Alves v. Riverside Cnty.
Alves v. Riverside Cnty.
2021 WL 3601986 (C.D. Cal. 2021)
April 12, 2021

Kewalramani, Shashi H.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Privilege Log
Failure to Produce
Waiver
Privacy
Attorney-Client Privilege
Proportionality
Cooperation of counsel
Attorney Work-Product
Download PDF
To Cite List
Summary
The Court ordered Defendants to produce any and all insurance-related documents, including any agreements pursuant to their Joint Powers Authority, to Plaintiff pursuant to both Plaintiff's RFP and Defendants' required initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). This includes any documents related to self-insurance, as well as any other reinsurance they possess, ensuring that all relevant ESI is disclosed in the case.
Additional Decisions
Tracy ALVES
v.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY, et al
Case No. 5:19-cv-02083-JGB-SHK
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed April 12, 2021

Counsel

John C. Burton, Matthew Sahak, Law Offices of John Burton, Pasadena, CA, Thomas Kennedy Helm, IV, Helm Law Office PC, Oakland, CA, Dale K. Galipo, Hang Dieu Le, Law Offices of Dale Galipo, Woodland Hills, CA, for Tracy Alves.
Anthony M. Sain, Garros Chan, Eugene P. Ramirez, Kevin H. Louth, Manning Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Riverside County, et al.
Kewalramani, Shashi H., United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE RELATED DOCUMENTS [ECF NO. 47]

*1 On February 17, 2021, following an informal discovery conference, Defendants County of Riverside (“Riverside County”), Sheriff-Coroner Chad Bianco, Deputy Sonia Gomez, and Deputy Brian Keeney (collectively, “Defendants”) filed the instant brief requesting the Court to uphold Defendants objections to Plaintiff Tracy Alves's (“Plaintiff”) request for production of documents (“RFP”) seeking Riverside County's insurance coverage related documents. Electronic Case Filing Number (“ECF No.”) 47, Brief Against Plaintiff's Demand For Production Of Insurance Coverage Related Documents (“Opposition to RFP Request” or “Opp'n to RFP Req.”). Plaintiff filed her Opposition on February 25, 2021. ECF No. 50, Opp'n. Defendants did not file a reply.
 
After reviewing the parties' arguments from their briefing and attachments, for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants' Opposition to RFP Request and is ordered to produce the responsive documents at issue.
 
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
This litigation arose from the death of Kevin Robert Niedzialek (“Decedent”) during the course of his arrest on July 29, 2019 by Defendants Gomez and Keeney. ECF No. 34, FAC at 3-6. Plaintiff is Decedent's sole surviving sibling and heir. Id. at 2. On July 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants alleging four causes of action: (1) unconstitutional policies, practices, and usages in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) acts, omissions, customs, and policies that violated California Civil Code § 52.1, known as the Bane Act; (3) assault and battery; and (4) police negligence. Id. at 9-13.
 
Discovery in this matter is ongoing and Plaintiff has served written discovery. See ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 2. On May 19, 2020, Defendants served their initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26, in which Defendants objected to providing any insurance-related information on the basis of “[p]rivacy... [and it] not [being] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” ECF No. 50-2, Ex. 2 at 3; see also ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 2. In response, Plaintiff served RFPs requesting, among others things, “[a]ll Documents concerning insurance and/or pooled risk management coverage, including but not limited to complete insurance and excess insurance policies, declaration sheets, and/or pooled risk agreements that may cover any defendant for any claim(s) alleged in this matter.” ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 2. On September 10, 2020, Defendants served their responses to Plaintiff's RFP, which included an objection to producing insurance-related documents on the basis that the documents are not relevant, are private, and are possibly privileged under attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege. See ECF No. 50-3, Ex. 3 at 3-4. Since then, the parties have exchanged letters regarding Defendants producing insurance-related documents but were not able to come to an agreement. See ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 3.
 
B. Parties' Arguments
*2 In support of their Opposition to RFP Request for the Court to deny Plaintiff's request for Defendant's insurance-related documents, Defendants make two arguments. First, Defendants argue that any insurance agreement by Riverside County “is not relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence regarding the actual incident at issue.” ECF No. 47, RFP Req. at 3. Defendants also suggest that Plaintiff likely intended to seek such information in order to “place themselves at an advantage for [the] upcoming mediation scheduled for March 26, 2021.” Id. at 4. Defendants appear to also make some sort of argument that insurance information is privileged information, citing to Rule 26(b)(3)(B). See id.
 
Second, Defendants argue that such information would not be a required disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Id. Specifically, Defendants explain that Riverside County is a member of a Joint Powers Authority, which is not a type of insurance but rather a group of government entities that pool self-insured claims and losses as authorized by California Government Code §§ 990.4 and 990.8. Id. Because a Joint Powers Authority is generally not considered to be insurance under California law, Defendants argue that any information regarding Riverside County's Joint Powers Authority would not be a required disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Id. at 4-6.
 
