*1 On May 3, 2021, plaintiff United States of America filed a motion to compel defendants City of Hesperia, County of San Bernardino, and the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department to supplement their responses to several discovery requests. The parties' respective positions are contained in a joint stipulation (“JS”). Docket No. 43. Plaintiff's arguments are supported by the declaration of its counsel Matthew Nickell (“Nickell Decl.”) and exhibits. Defendants' arguments are supported by the declaration of their counsel D. Dennis La (“La Decl.”) and exhibits. On May 25, 2021, the parties filed supplemental memoranda in support of their arguments. Docket No. 44 (“P. Supp. Mem.”), No. 45 (“D. Supp. Mem.”). Plaintiff also filed a supplemental declaration (“Nickell Supp. Decl.”) and exhibit.

The court found a hearing on the motion would not be of assistance and so vacated the hearing scheduled for June 8, 2021. The court now grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel and directs the parties to meet and confer regarding the remaining issues raised in the parties' briefs.

On December 2, 2019, plaintiff filed this civil rights action accusing defendants of enacting and enforcing a mandatory eviction ordinance with the intent and effect of discriminating against African American and Latino residents. See generally Compl.; First Am. Compl. (“FAC”). The City of Hesperia is located in the Victor Valley region of San Bernardino County. FAC ¶ 17. Since the late 1900s, the population of African American and Latino residents in the City has grown rapidly. Id. ¶ 18.

A. The Mandatory Eviction Ordinance

On November 17, 2015, the City enacted ordinance number 2015-12, entitled “An Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Hesperia, California, Requiring the Registration and Regulation of Housing Rental Businesses for Crime Free Rental Housing,” (the “Ordinance”). Id. ¶ 20. The San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department provided significant support and resources to create and implement the Ordinance. Id. ¶ 29. In particular, then-Captain Nils Bentsen, who is now Hesperia's City Manager, was the driving force behind the Ordinance. Id. ¶¶ 26, 30. The Ordinance went into effect on January 1, 2016 and remained in effect until on or about July 18, 2017. Id. ¶ 20. The Ordinance applied only to rental properties. Id. ¶ 21.

Under the Ordinance, all owners of rental property in the City had to register their properties and pay an annual fee. Id. Failure to register was a misdemeanor and carried fines. Id. The Ordinance also required owners to submit the names of all adult rental applicants to the Sheriff's Department for a background screening. Id. Additionally, owners had to use a commercial service to conduct their own criminal background check of tenants. Id. The City punished failures to screen tenants or applicants with a fine. Id.

The Ordinance also required owners to incorporate a “Crime Free Lease Addendum,” approved by the City council, into all new and renewed leases. Id. The addendum warned that if any occupant, guest, or other person under the occupant's control engaged in a single instance of any criminal activity on or near the property or, in the case of drug crimes, at any location, occupants would receive a three-day notice to vacate the premises. See id. The Ordinance did not require a conviction or any other criminal disposition to trigger the three-day notice. Id. The City imposed a fine on owners who failed to incorporate the addendum in a lease or failed to initiate an eviction in accordance with the Ordinance. Id.

*2 Finally, the Ordinance required all rental properties in the City to undergo annual police inspections of conditions, including poor lighting or landscape styles, that contributed to actual or potential criminal activity. See id. The City charged for inspections and imposed fines for failure to make required corrections. Id.

B. The Stated Purpose of the Ordinance

The stated rationale for the Ordinance was an alleged link between rental properties with increased illegal activity and calls for law enforcement services. Id. ¶ 23. Bentsen presented the City with data allegedly showing this nexus. Id. ¶ 30. Bentsen claimed that in 2014, one third of all 911 calls in the City came from rental properties. Id. Bentsen also alleged rental properties had a disproportionally higher share of “multiple response” citations, which are issued when officers have to respond multiple times to a particular residence for issues such as loud music. See id. Finally, Bentsen claimed nine out of ten homicides in Hesperia from 2012 to 2014 occurred at rental properties. Id.

