For the reasons outlined below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiffs commenced this civil rights action on May 18, 2020 on behalf of the Estate of Daniel Hernandez and individual plaintiffs Manual Hernandez and Maria Hernandez.[1] (Dkt. No. 1.) On August 18, 2020, the Honorable Dolly M Gee granted the parties' stipulation to consolidate the case with an action brought on behalf of minor M.L.H. through a guardian ad litem against the same defendants arising out of the same police shooting incident that resulted in the death of Daniel Hernandez. (Dkt. No. 24.)[2] Plaintiffs filed the operative Consolidated Complaint on September 8, 2020. (Dkt. No. 26 (“Complaint”).)

The Complaint alleges that on April 22, 2020, Hernandez was involved in a serious multi-vehicle auto accident in which he was among the injured. (Complaint at ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs allege that, after Daniel Hernandez exited his vehicle, “he walked a few steps from his vehicle in an unsteady gait posing no threat to anyone when Defendant McBride discharged two rounds at Hernandez.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiffs allege that after Hernandez fell to the ground McBride “continued to shoot at Daniel Hernandez even after he fell to the ground in a fetal position” and every round McBride fired “was unnecessary and each shot constituted the use of excessive force.” (Id.) According to the Complaint, “McBride's rounds lacked justification and recklessly endangered multiple bystanders,” and “the shooting violated LAPD policy and training regarding the drawing of weapons, tactics, and the use of force.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that both before and after the shooting, McBride “improperly marketed herself as an LAPD officer on various social media platforms” where “[s]he improperly capitalized on her position as an LAPD officer through this marketing[.]” (Id. ¶ 27.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that McBride used her LAPD position to become a social media influencer as a firearms enthusiast, including posting a YouTube video where McBride introduced herself “as an LAPD officer and she is heard to enthusiastically claim that she is from the LAPD's ‘Shootin’ Newton’ station.” (Id.) With respect to McBride, and as relevant to the Motion, the Complaint alleges that

(Id. ¶ 28.) McBride is alleged to have been acting under the color of state law at all times relevant to this lawsuit and is sued in her individual and official capacity. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for excessive force/unreasonable seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Claim); municipal liability for unconstitutional customs and practices against the City of Los Angeles and LAPD (Second Claim); interference with familial integrity and substantive due process violation (Third Claim); assault and battery (Fourth Claim); wrongful death (Fifth Claim); civil rights violations under California Civil Code (Sixth Claim); and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Seventh Claim). (Id. ¶¶ 31-90.)

A. Discovery Requests At Issue in the Motion

The Motion seeks an order compelling Defendants to respond to the following discovery requests:

Because of the voluminous nature of Plaintiff's requests and Defendants' responses, the Court will not recite each request and response in full here. However, the Court summarizes the substance of each request in its merits discussion below.[3] The relevant discovery requests and responses, as provided in the Joint Stipulation, are attached hereto as Appendix A.

B. The Informal Discovery Conference and Further Production of Documents

On April 12, 2021, the Court held an informal discovery conference with the parties in an effort to resolve the parties numerous disputes. (Dkt. No. 44.) At the conference, the Court addressed the parties' disagreement about certain proposed language for a Stipulated Protective Order, which was then entered on April 14, 2021. (Dkt. No. 45.) Second, the Court specifically discussed the City's responses and objections to Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 17-18, 20-23, 27-37, 40-46; and McBride's responses and objections to Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 14-30; and Interrogatories No.7, 9, 11-17. At the informal discovery conference, the Court ordered Defendant City to submit relevant portions of Defendant McBride's personnel file to the court for in camera review of information responsive to RFP Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 17, 30, 31, 32 (TEAMS and TEAMS II reports), 34 (any sustained use of force reports); 35 (background re: hiring) and 42 (LAPD DFAR). (Dkt. No. 44 at p. 3.)

The Court conducted in camera review of the McBride personnel documents and ordered Defendants to produce the responsive documents with limited redactions subject to the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order. (See Dkt. Nos. 50, 55.) Because the Court has already ordered the production of these documents the Court need not address these requests in resolving the Motion.

*3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, a party may obtain discovery concerning any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As amended in 2015, Rule 26(b)(1) identifies six factors to be considered when determining if the proportionality requirement has been met—namely, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Relevant information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id.

Rule 37 provides that “[a] party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3). The party seeking to compel production of documents under Rule 34 has the “burden of informing the court why the opposing party's objections are not justified or why the opposing party's responses are deficient.” Best Lockers, LLC v. Am. Locker Grp., Inc., Case. No. SACV 12-403-CJC (ANx), 2013 WL 12131586, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013).

District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to compel, the Court has similarly broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallet, 296 F.3d at 751).

