*1 Jane Roe filed suit against Defendants Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (“SWBTS”), where she was formerly an undergraduate student and part-time employee, and Paige Patterson, the former President of SWBTS. (Dkt. #8). The suit arises from alleged sexual assaults suffered by Roe at the hands of another former SWBTS student–employee and the alleged actions Defendants took in response. Roe asserts that Defendants were negligent in hiring and supervising their student–employees and in failing to provide sexual-assault training to students and faculty. Roe further asserts that Defendants intentionally disclosed her private facts to the public and took efforts to discredit her in response to her allegations of sexual assault. Roe asserts that, among other things, she has suffered and continues to suffer mental and physical injury. (Id. ¶¶ 128, 141). Defendants each deny the allegations and assert affirmative defenses. (Dkt. #19, #22).

At the joint request of the parties the Court entered a Protective and Confidentiality Order (the “Protective Order” or the “Order”). (Dkt. #29). The Order sets out procedures designed to protect confidential information throughout and beyond the duration of this case, including the designation and disclosure of confidential materials. The Order, among other things, directs the parties to designate all materials with Roe's personally identifiable information as “Highly Confidential” and restricts disclosure of such materials to a limited group of individuals important to litigating the case. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 12).

Now pending before the Court are Roe's Motion to Modify the Protective and Confidentiality Order, for Protection, and for Sanctions, (Dkt. #73), and SWBTS's Motion to Compel, (Dkt. #72). Roe's motion requests the return or destruction of certain documents, sanctions against SWBTS for alleged discovery abuses, limitation on deposition attendance, sequestration of deposition testimony, and modification of the Protective Order. SWBTS's motion requests disclosure of Roe's relevant medical history or authorizations pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule CV-34. The Court, having reviewed the motions, the record, and the applicable law, GRANTS in part Roe's motion and GRANTS SWBTS's motion.

Roe asserts that Defendants have committed several acts of wrongdoing in the discovery process. (Dkt. #73). First, Roe argues that SWBTS improperly obtained the police report in her sexual-assault case through an erroneously granted open-records request and that SWBTS refuses to return or destroy it. Second, Roe argues that both Defendants failed to designate materials with Roe's personally identifiable information, including the police report, as “Highly Confidential” in discovery disclosures. Third, Roe argues that SWBTS disclosed Roe's personally identifiable information, including the last four digits of her social security number and her date of birth, to third parties in notices of deposition with subpoenas for documents. Fourth, Roe argues that several of SWBTS's notices of deposition with subpoenas for documents were overbroad. And, fifth, looking ahead to depositions, Roe argues that she will be intimidated and her testimony impinged if individuals associated with SWBTS are present at her deposition. Roe also argues that the Defendants and key witnesses will change their testimony if given the opportunity to attend depositions or review deposition testimony.

*2 To remedy the alleged wrongdoings and prevent potential issues with deposition testimony, Roe requests the following relief. First, Roe requests that, consistent with a Texas Attorney General memorandum opinion designating the police-report materials confidential under Texas law and not subject to disclosure through an open-records request, the Court order SWBTS to return or destroy the records. Second, Roe requests that the Court sanction SWBTS for not designating materials “Highly Confidential,” in violation of the Protective Order. Third, Roe requests that the Court sanction SWBTS for disclosing materials with Roe's personally identifiable information to third parties, in violation of the Protective Order, and for failing to provide advance notice and copies of the subpoenas. Fourth, Roe requests that the Court sanction SWBTS for issuing overbroad subpoenas. Fifth, Roe requests that the Court issue a protective order limiting deposition attendance to the deponent, the deponent's counsel of record, and the opposing party's counsel of record, and sequestering deposition testimony. And, sixth, Roe requests modification of the Protective Order to treat all materials with Roe's personally identifiable information as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” rather than “Highly Confidential.”

Defendants oppose Roe's motion. SWBTS argues that it properly obtained the police report through an open-records request and has no obligation to return or destroy the materials. SWBTS further argues that it has not violated any discovery rules or Court orders and, if it has, that such violations were justified, inadvertent, and nonprejudicial. Defendants argue that Roe has failed to provide facts or arguments sufficient to satisfy the good-cause standard for implementing deposition controls or modifying the Protective Order.

The Court addresses each issue in turn.

