Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vinkov
Bhd. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vinkov
2021 WL 3553733 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
August 2, 2021

Blumenfeld Jr., Stanley,  United States District Judge

Dismissal
Bad Faith
Sanctions
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Summary
Electronically stored information was not relevant and was not discussed. The Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiff, dismissed the Defendant's counterclaims, and denied the Plaintiff's motion for monetary sanctions. The Court found that the Defendant's actions were outside the scope of his authority and not covered by the insurance policy.
Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company
v.
Sergei Vinkov
Case No.: 5:19-cv-01821-SB-SP
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed August 02, 2021

Counsel

Robert W. Brockman, Jr., David Phillip Berman, Brockman Bennett Quayle, San Diego, CA, Lee H. Roistacher, Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP, Solana Beach, CA, for Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company.
Sergei Vinkov, Hemet, CA, Pro Se.
Blumenfeld Jr., Stanley, United States District Judge

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND EX PARTE APPLICATION TO STAY (DKT. NOS. 206, 207, 234, 245)

*1 Before the Court are several filings relevant to the resolution of this insurance dispute. First, Plaintiff Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company moves for summary judgment as to both the complaint and counterclaims. Dkt. Nos. 207, 207-1 (MSJ); see Dkt. Nos. 228 (Opp. to MSJ), 232 (Reply ISO MSJ). Second, Plaintiff alternatively moves to dismiss the counterclaims as a terminating sanction for discovery abuse. Dkt. No. 206, 206-1 (MTD); see Dkt. Nos. 229 (Opp. to MTD), 232 (Reply ISO MTD). Third, Plaintiff seeks monetary and terminating sanctions based on Defendant Sergei Vinkov's purportedly frivolous filings. Dkt. Nos. 234, 234-1 (Mot. for Sanctions); see Dkt. Nos. 235 (Opp. to Sanctions), 240 (Reply ISO Sanctions). And fourth, Defendant seeks, by ex parte application, to stay these proceedings pending resolution of the underlying litigation. Dkt. No. 244 (Appl.); see Dkt. Nos. 245 (Opp. to Appl.), 246 (Reply ISO Appl.).
 
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was a volunteer member of the Church Council for the Trinity Lutheran Church of Hemet. Dkt. No. 207-2 (Pltf. SUF) 3. The church has a general liability policy through Plaintiff that, under certain circumstances, covers the actions of church employees and volunteers. Pltf. SUF 11. In 2018, a company called Solar Forward installed solar panels at the church. Pltf. SUF 2, 4. Dissatisfied with the purported lack of savings in the church's energy bills promised by Solar Forward, Defendant began investigating the church's energy usage. Id. After Solar Forward was not sufficiently responsive to Defendant's inquiries, Defendant began posting critical reviews of Solar Forward on social media. Pltf. SUF 7. In particular, Defendant posted a one-star review on the website Yelp.com, stating Solar Forward's products caused the church's energy bills to increase. Dkt. No. 207-5 (Berman Decl.) Ex. 3.
 
After Defendant refused to remove the posts, Solar Forward sued Defendant in state court for libel, slander, and trade libel. Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. 1. Defendant tendered his defense in the state-court action to Plaintiff based on his membership on the Church Council. Pltf. SUF 12. Plaintiff initially provided Defendant with a defense but withdrew it after it concluded no coverage existed. Pltf. SUF 13-14. Plaintiff reinstated its defense under a reservation of rights after the California Department of Insurance asked Plaintiff to review its coverage determination. Pltf. SUF 15. Plaintiff sued in this Court, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend, (2) a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to indemnify, and (3) recovery of its fees and costs in the underlying action. Dkt. No. 1 (Compl.). Defendant brought a series of counterclaims, of which only claims for bad faith and prompt payment remain. Dkt. Nos. 38 (First Amended Counterclaim), 49.
 