A. Plaintiff's Positions

In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have obstructed Plaintiff's efforts to obtain essential discovery by neither “serv[ing] their Initial Disclosures on Plaintiff M.L.H. nor serv[ing] any of their responses to co-Plaintiffs' similar discovery demands that were served on the City on July 20, 2020.” (Joint Stip.at 15.) Plaintiff further contends that Defendant McBride did not “serve any responses to Plaintiff M.L.H. to the initial set of discovery.” (Id.) Consequently, “Plaintiff M.L.H. served her own set of discovery ... on Defendants on February 12, 2021.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants “did not serve their responses to Plaintiff M.L.H.'s requests timely within the deadline prescribed by the FRCP 34, thereby waiving their objections[.]” Plaintiff maintains that Defendants “belatedly responded” with “boilerplate and meritless objections, a defective privilege log and a faulty declaration by custodian Detective Hun.” (Id. at 16.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant City's responses were due on March 15, 2021 but were not received until March 18 and McBride “responded with a similar set of meritless and boilerplate objections[.]” (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that when Defendants finally agreed to meet and confer, they refused to do so by video link, demanding instead a telephonic discussion where neither defense counsel “was prepared to discuss any issued raised in Plaintiff's Rule 37 meet and confer letter” and had a “very dismissive and disrespectful attitude toward Plaintiff's counsel or their discovery obligations.” (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff further complains that during the informal discovery conference “the Magistrate displayed a highly restrictive approach toward police misconduct litigation discovery,” “was very accommodating to the City attorney and demanded exacting drafting skills and relevancy arguments from Plaintiff, when it is not the precedent in federal civil rights cases briefed in this motion.” (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff also expressed dissatisfaction that the informal discovery conference did not include any discussion of Defendant's “faulty privilege log” and did not require Defendants to provide an “amended privilege log identifying all records sought any why it is burdensome to produce them with a Protective Order.” (Id.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the Magistrate Judge's order following the informal discovery conference required specific production by Defendants, but Plaintiff “is not clear what will be produced in response to the Magistrate's directives as the IDC and therefore “this motion addresses the authorities on broad discoverability of police personnel files.” (Id. at 19.)

*4 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have not produced a valid custodian's declaration or privilege log. (Id. at 49.) Plaintiff contends that the privilege log served with Defendants' initial responses on March 18, 2021 was defective in several ways. First, Plaintiff argues that Custodian Detective Brian Hun's Declaration (the ‘Hun Decl.”) fails to establish that Hun “actually reviewed” the records sought and does not detail “what specific harm would flow from disclosing them under a protective order.” (Id.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the Hun Declaration and the attached privilege log is “flawed because it adds newly asserted objections based on various grounds that were not asserted in the initial responses to these discovery demands, nor are available to the City in this action[.]” (Id. at 50.)

In sum, Plaintiff argues that Defendants provided boilerplate objections to virtually every request, asserted baseless privileges as grounds for refusing to produce relevant, discoverable investigative documents that are key to the civil rights claims at issue, and largely failed to produce responsive documents essential to Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants should be ordered to provide an amended privilege log and that monetary sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) are warranted against Defendants. (Joint Stip.at 130-132.)

B. Defendants' Positions

Defendants argue that following the informal discovery conference and the Court's entry of the Stipulated Protective Order, “a vast majority of the discovery issues in Plaintiff's motion compel have been resolved[.]” (Joint Stip.at 20.) Defendants emphasize that pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Order following the informal discovery conference, “Defendants have already produced documents and will be producing more in the next few days.” (Id. at 21.) Defendants also point out that during the informal discovery conference, the Court found that a number of Plaintiff's discovery requests were overbroad, sought irrelevant information and/or invaded McBride's legitimate rights of privacy. (Id.) Defendants also respond that Plaintiff's counsel's contentions that Defense counsel was unwilling “to engage in informal discussions and to meet and confer in good faith” are unfounded and inaccurate. (Id.)

Defendants object that many of Plaintiff's discovery requests are overbroad, ambiguous, seek confidential information that is shielded from discovery by a litany of privileges, including the “official information,” “governmental privilege,” “deliberative process” privilege, by the doctrine of “self-critical analysis” and/or that the information sought in Plaintiff's requests invade “the rights of privacy of any officers whose name may be mentioned in the requested documents.” (Id. at 50.)

I. Defendants' Discovery Responses are Timely

As an initial matter, the Court first addresses whether Defendants timely served their discovery responses. Under Rule 34, “[t]he part to whom the request id directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A). In addition, Rule 6(d) provides that when a party must act within a specified time after being served and service is made by mail, the deadline is extended by three (3) days.” FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants' responses were due on March 15, 2021 but not received until March 18, 2021, therefore, the responses were untimely under Rule 34. (Joint Stip. at 16.) On that basis, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have waived all objections to Plaintiff's RFPs and Interrogatories. (Id.) Defendants respond that “despite being in this case since September of 2020, the disputed discovery was served on Defendant City on February 12, 2021.” (Id. at 88.) Defendant City maintains that the parties had “no agreement to email only service, thus the standard rules concerning time of responses applies.” (Id. at 89.) Thus Defendant City asserts that its responses were due on March 17 not March 15 as Plaintiff contends, and the City “served their responses via email and mail on March 17 to Mr. Casillas's office. (Id.) According to Defendant City, counsel for M.L.H. “was inadvertently left of [sic] that email,” but “when it came to defense counsel's attention the next morning, the responses were then emailed to Ms. Mkrtchyan and an additional copy was sent out by mail.” (Id.) Thus, Defendant City maintains that its responses were timely and no objections have been waived. (Id.)