A. Police Report

Roe requests that the Court order SWBTS to return or destroy the police records and other related materials pertaining to Roe's sexual assault that SWBTS obtained through an open-records request made on the City of Fort Worth under Texas Government Code Chapter 552. Roe relies upon an Open Records Letter Ruling from the Texas Attorney General's Office determining that the materials are confidential and not subject to disclosure under Texas law. See (Dkt. #48, Ex. H). SWBTS opposes Roe's request. SWBTS defends the City of Fort Worth's initial determination that the materials are subject to disclosure and its own decision to retain the materials.

Roe provides no legal basis for the relief she seeks. To begin with, SWBTS obtained the records at issue outside the discovery process in this case, through an open records request to a state governmental entity. Even assuming the City of Fort Worth's disclosure of the police-record materials to SWBTS may have been erroneous under Texas law, Roe fails to provide any authority supporting her request that this Court order SWBTS to return the records or destroy them, and the Court is unaware of any authority supporting Roe's unusual request. Instead, Roe merely provides a Letter Ruling from the Open Records Division of the Texas Attorney General's Office, which does not carry the force of law, see Commissioners Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997) (“While [Texas] Attorney General's opinions are persuasive they are not controlling on the courts.”), advising that the materials are confidential and not subject to disclosure under Texas Government Code Chapter 552. On that basis alone, Roe requests that the Court exercise some unspecified authority to order the materials returned or destroyed. That is insufficient. Without a clear authorization for this Court to effectuate Roe's relief, her request is denied.

B. Disclosure Designations

Roe also requests sanctions against SWBTS for violation of the Protective Order by failing to designate materials with Roe's personally identifiable information as “Highly Confidential.” In support of her request for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), Roe points to SWBTS's disclosure, without proper designation, of the police record in Roe's sexual-assault case, which includes Roe's full name and extensive details of the incident.[1]

*3 SWBTS acknowledges that it initially disclosed the police reports, including an audio recording, without a “Highly Confidential” designation and explains that it chose not to designate the materials because they were provided pursuant to an open-records request as public information. SWBTS also noted that, upon request from Roe's counsel, it designated the materials “Highly Confidential” and redisclosed them. At no point, according to SWBTS, has it disclosed the materials to any third party.

Rule 37(b) authorizes a court to issue orders or sanctions to remedy a party's failure to obey a discovery order, including a protective order on discovery, and to deter future misconduct. Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2012). Specifically, when a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” a court “may” issue orders designed to address the wrongdoing and “must” exact monetary sanctions on the disobedient party. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (C); see also Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 488. No sanction will issue, however, if the failure was “substantially justified” or if other circumstances render an award of expenses “unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

SWBTS violated the terms of the Protective Order. The Order provides that “all documents containing personally identifiable information of the plaintiff are hereby designated as ‘Highly Confidential.’ ” (Dkt. #29 ¶ 3). The police report and related materials include, among other things, Roe's full name and details of her alleged assault, which clearly constitute her personally identifiable information. See (Dkt. #53, Ex. B). The issue, then, is whether imposing a sanction for the initial undesignated disclosure would be unjust.

Sanctioning SWBTS for a disclosure that it made under a mistaken view of the Protective Order and rectified upon request would be unjust. SWBTS received the police report through an open-records request after the report was initially determined to be public under Texas law. Further, SWBTS received the report prior to issuance of the Protective Order. For those reasons, SWBTS was not unreasonable in determining that the report was not subject to the Order. However, the Order requires designation of “all” discovery materials disclosed between the parties, without exception. After being notified of its mistake, SWBTS promptly rectified the situation by designating the report and reissuing the disclosure. And, according to its allegations, SWBTS has not disclosed the report to any third party. Under these circumstances, and without any showing of actual harm or prejudice, sanctions would lack meaningful deterrent value and be unjust. See E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 119 (5th Cir. 1993) (instructing that sanctions “should not be used lightly, and should be used as a lethal weapon only under extreme circumstances”).

SWBTS is cautioned, however, that it must strictly adhere to the terms of the Protective Order. Any future, similar violation of the terms of the Order will subject SWBTS to sanctions. See Stephens v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 769 F. App'x 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming sanctions when a party's violations were made “repeatedly and without any justification”).

