications as work product. In addition, the drafters changed the language of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) from “data or other information” to “facts or data.” Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2013) (discussing 2010 amendments to Rule 26). This change constituted a rejection of the outcome reached by cases that relied on the former “other information” language in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) to compel the production of draft expert reports and communications between attorneys and experts. Id. Thus, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) was expressly changed so that it would not conflict with new Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C), which now expressly exempt draft reports and attorney-expert communications from discovery. Id.

*3 Indeed, as stated in the 2010 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the amended Rule “is intended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all attorney-expert communications and draft reports.” Rule 26, Advisory Committee Notes (2010). “The amendments to Rule 26(b)(4) make this change explicit by providing work-product protection against discovery regarding draft reports and disclosures or attorney-expert communications.” Id. The 2010 Advisory Committee Notes explain that the amendment was necessary because “[c]osts have risen,” as “[a]ttorneys may employ two sets of experts—one for purposes of consultation and another to testify at trial—because disclosure of their collaborative interactions with expert consultants would reveal their most sensitive and confidential case analyses.” Id. Moreover, “attorneys often feel compelled to adopt a guarded attitude toward their interaction with testifying experts that impedes effective communication, and experts adopt strategies that protect against discovery but also interfere with their work.” Id. Thus, Rule 26 was changed in 2010 to address these concerns.

However, the 2010 Advisory Committee Notes cautioned that new Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) “do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation, or basis of those opinions.” Id. In addition, the Advisory Committee elaborated, “the expert's testing of material involved in litigation, and notes of any such testing, would not be exempted from discovery by this rule.” Id. “Similarly, inquiry about communications the expert had with anyone other than the party's counsel about the opinions expressed is unaffected by the rule.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff's Expert Terry MacLaughlin issued a report regarding the conditions of the ice skating rink aboard the Adventure of the Seas following an inspection conducted on August 19, 2017, ECF No. [127-1]. In the Report, MacLaughlin states that his opinions and conclusions in the report are based upon his 20 years of experience in the ice skating industry, his site visit to the ship, a meeting with Lebron and his family, the CCTV video of Lebron's incident, the video of Lebron's incident, the deposition of Amanda Campos and Lebron, the Defendant's responses to the requests for production provided by Plaintiff's attorney, and a review of the design drawings of the ice rink, ECF No. [127-1].

On September 25, and 26, 2017, Plaintiff served a Supplement and Amended Supplement to MacLaughlin's initial Report that indicated that MacLaughlin reviewed two hours of film of the public skate session in which Lebron fell, which generally further supported his conclusions regarding the hazardous ice conditions in the area where Lebron fell, ECF Nos. [127-2] [127-3].

On October 22, 2017, Plaintiff served its privilege log on Defendant in response to the subpoena duces tecum directed to MacLaughlin, ECF No. [76]. The privilege log lists thirty-one items consisting of sixteen emails between counsel and MacLaughlin and fifteen draft reports. For each of the entries, Plaintiff identifies either Rule 26(b)(4)(B) or (C) as the source of protection from disclosure for the document.

On October 25, 2017, MacLaughlin issued a Rebuttal to Defendant's expert witness David Wescott, ECF No. [128-6]. Among other things, in that report, MacLaughlin identified additional materials that were cited in Wescott's report and were thereafter reviewed by MacLaughlin. Those materials included certain ice maintenance and making course materials, and the ASTM standard guide for ice skating and hockey playing facilities, ECF No. [128-6].

Mr. MacLaughlin was deposed on October 24, 2017, ECF No. [127-5]. When asked if he brought a copy of all of his notes, outlines, drafts or similar writing prepared by him in reviewing or formulating his opinions, he stated that he had brought some outline notes, although he did not provide any copies of his draft reports, ECF No. [127-5] at 15-16. When asked if he had any other notes or outlines that he had created as part of his consultation in the case, he showed Defendant's counsel the notes that he had made the morning of the deposition identifying certain publications that he had read, ECF No. [127-5] at 17-18. He indicated that he had no raw data or measurements. He stated that with the exception of all of the articles and periodicals that he reviewed, which were not referenced in his report, the entirety of the documents or items that he reviewed in preparing his report consisted of a ship inspection, a meeting with the Lebron family, CCTV footage, a video of Mr. Lebron's incident, a deposition of Amanda Campos, defendant's responses to request for production, and design drawing of the ice rink, ECF No. [127-5] at 40. In addition, the following exchange occurred:

ECF No. [127-5] at 41.

