*1 On September 17, 2020, Plaintiffs Kyla Skye Staniskis (“Plaintiff” or “Staniskis”) and Michael George Tater (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action arising from the death of Shannon Tater (“Decedent”) against Defendants City of Huntington Beach, Stephani Williams, Michael Wagner, Nicole Shogren, Kelli Herrera, and Does 1 through 10. See Dkt. 1. On January 6, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and California law. See Dkt. 21 (“FAC”). Staniskis is Decedent's “adult daughter and successor-in-interest,” and Michael George Tater is Decedent's “sole surviving parent.” FAC ¶¶ 1-2.

On May 6, 2021, Staniskis filed two Motions to Quash Subpoenas served by Defendant City of Huntington Beach (“Defendant”) on several third parties. Dkt. 36, 37 (collectively, “Motions”). Plaintiff filed the Motions under Local Rule 7. Dkt. 36 at 4; Dkt. 37 at 4. On May 20, 2021, Defendant filed its Oppositions to the Motions. Dkt. 41, 42. On May 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Reply to each of the Motions. Dkt. 43, 44. The Motions are now fully briefed. The Count finds the Motions are appropriate for decision without oral argument and vacates the hearings set for the Motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. The Court rules as follow.

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019), aff'd sub nom. V5 Techs., LLC v. Switch, LTD., 2020 WL 1042515 (D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2020) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted).

Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See Rule 26(b)(2); see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)).

*2 Rule 45(d) provides various bases upon which a person subject to or affected by a federal subpoena may move to quash or limit such subpoena. Generally, “a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.” Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.” (quoting Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))). A party therefore generally lacks standing to object a subpoena served on a third party on grounds of relevance or undue burden. See Krenitsky v. Kirsch, 2020 WL 5017270, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020); Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, 2020 WL 1181491, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020).

On a timely motion, a court must quash or modify a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception ore waiver applies.” Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Separately, a person from whom discovery is sought may move for an order limiting or forbidding discovery “for good cause” to protect the moving party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Rule 26(c)(1). A party seeking to limit discovery has a “heavy burden” of showing why discovery should be limited. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 436, 437 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” DIRECTV. Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429); see La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence”). “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).

Although the Motions relate to different subpoenas, the parties' arguments in support of or in opposition to the Motions are substantively the same. The Court thus addresses the Motions together below.

A. Compliance with the Local Rules

Defendant argues that the Motions should be denied for procedural defect because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 37. See Dkt. 41 at 9-10; Dkt. 42 at 8-9.

Local Rule 37 requires “counsel for the parties to confer in a good faith effort to eliminate the necessity for hearing the motion or to eliminate as many of the disputes as possible” before “filing any motion relating to discovery under” Rules 26 to 37. C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-1. If, after conferring according to the process delineated under Local Rule 37-1, “counsel are unable to settle their differences, they must formulate a written stipulation unless otherwise ordered by the Court. The stipulation must be filed and served with the notice of motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 37-2. For disputes related to discovery subpoenas, Local Rule 37 “applies to all motions relating to discovery subpoenas served on (a) parties and (b) non-parties represented by counsel” “[e]xcept with respect to motions transferred to this district pursuant to [Rule] 45(f).” C.D. Cal. L.R. 45-1.

*3 Plaintiff contends that Local Rule 37 is inapplicable here, and so she properly filed the Motions pursuant to Local Rule 7, because “there has been no indication that these non-parties are represented by counsel.” Dkt. 36 at 4; Dkt. 37 at 4. Notably, it is not certain here that the non-parties here are not represented by counsel: Plaintiff merely states that “there is no evidence that” the non-parties are “represented by counsel.” Dkt. 43 at 2; Dkt. 44 at 2. Plaintiff also states that Defendant “did not state that the non-parties were represented by counsel.” Dkt. 43 at 2; see Dkt. 44 at 2. But Plaintiff does not state, and the meet-and-confer correspondences included with the Motions do not show, that Plaintiff tried to determine whether the non-parties are represented by counsel. See Dkt. 36-1 at 46-68 (CM/ECF pagination); Dkt. 37-1 at 11-36 (CM/ECF pagination). Regardless, given the uncertainty surrounding this matter and considering that the dispute here is between parties of this action, the Court views Local Rules 37 and 45, read together, as intending for the parties here to proceed under Local Rule 37.

Despite the procedural deficiency, in the interest of expeditiously resolving this dispute, the Court exercises its discretion to address the Motions' merits.