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment as to both its complaint and Defendant's remaining counterclaims. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves to dismiss the counterclaims as a terminating sanction. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for both terminating and monetary sanctions. While these motions were pending, Defendant sought, by ex parte application, a stay of all proceedings. The Court will look to each in turn.
 
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
*2 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to both the declaratory relief sought in Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant's counterclaims. Regarding the complaint, Plaintiff contends summary judgment is proper for its requested declaratory relief on the grounds that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff lacks a duty to defend or indemnify Defendant in the underlying action.
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record, read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are those necessary to the proof or defense of a claim, as determined by reference to substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on the issue. Id. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50.
 
The burden is first on the moving party to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party satisfies this burden either by showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, or by introducing enough evidence to entitle the moving party to a directed verdict when the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 325; C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party satisfies this initial requirement, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to designate specific facts, supported by evidence, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the nonmovant “fails to properly address another party's assertions of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion [or] ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
 
A.
The Court begins with the question of whether there is a duty to defend. Under California law, “[a]n insurer must defend its insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity under the policy.” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transportation, 36 Cal. 4th 643, 654 (2005). Whether a duty to defend exists “evaluated in light of the complaint's allegations, as well as extrinsic facts made known to the insurer at the time the claim is tendered.” Gorzela v. State Farm Gen. Ins., Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d 989, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2016). “While this duty is broad, it is not limitless ....” Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 2017). And “where there is no potential for recovery on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend.” Tana v. Pros. Prototype I Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 1616 (1996). For instance, “an insurer does not owe a duty to defend if it conclusively demonstrates that a policy exclusion applies to preclude coverage.” Associated Indus. Ins. Co. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., No. 3:20-CV-00507-H-DEB, 2021 WL 1921016, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2021); see S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 4th 383, 388-89 (2010) (“if, as a matter of law, neither the complaint nor the known extrinsic facts indicate any basis for potential coverage, the duty to defend does not arise in the first instance”).
 
*3 Here, Plaintiff argues that there is no duty to defend because Defendant is not even covered by the church's insurance policy. In particular, Plaintiff points to the policy language, which defines “covered person” to include the church and its leaders, employees, appointed persons, and volunteers (or the spouses of such persons) “in relation to any leadership activity undertaken on [the church's] behalf.” Dkt. No. 207-2 (Pltf. SUF) 20; see Dkt. No. 207-4 (Kelble Decl.) Ex. A. “Leadership activity” is further defined by the policy to mean “the decision-making acts of [the church's] leaders regarding the operation of your organization, and includes related and authorized activity undertaken by volunteer committee members and by other covered persons for the purpose of implementing such decisions.” Pltf. SUF 24; Kelble Decl. Ex. A.
 
Plaintiff notes “[t]here are no allegations in [the underlying] complaint that defendant was acting on behalf of the Church or within the course and scope of defendant's agency with the Church.” Pltf. SUF 10 (citing Berman Decl. Ex. 1). Furthermore, Plaintiff states Defendant was not a “covered person” because his allegedly defamatory “social media posts were not authorized by the Church, made for the benefit or on behalf of the Church, made within the course and scope of his duties as a member of the Church Council, or made in relation to the Church's religious or not-for-profit operations.” MSJ 7; see Pltf. SUF 26. Plaintiff provides the declaration of Kathie Christensen, a former member and former president of the Church Council. Dkt. No. 207-3 (Christensen Decl.) ¶ 1. She states “[c]ouncil members are not expected or authorized to act independently on any matter.” Id. ¶ 5. According to Christensen, after the solar panels were installed, Defendant began incessantly sending Christensen and other church leadership “with paperwork regarding his alleged investigation into the operation of the installed solar panels.” Id. ¶ 4. This culminated in a “report” regarding the operation of the solar panels, which Defendant had created on his own and without direction of church leadership. Id. ¶ 6. No one in leadership “authorized defendant to take any action related to his report.” Id. Around December 2018, Defendant began contacting Solar Forward and making social media posts “without the knowledge or authorization” of anyone in church leadership. Id. ¶ 8. According to Christensen, Defendant's role as member of the Church Council did not authorize him to make social media posts on behalf of the church and his duties in that role did not relate to “the Church's contracts and relationships with third party contractors.” Id. ¶ 15. Once Christensen and other leadership became aware of Defendant's actions, church leadership wrote Defendant twice to advise him that his activities “were done without the permission of the Church.” Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff also notes that Defendant himself stated in his social media posts that he “felt a big pressure from the Church leaders to remove” his allegedly defamatory review. Dkt. No. 207-5 (Berman Decl.) Ex. 3.
 