Three days after the deposition, and on the last day of the discovery period, the Defendant filed the Motion currently at bar, contending that the Plaintiff had improperly asserted work product protection as to certain emails between Plaintiff's Counsel and MacLauglin that were listed in the Plaintiff's privilege log.

In its Motion, the Defendant has provided examples of the correspondence between Plaintiff's Counsel and MacLaughlin that the Defendant contends is not protected by work product protection. The undersigned has reviewed the examples relied on by the Defendant and concludes, for the following reasons, that the emails at issue are protected from disclosure.

The Defendant first asserts that certain correspondence listed on the Plaintiff's privilege log are not protected from disclosure because those emails identify facts or data that Plaintiff provided to Mr. MacLaughlin. By way of example, Defendant cites the following:

1. August 19 email from counsel for Plaintiff to MacLaughlin listing what discovery MacLaughlin wants Plaintiff to request, as well as MacLaughlin's affirmance of the accuracy of the list;

2. August 15 email from Plaintiff's Counsel sending MacLaughlin template/sample expert report and explaining that report should provide an idea of how expert reports are written in federal court.

3. August 16 email from MacLaughlin to counsel for Plaintiff asking a question about the cause of Plaintiff's fall.

4. August 24 email regarding email from MacLaughlin to Plaintiff's counsel providing his thoughts after reviewing Defendant's discovery responses.

As noted by the Plaintiff, many of the emails cited by Defendant are authored by expert MacLaughlin and are requesting certain information from Plaintiff's Counsel without any indication that such information was provided by the Plaintiff's attorney, which is what the language of section (C) (ii) of Rule 26(b)(4) requires. In other words, the emails do not identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided to the expert but rather reflect Plaintiff's reiteration of the expert's request of items to be obtained by Plaintiff's Counsel, and do not indicate whether those items were produced by Plaintiff's counsel for consideration by the expert.

Defendant additionally identifies other emails as those identifying assumptions provided by Plaintiff to MacLaughlin. The bulk of the emails specifically identified by the Defendant appear to be emails involving Plaintiff's discussions of MacLaughlin's draft reports, or MacLaughlin's thoughts following a review of discovery, ECF No. [91] at 5-6. Neither of these categories fall within the exception set forth in Rule 24(b)(4)(C), and thus are protected from disclosure.

Defendant's reliance on Bluesky Greenlan Envtl. Sols., LLC v. 21st Century Planet Fund, LLC., No. 12-81234-CIV, 2014 WL 12515330, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2014), does not establish that the cited emails are discoverable. In Bluesky, the court conducted a cursory review of the plaintiff's privilege log and concluded that the log failed to comply with either the federal or local rules because it failed to properly designate the asserted privilege, listed clerical tasks, and referenced unknown third parties. Id. at *3. Therefore, the court, in directing the plaintiff to revise the privilege log to correct the deficiencies, reminded the plaintiff of the revisions to Rule 26, which protected communications between attorneys and experts unless the communications, among other things, identified the facts or data provided by a party's attorney that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed. In arriving at its determination, the court cited Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2013), wherein the Eleventh Circuit examined the limits of work product protection of communications between attorneys and experts. The Court in Hinchee concluded that the 2010 amendments to Rule 26 did not confer work-product status on the notes of a testifying expert or on a testifying expert's communications with other experts. Id. at *1194-95.

*5 Here, the emails sought by the Defendant are not the notes of MacLaughlin and are not MacLaughlin's communications with other experts, and thus are not the type of communications identified by the Court in Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee that are not protected by the current version of Rule 26. In fact, the emails specifically cited by the Defendant are either emails that reflect Plaintiff's Counsel's thoughts about reports drafted by MacLaughlin, or are communications from MacLaughlin to Plaintiff's Counsel about his thoughts regarding the Defendant's discovery, his inspection of the ship, or his review of the CCTV footage, ECF No. [91] at 5-6. The undersigned is unable to comprehend how, without more, any of these categories of emails can be considered to be correspondence that identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided to MacLaughlin that he considered in forming the opinions to be expressed, or assumptions provided by the party's attorney that MacLaughlin relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed. Rather, the Defendant seemingly is seeking to obtain communications exchanged between to MacLaughlin from Plaintiff's Counsel, including those communications that reflect Plaintiff's Counsel's thoughts, i.e., attorney opinion work product. This is the exact type of information that the 2010 Amendments to Rule 26 were designed to protect. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Compel is denied.

