*1 Plaintiffs Willie Williams, LaDon Cline, and Paul Contreras (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (“Defendant” or “J.B. Hunt”) in Orange County Superior Court on July 30, 2020. See Dkt. 1-1. On September 3, 2020, the action was removed to this Court. See Dkt. 1. On October 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint alleging Defendant violated sections of the California Labor Code relating to wages and meal and rest breaks; violated the Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2699, et seq.; and engaged in unlawful or unfair business practices under Section 17200, et seq., of the California Business and Professions Code. See Dkt. 16 (“FAC”).

On April 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Defendant to provide further responses to discovery, with a Local Rule 37-2 Joint Stipulation and supporting and opposing declarations with exhibits. Dkt. 24 (“Motion”); Dkt. 24-1 (“Joint Stipulation” or “Jt. Stip.”); Dkt. 24-2 to 24-7. The Court ordered the parties to file their optional Local Rule 37-2.3 supplemental memoranda by April 30, 2021, which the parties did. Dkt. 25, 26 (“Pls.' Supp. Mem.”), 27 (“Def.'s Supp. Mem.”). Finding that the Motion may properly be decided without oral argument, the Court vacates the Motion's hearing set for May 27, 2021, and rules as follows.

A. Substantive Discovery Law

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs, v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted).

Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)); Rule 26(b)(2). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)).

*2 Under Rule 34(a)(1), a party may serve on any other party requests, within the scope of Rule 26(b), to produce or permit inspection of, among other things, “any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Such requests “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection ....” Rule 34(b)(1)(A), (B). The party responding to a request for production must, for “each item or category,” “either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C).

Under Rule 33, “[a]n interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Rule 33(a)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Rule 33(b)(4). A propounding party may move for an order compelling an answer to an interrogatory if “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33.” Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii).

“Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”); Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

B. Local Rule 37 Procedures Governing Discovery Motions

On motions relating to discovery filed in this district, Local Rule (“L.R.”) 37-1 instructs:

L.R. 37-2 directs that if after the foregoing conference, counsel “are unable to settle their differences, they must formulate a written stipulation unless otherwise ordered by the Court.” L.R. 37-2.1 instructs, in part:

*3 L.R. 37-2.1. The moving party must deliver its portion of the joint stipulation to the other party after the parties' conference with “all declarations and exhibits to be offered in support of the moving party's position.” L.R. 37-2.2. Unless otherwise agreed, the opposing party must deliver its portion of the joint stipulation with all declarations and exhibits within seven days of receipt of the moving party's materials. Id. Once the opposing party's material is added to the joint stipulation by the moving party, the opposing party must sign, electronically or otherwise, the completed document by the end of the next business day. Id.

L.R. 37-2.4.

Courts may deny discovery motions for failure to comply with the Local Rules' requirements for such motions. See Pina v. Lewis, 717 F. App'x 739, 740 (9th Cir. 2018) (district court may properly deny a motion to compel “for failing to comply with local rules”); see also Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court's discretion.”); Lumber Liquidators, Inc. v. Sullivan, 2012 WL 4464867, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (denying discovery motion for failure to comply with L.R. 37-2); So v. Land Base, LLC, 2009 WL 2407954, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (same).

A. The Motion Was Not Prepared in Conformity with L.R. 37

According to Plaintiffs' counsel, upon receiving the discovery responses at issue in the Motion, counsel “sent a lengthy meet and confer letter” to Defendant's counsel “to begin the meet and confer process under [L.R.] 37” on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 24-2 at 2, ¶ 4. Defendant's counsel “responded by letter on April 6.” Id. Plaintiff's counsel represents that counsel “then informed [Defendant's counsel] that based on the response, the parties appeared to be at a standstill, and [Plaintiff's counsel] sent Plaintiffs' portion of the Joint Stipulation.” Id. In response, Defendant's counsel advised that the parties had not “sufficiently met and conferred.” Id. Following an exchange of email, Plaintiffs' counsel again advised Plaintiffs “would move forward with filing the Joint Stipulation and narrow the issues as needed based on any additional meet and confer.” Id. Counsel for the parties had a “Zoom conference call on April 19 to further discuss the issues but were not able to reach a resolution.” Id. The meet and confer correspondence appears to confirm the material aspects of the foregoing meet and confer chronology. See Dkt. 24-4.