*5 It is undisputed that Plaintiff served the discovery requests on February 12, 2021 by email. (See Dkt. No. 52-8 ((Ex. E).) Consequently, pursuant to Rule 34, Defendants' responses were due 30 days later, on March 15, 2021 and Rule 6(d) extended the deadline by 3 days for mail service. Defendant McBride served responses to Plaintiff M.L.H's RFPs and Interrogatories by email on March 15, 2021 and indicated that no hardcopy would follow. (Dkt No. 52-7 (Ex. D).) Defendant City provided its responses to Plaintiff M.L.H's RFPs via email and U.S. Mail on March 17 to the office of Plaintiff's co-counsel in the consolidated action and then on March 18 served the responses on Plaintiff M.L.H. via email and U.S. Mail. (See Dkt. No. 52-9 (Ex. F).)

Accordingly, on the record presented here, the Court concludes that, applying Rule 6(d), Defendant City had 33 days to serve its responses, i.e., until March 18, 2021. Thus, Defendant City's responses served on March 17 (and again on March 18) were timely. Defendants' objections are not waived.

II. Defendants' Objections Based on California Statutes and State Law Privileges Do Not Preclude Disclosure of Relevant and Proportionate Information

Although the Court finds that Defendants' objections are not waived, that does not mean that Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's Requests should be sustained. Indeed, Defendants' responses contain virtually identical objections in response to nearly every discovery request, particularly the RFPs that seek LAPD administrative, policy, and investigative information concerning the shooting on April 22, 2020 that resulted in the death of Daniel Hernandez and gives rise to this lawsuit. (See Joint Stip. at 21-45.) Defendant City also asserts various California statutes, including California Evidence Code Section 1040 et seq. and Section 1043, Government Code Section 6254, and Penal Code Sections 832.5, 832.7 and 832.8 as shielding from discovery key information that Plaintiff seeks in this federal civil rights action. (See, e.g., id. at 22 (Response to RFP No. 1.)

The Court first notes that even where California state statutes afford some protection under state law for the types of official information that Plaintiff seeks, where, as here, a case is brought under federal civil rights law, state law does not govern discoverability and confidentiality. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (holding in civil rights action, “the law of California ... does not inform federal privilege law.” (internal citations omitted)); King v. Conde 121 F.R.D. 180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Questions of privilege in federal civil rights cases are governed by federal law.” (internal citations omitted).) Pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in cases where federal law governs, the applicability of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience. FED. R. EVID. 501; and see Price v. County of San Diego, 166 F.R.D. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting “the only privileges which exist in federal question cases are those which have been established through the federal common law.”).

Furthermore, Defendant's asserted privileges and state statutes do not serve as absolute shields to bar disclosure in discovery if the information is otherwise relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case and the discovery is proportionate to the needs of the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As one district court emphasized, the “direct application of the state rule would be undesirable and improper. It would often frustrate the important federal interests in broad discovery and truth-seeking and the interest in vindicating important federal substantive policy such as that embodied in section 1983.” King, 121 F.R.D. at 187. More importantly, “if state law controlled, state authorities could effectively insulate themselves form constitutional norms simply by developing privilege doctrines that made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to develop the kind of information they need to prosecute their federal claims.” Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 656, 660 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting “most courts have concluded ... that it would be wholly inappropriate to create an ‘absolute’ privilege for confidential information in police files”). Finally, because of the federal court's broad view of discovery, even where applicable, the Supreme Court has held that privileges are to be “strictly construed.” University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).

*6 Applying these settled principles, the Court considers each of Defendants' asserted privileges in turn.

A. Official Information Privilege (“OIP”)

Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information[,]” including government personnel files. Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990), as amended on denial of reh'g (Feb. 27, 1991), as amended on denial of reh'g (May 24, 1991). To invoke the OIP, information regarding the necessity for its application must be provided in a timely manner to allow for a court to address whether the qualified privilege applies. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The procedure established in Kelly of requiring an appropriate declaration as a prerequisite to asserting this privilege has been utilized in numerous federal courts in California. See Martinez v. Davis, No. CV 05-5684-ABC (JEM), 2010 WL 11549650, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (collecting cases and noting “[c]ases in the Ninth Circuit routinely apply the Kelly/Miller criteria”).

A party asserting the privilege must make a “substantial threshold showing” by submitting an affidavit or declaration by an agency official with knowledge that, among other things, identifies the interests harmed by disclosure. Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 669. Specifically, the affidavit or declaration must contain the following information:

Id. at 670. Once this showing is made along with a proper privilege log, courts apply a balancing test to weigh the benefits of disclosure against the potential harm.