In sum, Plaintiff carries its burden, for purposes of this motion, to show that Defendant's conduct of making allegedly defamatory social media posts was undertaken on his own and without authorization of any church leader. Consequently, at least in regard to the actions giving rise to the underlying litigation, Defendant is not a “covered person” for purposes of the church's insurance policy with Plaintiff, and thus Defendant falls outside the scope of coverage.
 
Defendant offers nothing sufficient in response to defeat summary judgment. Though he provides a response to Plaintiff's statement of facts, Defendant fails to genuinely dispute any facts material to the question of coverage. For instance, he points to his own declaration, which says his actions “were conducted within the scope of [his] duties and performed in good faith to prevent the misuse of the congregational funds.” Def. Genuine Disputes 9 (quoting Dkt. No. 11 (Vinkov Decl.) ¶ 6). He also relies on his own affidavit, which seems to express that he was discharging his volunteer duties and that there was no requirement that he seek approval before making social media posts in the exercise of those duties. Def. Genuine Disputes 8 (citing Dkt. No. 39 (Vinkov Affidavit)). But these self-serving materials are wholly conclusory and fail to identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see also F.T.C. v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”). Otherwise, Defendant's opposition brief is only four pages of substantive content and fails to meaningfully discuss the question of coverage at issue here. Opp. to MSJ 2-5. Rather, it briefly identifies several alleged “jurisdictional defects.” Id. Though the arguments are hard to follow, they largely seem to rest on the notion that this case's dispute is theological in nature and thus inappropriate for resolution in a secular, judicial forum. This is a theory the Court has already rejected. Dkt. No. 199 (“Nothing in the First Amendment prevents this Court from resolving a dispute turning on the secular terms of a contract voluntarily entered into by a religious organization.”).[1]
 
*4 In the end, Plaintiff carried its initial burden, and Defendant failed to properly address the facts or legal arguments asserted against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Defendant offers nothing to show that his actions placed him within the scope of the insurance policy's coverage. Thus, there is no potential for coverage or, by extension, a duty for Plaintiff to defend Defendant in the underlying action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff's declaratory relief claim concerning the absence of a duty to defend.[2]
 
B.
The Court's finding that there is no duty to defend is material to the other issues presented by Plaintiff's motion.
 
Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on its declaratory relief claim regarding whether it possesses a duty to indemnify Defendant in the underlying action. MSJ 6-8. California law instructs that “the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295 (1993). So “where there is no duty to defend ... there is also no duty to indemnify.” Gorzela, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 996; see Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal., 47 Cal. 4th 302, 308 n.1 (2009) (noting a “conclusion” that there is no duty to defend is “dispositive” of a claim that there is a duty to indemnify). Accordingly, given the absence of a duty to defend, the Court also concludes there is also no duty to indemnify. Thus, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief regarding the duty to indemnify.[3]
 
Additionally, Plaintiff further moves for summary judgment as to Defendant's remaining counterclaims for bad faith and prompt payment. MSJ 8-10; First Amended Counterclaim 29-37. Judge Carney previously construed these claims as alleging a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Dkt. No. 49; see Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 121, 127 (1991) (“We have long recognized that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists to assure prompt payment of claims made by the insured.”). “California law is clear, that without a breach of the insurance contract, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, these counterclaims are “foreclosed” by the “determination that [Plaintiff] did not breach its duty to defend” Defendant. Everett Assocs., Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 35 F. App'x 450, 452 (9th Cir. 2002); see Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1, 36 (1995) (“It is clear that if there is no potential for coverage and, hence, no duty to defend under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.”). The Court therefore GRANTS the motion for summary judgment as to Defendant's counterclaims.
 
