*1 This cause comes before the Court on two discovery-related motions, as well as motions to extend the case deadlines. The Court rules as follows.

On March 19, 2018, Plaintiff/Counter Defendant Alerding Castor, LLP (“AC” or “Plaintiff”) filed its Motion to Quash Production of Confidential Bank Records, seeking to quash the third-party subpoenas issued to Old National Bancorp and The National Bank of Indianapolis. AC also seeks payment of its attorneys’ fees incurred in moving to quash the subpoenas. The subpoenas at issue seek production of copies of documents and records “showing the deposits from Paul Fletcher and/or Carole Wockner ... into any IOLTA account or other–named account for Alerding Castor Hewitt, LLP, and withdrawals of money by Alerding Castor Hewitt, LLP from deposits held in trust for Paul Fletcher and/or Carole Wockner in any IOLTA account or other-named account for Alerding Castor Hewitt, LLP” for October 1, 2012 through July 31, 2016. [Dkt. 109-1 at 4.] If deposits and withdrawals into and out of the accounts are not differentiated by depositor, then the subpoena seeks “records of all deposits into and withdrawals from IOLTA or other-named account(s) ....” [Dkt. 109-1 at 5.]

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 provides for discovery directed at a nonparty. The court may quash a subpoena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Although a party generally lacks standing to move to quash a subpoena served on a third party, a party may move to quash when it “ ‘claims some personal right or privilege in respect to the subject matter of a subpoena duces tecum directed to a nonparty.’ ” Bell v. Lantz, No. 1:13-cv-0035-TWP-DKL, 2015 WL 6609290, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2015) (quoting ITOCHU Int'l, Inc. v. Devon Robotics, LLC, 303 F.R.D. 229, 232 (E.D. Pa. 2014)). For example, a party has standing to challenge a third-party subpoena seeking the party's financial records. See id.

AC contends that the IOLTA account information is irrelevant to the claims in this case, specifically referencing Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs’ (hereinafter “Defendants”) legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. AC also represents that it provided copies of its client ledger of all deposits from Defendants’ account, copies of all checks deposited by Defendants, and copies of all itemized invoices to Defendants. [Dkt. 109 at 3–4.] According to AC, without a clear explanation, Defendants took issue with the documents provided and did not withdraw the subpoenas. Defendants assert that documents they obtained from AC reflect discrepancies in the IOLTA accounts and the IOLTA records provided by AC are incomplete. However, Defendants have offered no evidence to suggest that they made any payments to AC that are not reflected in the documents AC provided them. Merely asserting that they “have no reason not to question some or any aspect of the records coming from AC's custody” is not sufficient. [Dkt. 113 at 3.] Defendants have not suggested they have evidence that they made payments to AC that were not attributed to them. Though the third-party subpoenas may seek discoverable information, the information sought would be cumulative of the information that Defendants already obtained from AC in this action, and which Defendants presumably have in their own possession regarding the payments they made to AC. Thus, the Court may disallow this further discovery. See, e.g., Hurt v. Vantlin, No. 3:14-cv-00092-JMS-WGH, 2015 WL 5614757, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.

*2 Further, AC argues that the subpoenas seek documents that will contain privileged information—client account numbers and names. AC also argues that Old National as a practice does not redact account names and numbers when responding to subpoenas. AC asserts that it contacted National Bank Indianapolis, and the bank advised AC that it could provide Defendants with a copy of only the Defendants’ checks deposited to the bank. [Dkt. 109 at 4.] In the alternative, AC asks the Court to enter a protective order designating its IOLTA account information as “confidential.” [Dkt. 109 at 5.]

The party seeking to quash a third-party subpoena bears the burden of demonstrating that the information sought is privileged. Venice PI, LLC v. Doe 1, Cause No. 2:17-CV-285-JVB-JEM, 2016 WL 1566813, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2018). AC has discharged this burden. The names of AC's clients and their account numbers are privileged information to which the Defendants are not entitled.

Since National Bank of Indianapolis advised AC that it could provide Defendants with a copy of only Defendants’ checks deposited to National Bank of Indianapolis, the Court will allow that discovery to be provided; National Bank of Indianapolis is ordered to produce only a copy of the Defendants’ checks deposited to National Bank of Indianapolis by AC. The motion to quash production of confidential bank records [Dkt. 109] is GRANTED with respect to all other discovery sought and the subpoenas to Old National Bancorp and National Bank of Indianapolis are quashed.

With their Second Motion to Compel Discovery and Extend Rule 16 Scheduling Order, Defendants seek to compel responses to certain of their interrogatories and requests for production, namely Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3, and Request for Production No. 3, thus retracing ground covered by their prior Motion to Compel [Dkt. 78] and ruled on by this Court in the Order on Motion to Compel [Dkt. 98].

Interrogatory No. 2 seeks information about all cases presented at a jury trial since 2000 by AC attorneys assigned to Fletcher's case. AC's second supplemental response was that Attorneys Roach and Kirk had not presented any trial before a jury in the time period in question, and Attorney Alerding had one jury trial in that period, but “due to the length of Mr. Alerding's legal career, Mr. Alerding is unable to recall all the details of the case he presented before a jury.” [Dkt. 114-1 at 4.] In addition, the response stated that the “information regarding the case is not readily available to AC excluding Mr. Alerding's memory.” [Id.] The response also indicated that “AC spent hours searching its system and mycase.in.gov (“My Case”) in order to obtain as much information as possible” and Alerding was able to recall and AC was able to determine that the trial was in Orange County, Indiana, and the client represented was Manweb. [Id.] And AC responded that “Mr. Alerding is unable to recall any additional information.” [Id.]