C. Third-Party Subpoenas

Roe requests sanctions against SWBTS for (1) issuing to third parties notices of deposition with subpoenas for documents that include Roe's personally identifiable information, and (2) for failing to provide Roe notice or copies prior to issuance of the deposition notices. In support of her request for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3), Roe alleges that SWBTS sent six notices of deposition with subpoenas for documents to three of Roe's former educational institutions and three of her medical providers. See (Dkt. #48, Ex. K). Each subpoena commanded the subject to provide documents “pertaining to Jane Roe” and included Roe's date of birth and last four digits of her social security number. Roe did not receive notice or copies of the subpoenas until after they were issued. Roe contends that these subpoenas constitute willful efforts on the part of SWBTS to disclose Roe's personal information and circumvent the discovery mechanism of Local Rule CV-34.

*4 SWBTS denies wrongdoing but concedes that subpoenas were issued with Roe's date of birth and part of her social security number without first providing notice or copies for review. SWBTS asserts that it retained a vendor to issue the subpoenas and ascribes the delayed notice to the vendor. SWBTS defends its decision to issue the subpoenas, arguing that it has been unable to receive Roe's relevant medical records or authorizations despite several discovery requests and Local Rule CV-34's mandated disclosure. SWBTS also argues that any technical missteps were inadvertent and nonprejudicial because Roe was able to object to the subpoenas and SWBTS was able to withdraw them before receiving any responses or prompting any motions to quash.

Rule 26(g)(1) requires an attorney's certification on “every discovery request” that the request is consistent with the governing rules and is not frivolous, filed for an improper purpose, or unduly burdensome. Upon violation of the certification requirement, a court “must” issue an appropriate sanction, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds “substantial justification.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).

Roe has failed to demonstrate that SWBTS violated Rule 26(g)(1)’s certification requirement. The basis of Roe's argument is unclear—she lists several grievances against SWBTS and generally asserts that they are sanctionable under Rule 26(g)(3), without specifically identifying which certification SWBTS allegedly violated or how SWBTS's conduct constitutes a violation. Roe does not argue that SWBTS's actions violated the Protective Order, nor does she even cite to Rule 37(b). While she ascribes to SWBTS the improper purpose of attempting to circumvent Local Rule CV-34 by seeking medical records from third parties rather than from her, she misunderstands the nature and operation of the Rule. When a party places her “physical and mental condition” in issue, as Roe has done here, see (Dkt. #8 ¶¶ 128, 141), that party “shall provide” medical records or authorizations relevant to alleged injuries and damages to opposing counsel. Local Rule CV-34. The Rule acts as a mandate for Roe to disclose relevant medical records or authorizations, not as the exclusive means for SWBTS to obtain those materials in discovery. See id. (“[A] party may request medical records ... of another party ...”) (emphasis added). And there is some doubt about the legal foundation of Roe's apparent assertion that a technical violation of Rule 45(a)(4)’s requirement that the opposing party receive notice and copies of a subpoena prior to issuance is sanctionable under Rule 26(g)(3). Roe provides no authority supporting the proposition, and the Court is unaware of any controlling authority authorizing as much.

Even assuming SWBTS's conduct did violate the certification requirement, SWBTS was substantially justified. SWBTS issued the subpoenas seeking documents central to this case—the medical records or authorizations relevant to Roe's claimed injuries and damages. While the subpoenas were issued with late notice, Roe had sufficient opportunity to object and to have the subpoenas withdrawn prior to receiving any response or prompting any motions to quash. As to Roe's personally identifiable information in the subpoenas, SWBTS included the date of birth and last four digits of her social security number—not the nature of the suit or the underlying conduct—to enable the subpoena subjects to identify the relevant materials and respond. SWBTS should not be providing Roe's personally identifiable information to third parties without adhering to proper rules and procedures, but the circumstances explain its decision to include limited identifying information. For these reasons, the Court will not impose sanctions.

D. Subpoenas Duces Tecum

*5 Roe requests sanctions against SWBTS under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) for issuing improper notices of deposition with subpoenas for documents to Roe, her mother, and her sister. Roe argues that the subpoenas include overbroad and duplicative requests. Roe acknowledges that SWBTS withdrew the subpoena issued to Roe and, after objections were filed, withdrew the subpoenas issued to her mother and sister. SWBTS denies that it violated Rule 26(g)(1) or that its actions lacked substantial justification. SWBTS argues that the requested discovery was relevant and states that it withdrew the subpoenas upon counsel's request.