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production #5, #7, #10, #11, #‘21, #14, #16, ECF No. [89]. As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is untimely, ECF No. [92] at 2. Specifically, the Defendant asserts that because the Court's Scheduling Order ordered the Parties to complete discovery by October 27, 2017, and the Plaintiff did not serve the Defendant with its Fifth Requests for Production until October 18, 2017, the Plaintiff failed to propound that discovery in time for the Defendant respond prior to the close of discovery. The Defendant's argument, however, fails to acknowledge the undersigned's oral rulings made at a discovery hearing held on October 11, 2017, on this issue, ECF No. [164]. At that hearing, the undersigned observed that generally, the Plaintiff's requests for production were overbroad, duplicative and disproportionate to the needs of the case. In reaching that conclusion, the undersigned noted that the Plaintiff had previously propounded sixty-eight (68) requests for production and sought to compel production related to an additional twenty-one (21) requests.

Nevertheless, the Court ruled on three of the Plaintiff's Fifth Requests for Production, including specifically limiting the timeframe as to Request for Production Number 5, which sought production of maintenance logs for refrigeration equipment, to three (3) years, rather than the five (5) years as requested by the Plaintiff.[2] The undersigned also ruled that the Plaintiff would be permitted to propound an additional ten requests for production out of the twenty-one (21), at the Plaintiff's choosing. Specifically, the Court stated, “So [Plaintiff] can pick ten more. And [Defendant] can object on an individual basis, but in terms of all of these, I think they're redundant. I think they are overkill. I think that has been a trend throughout this case.” ECF No. [164] at 38. The Court continued with, “... I am giving you 81 [requests for production]. A total of 81. You need to plan your discovery better because there comes a point when it is simply harassing.” ECF No. [164] at 39. The Court then gave the Plaintiff until October 18, 2017 in which to identify the additional ten Requests for Production to propound on the Defendant, and gave the Defendant two weeks thereafter to respond to those requests, ECF No. [164] at 40. The Court noted that the time frame given to the Parties to complete discovery related to Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production was an example of the undersigned's discretion to extend the discovery deadline, ECF No. [164] at 40.

*6 Plaintiff, thereafter, and in compliance with the undersigned's Order, identified ten additional requests, to which the Defendant responded. Plaintiff now seeks to compel better responses to the Defendant's responses. Thus, the Defendant's contention that the Plaintiff's requests are untimely and should be denied on this basis is without merit, and the undersigned will consider the substance of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel better answers.

In the Motion, the Plaintiff contends that the Defendant failed to provide adequate responses to certain of the Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production, following a discovery hearing before the undersigned, ECF No. [89] at 2. The undersigned examines each request, in turn.

Request for Production Number 5 sought maintenance logs for five (5) years for the refrigeration equipment for the ice rink where Plaintiff's accident occurred. In response to the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the Defendant states that although the Defendant objected to five years as being overly broad, the Defendant nevertheless responded to the request by stating that there were no maintenance logs for the refrigeration equipment for the subject rink for the three years prior to the subject incident. The three (3) year time frame for which the Defendant responded is in compliance with the undersigned's oral ruling at the discovery hearing that limited the scope of the Plaintiff's Requests for Production for maintenance logs to three (3) years, ECF No. [164] at 37. In response to the Motion, however, the Defendant agreed to provide logs for a total of five years.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request to compel additional information is denied as moot.

Request for Production Number 7 sought “all documents indicating the certifications, if any, that the crewmembers responsible for inspecting, repairing, and maintaining the refrigeration equipment for the ice rink at issue in Plaintiff's incident must possess, and all documents indicating what organizations certify them.”

Defendant objected to the request as being vague and overly broad. However, the Defendant produced the personnel file of Ron Noel, the Studio B manager who was responsible for monitoring the refrigeration unit on the date of the subject incident.