Plaintiffs' meet and confer efforts were lacking under both the letter and the spirit of L.R. 37. As noted, L.R. 37-1 places the burden on the moving party contemplating a discovery motion to arrange for the conference designed to attempt, in good faith, to eliminate as many disputes as possible between the parties. The process begins with a compliant L.R. 37-1 letter “requesting such a conference.” Only after the failure of a conference of counsel in which they, in good faith, try to eliminate as many issues as possible raised in a meet and confer letter, may a moving party proceed with sending its portion of a joint stipulation. See L.R. 37-2. Plaintiffs here sent a “meet and confer” letter on March 9. Defendant filed a responsive letter on April 6. Plaintiff does not purport to rely on L.R. 37-2.4, so the issue of whether Defendant failed to confer in a timely manner is not before the Court. After receiving Defendant's April 6 letter, but before the parties had held a L.R. 37-1 conference, Plaintiffs sent their portion of a Joint Stipulation to Defendant. In so doing, Plaintiffs failed to comply with L.R. 37-2, which requires the Joint Stipulation to be forwarded only after a L.R. 37-1 conference has taken place. That the parties, five days after Plaintiffs sent their portion of the Joint Stipulation, held a Zoom conference does not alter the outcome for two reasons. First, although the parties may “otherwise agree” to alter some aspects of the L.R. 37 process, Defendant apparently did not agree to alter the meet and confer order, as reflected in its objection to the process prior to the Zoom conference. See Dkt. 24-2 at 2, ¶ 4; Dkt 24-4 at 22 (CM/ECF pagination). Second, Plaintiffs' counsel advised they “would move forward with filing the Joint Stipulation,” apparently regardless of the outcome of any subsequent conference, and would only thereafter “narrow the issues as needed based on any additional meet and confer.” Dkt. 24-2 at 2, ¶ 4. Thus, the belated conference was, in all material respects, doomed to failure.

*4 Plaintiffs' sending of its portion of the Joint Stipulation before the parties had conferred in good faith either in person or by remote means violated L.R. 37's procedures. Doing so also violated the spirit of L.R. 37, which is designed to create a process by which the parties in good faith work collaboratively to attempt to resolve their disputes or as many of those disputes as possible through a conference of counsel. A party that has already prepared and forwarded its portion of a Joint Stipulation before such a meeting, and states the party will be proceeding with the Joint Stipulation regardless of the outcome of the meeting, is not proceeding in a manner designed in good faith to collaboratively resolve a disputes. Plaintiffs approach here was not in conformity with the letter or spirit of L.R. 37.

Having so found, the Court turns to the issue of the appropriate remedy. As noted, courts may deny discovery motions for failure to comply with the Local Rules' requirements for such motions. See Pina, 717 F. App'x at 740; Tri-Valley CARES, 671 F.3d at 1131; So, 2009 WL 2407954, at *2. However, it is apparent that a compliant meet and confer was not likely to resolve or narrow issues raised in the Motion regarding the proper scope of class discovery. Further, the material presented is sufficient for the Court to rule on that dispute, and, because of the importance of that dispute in framing other issues, both in the Motion and in other potential discovery matters, the Court exercises it discretion to hear and decide that issue here. But with respect to all other issues raised in the Joint Stipulation, as discussed further in Section III.C., below, the Court denies the Motion as to all other issues for failure to comply with L.R. 37's procedures.

B. Proposed Class Definition and Class Discovery

The Court first addresses the parties' dispute on Plaintiffs' class definition. Plaintiffs argue that they “are entitled to information for the entire putative class,” which they define as “[a]ll California drivers who performed work for J.B. Hunt under its piece-rate compensation scheme from four (4) years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the date of final disposition.” Jt. Stip. at 22; see also FAC ¶ 35. But Defendant argues a “fundamental infirmity runs through all of Plaintiffs' discovery requests” because Plaintiffs' class definition is not “clear [and] suitably tailored to Plaintiffs' theories of liability in this case” and contains “language that assumes facts that J.B. Hunt disputes.” Jt. Stip. at 4.