Here, Defendants provided a privilege log produced on March 18 along with the Declaration of Detective Brian Hun in support of the LAPD's privilege log and the privileges asserted therein. (Dkt. No. 52-6 (Ex. C).) Det. Hun serves in a supervisory position in the Legal Affairs Division of the LAPD. (Hun Decl., ¶ 1.) Hun states that he is “familiar with LAPD personnel files, personnel/complaint investigations and use of force investigations, and is familiar with[ ] the requested categories of documents.” (Hun Decl., ¶ 6.) He is “familiar with the type of documents sought in [Plaintiff's] request and rationale for seeking to withhold them from discovery.” (Id.) He provides the information in the declaration “on information and belief.” (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have failed to properly invoke the OIP. Plaintiff emphasizes that Defendants' privilege log is “faulty” because it does not “identify any records with particularity by Plaintiff [sic] including personnel or other records responsive to this request.” (Joint Stip. at 50.) Plaintiff also argues that Detective Hun's declaration is deficient because it fails to state that Hun actually reviewed the records sought and does not outline the specific harm that would “flow from disclosing them under a protective order to litigants here.” (Id. at 49.)

*7 Having reviewed the Hun Declaration, the Court concludes that it is not sufficient to invoke the OIP because it fails to satisfy items #2, #3, and #4 under Kelly. Detective Hun has not personally reviewed any of the documents (#2) and does not describe specific governmental interest that be harmed as a result of disclosure of policy and personnel documents (#3) and he does not disclosure subject to a protective order would result in harm. Hun describes generalized harm to the LAPD, “as well as officers and their families” that could result from “[u]nfettered release of an investigation into the alleged misconduct occurring on the job[.]” (Hun Decl. ¶ 6.) But Hun also acknowledges that LAPD as a matter of policy maintains ”these requested documents with the expectation that such files and investigations and the contents of the files and investigation will not be subject to disclosure, absent good cause and a court order.” (Hun Decl. ¶ 2 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff is not seeking wholesale public disclosure of the requested LAPD documents, but rather disclosure and use in this litigation will be governed by the Stipulated Protective Order. (See Dkt. No. 45.) As emphasized in Kelly, what “in many situations would pose the threat to law enforcement interests is disclosure to the public generally, not simply to an individual litigant and/or her lawyer.” Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 662. Accordingly, the Hun Declaration does not meet the Kelly requirements to invoke the OIP as a total bar to the discovery that Plaintiff seeks here.

But even if the Hun Declaration was adequate to properly invoke the OIP, given the significant public policy interests at issue in this case concerning the use of lethal force by law enforcement, the Court concludes, that the federal interests in disclosure outweigh any potential harm to the LAPD or individual officers, particularly given the Stipulated Protective Order.[4]

B. Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

As Plaintiff correctly points out, the Ninth Circuit has not recognized a “self-critical analysis privilege.” (Joint Stip. at 58 (citing Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1992); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 611 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). Defendants offer no authority to the contrary but argue that Dowling only mentioned in a footnote that the privilege had not been recognized, and they urge that “no binding authority exists which prevents this Court from finding such a privilege appropriate and applicable in this case regarding certain items particularly those involving the internal evaluation and analysis by the department.” (Joint Stip. at 102.) In the absence of binding authority in this circuit affirmatively recognizing a “self-critical analysis” privilege that shield law enforcement investigatory documents from discovery in the Section 1983 context, the Court declines Defendant's invitation to make new law.

Given the Stipulated Protective Order and the importance of the interests and claims at issue here, the Court concludes that the asserted self-critical analysis privilege is neither appropriate nor applicable in this federal civil rights action.

C. Federal Deliberative Process Privilege

The deliberative process privilege “permits the government to withhold documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising a part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated.” Federal Trade Commission v. Warner Communications, 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). The privilege “was developed to promote frank and independent discussion among those responsible for making governmental decisions” with.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The “purpose of the privilege is to protect the quality of agency decisions.” Id.

*8 The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege, where a litigant “may obtain deliberative materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government's interest in non-disclosure.” Id. In making this determination, courts consider four factors: “(1) the relevance of the evidence; (2) availability of other evidence; (3) the government's role in the litigation; and (4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that Kelly “states that the deliberative process privilege is the same as the self-critical analysis privilege, and such privilege should not offer any protection for the kinds of information generated by police department.” (Joint Stip. at 59 (citing Kelly, 114 F.R.D at 656, 659).) But Kelly made no such sweeping holding. Rather, in Kelly, the court conducted a thoughtful, highly nuanced discussion of the self-critical analysis and deliberative process privileges, as well as other frequently cited privilege doctrines from other types of litigation, in an effort to articulate an approach privilege doctrine that is tailored to the unique discovery considerations that arise in civil rights cases against state and local law enforcement agencies. Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 660-670.

Furthermore, after examining the policy rationale behind the deliberative process privilege, which includes the protection of pre-decisional aspects of government policy-making, Kelly expressly acknowledged the “deliberative process” privilege may be applicable in civil rights litigation against law enforcement agencies, but noted that “courts could apply the ‘deliberative process' privilege to most kinds of information generated by police departments only if they are willing to stretch, in some instances almost beyond recognition, the policy rationale that supports that privilege.” Id. at 658. In Kelly, the court ultimately concluded “[t]he deliberative process privilege should be available only to communications that contribute to a deliberative process.” Id. at 658. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, Kelly does not stand for an all-or-nothing wholesale rejection of the deliberative process privilege in the context of discovery against a police department.

