Defendant argues, among other things, that since plaintiff asserts that it was not possible for her to take duty-free meal periods, that she never took duty-free meal periods when she worked for defendant, and that she took a working lunch every day,[2] defendant is entitled to information about personal activities plaintiff may have conducted during her workday in order to defend itself in this litigation. In particular, defendant argues: 1. that telephone records, records of purchases made during the workday, and documents showing dates and times of personal appointments plaintiff attended during any day she worked for defendant[3] could show that plaintiff spent time during her workday on personal activities such as engaging in social phone calls, shopping, and attending to personal matters, which would contradict plaintiff's assertions that it was not possible for her to take duty-free meal periods; 2. that defendant's need for such records to show how plaintiff spent her days outweighs plaintiff's privacy concerns; and 3. that any burden to produce the records would be slight.

Plaintiff counters that whether she actually took a meal period on any given day is not an issue for class certification;[4] that since defendant did not have a specific meal period policy prior to 2010, and defendant simply left it to each investigator to decide whether and when to take a meal break, whether or not plaintiff took a duty-free meal period that complied with California law is a damages question bearing no relationship to the issues at the class certification stage of this litigation; and that the phone records will not show who made or received the calls or whether business was being conducted, the sales records will not reveal when a transaction took place or how long it took to make the purchase or whether plaintiff was conducting business at the same time, and the appointment records will not show the length of the appointments or if plaintiff simultaneously conducted business.

Plaintiff initially objected to each of the six discovery requests on the same three grounds: relevance, burden, and privacy. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), discovery is permitted of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” As a general matter, Rule 26(b) is to be “liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information,” even if that information is not ultimately admitted at trial. See Comcast of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Top End International, Inc., 2003 WL 22251149, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (“Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). The burden here is on plaintiff to show that discovery should not be allowed (Comcast, at *2, citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)); it is not up to plaintiff to decide what defendant needs to defend this action. In any event, it is not the role of the Court in this Motion to determine what evidence the District Judge will actually allow in at a trial in this case. See, e.g., Colonial Life & Accident Insur. Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 31 Cal.3d 785, 791, n. 8 (1982) (quoting Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 161, 172-73 (1970) (“[Courts] may appropriately give the applicant [for discovery] substantial leeway, especially when the precise issues of the litigation of the governing legal standards are not clearly established [citation]; a decision of relevance for purposes of discovery is in no sense a determination of relevance for purposes of trial.”) (brackets in original)). Thus, what is relevant will be liberally considered. Nevertheless, “[d]iscovery must be narrowly tailored ... and must not be a fishing expedition.” Zewdu v. Citigroup Long Term Disability Plan, 264 F.R.D. 622, 626 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Groom v. Standard Ins. Co., 492 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2007)). Based on its review of the Complaint, and the parties' positions in connection with the Motion, the Court finds that much of the requested discovery, as modified below, is relevant under these standards.

Furthermore, plaintiff's objections that the requests for documents and interrogatories are oppressive and burdensome lack substantiation. It is well-established that the burden is on the objecting party to show grounds for failing to provide the requested discovery. See, e.g., Smith v. B & O Railroad Co., 473 F.Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979); Sherman Park Community Association v. Wauwatosa Realty, 486 F.Supp. 838, 845 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Laufman v. Oakley Building and Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 121 (S.D. Ohio 1976). Plaintiff cannot simply invoke generalized objections; rather, with respect to defendant's discovery requests, plaintiff

Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citations omitted); Wirtz v. Capitol Air Service, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 641, 643 (D. Kan. 1967). For a burdensomeness argument to be sufficiently specific to prevail, it must be based on affidavits or other evidence showing the exact nature of the burden. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 24 (D. Neb. 1983) (party objecting to production requests must specify why the requests are objectionable); Roesberg, 85 F.R.D. at 296-97. Plaintiff's generalized objections of burdensomeness are insufficient.

Neither does plaintiff's objection that the requested information is private warrant her refusal to produce the information. The Court has balanced plaintiff's asserted right to privacy against the relevance of the information being sought by defendant. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992); Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (the right to privacy is not absolute, but is “subject to invasion depending upon the circumstances.”). The Court finds that defendant's discovery needs here outweigh the concerns of plaintiff, and that the Protective Order entered in this action -- which contains multiple levels of protection, and specifically contemplates the production of information of a “private nature” (Protective Order, ¶ 6(a)) -- strikes the appropriate balance between the need for the information and the privacy concerns. See, e.g., Knoll v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (approving of protective orders to protect non-parties from “the harm and embarrassment potentially caused by nonconfidential disclosure of their personnel files”).

The Court concludes that the documents and information sought by defendant are relevant to defendant's defense in this action, and must be produced. The Court agrees with defendant that records showing multiple purchases during an extended time frame, or transactions from locations that require significant time to complete (such as at a restaurant), lengthy telephone calls to non-work related numbers, or personal appointments kept during workday hours, could show that plaintiff had time during her workday for personal activities, and could thus disprove her allegations that she could never take 30 minutes off during the day for lunch. Such information may also be used, among other purposes, to impeach plaintiff's testimony. Whether defendant's meal period policy, or lack thereof, during the relevant time frame is sufficient in and of itself to prove that defendant is liable in this action, or that class certification is appropriate, is an issue to be determined by the District Judge in the certification motion or at trial, not in this discovery motion. Accordingly, defendant's Motion is granted. No later than August 19, 2011, plaintiff shall produce all documents and information responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 25-27 and Interrogatories Nos. 14-16 for the time period from August 26, 2006, through November 30, 2008.[5] The documents and information shall be limited to those days during the relevant time frame that plaintiff contends she was actually at work, and to the hours of 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.