1. Summary of the Parties' Arguments

As context, Defendant explains that

Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 2. Defendant also states that it

Jt. Stip. at 30 (citing Dkt. 24-7, Ex. A-F).

Defendant sets forth two reasons why Plaintiffs' proposed class comprise an “ill-defined group of employees.” Jt. Stip. at 30. First, Defendant argues “the term ‘California drivers’ in the class definition” is unclear and overly broad. Id. at 31. Defendant states that Plaintiffs' proposed class “include[s] any driver who ever worked in California in the last almost five years, even if California law might not apply to them because they weren't based in California or did not predominately work in California.” Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 3; see also Jt. Stip. 31 & n.4 (citing Dkt. 24-7, Ex. S) (stating Plaintiffs “insist they are entitled to identifying information for all ‘California resident drivers’ ” and also “seek information on any J.B. Hunt driver who worked in California, regardless of residence”). Stating that “Plaintiffs complain only about the time they worked in the dedicated business unit for the Target account in Rialto, California,” Defendant argues Plaintiffs' proposed class should therefore be limited “to those California resident drivers who worked for the Target account in California.” Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 4.

*5 Defendant also takes issue with “the phrase ‘piece-rate compensation scheme’ in the proposed class definition, stating it does not help “identify[ ] an ascertainable class” because

Jt. Stip. at 8-9 (citing FAC ¶ 9 (“The piece rate formula is based on the number of miles [Defendant's drivers] drive and the number of stops they make. Thus, when the ‘wheels are not rolling,’ they are not earning compensation.” (emphasis omitted)); Dkt. 24-7, Ex. A-M); see also Jt. Stip. at 32. Defendant states it has “pointed out these flaws,” but Plaintiffs “made no effort to recast the proposed class definition.” Jt. Stip. at 9; see also id. at 31.

Plaintiffs argue that their proposed class definition should not be narrowed because they “are entitled to discovery to determine whether certification is appropriate” before class certification. Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 1 (stating also that Defendant is seeking “to preliminarily adjudicate class certification prior to producing any discovery on the issue”); see Jt. Stip. at 22 (stating the discovery requests at issue are “critical to Plaintiffs' ability to gather information about the scope of Defendant's liability and the appropriateness of class certification”). “As the Ninth Circuit has noted[,] ‘the better and more advisable practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigants an opportunity to present evidence as to whether a class action was maintainable.’ ” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 1 (quoting Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977)). So, Plaintiffs argue, limiting the proposed class definition “upends the nature of evidence-gathering in a class action.” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 1.

As to Defendants' contentions about certain phrases in the proposed class definition, in relation to the phrase “California drivers,” Plaintiffs maintain that “[c]aselaw is clear that discovery of information for the entire putative class, even if they worked at different locations from the Named Plaintiffs, is appropriate.” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 2. As to Defendant's contentions about the phrase “piece-rate compensation scheme,” Plaintiffs argue “how drivers are paid and whether the pay scheme is legal go to the very heart of the merits of this lawsuit,” and “Defendant's documents showed that drivers are paid by piece-rate or activity-based compensation.” Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 2. Therefore, “the legality of this compensation scheme and whether it's a ‘piece-rate’ should not be adjudicated prior to even obtaining any discovery.” Id.

2. Relevant Legal Standard

*6 Whether to allow pre-class certification discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975). “[O]ften the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class certification and that some discovery will be warranted.” Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942; see also In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating Rule 23(a)'s threshold requirements for class actions are: (1) numerosity; (2) common questions of law or fact; (3) typicality of the claims or defenses; and (4) adequacy of the representation). But while “in some cases a district court should allow discovery to aid the determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of [Rule] 23 are satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion.” Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (as amended) (citing Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (“the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating the class allegations”)).