III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
*5 Plaintiff separately moves to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims “for his willful failure to comply with multiple Orders of the court.” MTD 1. Though this Order grants summary judgment as to the counterclaims, the Court is persuaded that dismissal would otherwise be appropriate on this separate ground.
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) states: “If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders.” Such orders include “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence” or “dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii), (v). A sanction of dismissal under Rule 37 usually requires improper conduct that was “due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1233 (9th Cir.2006) (citation omitted).
 
Moreover, “[t]he inherent power of the Court extends beyond those powers specifically created by statute or rule, and encompasses the power to sanction misconduct by the attorneys or parties before the Court.” Lewis v. Ryan, 261 F.R.D. 513, 519 (S.D. Cal. 2009). “Dismissal under a court's inherent powers is justified in extreme circumstances, ... in response to abusive litigation practices, ... and to insure the orderly administration of justice and the integrity of the court's orders.” Halaco Eng'g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
 
Plaintiff seeks dismissal because Defendant has repeatedly failed to conduct discovery in good faith, even in the face of consistent court directions to do so. For instance, the Magistrate Judge imposed monetary sanctions against Defendant for “refus[ing] to answer any substantive questions about the subject matter of the lawsuit” at his deposition, despite the Magistrate Judge's clear instruction that he was not relieved from his obligation to be deposed. Dkt. No. 161. But when Defendant sat again for a deposition, his conduct continued to be obstructive, repeatedly failing to answer simple questions, raising frivolous objections, and improperly criticizing the opposing attorney and his Russian interpreter. To identify just a few examples, when Plaintiff's counsel asked Defendant whether he ever went by the name “Daniel Vivkon,” Defendant responded:
It's a good question. But to provide the answer, I would like to ask the David what's the meaning – what's his meaning under the word “name”? Because “name,” it's can be – I don't know. Descriptive – descriptive, like, I don't know, bed, window. It can be an English word, if you look at vocabulary, has a lot of meanings and sometimes people use the name like to state user names for electronic communication. But it will be different – it will be sound so different for legal communication names when the people represent themself in society for legal purposes.
See Dkt. No. 207 (Berman Decl.) Ex. B at 45. When asked when he joined the church, Defendant responded:
David, I feel so sorry. I understand this is your job and I am not empowered to criticize the quality of your job. We have California State Bar to evaluate your performance. Your client can look our records and transcripts of this deposition to evaluate the quality of your preparation. But I would like to state objections that asked and answered before because I disclosed that information in the state court – California state court's jurisdictions and the federal jurisdictions. And it's a well-known fact when I was officially joined to Trinity Lutheran Church ...
*6 Id. at 78-79. When asked whether anyone at the church asked him to conduct an investigation into the solar company, Defendant responded:
Okay. David, I'm totally – I'm sorry, but your question doesn't allow me to help you. First, definition of the church. We know the definition of the church from the Bible. We are two person in the name of the God. It's a church. A church may be a vehicle like name of organization, religious nonprofit organizations. Church can be referred to as a place where I was a member where Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company was insurer. And, mainly, a definition is not specified. It's so hard for me to describe. And I don't understand. Do you expel the Holy Spirit of the Jesus Christ from our dialogue, from our religious duty? It's not clear, so I would like to just object. That the question is so vague and ambiguous that deprives me to state answer clearly.
Id. at 87-88. When asked whether he told anyone from the church that he was going to post the Yelp review, Defendant responded:
Could you be more specific or context or dates or do you mean God or Holy Spirit or – could you be more specific? I'm saying repetitiously that your question doesn't allow me to state clear answer because, in my mind, I'm thinking in theological, a legal and civil discourses, so I don't understand what genre you're trying to dig. So, for me, I can say that, yes, with the Holy Spirit permission, but I don't understand will this be sufficient for you or not. So it's – you just need to be more clear and probably, that's why I'm saying and asking supreme court.
Id. at 105-106. The transcript is replete with similar instances of Defendant's evasive non-responses. Though some of the issues could have been due to the fact that English is not Defendant's first language, Defendant declined to rely on the interpreter provided for him when answering the questions. Id. at 133 (Defendant: “I decline and terminate the certified interpreter right away from this further proceedings. I disagree with statements which she have made and I decline the processions and I would like to make a break to resolve my emotional and mindful situation.”). This choice to forgo the interpreter appears to have also created problems and delay. See id. at 109 (Plaintiff's Counsel: “Mr. Vinkov, I want to note for the record, again, that your English is so bad and your pronunciation is so bad, your refusal to use the Russian interpreter is hampering the court reporter's ability to perform her duties ...”).
 