In reality, however, plaintiff alleges City and Sheriff's Department officials made several statements showing the Ordinance was actually enacted with a discriminatory intent. Id. ¶ 24. Specifically, plaintiff claims defendants sough to evict and deter African Americans and Latinos from renting in Hesperia. Id. For instance, during a city council hearing, City Councilmember Russ Blewett allegedly stated the purpose of the Ordinance was to “correct a demographical problem.” Id. ¶ 25. Moreover, Mayor Pro Tem Bill Holland allegedly compared the Ordinance to “call[ing] an exterminator out to kill roaches.” Id. Plaintiff also claims defendants intended to discriminate against persons moving from Los Angeles County, knowing that county has significant minority populations. Id.

C. Enforcement of the Ordinance

Plaintiff alleges defendants enforced the Ordinance with the intent to evict and deny housing to African Americans and Latinos. See id. ¶¶ 36-62. Enforcement was specifically handled by a special Crime Free Housing Team within the Sheriff's Department. Id. ¶ 37. The Sheriff's Department had the discretion to decide whether the Ordinance required an eviction. Id. ¶ 38.

Plaintiff claims the Sheriff's Department routinely ordered evictions under the Ordinance despite the absence of any conviction or court judgment against a resident. See id. ¶ 41. Even a multiple response citation for loud music could trigger eviction. Id. Conduct that was legal under California state law, such as exercising the right to use medical marijuana, could also subject a resident to eviction. Id. ¶ 42. The Sheriff's Department also encouraged property owners to evict entire households even if only one member engaged in purported criminal activity. Id. ¶ 46. For example, the Sheriff's Department demanded the eviction of an elderly Latino couple after their adult son, who did not live with them, was arrested. Id. In another case, a woman and her three children were evicted after she called 911 to report that her husband was beating her with a television cable. Id. ¶ 47.

D. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Investigation

On June 2, 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (“HUD”) Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity filed an administrative complaint against Hesperia with HUD under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(iii). See id. ¶ 71. The Assistant Secretary alleged Hesperia violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See id. The Assistant Secretary filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2016, adding the County and Sheriff's Department as respondents. Id.

*3 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a) and (b), HUD conducted an investigation, attempted reconciliation, and prepared a final investigative report. Id. ¶ 72. HUD concluded that reasonable cause existed to believe defendants had engaged in illegal discriminatory housing practices in violation of the FHA. Id. ¶ 73. On October 16, 2019, HUD's Secretary issued a charge of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A). Id. ¶ 74.

On November 1, 2019, the City elected to have the case heard in a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). Id. ¶ 75. Accordingly, HUD's Secretary authorized the U.S. Attorney General to commence a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o). Id. ¶ 77.

E. The Federal Government's Claims

In this action, plaintiff's first claim for relief alleges defendants violated the FHA. Id. ¶¶ 81-86. Plaintiff claims defendants' conduct in developing, enacting, and enforcing the Ordinance constitutes: (1) A denial of housing or otherwise making housing unavailable because of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); (2) discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); (3) coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with persons in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of their having exercised or enjoyed, their rights under § 804 of the FHA, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617; (4) a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights granted by the FHA, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a); and (5) a denial to a group of persons of rights granted by the FHA, which raises an issue of general public importance, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a). Id. ¶¶ 83, 84. Plaintiff alleges defendants' conduct was malicious, intentional, willful, and taken with reckless disregard for the rights of others. Id. ¶ 86.

Plaintiff's second claim for relief alleges the City violated Title VI. Id. ¶¶ 87-90. Plaintiff claims the City intentionally discriminated against residents and prospective residents of Hesperia on the basis of race and national origin, in violation of Title VI and HUD's implementing regulation. Id. ¶¶ 89-90.

Plaintiff's third claim for relief alleges the City violated Title VI assurances. Id. ¶¶ 91-94. Plaintiff claims the City signed contractual assurance agreements with the United States that all of its federally funded programs would be conducted in compliance with Title VI requirements and HUD's implementing regulation. Id. ¶ 92. Plaintiff alleges the City violated these contractual assurances by intentionally discriminating against individuals on the basis of race and national origin. Id. ¶¶ 93-94.

As a result of defendants' alleged violations of federal law, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and civil penalties. See id., Prayer for Relief.