As discussed, Rule 26(g)(1) requires an attorney's certification on “every discovery request” that, after a reasonable inquiry, the request is consistent with the governing rules and is not frivolous, filed for an improper purpose, or unduly burdensome. Upon violation of the certification requirement, a court “must” issue an appropriate sanction, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds “substantial justification.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).

Roe has again failed to demonstrate that SWBTS violated Rule 26(g)(1)’s certification requirement. Roe's general allegation that the discovery requests are sanctionably overbroad is unsupported. SWBTS's requests are tailored to the case, including Roe's alleged injuries and damages. See (Dkt. #53, Ex. U). Roe correctly points out some overbroad requests, including requests for “[a]ny and all documents reflecting your phone records (text and voice) for the time period of August 1, 2014 through October 31, 2015,” and for “[a]ll photographs, videotapes, audio tapes, day-in-life films or movies of Plaintiff that are in the possession, custody or control of Plaintiff or her attorneys, family, friends, health care providers or photographers.” The first, while temporally limited, extends into communications unrelated to this case, and the second is also, on its face, overly broad. Each request, however, encompasses materials relevant to this case. For example, while SWBTS is not entitled to production of every photograph of Plaintiff, SWBTS is entitled to photographs relevant to the issues in this litigation. But such requests, which must be appropriately narrowed, do not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct. The parties are expected to work together to resolve such issues, narrowing discovery requests as needed to focus on the issues raised in this case. In this regard, the Court notes that SWBTS ultimately withdrew the subpoena issued to Roe, without need for filing objections, upon counsel's request. For these reasons, SWBTS is not subject to sanctions.

E. Protective Order

Roe further requests a protective order restricting attendance at depositions and sequestering deposition testimony. Two concerns underlie the requests. First, Roe fears that unrestricted deposition attendance would adversely influence her testimony and the testimony of her family given the nature of the allegations against Defendants, particularly allegations concerning Defendants’ alleged mistreatment of Roe after she reported that she had been sexually assaulted. Second, Roe is concerned that Defendants’ witnesses may alter their testimony if given the opportunity to attend depositions or review deposition testimony. To assure uninfluenced testimony, Roe requests limiting deposition attendance to only the deponent, the deponent's retained counsel, and the parties’ litigation counsel of record, and prohibiting disclosure of testimony to other witnesses through sequestration.

Defendants oppose the requested protective order, arguing that Roe has failed to show good cause by relying on conclusory statements of influence rather than particular and specific allegations. Patterson has nonetheless agreed not to attend the depositions of Roe, her mother, or her sister. Defendants also argue that any restriction on deposition attendance or on review of deposition testimony would unduly prejudice their ability to fully and fairly prepare their case.

*6 A party may request a protective order to prevent “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). Upon finding good cause, a court may issue an order that, among other things, “designat[es] the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted,” id. 26(c)(1)(E), and sequesters deposition testimony, see In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). The movant bears the burden of proving good cause through “a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Id. at 306 (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)).

The Court is mindful of the sensitive information at issue and the justifiable concern for intimidation. The case is premised on allegations that Roe was repeatedly sexually assaulted and that her former educational and spiritual institution and its leadership failed to protect her or her personal information. That failure, according to Roe, included active efforts to suppress her allegations through embarrassment and intimidation. Far from conclusory statements, Roe provides specific allegations of fact regarding Patterson. Taking one example, Roe contends that Patterson appeared unannounced at a meeting between Roe and an SWBTS employee on a matter unrelated to Roe's sexual assault allegations. According to Roe, Patterson proceeded to commandeer the meeting to discuss the details of the alleged sexual assaults suffered by Roe, in front of the SWBTS employee and over Roe's objections. See (Dkt. #8 ¶¶ 91–102).

The sensitive nature of this case and the specific allegations of intimidation warrant some protection to assure uninfluenced deposition testimony. Roe's allegations of influence are primarily directed at Patterson, who has agreed to not attend the depositions of Roe, her mother, and her sister. This compromise will alleviate much of Roe's understandable concern. As additional precautions, for all depositions, it is appropriate to limit the number of SWBTS corporate representatives in attendance to one, to allow the attendance of SWBTS's corporate counsel, and to allow video appearance. These measures will provide adequate protection to Roe and her family and help assure uninfluenced testimony.