The decision to not use the provided interpreter and the multitude of nonresponsive answers, meritless objections, and needless criticisms of others “reflect an attitude that evasive behavior and delay is the most effective way to resolve this case.” Am. Bd. of Internal Internal v. Mittman, No. SACV 08-00929-AG (MLGx), 2010 WL 11515310, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010). Importantly, this conduct occurred after the Magistrate Judge had already made plain that Defendant “was not excused from providing substantive answers during his deposition” and imposed monetary sanctions against him. Dkt. No. 161. Even before that, Plaintiff sought terminating sanctions as to Defendant's counterclaims based on “his willful failure to comply with Magistrate Pym's October 5, 2020 Order to provide substantive responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests by October 19, 2020.” Dkt. No. 121. This Court highlighted the “prejudice that results from a party's failure to comply with the discovery process and court orders” but declined “to issue the extreme remedy of a terminating sanction when no lesser relief has been imposed (or requested) and the violative party has not been warned of the risk of dismissal.” Dkt. No. 149. Against the backdrop of this history, Defendant's obstructive and evasive conduct at his deposition evinces the “willfulness, bad faith, and fault” needed to impose terminating sanctions. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007).
 
*7 In sum, though the Court is mindful of “the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits,” id., other considerations support the conclusion that Defendant should not be allowed to continue to litigate his counterclaims. Defendant's conduct appears to be part of an overall pattern that amounts to an abuse of process, including submitting an extraordinary number of filings, many unnecessary or frivolous. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 224 (denying Defendant's motion for default judgment because Plaintiff had filed an answer to the counterclaim and noting that “Defendant has been submitting numerous and often wholly meritless filings”). Defendant has been warned repeatedly that failure to comply with court orders and the discovery process may result in case-dispositive sanctions.[4] Yet Defendant continued to obstruct his deposition when it resumed. It does not appear that any lesser sanction would be sufficient to enforce compliance. Furthermore, Defendant's conduct has caused prejudice to Plaintiff by thwarting the discovery of information and increasing the costs of the litigation. Similarly, the public's interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket favor termination sanctions.
 
Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims. With a subsequently filed motion, Plaintiff also “seeks both monetary and dispositive sanctions, in the form of a dismissal of defendant's counter-claim, for continuously having to respond to numerous defendant's frivolous filings ....” Mot. for Sanctions 1. This later-filed motion is DENIED. Having already dismissed the counterclaims as a sanction, the motion is largely moot, and the Court declines to impose monetary sanctions on top of terminating sanctions.
 