F. Discovery in Question

Plaintiff served its first sets of Requests for Production on defendants on April 23, 2020. Nickell Decl., Ex. 6 (RFPs to City), Ex. 7 (RFPs to County), Ex. 8 (RFPs to Sheriff). Defendants responded on June 26, 2020. Id., Ex. 9 (City's RFP Responses), Ex. 10 (County's RFP Responses), Ex. 11 (Sheriff's RFP Responses). The City supplemented its responses on November 13, 2020 and produced additional documents on April 9, 2021. Id., Ex. 12 (City's Supp. RFP Responses). The County supplemented its responses on December 11, 2020 and produced additional documents in batches between November 6, 2020 and February 10, 2021. Id., Ex. 13 (County's Supp. RFP Responses).

*4 Plaintiff served its first sets of interrogatories on defendants on October 14, 2020. Id., Ex. 14 (Rogs to City), Ex. 15 (Rogs to County), Ex. 16 (Rogs to Sheriff). Defendants responded on November 30, 2020. Id., Ex. 17 (City's Rog Responses), Ex. 18 (County's Rog Responses), Ex. 19 (Sheriff's Rog Responses).

Although there are minor differences in some of the discovery requests made to each defendant, the requests at issue here seek substantially the same information from each defendant. At issue are RFP numbers 30 and 34 to all three defendants and interrogatory number 4 ot the City and Sheriff, seeking information regarding data used to justify the Ordinance and the individuals who prepared it; RFP numbers 11-16 to the County and Sheriff, requesting police activity and residential property data; and various communications withheld as privileged and listed on defendants' privilege logs.

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring defendants to produce: (1) Data and information used to justify the Ordinance; (2) police activity and residential property data; (3) multiple communications and other documents withheld based on claims of privilege; and (4) a detailed account of the steps that defendants took to search for responsive evidence so that plaintiff can assess the diligence of those searches. See JS at 4, 70-71. The court will first consider the parties' arguments regarding privileges because privilege issues affect the court's analysis of the other disputes.

A. Discovery Standards

Rule 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)).

A party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). A request is adequate if it describes items with “reasonably particularity”; specifies a time, place, and manner for the inspection; and specifies the form or forms in which electronic information is to be produced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). “Thus, a request is sufficiently clear if it places the party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Richmond v. Mission Bank, 2015 WL 1637835, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The responding party must respond in writing and is obligated to produce all specified relevant and non-privileged documents, tangible things, and electronically stored information in its “possession, custody, or control” on the date specified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Alternatively, a party may state an objection to a request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)-(B). In moving to compel the production of documents, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating “actual and substantial prejudice” from the denial of discovery. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv).

*5 Parties can also serve interrogatories related to “any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). Interrogatories must be answered fully in writing under oath. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3).

B. Defendants' Privilege Claims

Plaintiff makes general and specific arguments against defendants' claims of privilege. Plaintiff generally argues that certain privileges are unsupported and inapplicable with respect to RFP numbers 11-16, 30, and 34. Plaintiff also challenges defendants' privilege claims as to multiple specific entries in their privilege logs. The court notes the record includes two privilege logs from the City (Nickell Decl., Exs. 28-29) and six from the County (id., Ex. 30). It appears the Sheriff joins in on the County's privilege claims. See JS at 66 n.11. The court considers plaintiff's general arguments first.

1. Attorney-Client Privilege

Defendants claim protection under the attorney-client privilege for the vast majority of the documents listed in their privilege logs. Plaintiff raises four arguments against defendants' claims of attorney-client privilege. First, plaintiff argues the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts, such as data and information concerning the development and enactment of the Ordinance. See JS at 29, 59. According to plaintiff, the privilege shields only confidential communications made between attorneys and their clients for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. JS at 29. Second, plaintiff argues the City waived the attorney-client privilege for any communications shared with Bentsen, who was not a City official or employee at the time. See JS at 64, 67. Third, plaintiff contends defendants are improperly withholding non-privileged communications and documents simply because they were accompanied by or attached to privileged attorney-client communications. See JS at 65-66. Plaintiff argues defendants have to produce those communications, including attachments, with only privileged portions redacted. See JS at 66. Fourth, plaintiff contends the County's privilege log lacks sufficient details to assess its privilege claims. See JS at 66-67.