In response, Plaintiff argues that even though a primary insurance policy does not exist, Riverside County's participation in the Joint Powers Authority is essentially a reinsurance that may cover all or part of any judgment in the instant matter, and therefore Defendants must provide such information pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 4-5 (citing Estate of Brown v. Lambert, No. 15-CV-1583-DMS-WVG, 2020 WL 3606392 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2020)). Plaintiff points out that Riverside County is only self-insured up to either $2 or $5 million and has reinsurance through two other insurance companies of up to $10 million, with further reinsurance layers. Id. at 5.
 
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants have not provided any authority that relieves them from the duty to disclose insurance information under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Id. Plaintiff points out that Defendants have not provided a privilege log and therefore waived their work product privilege objection, but moreover, insurance policies are not work product. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff also argues that, while Defendants have not provided any federal case law exempting Joint Powers Authority from mandatory disclosure, at least one case—Estate of Brown—indicates that secondary insurance, or reinsurance, must be produced. Id. at 6.
 
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards Regarding Discovery
Rule 26(b)(2) governs the scope of permissible discovery and provides:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
 
Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
*3 Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Nguyen, No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
 
“The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). The party opposing discovery then has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794 at * 1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009). “The party opposing discovery is ‘required to carry a heavy burden of showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Reece v. Basi, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014), aff'd, 704 F. App'x 685 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975)).
 
“The district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., No. CV 10-3165 GHK (SS), 2015 WL 12731923, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
 
B. Analysis
Rule 26 also explicitly sets forth a list of required disclosures each party must make to each other, including the following:
[F]or inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). The advisory committee notes further clarify when disclosure of any insurance agreements is required:
Disclosure is required when the insurer “may be liable” on part or all of the judgment. Thus, an insurance company must disclose even when it contests liability under the policy, and such disclosure does not constitute a waiver of its claim. It is immaterial whether the liability is to satisfy the judgment directly or merely to indemnify or reimburse another after he pays the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1937 amendment.
 
Here, instead of providing the initial disclosures, Defendants seek to have their objections upheld to Plaintiff's RFP seeking Riverside County's insurance-related documents because they argue that the documents are irrelevant and because Defendants are self-insured such that any other insurance-related documents are not required to be disclosed. ECF No. 47, RFP Req. at 3.
 
First, as other courts have noted, disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) is absolute and does not need a showing of relevance. See Suffolk Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 141, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv)] is absolute ... and does not require any showing of relevance.”) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D. Kan. 2007)); Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Nordic Pcl Constr., No. 11-00515 SOM-KSC, 2013 WL 12133660, at *4 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 2013) (“Reinsurance policies are discoverable pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), and no showing of relevance is required.”). Thus, regardless of the type of insurance Defendants possess, Defendants must produce them to Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
 
*4 Second, even if Defendants are self-insured, Defendants must still produce any other insurance-related documents that may satisfy a portion, if any, of a judgment against Riverside County. Defendants argue that, because Riverside County is primarily self-insured and a Joint Powers Authority is not considered insurance under California law, Riverside County does not need to produce any type of insurance-related documents. ECF No. 47, RFP Req. at 4-6. However, the Court disagrees.
 
As an initial matter, self-insurance related documents are discoverable under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). See Jacobs v. Scribner, No. 1:06-CV-01280-AWI, 2010 WL 4666045, *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2010) (ordering the defendants to produce “any insurance agreement ... that may cover all or part of any judgment rendered in this case” or an affidavit as to whether there is insurance coverage, despite the defendants' claim of self-insurance); Sieber v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CV 17-13024, 2019 WL 2176976, at *3 (E.D. La. May 20, 2019) (“[S]elf-insurance agreements are not exempt from disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A), as the rule expressly allows for inspection and copying of “any insurance agreement by which a possible judgment may be satisfied.”). Therefore, Defendants must produce any documents they possess related to their self-insurance.
 
Moreover, Defendants must also produce any and all agreements under their Joint Powers Authority, and any other reinsurance they possess. Although Defendants attempt to argue that a Joint Powers Authority is technically not insurance under California law, the Court disagrees that this precludes disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon a review of publicly available information, the Joint Powers Authority of which Riverside County is a member states that it “develop[s] effective risk management solutions to help public entities proactively control losses and prepare for property, casualty and employee benefit exposures.” PRISM, About PRISM, https://www.prismrisk.gov/about-prism/ (last accessed April 8, 2021). Additionally, PRISM states that its purpose is to “find cost-effective insurance solutions and risk management services for members.” Id. Consequently, though it may not technically be considered insurance, its purpose appears to be similar to insurance.
 