Interrogatory No. 3 seeks like information about cases tried to the bench. AC's second supplemental response provided a little information regarding bench trials of Attorneys Roach and Kirk. [Dkt. 114-1 at 5–6.] It also stated that Attorney Alerding had tried seven bench trials but he was unable to recall most details because of the length of his legal career and because some of the bench trials occurred before he became a partner, the information was not readily available to AC. [Dkt. 114-1 at 6.] The response also stated that “AC spent hours searching its system and My Case in order to obtain as much information as possible” and then provided some very general information about five cases. [Dot. 114-1 at 6–7.] The motion to compel argues that the interrogatory answers are incomplete and it is “unfathomable” that Attorney Alerding could not recall the details of the jury trial or the outcome of 4 of the 5 bench trials. [Dkt. 117 at 1.] AC's supplemental interrogatory responses are verified: Alerding attested “under the penalties for perjury that the answers to the foregoing interrogatories are true and correct.” [Dkt. 114-1 at 12.] The verification is dated “2/9/2018.” [Id.]

*3 The Court's Order on Motion to Compel [Dkt. 98] addressed Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3, providing that “[t]o the extent that the sought information is in Alerding's possession, Alerding is ordered to provide information of all the cases personally presented at trial before a jury and/or a civil bench trial by Roach and Kirk, as well as the other requested information regarding Mr. Alerding. The information provided shall be limited to the ten year period prior to the trial date of the Zupan lawsuit.” [Dkt. 98 at 7 (emphasis added).]

In responding to the Second Motion to Compel, AC asserts that the interrogatory answers “were the best, most complete answers to AC's knowledge.” [Dkt. 117 at 2.] Defendants have no evidence to refute Alerding's verification that the supplemental answers are true and correct. Defendants’ speculation that an attorney should recall more information about the cases he has tried is insufficient to support a motion to compel. AC was ordered to provide the information only to the extent the information was in AC's possession. Based on the supplemental answers as verified by Mr. Alerding, that is exactly what AC did. And the Court notes that the February 2018 supplemental answers have provided more information to Defendants than the earlier answers that were provided in October 2017. Defendants will have to live with the supplemental interrogatory answers they have received.

Defendants also complain that AC has not produced time cards or records for personnel charging to Defendants’ case, such as billing back-up, etc. According to Defendants, AC has not produced a “single document responsive” to Request for Production No. 3 and the Court's order, docket 98. [Dkt. 114 at 3.] Defendants seek an order compelling production and allowing them to inspect AC's electronic files from which the documents were generated.

AC responds that the Court has already denied Defendants’ motion to compel Alerding to re-produce documents responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 3–9, and, indeed, the Court has denied the motion. [Dkt. 98 at 12.] However, the Court did order Alerding to produce any requested documents to the extent it had not produced them as they are kept in the ordinary course of business. [Id.] But there is no evidence to suggest that Alerding failed to comply with this order. That Defendants simply do not believe AC, for example, when it states it does not keep time cards, is not enough to obtain an order compelling further production or sanctions.

For these reasons, the Second Motion to Compel [Dkt. 114] is denied.

Defendants seek an enlargement of the discovery deadline, arguing that AC's incomplete and late discovery responses necessitate an enlargement. And they seek sanctions against AC for violating the Court's discovery orders. Defendants ask for an additional 60 days following the provision of outstanding discovery, within which to depose Attorneys Alerding and Roach. AC does not object to an extension of the discovery deadline for 60 days, provided that (1) the extension is to allow Defendants to depose Mr. Alerding and Mr. Roach, and (2) the dispositive motion deadline is also extended.

Plaintiff also separately moves for an enlargement of time to file dispositive motions, seeking 30 days after the Court rules on the Second Motion to Compel or 30 days after the completion of any discovery the Court allows.

The Court agrees that good cause exists for extending the discovery deadline for purposes of deposing Alerding and Roach and the completion of any remaining discovery. The Court further finds that for good cause shown, the motion to enlarge the dispositive motion deadline should be granted.

*4 Accordingly, the Court hereby amends the approved Case Management Plan as amended [Dkts. 27, 29, 73, & 94] as follows:

All other requirements of the approved Case Management Plan as amended [Dkts. 27, 29, 73, & 94] remain in effect.

The Court anticipates no further enlargement of these deadlines.

For the reasons stated, the Court orders as follows:

SO ORDERED.

Distribution:

PAUL FLETCHER

1203 E. Cota Street

Santa Barbara, CA 93103

CAROLE WOCKNER

1203 E. Cota Street

Santa Barbara, CA 91303

Michael J. Alerding

ALERDING CASTOR LLP

malerding@alerdingcastor.com

Michael E. Brown

KIGHTLINGER & GRAY LLP

mbrown@k-glaw.com

George M. Plews

PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN LLP

gplews@psrb.com

Anthony Roach

ALERDING CASTOR HEWITT LLP

aroach@alerdingcastor.com