Defendants' main counter argument is that plaintiff failed to fully meet and confer about privileges. See JS at 10, 67-68. Other than that, defendants do not offer much of a response to plaintiff's first and third arguments. See JS at 38. The City argues it did not waive the privilege for communications shared with Bentsen because he was the City's agent and was acting on its behalf at the time of the communications. See JS at 68-69. As for the County's privilege claims, the County alleges it is not withholding any documents responsive to any of plaintiff's requests based on the attorney-client privilege. See JS at 70. The County explains that the documents identified in its privilege logs “were duplicated based upon the County's privilege log that was produced in response to the prior HUD investigation.” Id.

“The attorney-client privilege protects confidential disclosures made by a client to an attorney in order to obtain legal advice, as well as an attorney's advice in response to such disclosures.” U.S. v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981). The privilege “only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.” Id. at 395-96 (“A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

*6 First, plaintiff disputes defendants' claim that the parties did not sufficiently meet and confer regarding privileges. See P. Supp. Mem. at 2. Since October 30, 2020, plaintiff has sent at least two meet-and-confer letters to defendants, carefully outlining several challenges to their privilege claims. See Nickell Decl., Ex. 20 (October 30, 2020 letter regarding the County's and Sheriff's RFP responses), Ex. 21 (November 2, 2020 letter regarding the City's RFP responses). In the October 2020 letter, plaintiff argued the County failed to provide sufficient information to assess its asserted privileges, did not specify whether allegedly privileged emails had attachments, and failed to identify any documents withheld on the basis of privileges other than attorney-client and work product. See id., Ex. 20 at 4-5. In the November 2020 letter, plaintiff argued the City also failed to provide sufficient information to assess its asserted privileges and did not specify whether allegedly privileged emails had attachments. See id., Ex. 21 at 4-6. Plaintiff also provided counter arguments to each of the privileges asserted in the County's and City's privilege logs, including the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, deliberative process privilege, joint defense privilege, and privacy. See generally id., Exs. 20, 21. Plaintiff claims the parties discussed these discovery disputes during multiple meetings between November 2020 and March 2021. See id. ¶ 13.

The court is satisfied with the parties' meet and confer efforts regarding privileges with one exception. There is no indication plaintiff ever met and conferred with the City about whether it waived any privileges by sharing documents and communications with Bentsen. That issue is particularly important because plaintiff seeks production of at least eighty-six withheld documents that were shared with Bentsen. See JS at 70-71. For these reasons, the court will consider plaintiff's privilege arguments, except for those concerning waiver due to Bentsen.

Second, the court agrees with plaintiff that defendants cannot assert the attorney-client privilege to withhold relevant facts and documents other than confidential attorney-client communications. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96. To the extent defendants are withholding any such information or documents, including data, based on the privilege, the court overrules those privilege claims.

Third, as for emails forwarding or discussing privileged attorney-client communications, defendants must produce those emails with only the privileged portions redacted. In re New Century, 2009 WL 10691336, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009) (“Any document that contains both protected and responsive information shall be redacted to eliminate any reference to attorney-client matters ....”). Similarly, attachments to privileged emails are not themselves privileged simply by association. Defendants must produce those attachments unless they claim they are privileged in their own right; if so, each attachment must be listed in the privilege logs separately. See O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 272, 280 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

Fourth, the County's explanation regarding its privilege logs is confusing. The County must amend its discovery responses to clarify whether it is withholding any responsive information or documents based on privilege, including each of the documents listed in its privilege logs. See Nickell Decl., Ex. 30. If it is withholding any documents, it must amend its privilege logs to include: (1) A description of the content of the documents; (2) the identity, position, and affiliation of their authors; (3) the date the documents were created; (4) the identity, position, and affiliation of all addresses and recipients; and (5) the specific reasons for their being withheld, including the privileges invoked and grounds therefor. See In re Banc of Cal. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 3017676, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2019) (citations omitted).

2. Work Product Doctrine

Defendants claim the protection of the work product doctrine for most of the documents listed in their privilege logs. Plaintiff argues defendants failed to support their work product doctrine claims. See JS at 30. Plaintiff further contends the doctrine does not protect information and documents predating the enactment of the Ordinance because they would not have been prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id. Plaintiff also argues the City waived the doctrine's protection by sharing information and documents with Bentsen. See JS at 67. Defendants do not offer any real argument in support of their work product claims. Additionally, the County claims it is not withholding any responsive documents based on the work product doctrine. See JS at 70.