IV. DEFENDANT'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
Lastly, the Court resolves Defendant's ex parte application for a stay. Dkt. No. 244 (Appl.); see Dkt. Nos. 245 (Opp. to Appl.), 246 (Reply ISO Appl.). Arriving weeks after the motions discussed above were fully briefed, this application requests a stay of this matter pending final resolution of the underlying action. It is seemingly motivated by the filing of an amended complaint in the underlying action and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). Appl. 6.
 
Defendant's application does not demonstrate that a stay is warranted such that the Court should not resolve the immediate motions for summary judgment and to dismiss. The complaint in the underlying action was recently amended, but notably Defendant did not attach the new pleading to his application or articulate why the amendment is meaningful here. Plaintiff, however, notes that “the only change in the Amended Complaint are the names of the parties.” Opp. to Appl. 2 (e.g., “the original 2019 Complaint identified defendant as Sergei Daniel Vinkon; the Amended 2021 Complaint identifies defendant as Sergei Daniel Vinkov”). Nor does the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fulton appear to have any bearing whatsoever on this matter. As discussed above, this insurance dispute does not appear to turn on the First Amendment's religion clauses in any way.
 
To be sure, an insurance coverage case should often be stayed until the underlying case is fully resolved to avoid prejudicing the insured through inconsistent factual determinations. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. B.T.B., Inc., No. CV-F-10-1990 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 284974, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011). But “when the coverage question is logically unrelated to the issues of consequence in the underlying case,” a declaratory relief action seeking to determine the existence of coverage “may properly proceed to judgment.” Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. 4th 902, 908 (1994). Here, the Court grants summary judgment on the narrow ground that Defendant's actions were outside the scope of his authority as a church leader and, thus, he was not covered by the insurance policy. Defendant identifies no relationship between that finding and the questions posed by the underlying litigation, and the Court likewise discerns none. Cf. Pltf. SUF 10 (“There are no allegations in Solar Forward's complaint that defendant was acting on behalf of the Church or within the course and scope of defendant's agency with the Church.”).
 
*8 A stay can also be appropriate pending resolution of the underlying litigation to avoid forcing the insured to fight “a two-front war, doing battle with the plaintiffs in the third party litigation while at the same time devoting its money and its human resources to litigating coverage issues with its carriers.” State Farm, 2011 WL 284974, at *7 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Yet that rationale has little purchase here, where the stay request raising such an argument comes over twenty months into the case and well after discovery has concluded and dispositive motions have been fully briefed. All that remains is to grant summary judgment and Defendant provides no persuasive reason for why the Court should defer doing so.
 
The ex parte application is DENIED.
 
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court:
• GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment:
• GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaims;
• DENIES Plaintiff's motion for monetary sanctions; and
• DENIES Defendant's ex parte application.
 
The various objections filed by both parties are overruled. Plaintiff must submit a form of judgment by August 9, 2021.

Footnotes
Defendant's arguments in opposition invoke myriad legal doctrines, many that bear no clear relation to the case at hand. None persuades this Court that summary judgment is improper, and none warrants a detailed response. See Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir.1984) (wholly meritless arguments do not warrant extensive treatment).
Having found there is no duty to defend, the Court need not address Plaintiff's alternative argument that there was no “occurrence” for purposes of coverage because Defendant's conduct was intentional.
The motion for summary judgment does not analyze the third claim for relief, for recoupment of defense expenditures, perhaps because Defendant elected to represent himself in the underlying litigation. In any event, it appears that Plaintiff has abandoned this claim.
Dkt. Nos. 149 (warning that “failure to comply with ... any other order from this Court or the magistrate judge may result in sanctions, up to and including case-dispositive sanctions”), 152 (warning that the failure to “comply with the ordinary meaning of all orders ... or otherwise act in good faith, may result in sanctions, up to and including case-dispositive sanctions”). Warnings have not worked. Nor have monetary sanctions. Magistrate Judge Pym imposed monetary sanctions against him when he failed to meaningfully participate at his initial deposition. Dkt. No. 161.