Moreover, Defendants themselves also suggest that the Joint Powers Authority functions as reinsurance. Specifically, Defendants explain that a Joint Powers Authority “pool[s] [member's] assets to promote risk control and pay claims against member entities.” ECF No. 47, RFP Req. at 4 (citing Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. V. Beta Healthcare Grp., 197 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1150 n.2 (2011)). In other words, it appears that a Joint Powers Authority still could possibly indemnify or pay out any portion or all of a claim against Riverside County, including the instant claims in this litigation—which Defendants did not refute during the informal discovery conference. While there may be some distinctions between a Joint Powers Authority and conventional insurance companies, such as licensing and underwriting, the Court finds that the function of Riverside County's Joint Powers Authority, PRISM, appears to be one of reinsurance to Riverside County even though PRISM may not be recognized as an insurance company under California's insurance regulations.
 
In light of the above, this Court finds Estate of Brown, on point and instructive. After finding that a majority of courts favors disclosure of a defendant's reinsurance policy under Rule 26(a), including the Southern District Court of California, the court in Estate of Brown also concluded that the defendants' reinsurance policies were discoverable under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) despite the defendants' objections that its reinsurance policies were not discoverable under California law and were irrelevant to the issues in the case. See Estate of Brown, 2020 WL 3606392 at *4-6. Similarly, because PRISM functions as a form of reinsurance, this Court also concludes that any PRISM agreements, or other reinsurance agreements entered into by Riverside County, are discoverable to Plaintiff under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
 
*5 Defendants rely heavily on Starstone National Insurance Company v. Independent Cities Risk Management Authority, et al. (“Starstone”), No. CV 19-1130 PA (Ex), 2019 WL 4422672 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) for their argument that the Joint Powers Authority is not considered insurance. However, Starstone is inapplicable to the instant matter. In Starstone, the parties were disputing the coverage limits of a claim under a joint powers authority. Starstone, 2019 WL 4422672 at *2. Upon a motion to dismiss, the court in Starstone held that a joint powers authority was not considered an insurance company under California law such that the plaintiff could not state a claim under the joint powers authority. Id. at *3. In contrast, as noted by Plaintiff, the issue presently before this Court is not applying California law to Riverside's Joint Powers Authority. See ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 6.
 
Defendants also attempt to argue that Plaintiff should not be entitled to Defendants' insurance information as it would “tip [Defendants'] own hand[.]” ECF No. 47, Opp'n to RFP Req, at 4. However, the Court is unpersuaded by this argument. As of the date of this order, the parties' mediation has already passed. But more importantly, the purpose of disclosing such information is to facilitate settlement discussions, as contemplated by the advisory committee:
Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation. It will conduce to settlement and avoid protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite effect. The amendment is limited to insurance coverage, which should be distinguished from any other facts concerning defendant's financial status (1) because insurance is an asset created specifically to satisfy the claim; (2) because the insurance company ordinarily controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is available only from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1937 amendment. Thus, Defendants cannot withhold their insurance coverage information on this basis.
 
Finally, Defendants appear to also make some sort of argument that the documents sought by Plaintiff are privileged. See ECF No. 47, RFP Req. at 4 (“[T]his Court must deny [P]laintiff's discovery request, not only on relevancy grounds, but also as privileged information under FRCP 26(b)(3)(B)). It is unclear what privileged material would be covered by this request. Though it is possible that documents concerning communications, summaries, analysis, mental impressions, and conclusions of Riverside County's counsel rather than factual information relating to the underlying claims may be covered, those types of documents should be listed in a privilege log. However, based on the record currently before the Court, Plaintiff does not appear to be seeking communications between Riverside County and its insurers—rather, Plaintiff is merely seeking the insurance agreements or policies, if any, themselves. See ECF No. 50, Opp'n at 6.
 
Accordingly, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff is not entitled to Riverside County's insurance-related documents. As such, Defendants must produce such documents, including any agreements pursuant to their Joint Powers Authority, to Plaintiff pursuant to both Plaintiff's RFP and Defendants' required initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). The Court cautions that Defendants' mere assertion that Riverside County is self-insured is, by itself, insufficient. See Jacobs, 2010 WL 4666045, at *5 (granting the plaintiff's motion to compel because “Defendants' statement that the State of California is self-insured is an insufficient response.”). If Riverside County's self-insurance documents or any other insurance documents, including the Joint Powers Authority agreement(s), are unavailable, then Defendants should submit an affidavit of an authorized Riverside County employee explaining “whether the self-insurance covers Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in excess of the amounts sought in the [FAC].” Id. If not, then Defendants must produce all other insurance agreements, if any, that may cover all or part of any judgment rendered in this case. Id.
 
*6 Accordingly, Defendants' Opposition to RFP Request is DENIED.
 
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously set forth, Defendants' Opposition to RFP Request is DENIED and Defendants are ordered to produce any and all insurance-related documents responsive to Plaintiff's RFP as soon as practicable.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.