*7 The work product doctrine is a qualified privilege that protects documents prepared by a party or its representative in anticipation of litigation. U.S. v. Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2020). At its core, the doctrine protects an attorney's mental processes and prevents “exploitation of a party's efforts in preparing for litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff's argument that the doctrine does not apply to documents created before the enactment of the Ordinance is not necessarily correct. The doctrine may apply as long as defendants created the documents because they anticipated eventual litigation after the Ordinance's enactment. See Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citations omitted). On the other hand, defendants must show that, at the time they created the documents, there was “more than a remote possibility of litigation,” and the documents were not prepared solely in the ordinary course of business. Id. (citations omitted); U.S. v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing “dual purpose” documents).

There is insufficient evidence in the record for the court to conclusively determine the propriety of defendants' work product claims. The City must amend its privilege logs to include the information previously discussed in the context of the County's privilege logs. Once the City and the County amend their privilege logs, they must also provide plaintiff with information sufficient to show that defendants created those documents at least in part in anticipation of litigation. If plaintiff continues to dispute the claimed work product protection, the parties must meet and confer about this.

With respect to plaintiff's waiver argument, it is harder to waive the work product doctrine's protection than the attorney-client privilege. “[D]isclosure of work product to a third party does not waive the protection unless such disclosure is made to an adversary in litigation or has substantially increased the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information.” Sanmina, 968 F.3d at 1119-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding the purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect the adversarial process). Plaintiff does not argue that Bentsen is defendants' adversary; in fact, it repeatedly notes he was the architect of the Ordinance. Thus, even if Bentsen was not a City official or employee at the time the City shared evidence with him, the City did not waive work product protection.

3. Joint Defense Privilege

The City claims the joint defense privilege protects the documents listed in privilege log entries 31, 49-51, 53-54, 199-200, 248, 252-253, 258, 260-261, 264, 299-301, 305-307, and 341-342. Nickell Decl., Exs. 28, 29. Plaintiff argues the joint defense privilege does not protect documents created before the HUD investigation began. See JS at 33, 65. Plaintiff contends that, at that time, there could not have been a joint defense effort between the defendants. See id. The City makes no arguments in support of its joint defense privilege claims.

The joint defense privilege protects communications between an individual and another's attorney when the communications “are part of an on-going and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy.” Bryant v. Mattel, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1275 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 495 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (also known as the common interest privilege). To assert the privilege, a party must establish that: “(1) The communications were made in the course of a joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and (3) the privilege has not been waived.” Bryant, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

*8 As plaintiff correctly notes, the City cannot assert the privilege to withhold documents created before defendants began their ongoing and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy. The court finds the City could have plausibly adopted a common defense strategy with the other defendants as early as June 2, 2016 when HUD began its investigation. The City provides no evidence suggesting an earlier date. Based on this finding, the court overrules the City's joint defense privilege claims to log entries 253, 258, 260-261, 264, 299-301, and 305-307, all of which predate June 2, 2016.

The court sustains the City's joint defense privilege claim to log entry 31. There is evidence in the record from which the court can infer that the document is a communication made in the course of a joint defense effort and designed to further that effort.

As for log entries 49-51, 53-54, 199-200, 248, 252, and 341-342, there is insufficient evidence in the record for the court to rule on the propriety of those joint defense privilege claims. The court cannot assess whether the privilege applies if it does not know the title and affiliation of the individuals listed on the logs. The court needs that information to confirm the individuals are part of the joint defense effort and to assess whether the privilege has been waived. Accordingly, the City must amend its privilege logs to include the information previously discussed in the context of the County's privilege logs. If the parties wish to bring this same issue before the court again, they must first meet and confer after the City has amended its logs.