B. Analysis of the Merits of the Motions

The Motions here relate to Defendant's subpoenas to seven police departments (collectively, “the Police Department Subpoenas”) and to Cypress College Human Resources (“Cypress College Subpoena”) (collectively, “the Subpoenas”).

The Police Department Subpoenas, served on the police departments of Costa Mesa, Fountain Valley, Irvine, Newport Beach, Santa Ana, Tustin, and Westminster, seek “[a]ny and all reports, records, billings, invoices pertaining to: Shannon Michelle Tater.” See, e.g., Dkt. 36-1 at 10. The Police Department Subpoenas also state “Date of Birth: 6/10/1979” and specify this information “is provided for identification purposes only and does not limit the scope of discovery.” See, e.g., id.

The Cypress College Subpoena seeks “[a]ny and all employment records pertaining to Shannon Michelle Tater including, but not limited to, pre-employment papers, time sheets, payroll, insurance, medical and personnel reports.” Dkt. 37-1 at 9. Like the Police Department Subpoenas, the Cypress College Subpoena states “Date of Birth: 6/10/1979” and specifies this information “is provided for identification purposes only and does not limit the scope of discovery.” Id.

On Plaintiff's standing to quash the Subpoenas, first, Plaintiff's contentions that the Subpoenas seek irrelevant information and are overly broad do not provide her standing to quash the Subpoenas. See Dkt. 36 at 3, 12-16; Dkt. 37 at 8-10; see also Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Lee v. Lee, 2020 WL 7890868, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[O]nly the party to which the subpoena is directed has standing to object to the requests on the grounds that they are irrelevant, vague, overbroad, duplicative, unduly burdensome, etc.”); Davis v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 10562943, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2017) (noting that Rule 45 “does not generally allow for objection by a party who may be impacted by the production of documents from a third party” (citing Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74)). The Court therefore does not consider Plaintiff's relevancy and overbreadth arguments.

Plaintiff contends that she “has standing to move to quash” the Subpoenas because Defendant seeks “information that infringes on [Decedent's] right to privacy under California and federal law.” Dkt. 36 at 5; Dkt. 37 at 8. As an initial matter, federal, not state, law governs privilege analysis for cases, such as this, where subject matter jurisdiction is based upon the existence of a federal question. See FAC ¶¶ 3, 5-6; Fed. R. Evid. 501; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); Grasshopper House. LLC v. Accelerated Recovery Ctrs., LLC, 2010 WL 11549386, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2010) (explaining that because the court has “federal question jurisdiction over this action ... any privacy or privilege determinations are governed by federal [law], rather than by California law.” (internal citation omitted)). Still, under federal law, discovery may be restricted because of a party's privacy rights in the information sought by the propounding party. See Curtis Conyers v. Marisa Cano, 2020 WL 7084546, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020) (citing Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.”)).

*4 Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks standing because “[a]ny privacy rights Decedent may have had in her records did not survive her death.” Dkt. 41 at 11 (citing United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1581 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 854 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988)); Dkt. 42 at 10. Defendant further argues that “Staniskis has no standing to assert a violation of another person's right to privacy.” Dkt. 41 at 11 (citing Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1581); Dkt. 42 at 11. As Plaintiff notes, however, courts have found that a right to privacy may survive a person's death, and this right may be asserted by others. See, e.g., Azami v. Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp., 2020 WL 7264838, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (finding subpoenas seeking medical information about the plaintiff's deceased husband “sufficiently implicated [the] plaintiff's privacy interests so as to give [the] plaintiff standing to move to quash” the subpoenas (citing Prescott v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 2011 WL 2119036, at *1, n.2 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (“A patient has a right of privacy in the confidentiality of his medical records even after his death and these rights may be asserted by the decedent's survivors.”)).

Even so, Plaintiff does not provide, and the Court did not find, any authority concluding that a decedent's privacy interest in police or employment records, as opposed to medical records, continues to exist after death. Plaintiff cites M.H. v. City of San Bernardino, asserting the court in that case “acknowledged that a federal constitutional right to privacy exists as to a [d]ecedent's probation records.” Dkt. 43 at 5 (citing 2020 WL 6595013, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020)); Dkt. 44 at 4 (same). But the court in M.H. only found that “to the extent a federal constitutional right to privacy applies to the [d]ecedent's probation records,” the defendants' “need for the probation records outweighs the privacy interests.” M.H., 2020 WL 6595013, at *4 (emphasis added). The court did not expressly find such a right continued to exist after death, but merely found that “to the extent” it survived, it was outweighed by other factors.

