Hathaway v. Idaho Pac. Corp.
Hathaway v. Idaho Pac. Corp.
2019 WL 12528652 (D. Idaho 2019)
January 16, 2019
Nye, David C., United States District Judge
Summary
The Court found that Idaho Pacific Corporation (IPC) failed to timely disclose Margaret Johnson's P.O. Box address and phone number, which were readily available in her personnel file. IPC also failed to disclose a physical address for Johnson that was in her personnel file. As a result, the Court excluded Johnson as a witness at trial and denied IPC's motion to reconsider the scope of sanctions.
Additional Decisions
ROSS HATHAWAY, Plaintiff,
v.
IDAHO PACIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant
v.
IDAHO PACIFIC CORPORATION, Defendant
Case No. 4:15-cv-00086-DCN
United States District Court, D. Idaho
Signed January 16, 2019
Counsel
Amanda Elizabeth Ulrich, DeAnne Casperson, Casperson Ulrich Dustin PLLC, Idaho Falls, ID, for Plaintiff.Amy Allen Lombardo, Richard H. Greener, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Boise, ID, for Defendant.
Nye, David C., United States District Judge
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Idaho Pacific Corporation's (“IPC”) Motion to Reconsider (Dkt. 132). Specifically, IPC moves the Court to reconsider the scope of sanctions previously imposed for IPC's failure to timely disclose all contact information for Margaret Johnson during discovery. Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will address the motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds good cause to DENY the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court has recounted the background of this dispute in prior orders. See Dkt. 48, at 2-5. Most relevant to the instant motion is Margaret Johnson's role in the case. Johnson and Hathaway were co-workers at the time of the alleged incident that gave rise to this litigation. Following that incident, Johnson gave a statement to her supervisor that she overheard Hathaway say that he should “trip and fall and then [IPC would] have to pay.” See Dkt. 18-6. Hathaway denies making that statement and claims he was never given a chance to respond to Johnson's allegation. IPC claims that it met with Hathaway and gave him a chance to do just that. However, IPC kept no record of such a meeting, unlike the interview with Johnson, which was both tape-recorded and transcribed.
During discovery, Hathaway asked IPC for Johnson's contact information and personnel file so he could depose her. In its initial disclosures, IPC indicated that it did not have an address for Johnson. Later, in its supplemental disclosures, it gave Hathaway a P.O. Box number for Johnson located in Ririe, Idaho. Finally, apparently after Hathaway made several attempts to obtain information from IPC, IPC gave Hathaway a phone number for Johnson. The number was no longer in service. IPC maintains that it terminated Johnson in April of 2014 as part of a reduction in force. Dkt. 39, at 4. IPC continued to contact Johnson at the P.O. Box address in Ririe, Idaho, after it terminated her. Id. Johnson has never given IPC a forwarding address or change of address information. Id. Therefore, IPC maintains that it gave Hathaway the only contact information it had for Johnson. Id.
Hathaway was unable to contact or depose Johnson during discovery, which closed on September 30, 2016. Dkt. 39, at 3. However, at the end of June, 2017, IPC asked to take a trial deposition of Johnson. Id. Apparently, Johnson moved to Nevada after leaving IPC, and IPC finally obtained her current contact information by hiring a private investigator. Id. On June 28, 2017, IPC provided this updated contact information to Hathaway along with its request to depose Johnson. Id. at 4.
Following this development, Hathaway moved to exclude Johnson as a witness. In granting that motion, the Court explained:
*2 IPC violated the discovery rules. First, IPC failed to timely disclose Johnson's P.O. Box address and phone number. This information was readily available to IPC; it appeared on many documents within Johnson's personnel file. Accordingly, IPC should have included this information in its initial disclosures on July 24, 2015. Instead, it initially stated that her address and phone number were unknown. It did not supplement this initial disclosure with Johnson's Ririe, Idaho, P.O. Box until August of 2015 and it did not provide Johnson's phone number to Hathaway until June 6, 2016. At that point, the phone line was out of service. Yes, IPC eventually disclosed this information during discovery, but it should have disclosed it earlier and its dilatory disclosure may have prevented Hathaway from locating Johnson during discovery. Moreover, during its in camera review of Johnson's personnel file, the Court located a physical address for Johnson that IPC never disclosed on a “Payroll Verification Information” form. It is not clear whether this information would have led Hathaway to find Johnson, but the failure to disclose this address was a violation of the letter of the law as it was “reasonably available” to IPC. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E). IPC's failure to comply with Rule 26 is neither substantially justified nor harmless.