Indeed, in Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D 614 (N.D. Cal. 1996), a Section 1983 excessive action based on a wrongful death of an arrestee, the court reasoned that if the deliberative process privilege applies, a” litigant may obtain discovery of materials protected by the privilege if the need for the materials outweighs the governmental interest in keeping the decision-making process confidential.” Price, 65 F.R.D. at 620. In Price, the court granted the defendants' claim of deliberative process privilege with respect to certain documents but found other documents “highly relevant to Plaintiffs' claims of liability, especially under the Monell cause of action.” Id. Moreover, the court stated it was “convinced that the infringement upon the frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions of the County ... can be alleviated through the use of a strict protective order against use or dissemination of the materials outside of this lawsuit.” Id.

Consistent with the analyses in Kelly and Price, this Court too, takes a fact-specific approach to the applicability of the deliberative process privilege. Notably, here, as in Price, Plaintiff has asserted a Monell claim against Defendant City, which puts Defendant City's policies and decision-making regarding use of deadly force squarely at issue. Therefore, in the discussion below, in determining whether Defendants' assertions of the deliberative process privilege serve to bar production of responsive, proportionate information, the Court considers the nature and scope of the specific information sought in Plaintiff's individual requests as well as Defendants' asserted reasons why the deliberative process privilege should apply to prevent the discovery Plaintiff seeks.

D. Officer's Rights to Privacy and Third-Party Privacy Rights

*9 Defendants also seek to shield much of the information Plaintiff seeks based on asserted rights of privacy for Defendant McBride, as well as other non-defendant police officers and third-parties. (Joint Stip. at 102-103; and see, e.g., Hun Decl. ¶ 7-10.) While the Court recognizes legitimate privacy interests of individuals and does not ignore state privacy rules, in weighing individual privacy rights against the substantial federal interests in vindicating federal civil rights law, the Court finds that there are adequate means to shield individual privacy in the discovery process, including through the Stipulated Protective Order and appropriate redactions such that individual privacy interests are not, in and of themselves, a reason to prevent disclosure of relevant and proportionate information that is in the possession, custody, and control of Defendants.

The Court now turns to the specific discovery requests at issue. The Court finds that certain of Plaintiff's discovery requests seek information that is properly within the range of relevant and proportional material in this civil rights action and Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

III. Plaintiff's RFPs to City

Defendants correctly point out, that despite the lengthy Joint Stipulation, many of the disputed requests have been addressed following the informal discovery conferences held on April 6 and 12, 2021. (Joint Stip. at 20; and see Dkt. Nos. 42, 44.) Specifically, the Court has ordered Defendants to produce documents responsive to the following RFPs:

(Dkt. Nos. 44, 50, 55, 58.)

The following RFPs have not been previously addressed by the Court.

*10 Video tapes of interviews conducted by Defendant City regarding or related to the Hernandez shooting on April 22, 2020, are plainly relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case and proportionate to the needs of the case. Moreover, it is entirely unclear how or why Defendant City asserts that the information is both highly confidential and “equally available to propounding party.” This objection indeed appears to be a boilerplate assertion where little thought was given to the substance of the actual request. Further, Defendants' objection that the information is “not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is based on a former, more liberal standard for discovery. See Curtin v. County of Orange, Case No.SA CV 16-591-SVW) (PLSx), 2017 WL 5593025 at *3 n.4. After the December 1, 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the scope of permissible discovery is now defined as any non-privileged information that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. FED. R.CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

With respect to Plaintiff's request for documents concerning “any issue related thereto,” the Court agrees with Defendant City that this phrase is vague, ambiguous, and fails to identify the information sought with sufficient specificity as required under Rule 34. As to this portion of RFP No. 21 is Defendant City's objection SUSTAINED. That said, in light of the Court's discussion and analysis above, Defendant City's objections based on self-critical analysis, official information and/or governmental privilege, state law evidence code and/or privileges, and individual rights of privacy are OVERRULED.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant City must produce in response to RFP No. 21 any and all video interviews relating to the Hernandez shooting in its possession, custody, or control.

The Complaint alleges that “after her initial volley of gunfire, Defendant [McBride] continued to shoot at Daniel Hernandez even after he fell to the ground in a fetal position.” (Complaint at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff further allege that “the shooting violated LAPD policy and training regarding the drawing of weapons, tactics, and the use of force.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) Central to Plaintiffs' claims is the allegation that Defendant McBride held herself out as “a self-proclaimed public figure on social media showcasing her love of guns as well as her self-proclaimed firearms and tactical prowess in shooting competitions.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) These allegations put Defendant McBride's use of firearms as a police officer squarely at issue in the case. Further, to the extent this information is contained in Defendant McBride's personnel file, the information is plainly discoverable.