4. Deliberative Process Privilege

The City asserts the deliberative process privilege for 33 documents (i.e., privilege log entries 40, 98, 126, 160-165, 249-251, 255, 266-268, 273, 284, 293, 299-301, 305-315). See Nickell Decl., Ex. 28. Plaintiff argues the City's deliberative process privilege claims are unsupported and inapplicable. See JS at 30. Plaintiff contends the City failed to show the allegedly privileged documents are predecisional and deliberative. Id. Even if the privilege applies, plaintiff notes it is qualified and argues the public interest in disclosure of the requested evidence in this civil rights case outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure. See JS at 31-32. The City does not offer any argument in support of its deliberative process privilege claims.

The deliberative process privilege protects confidential government documents that are both “(1) predecisional or antecedent to the adoption of agency policy and (2) deliberative, meaning [they] must actually be related to the process by which policies are formulated.” Nat'l Wildfire Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The privilege recognizes the need to “protect the consultative functions of government by maintaining the confidentiality of advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege. F.T.C. v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). “A litigant may obtain deliberative materials if his or her need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government's interest in non-disclosure.” Id. (citations omitted). In deciding whether to override the privilege, courts consider “1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government's role in the litigation; and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions.” Id. (citations omitted).

*9 The majority of the documents the City claims are protected by the privilege are dated after November 17, 2015, the date on which the Ordinance was enacted. Those documents cannot be predecisional or antecedent to the adoption of agency policy, i.e., the Ordinance. Thus, the court overrules the City's deliberative process privilege claims as to those documents (i.e., log entries 40, 98, 126, 160-165, 249-251, 255, 266-268, 273, 284, 293).

As for the rest of the documents (i.e., log entries 299-301, 305-315), the City failed to provide sufficient information to show they are predecisional and deliberative. At this point, the propriety of the privilege claim as to log entries 299-301, 305-307, and 314-315 would not make a difference because there is still a question whether those documents are also protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine based on the court's previous analysis. Thus, the court will not decide whether to overrule those privilege claims at this time.

On the other hand, log entries 308-313 are only partially protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine because they appear to be instances in which non-attorneys exchanged privileged attorney-client communications and work product. Thus, the City can only redact the portions that are actually privileged. Presumably, the City will argue the portions that are not protected by those two privileges are still properly withheld under the deliberative process privilege. Not so.

The court agrees with plaintiff that the qualified deliberative process privilege must give way to allow for accurate fact-finding in this civil rights case. See Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. First, internal communications, such as those described in privilege log entries 308-313, are highly relevant to this case, especially if they involved deliberations as the City claims. These communications may contain evidence of defendants' intent and rationale for developing and enacting the Ordinance. See Valley Surgical Ctr. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2017 WL 10574239, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (overriding the deliberative process privilege to order disclosure of evidence of intent). Second, evidence of intentional discrimination is generally hard to uncover, and the City does not argue plaintiff can find it in other places. Id. (agreeing that evidence of intent is not typically readily available). Third, the governmental holder of the privilege is a party to this litigation, which weighs in favor of disclosure. Id.

Fourth, some courts have determined that “subjecting members of a government agency to public scrutiny may be useful in encouraging frank and honest internal communications.” Id. (citing Newport Pac., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 200 F.R.D. 628, 640 (S.D. Cal. 2001)). To be fair, under most circumstances, disclosure of confidential government deliberations will also carry the risk of hindering the purpose of keeping such discussions private. But this is the type of case in which any potential negative effects are overcome by the public interest in allowing government regulators to do their job to investigate potential civil rights violations. See N. Pac., LLC v. City of Pac., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding the federal interest in enforcing federal rights overcomes the deliberative process privilege); cf. Noble v. City of Fresno, 2018 WL 1381945, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018) (“[T]he deliberative process privilege is inappropriate for use in civil rights cases against police departments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

*10 For these reasons, the court overrules the City's deliberative process privilege claims to privilege log entries 308-313 as well.

5. City's Privilege Logs: Communications Between City Attorneys and Bentsen Predating the Ordinance

Plaintiff seeks production of ten email communications between City attorneys and then-Sheriff's Department Captain Bentsen – privilege log entries 294-295, 297-301, and 305-307 – that predate the adoption of the Ordinance in November 2015. JS at 64. The City claims all of those emails are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Nickell Decl., Ex. 28 at 76-81. In addition, the City claims log entries 299-301 and 305-307 are protected by the deliberative process and joint defense privileges. Id. at 78-81.