Although “nothing in Doninger and Mantolete ... suggests that a prima facie showing is mandatory in all cases, ... it is clear that a court has discretion to decide whether to require the prima facie showing that was approved of in Doninger and Mantolete” before allowing discovery. Kaminske v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2010 WL 5782995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010); see Madeira v. Converse, Inc., 2019 WL 7877349, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2019) (“But although it would be an abuse of discretion to deny class discovery where a plaintiff has made [a prima facie showing], courts have discretion as to whether a prima facie showing is required for class discovery to proceed.” (citing Kaminske, 2010 WL 5782995, at *2)); Cortez v. Best Buy Stores, LP, 2011 WL 13238983, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (citing Kaminske, 2010 WL 5782995, at *2); Amaraut v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7558 at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2020) (exercising the court's discretion to not “require a prima facie showing as a prerequisite for pre-certification discovery”); accord Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942. Indeed, the prima facie showing standard has been cited and implicitly reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit and applied by other courts in this District. See, e.g., Perez v. Safelite Grp. Inc., 553 F. App'x 667, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2014) (as amended); Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942; Johnson v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp., 2020 WL 6565315, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020); Nguyen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 503, 505-506 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

3. Application

Plaintiffs have not shown that responses to the discovery requests in dispute are likely to substantiate their class allegations. Plaintiffs instead insist that they need not make a prima facie showing and that “caselaw” permits the pre-class certification discovery they seek. Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 1. Defendant, however, has presented support for concluding that Plaintiff's class definition is overly broad and unwieldy, rendering class-wide discovery based on that definition overly broad and disproportional to this case's needs.

Although Plaintiffs do not clarify what they mean by “California drivers,” Plaintiffs appear to seek information on drivers who worked in California from 2016 to “the date of final disposition” even if a driver was not a California resident or did not predominately work in California. See FAC ¶ 39 (alleging that Plaintiffs and proposed class members “work or have worked for Defendant as drivers in California”); accord id. ¶ 35 (stating the relevant time period). Plaintiffs neither refute Defendant's assertions about this issue nor suggest “California drivers” refers to a more limited group. Counsel's meet and confer correspondence on this issue also show that Plaintiffs refused to narrow “the definition of ‘truck drivers,’ ” because “[t]here has been no Court order or ruling limiting Plaintiffs' discovery or claims to only those truck drivers who worked more than 50% of their time in California,” and “[i]n these initial stages of discovery, Plaintiffs are allowed to conduct discovery on broad issues so long as they are relevant.” Dkt. 24-7 at 1119-20.

*7 Such expansive class discovery is not warranted at this time based on the information presented on this Motion. To start, the named Plaintiffs allegedly were employed by Defendant within California and drove routes in Los Angeles County and Orange County only. See FAC ¶ 30. Plaintiffs do not allege they drove in other counties in California as Defendant's employees. Moreover, Defendant's documents show that its pay plans vary between accounts and divisions. See Dkt. 24-7, Ex. A-F. Plaintiff does not provide any support that, by merely “work[ing] or hav[ing] worked” as one of Defendant's drivers in California, a driver would be subject to the same violations alleged. FAC ¶ 39; see Manigo v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2016 WL 9281314, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (denying class-wide discovery where the plaintiffs offer “no evidence through declaration, argument, or otherwise, that any other router dispatcher in ... California was subjected to the same unlawful practices of which they complain, or that defendants maintained an unlawful policy or practice at any or all of its California facilities during the requested time frame.”); Erami v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 2016 WL 11520703, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (“The record before the Court in this case contains no evidence that plaintiff's experience working for defendant ... extended beyond the branch in California where she was employed.”). Therefore, pre-class certification discovery into Defendant's drivers who neither are California residents nor predominately work in California, based on the information provided, is not be proportional to the needs of this case.

Plaintiffs' citation to Frieri v. Sysco Corp., 2017 WL 2908777 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2017), and Amaraut, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7558, does not alter the outcome here. See Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 2. In Frieri, the court found the plaintiff made a prima facie showing and “satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 pleading ... as demonstrated by survival of claims in response to a motion to dismiss.” 2017 WL 2908777, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (“survival of a motion to dismiss necessarily demonstrates compliance with the prima facie requirements” (citing Nguyen, 275 F.R.D. at 507)). That has not happened here. Further, as discussed above, the Court here finds Plaintiffs have not otherwise shown they have made a prima facie showing.