Thus, the Court finds that the information sought in RFP No. 29 is relevant and proportionate to the needs of the case, particularly considering: the importance of the issues at stake in this wrongful death civil rights action, that Defendant City has exclusive access to the information concerning Defendant McBride's authorization to use firearms as a reserve officer, and Defendant City has not shown that any burden or expense of the request outweighs it likely benefit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

Accordingly, for all the reasons articulated above, the Court OVERRULES Defendant City's litany of privilege and privacy objections to this request. Privacy and/or confidentiality concerns for both the LAPD and Defendant McBride individually can be adequately protected under the strict provisions of the Stipulated Protective Order.

IT IS ORDERED that, in response to RFP No. 29, Defendant City must produce any and all video interviews relating to the Hernandez shooting in its possession custody and control.[5]

These RFPs seek documents pertaining to other crime and/or arrest reports or legal actions that may have involved Defendant McBride during her employment with LAPD either as a “victim or witness” or legal actions where McBride is identified as a “responsible or named” employee in a Government Tort Claim action. Plaintiff argues that RFP No. 33 seeks “historical relevant arrest and use of force reports involving McBride.” (Joint Stip. at 47.)

Defendant City argues that the information sought in RFP Nos. 33 and 43 is “irrelevant, overbroad, violate[s] FRCP 26 and [is] barred by privilege and privacy laws.” (Joint Stip. at 105.) With respect to RFP No. 33, Defendant maintains that “whether Officer McBride was a victim or witness to another incident has no bearing on any of the issues raised in this case. There simply is no relevance, and Plaintiff has not presented any valid arguments as to how this request is relevant to liability in this case.” (Id.) The Court agrees.

Plaintiff wholly fails to demonstrate how the requested “crime and arrest reports” are relevant to the excessive force allegations alleged in the Complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not limit RFP No. 33 or 43 to other shooting incidents and Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the request for five years of “crime and arrest reports” are proportional to the needs of the case, where arguably, Defendant McBride is a “witness” to every crime and/or arrest report she has ever submitted during her LAPD career. Therefore, Defendants' objections to RFP Nos. 33 and 43 on relevance and overbreadth grounds are SUSTAINED and IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED as to RFP Nos. 33 and 43. Defendant City need not produce documents in response to RFP Nos. 33 and 43.

IV. Plaintiff's RFPs to McBride

Plaintiff's RFPs to Defendant McBride seek information concerning Defendant McBride's non-LAPD weapons training and competitive shooting activities with private companies, Taran Tactical Innovations (“TTI”) and Dillon Precision, as well as information from Defendant's McBride's social media accounts. (Joint Stip. at 106-113).

Plaintiff argues that the information regarding Defendant McBride's communications and activities with these private companies is relevant because “[a]mong other officers at scene [sic], she was the only one who pulled the trigger multiple times at disabled Hernandez killing him” and the documents regarding TTI and Dillon Precision are relevant to challenging McBride's credibility, which, Plaintiff argues, is a “central aspect of this case.” (Joint Stip. at 113.) Plaintiff further contends that McBride is “an attractive media star, cop influencer, a gun carrying model, a modern-day sharpshooter a la Anne Oakley” who is an avid participant in shooting competitions and “openly boasting about it on social media and in the public forum.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that McBride's

(Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).) Defendants respond that that Plaintiff's RFPs 18 and 20-30 to McBride are “irrelevant, overbroad, ambiguous not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and invade McBride's privacy rights, among other privileges.” (Joint Stip. at 135.)

C. Plaintiff's RFPs to McBride re: TTI and Dillon Precision Are Facially Overbroad

After a thorough review of Plaintiffs RFPs, Defendants Responses/Objections, and the allegations of the Consolidated Complaint, the Court finds that Defendant McBride's love for guns and avid participation in private shooting competitions might arguably be relevant for purpose of individual liability in this case.[6] However, Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 18 (TTI communications), 20 (videos training or shooting at TTI facilities), 21 (photographs training/or shooting at facilities) and 22 are overbroad with respect to both scope and time. Defendants strenuously argue that none of this information is relevant and insist that only relevant evidence is admissible. (Joint. Stip. at 136.) But information need not be admissible to be discoverable.[7] FED. R.CIV. P. 26(b)(1); and see Laub v. Horbaczewski, 331 F.R.D. 516, 521 (C.D. Cal. Apr.22, 2019).

*13 As to the instant discovery Motion, to the extent Plaintiff seeks information concerning communications between McBride and TTI and Dillon Precision for more than five years prior to the Hernandez killing, these RFPs seek information that is neither relevant to any claim or defense in this action nor proportional to the needs of the case. The Court finds that only a narrow time frame, from January 1, 2019 through the date of the incident, is arguably relevant based on the allegations in the Consolidated Complaint, and Defendant' McBride's appropriate privacy concerns may be addressed under the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion in part, as follows: Defendant McBride shall provide responsive documents, if any, in response to RFP Nos. 18, 20, 21 and 22 for the period January 1, 2019 through date of the incident in question, i.e., April 22, 2020. The Court notes that RFP No. 24 appears to seek information that will be duplicative of information provided in response to RFP No. 18, Therefore, no further response is needed to RFP No. 24. To the extent Defendant McBride, after reasonable and diligent search, concludes she has no responsive documents in her possession, custody, or control consistent with this Order, she must provide amended written responses to Plaintiff's RFPs so stating.