For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's request to compel a better response to this request is denied. First, the request does not limit the certifications that are being requested to those related to the maintenance of refrigeration equipment, and does not limit the number of years for when the certifications were issued, thus the request is seemingly overbroad. In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff states that he is “essentially seeking to know if anyone is required to possess any type of certification for operating the refrigeration equipment.” ECF No. [89] at 7. A close read of the request supports the Plaintiff's contention, although the request is confusing and ambiguous as written, as it is unclear if the Plaintiff is seeking identification and production of the certifications held by crewmembers responsible for the refrigeration equipment, or if the Plaintiff is merely asking if RCL requires its crewmembers who are responsible for the refrigeration equipment to hold certain certifications, and if so, for RCL to produce documents indicating that requirement, and documents that indicate what organization provides that certification. Defendant's response to the Motion illustrates this ambiguity because the Defendant states the Request is seeking “the personnel files of every Studio B Manager, technical staff in Studio B, and anyone who may have worked in the engine room for an unlimited period from the time the ship was built until the present.” ECF No. [92] at 6. Therefore, the undersigned sustains the Defendant's objection to the request as being overbroad to the extent that the Request can be read to require the production of all personnel files of certain crewmembers without any time restriction. In addition, to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks information regarding whether RCL requires its crewmembers who work on the refrigeration equipment to hold certifications and for RCL to identify which organizations issue those certifications, the Plaintiff's Request for Production is ambiguous at best. The Defendant does not address this clarification in its Response. Since one of the issues in this case relates to the proper operation of the refrigeration equipment, the request is relevant with respect to the date of the incident at issue. This information is better sought through an interrogatory rather than a request for production, and therefore, on or before August 24, 2018, the Defendant shall respond to this request by stating what, if any, certifications were required for persons operating the refrigeration equipment on the date of Mr. Lebron's fall.

*7 Request for Production Number 10 sought “all maintenance logs for the previous five (5) years for the grinding wheels used to sharpen the ice skates Plaintiff was wearing at the time of the incident.” ECF No. [89] at 7.

The Defendant objected to this request on various grounds, including that the request was overly broad and not proportional to the needs of the case because it sought documents for a five-year period. In its Motion to Compel, the Plaintiff states that the Defendant has indicated that there were no maintenance logs “per se” and that the Defendant produced “replacement orders”, ECF No. [89] at 7. Plaintiff however contends that Defendants should be compelled to provide a better response that states that all documents responsive to the request have been produced. Plaintiff further contends that five years is an appropriate time frame.

In response to the Motion, the Defendant states that it has produced the purchase orders for the replacement parts ordered for the blademaster for two years prior to the Plaintiff's accident. Defendant therefore contends that the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel should be denied because all responsive documents have been produced for the 2 years prior to the incident.

As stated above, the Plaintiff did not file a reply to the Motion, and thus did not provide a response to the Defendant's statement that all responsive documents for the two year time frame prior to the incident have been produced. Accordingly, based upon the needs of this case, and the documents produced by the Defendant in response to this Request, the undersigned concludes that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated the need for any additional production on this issue. The Plaintiff's Request to Compel as to Request for Production Number 10 is therefore denied.

Request for Production Number 11 sought all personnel files for the crewmembers responsible for inspecting, repairing, etc., the grinding wheels used to sharpen the ice skates Plaintiff was wearing at the time of the incident, ECF No. [89] at 8. Request No. 12 sought production of all documents indicating the certification that the crewmembers responsible for inspecting, repairing, storing, etc., the grinding wheels used to sharpen the skates Plaintiff was wearing at the time of the incident, ECF No. [89] at 9.

The Defendant objected to these requests on various grounds, including that the requests were overly broad in the time frame because the requests were not proportional to the needs of the case. Defendant further stated that it is unable to respond to the request because it has been unable to determine which member of the ice staff was responsible for sharpening the ice skates during the subject cruise, and thus is unable to produce his or her personnel file.

In the Motion, the Plaintiff states the Defendant has waived its scope objections by implicitly expressing no objection to producing the documents. Plaintiff's Counsel further states that it “finds it hard to believe” that the Defendant is unable to determine which employee was responsible for sharpening the ice skates. Plaintiff therefore requests that, if there are no responsive documents, the Defendant be required to state that the Defendant does not have any policy or procedure for keeping records responsive to this request.

*8 In Response, the Defendant states, “there is no better response which could be provided as the ice staff crewmember who was responsible for sharpening the skates/utilizing the blade master during the subject cruise remains unidentifiable.” ECF No. [92] at 8.

The undersigned finds that the Plaintiff has the stronger argument on this issue. If the Defendant is unable to identify the particular crewmember who is responsible for skate sharpening on a particular cruise, then the Plaintiff's request that the Defendant be required to state that the Defendant does not have any policy or procedure for keeping records responsive to this request is reasonable and accurate. The Defendant has not stated otherwise. As such, the Defendant shall provide an amended response to Requests for Production Nos. 11 and 12, within five days from the date of this Order, which states that the Defendant does not have any policy or procedure for keeping records responsive to this request.