Based on the court's previous analysis, it is still unclear whether each of these documents is protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. In addition, even though the joint defense privilege does not apply to log entries 299-301 or 305-307, it remains undecided whether those entries are protected by the deliberative process privilege. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for disclosure of log entries 294-295, 297-301, and 305-307 is denied without prejudice at this time.

6. City's Privilege Logs: Communications Forwarding or Discussing Attorney-Client Communications

Plaintiff argues the City is improperly withholding various communications between non-attorney personnel from the City and Sheriff's Department simply because they forwarded or discussed attorney communications. JS at 65. Specifically, plaintiff seeks production with redactions of privilege log entries 3, 6, 9, 14-15, 26-28, 49, 51, 67, 71-73, 80, 97, 99, 107-109, 111, 126, 129-133, 139, 143, 149-156, 182-184, 196-199, 201-204, 208-211, 213, 215-216, 219-220, 223-224, 226-229, 231, 247-248, 252, 255, 257-258, 260-261, 264, 279, 304, 308, 310-313, 317, 330, 333, 338-340, 342, and 348. JS at 65-66.

As previously ordered, the City must produce these communications with redactions only to portions genuinely protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and joint defense privilege.

7. County's Privilege Logs: Communications Between Bentsen and the City Predating the Ordinance

Plaintiff argues the County is improperly withholding various email communications. See JS at 66-67. The County claims that, despite its privilege logs, it is not withholding any documents under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. See JS at 70. As already ordered, the County must amend its discovery responses and privilege logs to clarify whether any documents are being withheld on the basis of any privileges.

C. RFP Numbers 30 and 34 to All Defendants and Interrogatory Number 4 to the City and Sheriff

1. Discovery Requests

RFP number 30 seeks “[d]ocuments relating to the design and enactment of the 2015 Ordinance,” including analyses, memoranda, notes, communications, reports, meeting minutes, agendas, materials prepared for county board and city counsel members, audio, video, and transcripts of board and council meetings, news reports, social media activity, and statements or information provided by the public. See Nickell Decl., Exs. 6-8.

*11 RFP number 34 requests “[a]ll documents, including data, information, and analyses, relating to Nils Bentsen's recommendation that the City adopt a crime free rental housing program,” including analyses and reports created to assess the need for the program, all materials used to generate those analyses and reports, notes and workpapers (including drafts and markups), and communications about the recommendation and its bases. See id.

Interrogatory number 4 asks the City to state all facts relating to the decision to develop and adopt the Ordinance, including but not limited to “identifying all data, information, and sources compiled, analyzed, and considered in making that decision.” See id., Ex. 14. The interrogatory also asks for the identity of “all persons involved in identifying and compiling the data or information or performing the analyses relating to that decision, and all persons responsible for making that decision.” Id. Interrogatory number 4 to the Sheriff is similar, except that it asks for facts regarding the Sheriff's suggestion or recommendation that the City develop and enact the Ordinance. See id., Ex. 16.

2. Plaintiff's Position

The crux of plaintiff's argument is that the deposition testimony of Bentsen – Hesperia's City Manager, former Sheriff's Department Captain overseeing the Hesperia station, and chief architect of the Ordinance – proves defendants are withholding evidence responsive to RFP numbers 30 and 34 and interrogatory number 4. See JS at 21-24. Bentsen testified that several individuals, including approximately four from a crime analysis office within the Sheriff's Department, helped prepare the data he used to support the Ordinance. JS at 23; Nickell Decl., Ex. 25 at 85:1-86:25. Specifically, Bentsen relied on three data points, including service calls, homicides, and multiple response forms. JS at 23; Nickell Decl., Ex. 24.

In response to RFP numbers 30 and 34, defendants allegedly produced only one PowerPoint and three Excel files consisting of a few cells containing only conclusory counts and percentages but no formulas. JS at 23-24. Plaintiff argues there must be more responsive documents, since it is illogical that a process that involved at least four individuals yielded only three Excel files. See id. Specifically, plaintiff contends defendants are withholding data, summaries, and analyses related to the three data points that Bentsen used to link crime to rental properties. See id. Defendants also failed to identify all of the crime analysis office staff who assisted with preparing the data that Bentsen used. JS at 23. In addition to supplementing their responses, plaintiff asks that the court order defendants to describe with specificity their searches for responsive documents. JS at 23-24.