The remaining protection Roe seeks, however, would unduly prejudice Defendants’ ability to develop and present their defenses against Roe's claims. Excluding parties and their representatives from key witnesses’ depositions will, among other things, impair Defendants’ ability to assess their credibility. SWBTS states that the only individuals set to attend the depositions of Roe and her family are its counsel of record, a paralegal, its corporate counsel, and its corporate representative (SWBTS's current chief of staff, who was not an SWBTS employee at the time of the alleged wrongdoing). Unlike Patterson, Roe has not provided specific assertions as to why Defendants’ corporate representative and corporate counsel should be totally barred from attending depositions, much less prohibited from even reviewing deposition testimony. See In re Terra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d at 306 (“[I]n the typical case, deposition witnesses are not subject to sequestration.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee notes). Aside from general allegations of SWBTS's current or former employees acting as Patterson's “proxies,” Roe fails to present any specific, convincing evidence to support an order (1) excluding certain individuals from attending depositions or (2) prohibiting individuals important to litigating the case from reviewing deposition materials.

*7 Roe's invocation of case law involving allegations of fraud is unpersuasive because Roe herself does not allege fraud. While she contends that certain of the parties and the witnesses may change their testimony, this speculative concern based on shared affiliation with SWBTS or its current and former employees is insufficient to demonstrate good cause for a protective order or sequestration. See id. at 305 (determining that the good-cause standard for sequestration of witnesses was not met by speculative allegations that defendant's “employees might feel a sense of camaraderie or feel pressure from [defendant employer] that might taint their testimony”). For these reasons, Roe's request is granted in that Patterson may not attend the depositions of Roe or her family, SWBTS may bring only one corporate representative to each deposition, and attendance may be by video. Roe's request is otherwise denied.

F. Amendment of the Protective Order

Roe requests that the Court modify the Protective Order to require all documents containing Roe's personally identifiable information be designated as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” meaning that such materials will be subject to review only by counsel, not the parties themselves, nonparty witnesses, or anyone else. Roe argues that this restrictive modification is necessary because the current designation, “Highly Confidential,” has proven inadequate to protect her personally identifiable information. In support, Roe contends that both Defendants have breached the Order by failing to timely designate materials “Highly Confidential” and that SWBTS has breached the Order by impermissibly disclosing such materials to third parties.

Defendants largely avoid disputing the allegations of wrongful conduct. Instead, they argue that designating materials with Roe's personally identifiable information as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” would substantially hinder their ability to fully and fairly develop and present a defense. Defendants contend that the proposed designation would apply to the majority of discoverable materials, placing those materials beyond the review of the Defendants themselves, as well as witnesses and others necessary to defend against the claims. This deprivation, Defendants argue, would cause undue prejudice without any material addition to Roe's privacy protections.

Roe's concerns about the protection of her confidential information are understandable. However, the cause for Roe's concerns has been the identified failures by Defendants to comply with the terms of the Order, rather than a reassessment that the Order's protective scheme is itself inadequate.

The Order provides two tiers of confidentiality designation: “Confidential” and “Highly Confidential.” The latter designation includes “all documents containing personally identifiable information of the plaintiff[.]” Such documents must be clearly designated and “maintained carefully so as to preclude access by persons who are not entitled to receive such information.” Disclosure is limited to a select group of individuals necessary to litigate the case, including counsel, SWBTS and its “officers, directors, overseers, in-house counsel, insurers, agents, representatives, or employees,” and “non-party deponents, witnesses, or potential witnesses,” on the condition that such persons must bind themselves to the terms of the Order. When such materials are disclosed, they may be used only for the limited purpose of “preparing for, conducting, participating in the conduct of, and/or prosecuting and/or defending the Proceeding, and not for any business or other purpose whatsoever.” In sum, the Order clearly identifies the appropriate designation of materials with Roe's personally identifiable information and carefully guards such materials throughout and after the pendency of this case.

The Order's strictures are sufficient to protect the sensitive materials involved in this case. That was true when the parties jointly proposed the Order and it remains true now. What has changed is adherence to the Order's terms: Defendants have each violated the Order. While the violations are ultimately not sanctionable, they raise concern about Defendants’ discovery behavior and appreciation for the sensitivity of the allegations and evidence in this case.