Plaintiff also cites to Shinedling v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., in which the court held a plaintiff had standing to quash a subpoena seeking, from a third party, documents relating to a loan issued to the plaintiff and his deceased wife because the plaintiff had “privacy and other interests” in the information sought. 2013 WL 12142949, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013); see Dkt. 43 at 4-5; Dkt. 44 at 4. While Shinedling shows that the right to privacy can extend beyond medical information, the plaintiff in Shinedling was asserting his own privacy interests, not only those of his deceased wife, in the financial documents sought. This is unlike the situation here: Plaintiff is not asserting her own right to privacy over Decedent's police and employment records. The ruling in Shinedling therefore does not support Plaintiff's position. Likewise, the court's holding in Schachter v. United States also does not support Plaintiff's arguments, because the court in Schachter determined that Congress intended an action brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7431, which is not at issue here, to survive the death of a taxpayer. See 847 F. Supp. 140, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also Dkt. 43 at 5; Dkt. 44 at 4-5.

In any event, even assuming Decedent's right to privacy in police and employment records survive her death, and assuming Plaintiff may assert this right, the right to privacy is not absolute and is subject to a balancing of needs. See A. Farber & Partners, Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 191; Marshall v. Galvanoni, 2019 WL 2491524, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) (“To evaluate whether privacy interests should prevail over the interest in fully discovering a case, the court must balance the party's need for the information against the individual's privacy rights.”). Thus, even where “objections are raised regarding confidential, private or personal information, ... confidential information may be required to be disclosed after” weighing “the right to discover relevant information ... against the right to privacy” Peck v. Cty. of Orange, 2020 WL 4353687, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); see Carter v. Telecare Corp., 2019 WL 6711688, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (declining to quash third-party subpoena because, in part, “while it is clear that plaintiff has a privacy interest in her employment records, defendant has provided sufficient reason to demonstrate that the requested documents are relevant to the parties' claims or defenses ....”); Bond v. Arrowhead Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2013 WL 12330716, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) (compelling production of medical records because “the information sought by plaintiff in the requested documents pursuant to the subpoena is relevant to plaintiff's claims in the pending action” and “plaintiff's need for the discovery outweighs any alleged privacy interest of third parties whose information may be produced.”).

*5 Conducting such balancing here, the Court concludes that Defendant's interest in obtaining the information sought by the Police Department Subpoenas, to the extent they seek “all reports [and] records ... pertaining to” Decedent, and by the Cypress College Subpoena outweighs any privacy rights that may exist. Defendant has shown that the information sought relates to the SAC's Fourteenth Amendment claim for Interference with Familial Relations and claims for damages and thus meets Rule 26(b)'s broad definition of relevance for discovery purposes. Considering each Subpoena separately, and balancing Defendant's need for the information as it relates to issues such as Decedent's potential lifetime earnings, Decedent's potential life expectancy (Police Department Subpoenas only), and the nature of the familial bonds and support between Decedent and Plaintiffs underlying the Interference with Familial Relations claim as alleged in SAC ¶¶ 134-141 (Police Department Subpoenas), against the Decedent's right to privacy, which the Court assumes survives her death, in the police and employment records sought by the Subpoenas, the Court finds the balance tips in favor of disclosure except to the extent the Police Department Subpoenas seek “all ... billings [and] invoices pertaining” to Decedent. As to such billing records, the Court finds the connection between such billing records and the FAC's claims tangential at best. Defendant does not explain how police department billings and invoices would reveal Decedent's relationship with her family members or show Decedent's “habits, activities, lifestyle.” Dkt. 41 at 14-15. The Court may, on its own, limit the extent of discovery when it falls outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). See Rule 26(b)(2)(C); Vysata v. Menowitz, 2019 WL 2871145, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2019) (“Although [the] [d]efendants appear to lack standing, the Court nevertheless exercises its inherent power to limit discovery.” (citing Rule 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii))). The Police Department Subpoenas are therefore quashed to the extent they seek billings and invoices related to Decedent.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Quash Subpoena to Cypress College (Dkt. 37) is DENIED in its entirety and the Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Police Departments (Dkt. 36) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows. The Police Department Subpoenas, served on Costa Mesa Police Department, Fountain Valley Police Department, Irvine Police Department, Newport Beach Police Department, Santa Ana Police Department, Tustin Police Department, and Westminster Police Department, are QUASHED as to requests for “all ... billings [and] invoices pertaining to” Decedent, but the Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Police Departments is denied in all other respects.

Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to serve this Order by appropriate means upon the subpoenaed parties within three days from the date of this Order. Counsel for Defendant may, but is not required to, separately serve the Order on the subpoenaed parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.