Dkt. 48, at 7-8. In light of these findings, the Court did not permit IPC to use Johnson as a witness at trial, either by calling her as a live witness or presenting her prerecorded trial deposition. Id. at 9. IPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court denied. See Dkt. 82, at 1-7.
The first trial occurred between December 11, 2017, and December 15, 2017, and ended with a hung jury. The Court declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial on all claims. The new trial is set to begin on March 18, 2019. On October 19, 2018, IPC filed another Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Court to allow Johnson to serve as a witness in the second trial.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
The parties disagree over what standard should apply to the instant motion. IPC claims the Court should “review[ ] the matter under its inherent discretionary power to revisit all interlocutory decisions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).” Dkt. 133, at 1-2. That Rule states, in part:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
FRCP Rule 54(b) (emphasis added).
In discussing this rule, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[a]ll rulings of a trial court are subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment.” United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, under Rule 54(b), the Court has broad discretion to revisit and modify an interlocutory order.
Hathaway counters that Rule 54 does not apply, and that IPC can only bring this Motion for Reconsideration under Rules 59 or 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There appears to be some merit to this argument. While the Ninth Circuit has explained that a “district court's power to rescind, reconsider, or modify an interlocutory order is derived from the common law, not from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” City of L.A. v. Santa Monica BayKeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001), at least one district court in this Circuit interprets City of L.A. as simply “affirm[ing] the power of trial courts to correct their own mistakes” and “does not create a right of parties to bring a motion for the court to correct or change its orders.” Henderson v. Muniz, No. 14-cv-01857-JST, 2018 WL 6331008, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018). Thus, IPC's instant motion may be improper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the Court will briefly address the merits of IPC's request.[1] While the Federal Rules may not provide a vehicle for IPC to seek reconsideration on this issue at this time, Rule 54(b) undoubtedly gives the Court power to do so sua sponte.
IV. ANALYSIS
*3 Although the Court has the power to modify its prior order, it does not find compelling reasons to do so. Rule 37(c)(1) permits the Court to preclude “the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). This power “gives teeth” to Rule 26(a) requirements. Id. The Court's prior order fully explained its reasoning for excluding Johnson from trial, and the Court stands by that reasoning today. See Dkt. 48, at 5-9.
While IPC claims changed circumstances justify a modification to the Court's prior order, the Court disagrees. The Court did not exclude Johnson simply because the first trial was fast approaching, as IPC's motion seems to suggest. The Court excluded Johnson because IPC did not properly disclose her information during discovery—proximity to trial had nothing to do with it.
Next, IPC attempts to paint the hung jury as a “changed circumstance[ ] [that] warrant[s] another look at the matter.” Dkt. 133, at 1. Again, the Court disagrees. That the first trial resulted in a hung jury does not change the fact that IPC failed to comply with Rule 26(a) long before trial and does not alter the Court's view of an appropriate sanction for that failure.
Nor is the Court persuaded by IPC's plea for a reduced sanction because it “has now experienced the full brunt of this sanction—a trial without the evidence.” Dkt. 133, at 4. This argument—that the Court should reduce the consequences of IPC's discovery violation simply because the first trial resulted in a hung jury—has no legal basis and does little to persuade the Court. Just because the sanction has affected IPC once does not mean it no longer applies. The Court imposed this sanction because of IPC's conduct during discovery, and the outcome of the first trial is largely irrelevant to the sanction's continued vitality.
Finally, IPC once again asks the Court to—at the very least—allow it to introduce Johnson's recorded interview at trial. For the same reasons stated above, the Court will not deviate from its prior order excluding this recording from trial as no changed circumstances warrant doing so. IPC failed to properly disclose Johnson's information during discovery, and it must live with the consequences of that failure.
V. ORDER
The Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. Idaho Pacific's Motion to Reconsider (Dkt. 132) is DENIED.
Footnotes
The Court does not need to determine today whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) gives parties a right to bring a motion for a court to correct or change its orders, as the Court will instead review its previously imposed discovery sanctions under Rule 54(b) of its own volition.