As for Amaraut, the court in that case “use[d] its discretion and [did] not require a prima facie showing as a prerequisite for pre-certification discovery.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7558, at *27. Here, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion to require Plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing that the written discovery requests at issue are likely to support their class allegations given Defendant's evidence that pay plans vary between accounts and divisions and the broad definition of “California drivers” even though Plaintiffs are alleged to have driven routes in only Los Angeles and Orange Counties while employed by Defendant. Compare Madeira, 2019 WL 7877349, at *3 (finding the plaintiff “made at least the minimum showing that there are class-wide issues that could be substantiated with class-wide discovery” because the defendant “does not provide any further explanation of its argument” that the plaintiff failed to make such a prima facie showing), with Holloway v. 3M Co., 2019 WL 7172600, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (denying class-wide discovery in part because the defendant's regional human resources manager's declaration explaining “the substantial differences between the operations at each facility”), reconsideration denied, 2019 WL 7173146 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019).

On the phrase “piece-rate compensation scheme,” the Court notes that this phrase, at least theoretically, narrows the scope of the class discovery sought: It limits discovery to “California drivers” who were under Defendant's “piece-rate compensation scheme.” Jt. Stip. at 4. Yet Defendant has provided documents showing that its pay plans are not, unlike Plaintiffs' definition of “piece-rate compensation scheme,” “based on the number of miles [Defendant's drivers] drive and the number of stops they make.” FAC ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted); see, e.g., Dkt. 24-7, Ex. A-F. And despite Defendant purportedly raising this issue with Plaintiffs, a claim that Plaintiffs do not refute, Plaintiffs did not amend their proposed class definition. So, while the phrase “piece-rate compensation scheme” qualifies “California drivers,” there is little practical effect, and it even creates ambiguity in Plaintiffs' proposed class definition.

*8 For the reasons above, at this time, based on the evidence presented on this Motion, allowing the discovery sought into Plaintiff's proposed class is disproportionate to this case's needs. Nonetheless, the Court declines to limit class discovery to “California resident drivers who worked for the Target account in California” as Defendant argues. Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 4. Plaintiffs' allegations, as presented in the FAC, are not specific to “the time they worked in the dedicated business unit for the Target account in Rialto, California,” as Defendant states. Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 4; see also id. at 2. Notably, Defendant did not argue that class discovery should be narrowed in this way in the Joint Stipulation, only doing so in its Supplemental Memorandum. Defendant's contention is thus neither adequately briefed nor argued.

Thus, for all discovery requests, to the extent Plaintiffs seek an order compelling further responses based on Plaintiff's class definition, the Motion is DENIED.

C. All Other Issues Raised in the Motion

As discussed above, Plaintiffs failed to comply with L.R. 37's procedures in preparing and presenting the Motion to the Court. Although the Court has exercised its discretion to decide the main issue raised in the Motion regarding the scope of class discovery, it exercises its discretion to deny relief as to all other issues raised in the Motion, without prejudice, because of Plaintiffs' violation of the letter and spirit of L.R. 37 meet and confer procedures. The basis for the Court's decision is partially set forth in Section III.A., above. In addition, the Court notes that it is apparent from the Joint Stipulation and the parties' respective Supplemental Memorandum that the main issue in dispute was the class-based discovery requests. The ruling on that issue should serve to eliminate, narrow, or recast many, if not all, of the other disputes relating to the particular language at issue in certain requests and certain objections.