D. Information re: Defendant McBride's Social Media Accounts

E. Plaintiff's RFPS Seeking McBride's Entire Social Media Archival Files are Overbroad and Not Proportional to the Needs of the Case

With the exception of RFP No. 25, which seeks information concerning to “any firearms training not provided to you by the CITY,” Plaintiff's RFPs seeking the entirety of Defendant McBride's social media accounts demand information that is both irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of this case.

First, there are no time limits on the information Plaintiff seeks. Defendant, who was only nineteen (19) years old when she joined the LAPD, may, like many young adults, have had social media accounts on some of these platforms since she was in middle school. There is no showing whatsoever that such information would have any relevance in this civil rights action arising from her conduct as a LAPD officer. Plaintiff contends that “McBride deleted her social media accounts as an effort to destroy material evidence relevant to this lawsuit.” (Joint Stip. at 114.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant McBride as a “public figure of notoriety and a public officer cannot “hide behind her privacy rights to conceal evidence about her true motivations behind the shooting.” (Id.)

*15 Plaintiff argues that “[i]dentical discovery requests were ordered to be produced in their entirety in the Central District and Plaintiff was charged with spoliation for deleting his Facebook account.” (Joint Stip. at 114 (citing Holloway v. County of Orange, et al. 8:18-cv-01514-DOC-DFM, Doc. 147).) But the Court's own review of the Holloway order upon which Plaintiff relies reveals that, in Holloway, the court specifically “suggested that Defendants' request for Plaintiff's entire Facebook account was facially overbroad but could be narrowly tailored to require some production.” Holloway v. County of Orange, et al. 8:18-cv-01514-DOC-DFM, Doc. 147 at 1 (emphasis added). Additionally, in that case, the court reached its conclusion regarding spoliation based on the defendant's own sworn deposition testimony that he deleted his FaceBook page. (Id.) Here, Plaintiff offers no such evidence demonstrating that spoliation of evidence material to this case has actually occurred, i.e., that relevant social media evidence has been actually deleted rather than merely deactivated. But even if that were so, it would not justify a demand for Defendant McBride to produce the entire archival history for all of her social media accounts without any reference to subjects relevant to the issues in this case.

No such narrowing has occurred—or even been proposed—here. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the information requested could capture information posted about family events, such as weddings, birthdays, graduations, family trips, etc. (Joint Stip. at 115 (“she has posted public photos/videos of her with family or friends, her wedding, videos at hospital, videos at shooting ranges”).) Defendant emphasizes that “Plaintiff never explains how Officer McBride's personal interests, family outings or other life events depicted in her social media accounts have any bearing whatsoever on the subject incident giving rise to this case.” (Id. at 136.) The Court agrees.

Plaintiff has made no effort to exclude irrelevant personal and/or family postings from the social media-related discovery requests. Nor has Plaintiff limited the requests to information concerning the alleged videos at shooting ranges or other postings that directly relate to Defendant McBride being a “cop influencer” and so-called firearms “media star.” (See Joint Stip. at 113.) Rather, Plaintiff simply argues that McBride “is acting by all means as a celebrity and cannot shield herself in this lawsuit behind the disingenuous claims of privacy.” (Id. at 115.) As noted, privacy concerns can be adequately addressed under the parties' Stipulated Protective Order. What Plaintiff fails to appreciate is that in the absence of any effort to narrow these requests to social media information that is relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, these RFPs are overbroad and do not meet the requirements of Rule 26(b)(1).

Accordingly, this Court concludes that the requests for “any and all” Social Networking Service Applications, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, WhatsApp and TikTok, are facially overbroad and the Motion is DENIED as to RFPs to McBride Nos. 25-30.

V. Plaintiff's Interrogatories to McBride

Interrogatories Nos. 7, 11, 12, 13 and 15 seek information regarding Defendant McBride's employment and disciplinary history as a law enforcement officer, any alleged complaints against her, along with information concerning her involvement in firearms training, practice and competition for five years prior to the Hernandez shooting in April 2020 to the present. Plaintiff acknowledges that the Interrogatories to McBride “in large part cover the same issues referenced by Plaintiff in the inspection demands propounded to City and McBride” but argues that the interrogatories “are a necessary component of Plaintiff's discovery requests because they are verified by the Defendant under penalty of perjury, are relevant to her credibility.” (Joint Stip. at 125-126 (errors in original).) With the exception of Interrogatory No. 15, Defendants assert nearly identical objections and provide no substantive responses.