*8 But Roe presents an onerous solution. Her request to designate all materials with her personally identifiable information as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” would unduly hinder Defendants’ ability to fully and fairly litigate the case and present their defenses. The modification would place a great deal of critical evidence beyond the review of Defendants and other important witnesses. This would constrain Defendants’ ability to litigate the case, as counsel would be left to parse the evidence and advocate Defendants’ positions without the benefit of the Defendants or the witnesses’ perspectives on this fact intensive matter. The existing protective scheme in place under the Order, coupled with the troubling byproducts of Roe's proposed alternative scheme, warrant denial of Roe's request.

SWBTS has filed a motion to compel Roe to produce medical records or medical authorizations relevant to her asserted injuries and damages in this case. (Dkt. #72). SWBTS argues that production of relevant medical records or authorizations is required by Local Rule CV-34 and that its motion to compel is necessary given Roe's delay in disclosing those materials.

Roe opposes the motion. Roe appears to believe that SWBTS's request for medical records sweeps too broadly, and that records produced may not be properly handled under the Protective Order. Roe further characterizes SWBTS's motion as a bad-faith effort to circumvent Local Rule CV-34 and to “bully” Roe into providing discovery beyond what is allowed under the Rules. However, should the Court deem medical records or authorizations subject to discovery, Roe requests that the Court review them in camera prior to disclosure to determine which are relevant and deem the disclosures “Attorneys’ Eyes Only.”

The Court will GRANT SWBTS's motion, with the instructions that (1) Roe must timely provide to SWBTS either her medical records themselves or signed authorizations, limited to records of health that are relevant to the injuries and damages claimed by Roe in this suit, and (2) all such health records shall be designated and treated as “Highly Confidential” under the Protective Order.

Roe is obligated to disclose medical records or authorizations relevant to the injuries and damages she put in issue related to her “physical or mental condition.” Local Rule CV-34(a) provides that when a party's physical or mental condition is at issue, that party “shall provide” to the opposing counsel either the party's medical records or a signed authorization so that records of healthcare providers which are relevant to the asserted injuries and damages. (Emphasis added). Roe placed her physical and medical condition at issue in this case by asserting that she “has suffered, and continues to suffer, great pain of mind and body, physical injury, shock, emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotion distress,” and other related physical and mental injuries and damages. (Dkt. #8 ¶¶ 128, 141). Roe must therefore comply with Local Rule CV-34(a)’s mandate that relevant medical records or authorizations regarding these injuries and damages be disclosed to SWBTS.

Finally, Roe asks the Court to review potentially responsive discovery materials in the first instance, before disclosing them to SWBTS. That is not the role of the Court. It is the parties’ obligation to engage in discovery in accordance with the Rules. Only after attempts to mutually resolve discovery disputes have been unsuccessful is the Court called upon to resolve such disputes. Here, SWBTS has repeatedly requested medical records or authorizations relevant to this case. Roe has failed to provide either the relevant medical records or authorizations. In keeping with Local Rule CV-34's disclosure requirement and in view of the limited terms of SWBTS's request for “executed medical authorization or the records of health care providers which are relevant to injuries and damages claimed,” Roe must provide only those medical records or authorizations relevant to the injuries and damages she asserts.

*9 Based on the Complaint and the allegations therein and bearing in mind the broad standards of discovery and relevance under the Federal Rules, the parties should be able to determine the scope of relevant materials without need for court intervention. See United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Courts have long recognized the broad scope of discovery.... ‘Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.’ ”) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). If, however, the parties encounter issues in the production of Roe's health records or authorizations that cannot be resolved through mutual agreement, the parties may seek the Court's intervention at that time. Roe's request for sanctions is denied.

It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff Jane Roe's Motion to Modify the Protective and Confidentiality Order, for Protection, and for Sanctions, (Dkt. #73), is GRANTED in part. It is ORDERED that Defendant Patterson may not attend the depositions of Roe or her family members. Further, Defendant SWBTS may only bring its counsel of record, one corporate representative, one corporate counsel, and paralegals to the depositions of Roe and her family members. All other relief requested in Roe's motion, (Dkt. #73), is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Defendant SWBTS's Motion to Compel, (Dkt. #72), is GRANTED. By no later than August 31, 2020, Roe must provide to SWBTS either her medical records themselves or signed authorizations for such records, limited to records of health that are relevant to the injuries and damages claimed by Roe in this suit. The Court further ORDERS that all such health records shall be designated and treated as “Highly Confidential” under the Protective Order.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17th day of August, 2020.