In addition, and separate and apart from the meet and confer issues, a joint stipulation in support of a discovery motion “must contain all issues in dispute” and, if, for example, the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is at issue, “the stipulation must contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient answer, followed by each party's contentions as to that particular interrogatory, separately stated.” L.R. 37-2.1. Here, the Joint Stipulation, as it relates to the parties' disputes on the particular language of specific request and on specific objections to particular requests, does not present the parties' respective arguments in serial form or in a fashion that clearly presents the disputes. It was Plaintiffs' obligation to present the issues in compliance with Local Rule 37-2.1. Instead, it appears that Plaintiffs provided an “omnibus” “legal argument” relating to all disputed discovery requests, rather than following each request at issue. See Jt. Stip. at 21-29. There are circumstances where such a global approach may be warranted, such as the issue of the propriety of class-wide discovery, on which the Court has ruled. But when the dispute concerns individual objections, such a vagueness, overbreadth, or privilege, relating to individual discovery requests, and the specific language of the request and the response matter, the Joint Stipulation's presentation prevents the Court from efficiently and effectively considering the parties' respective positions. In organizing the Joint Stipulation as they did, Plaintiffs have left the Court in the position of hunting between various places within the Joint Stipulation to attempt to locate the discovery request in dispute, the response, Plaintiffs' purported challenge to the response or the objections in the response, and Defendants answer to those challenges. A further meet and confer on the disputed requests, responses, and objections, considering the Court's ruling on the class-wide discovery issue, with any remaining issues presented in a coherent way, is necessary here.

*9 As a result, the Motion is denied as to other remaining issues. But this denial is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a renewed motion, with a properly formatted joint stipulation following additional videoconference, telephonic, or in-person (if permitted by governing restrictions) meet and confer efforts by counsel on each request, response, or objection remaining in dispute.

With respect to such potential further meet and confer efforts, the Court notes the following:

Parties responding to discovery should use common sense and attribute ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests. Advanced Visual Image Design, LLC v. Exist, Inc., 2015 WL 4934178, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (citing Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 606 (S.D. Cal. 2012)); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 618-19 (D. Colo. 2007) (finding parties have an “obligation to construe ... discovery requests in a reasonable manner”); King-Hardy v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 32506294, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2002) (finding the responding party must give discovery requests a reasonable construction, rather than strain to find ambiguity); McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000) (“A party responding to discovery requests should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized ....” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A party objecting based on vagueness or ambiguity must explain the objection. See NexGen HBM, Inc. v. ListReports, Inc., 2018 WL 6438572, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (rejecting the defendants' objections that numerous terms are “vague or ambiguous” given that they “offer no argument to support the objection” (citing Jones v. Cooper, 2010 WL 2816323, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (“To the extent that [the] [p]laintiff objects to the request on the ground that it is vague, ambiguous, or overbroad, [he] must explain how the request is vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.”))).

As noted, a party responding to a request for production must, “[f]or each item or category, ... either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C). An evasive or incomplete answer or response is treated as a failure to answer or respond. Rule 37(a)(4). Thus, “[a]n objection may state that a request is overbroad, but if the objection recognizes that some part of the request is appropriate, the objection should state the scope that is not overbroad,” and identify what is withheld based on the objection. Rule 34 Advisory Committee Notes (2015 Amendment).

Further, when a party withholds information under a claim of privilege, the party must (1) “expressly make the claim,” and (2) “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Rule 26(b)(5)(A). A party asserting a privilege must “provide sufficient information to enable other parties to evaluate the applicability of the claimed privilege or protection.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, “boilerplate objections or blanket refusals inserted into a response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege.” Id. at 1149. Furthermore, “the effect of untimeliness in properly asserting the privilege is to waive or otherwise abandon the privilege.” Id. at 1147.

*10 Lastly, given the denial of the Motion, the Court does not address the parties' contentions over the use of Belaire-West notices, noting that the issues are somewhat narrower in light of the Court's ruling above. The Court nevertheless notes that the parties agree that privacy protection is warranted here. See Jt. Stip. at 15 n.2; Pls.' Supp. Mem. at 5. Counsel in cases such as this one routinely reach agreement on appropriate procedures for issues such as these. Counsel are directed to work collaboratively and in good faith to attempt to resolve all discovery disputes informally, particularly as to issues relates to the privacy interests of third parties that all parties acknowledge.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion (Dkt. 24) is denied.