*17 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the information regarding Defendant's employment and possible disciplinary history is relevant and proportional to the needs of this civil rights action. (See Joint Stip. at 129.) Further, for the reasons discussed above, the Court overrules Defendant's litany of objections based on state law, governmental privileges, “official information” privilege and “self-critical analysis.” While mindful of the Defendants' need for confidentiality of policy-making processes, the Court finds that the importance of vindicating the constitutional rights at issue in this case outweigh any asserted need for total agency confidentiality. In addition, given the strict Stipulated Protective Order, any sensitive information in Defendant’ McBride's personnel file or contained in LAPD policy documents that may be responsive to the Interrogatories will not be broadly disclosed to the general public.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Interrogatories to McBride Nos. 7, 9, 12, 13, and 15 and IT IS ORDERED that McBride shall provide complete amended written responses to these Interrogatories. To the extent, Defendant McBride contends that information responsive to these Interrogatories can be found in documents already produced in discovery, Defendant's amended written responses shall identify the responsive materials by bates-identifier. If no responsive information can be located, Defendant's amended written response shall so state.

Interrogatory No. 11, however, is more problematic. The parties discussed this request with the Court during the informal discovery conference that preceded this Motion. Then, as now, it was unclear exactly what information Plaintiff seeks, why that information is relevant, and even if the information were described with sufficient specificity, how Defendant would go about identifying it without conducting a hand search for each and every arrest report Defendant McBride submitted during her tenure with LAPD to determine if it contained an allegation or even a passing reference to the crimes of battery (Cal. Penal Code §§ 242, 243), assault (Cal. Penal Code §§ 240, 245), or resisting a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code §§ 69, 148).

As noted with respect to RFP No. 33 (see discussion infra at 18), the Court finds this request is vague and ambiguous as to what information is actually being sought. The interrogatory is overbroad with respect to time and is not limited to any shooting related incidents. Additionally, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the request for five years of information about these potential crime and/or arrest reports are proportional to the needs of the case, when Defendant McBride is arguably a “witness” to every crime and/or arrest report she has ever submitted during her LAPD career.

Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 11 and Defendant McBride need not provide any further response to Interrogatory No. 11.

VI. Defendants Must Produce An Amended Privilege Log

Plaintiff also protests that Defendant City provided a “defective” privilege log with their initial responses and objections to Plaintiff's RFPs. (Joint Stip. at 16.) The Court agrees. Rule 26 provides, in relevant part,

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(5). Here, Defendants' privilege log does not identify specific documents, but rather, in the column labeled “Document Description” lists categories of documents, e.g., “internal Affairs materials related to the subject incident” and Force Investigation Division materials related to the subject incident. (Dkt. No. 52-6 (Ex. C).) Under “Identity & Position of Author,” Defendant lists “Various” for ten of eleven categories of documents listed on the Privilege Log. (Id.) The current “privilege log” fails to identify with any specificity precisely what documents exist and are being withheld subject to the asserted privileges.

*18 More importantly, for the reasons discussed above, numerous individual documents and categories of documents—particularly Defendant McBride's personnel file, agency policies regarding body camera video, TEAMS reports, etc.—properly must be disclosed as these documents are both relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in this litigation and proportionate to the needs of this case.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, within ten (10) days of the date of the Order, Defendant City must serve a complete and accurate privilege log that identifies any specific documents, and where known, the named author(s) and/or recipients of any otherwise responsive documents that Defendants continue to withhold following this Order.

VII. Sanctions are Not Warranted Against Defendants

Plaintiff argues that monetary sanctions should be awarded against Defendants for obstructing discovery by making objections that were “thoughtless and boilerplate, without any genuine consideration for whether any objection ... applied to the discovery requests.” (Joint Stip. at 130.) Defendants respond that Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions should be denied because Plaintiff “waited until just two months ago to propound any discovery,” Defendants' responses to the discovery were timely, and Defendants had “agreed to produce a majority of the documents and information, subject to a protective order.” (Id. at 138-39.)

Rule 37 provides that where, as here, a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, “the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (a)(5)(C). Here, the Court exercises its discretion and declines to award monetary sanctions.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part as follows: within ten (10) days of the date of this Order

The Motion is DENIED is all other respects. Each party to bear their own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Manuel and Maria Hernandez are the parents of deceased Daniel Hernandez. (Joint Stip.at 15.)

M.L.H. is a minor and successor-in-interest to decedent Daniel Hernandez. (See Dkt. No. 21.)

The Joint Stipulation is comprised of 141 pages of briefing, along with 348 additional pages of declarations and exhibits, for a total of 489 pages. (See Dkt. No. 52.)

The Court has already ordered that addresses, social security numbers, payroll information and other sensitive personal information be redacted from the McBride personnel file documents to be produced. (See Dkt. Nos. 50, 55.)

If Defendants have additional concerns that are not fully addressed here, the responsive documents may be submitted for in camera review prior to production to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff's assertion the information sought in these RFPs is relevant to McBride's credibility is less persuasive. It is not at all clear why an enthusiasm for firearms is relevant to the defendant's credibility or otherwise suggests that Defendant McBride would be untruthful.

Here, based on the specific allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff makes a colorable argument for relevance of the information about Defendant McBride's avid participation in shooting competitions and non-LAPD firearms training. It is yet to be seen what, if any, of such information may be admitted at trial but hat is an issue for another day and another court.