Request for Production Number 14 sought all photographs and videos of the compressor of the refrigeration equipment for the five years prior to Plaintiff's incident, ECF No. [89] at 10. The Defendant objected to this request on various grounds, including that the request was overly broad and not proportional to the needs of the case as it sought documents for a five year period.

In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff states that the Defendant appears to be waiving this objection by producing photographs that are responsive to Plaintiff's Request. Plaintiff however seeks to compel the Defendant to state clearly that it has produced all documents responsive to the Request.

In response to the Motion, the Defendant states that it has produced photographs of the compressor and refrigeration system. Defendant further states that at the Parties’ 7.1 conferral conference, Defendant informed the Plaintiff that the produced photographs were recently taken in order to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests, and confirmed that no documents were being withheld.

As such, the Defendant shall provide an amended response to Request for Production No. 14, within five days from the date of this Order, which states that the Defendant the Defendant has produced all documents responsive to the Request.

In this Request, Plaintiff sought production of the “ship's position log” from the time of each incident identified in the Defendant's Third Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's Fourth Request for Production Number 63, as well as all of the ship's positions one hour before and one hour after each incident, ECF No. [89] at 11. Defendant responded to the request as being overly broad, unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case.

In response to the Motion to Compel, the Defendant contends that if the Court requires the Defendant to produce ship logs from the time of each prior incident, it would be extremely burdensome for the Defendant to respond to the request because the Defendant would have to contact each ship, have the ship manually locate the page for the particular date of each incident in the handwritten log, photocopy it and have it sent shoreside. Defendant contends that many of the prior incidents are not substantially similar to the issues in this case and the evidence in this case shows that the thrusters were not engaged at the time of the Plaintiff's incident. Defendant further states that it has already provided Plaintiff with information regarding whether the ship was at sea or in port at the time of each of the prior incidents—information which was obtained after Defendant individually retrieved and reviewed the privilege accident reports and/or investigative documents for each prior incident.

*9 In support of its position, the Defendant has submitted the Affidavit of Jillian Studders, the adjuster for guest claims in the Risk Management Department for RCL, ECF No. [92-4]. In that Affidavit, Studders states that she has conducted a search of RCL databases of all slip and falls on the Voyager class vessels for three years prior to Lebron's incident, and determined that there are 108 responsive accident reports. She states that the production of the pages of the handwritten log for one hour before and one hour after each ice skating fall that occurred on the Adventure of the Sea for three years would be extremely burdensome. Defendant thus argues that the Motion to Compel should be denied.

The undersigned agrees with the Defendant. This Request is marginally related to the cause of the Plaintiff's fall in this case, and the work required by the Defendant to produce such documents, as evidenced by the Affidavit submitted by the Defendant, is disproportionate to the needs of this case. The undersigned denies that Plaintiff's request to compel a better response to this Request.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production, is denied except to the limited matters stated above with respect to Requests for Production Nos. 7, 11, 12, and 14 as set forth above in this Order.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Compel Email Correspondence Contained in Plaintiff's Expert, Terry MacLaughlin File, ECF No. [82] is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Better Responses to Plaintiff's Fifth Request for Production #5, #7, #10, #11, #12, #14, #16, ECF No. [89] is GRANTED, in part, only to the extent that Defendant shall provide an amended response to Requests for Production Nos. 7, 11, 12 and 14 as set forth above, on or before August 24, 2018.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami-Dade County, Florida, this 15th day of August, 2018.

In the Response, Plaintiff clarifies that he did not assert a claim of privilege as to email correspondence between his attorneys and Dr. Ying Lu, his biomechanical expert, and that the Defendant cancelled the deposition of Dr. Brad Cohen, ECF No. [85] at 1. The Plaintiff states that therefore the issues raised in Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order Regarding Defendant's Notices of Taking Deposition and Subpoenas Duces Tecum of Plaintiff's Experts, ECF No. [71] are resolved, other than the issue regarding the production of emails by Terry MacLaughlin which is addressed in this Order. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, ECF No. [71] is denied, as moot.

The Court also directed the Defendant to respond to Requests for Production Numbers 1 and 3, which related to documents pertaining to the ice skating rink refrigeration equipment, ECF No. [164] at 36-37. The undersigned also denied the Plaintiff's request for an additional inspection of the ship's refrigeration equipment by the Plaintiff's expert, ECF No. [164] at 16. The undersigned stated that the Plaintiff could seek for the Court to reconsider this ruling after receiving and reviewing the information from the Requests for Production related to the refrigeration equipment, ECF No. [164] at 16.