To the extent defendants refuse to supplement their responses due to their stated objections – that the RFPs and interrogatory seek irrelevant information, lack foundation, assume disputed facts, and are overbroad, disproportional, vague and ambiguous, and compound – plaintiff argues those objections are unsupported boilerplate. See JS at 24-29. First, plaintiff contends defendants' objection that RFP number 34 is “not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” is inapposite. JS at 25. According to plaintiff, the current standard allows discovery of any relevant evidence that is non-privileged and proportional to the needs of the case, even if it is not admissible. Id. In any event, plaintiff argues the requested information is relevant and proportional to test whether defendants' crime-reduction rationale for the Ordinance was pretextual and whether defendants enforced it in a discriminatory manner. JS at 26-27. Second, plaintiff counters the RFPs do not lack foundation, assume disputed facts, or are overbroad or vague because they simply and clearly ask about the circumstances behind the Ordinance's adoption. See JS at 26-28. Third, plaintiff argues objections based on compound language are inappropriate against RFPs. JS at 28. Plaintiff contends interrogatory number 4 is not compound because it does not contain multiple, discrete subparts. Id. Rather, interrogatory number 4 simply provides examples to illustrate the scope of the request and specify the type of information requested. See id.

*12 Further, plaintiff argues defendants' privacy objections are unsupported and unnecessary given the stipulated protective order on file. See JS at 33. Plaintiff also contends the strong public interest in uncovering civil rights violations outweighs any possible privacy interests in this case. JS at 34.

3. Defendants' Position

Defendants explain they asserted a variety of objections in response to RFP numbers 30 and 34 to avoid waiving them should additional documents be identified later. JS at 37-38. But they deny withholding any responsive documents other than those expressly listed in their privilege logs. JS at 38. Defendants also argue the RFPs do not specifically request “crime-related data points,” so plaintiff must issue a new RFP requesting such information. See JS at 13. Additionally, defendants note they have produced a significant amount of data, information, and analyses related to, among other topics, arrests, crime reports, and service calls. See JS at 36. Defendants deny scrubbing any underlying formulas from the Excel files they produced. Id. Finally, although it is unclear if defendants continue to object to these two RFPs on the basis of privacy, they argue in their supplemental memorandum that disclosing criminal data would violate the state and federal privacy rights of unknown third parties. See D. Supp. Mem. at 4.

As for interrogatory number 4, defendants argue plaintiff's request for the names of crime analysis office personnel is premature because the parties have not met and conferred about the issue. JS at 36-37. Defendants claim they are not refusing to provide this information, even though they initially objected because plaintiff's interrogatory is compound and overbroad. JS at 37.

4. RFP Numbers 30 and 34 to All Defendants

There are essentially two issues related to RFP numbers 30 and 34, including the alleged existence of additional non-privileged, responsive documents and the propriety of defendants' objections. The court considers each in turn.

First, defendants claim they produced all responsive, non-privileged documents already because plaintiff did not specifically seek “crime-related data points” in RFP numbers 30 and 34. Defendants' reading of the RFPs is improperly narrow. Crime-related data points are part of the materials that both RFP numbers 30 and 34 seek. Namely, the requests ask for data, analyses, reports, and other documents related to the design and enactment of the Ordinance. Plaintiff did not have to verbatim seek “crime-related data points” as defendants suggest. Indeed, defendants themselves argue they have already produced significant numbers of crime-related data in response to these same RFPs. See JS at 36. Thus, the court rejects defendants' argument that plaintiff must issue a new RFP in order to obtain the requested data.

Additionally, the court does not buy defendants' argument that they do not understand what types of documents would be included in plaintiff's request for crime-related data points. Defendants must construe the request reasonably and with common sense and without “conjur[ing] up ambiguity where there is none.” Gibson Brands Inc. v. John Hornby Skewes & Co., 2015 WL 12681376, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, defendants showed themselves capable of understanding the RFPs by producing other crime-related data. Plaintiff also provides specific examples of what it seeks – data, summaries, and analyses pertaining to service calls, homicides, and multiple response forms.

*13 Finally, at this point, the court has no reason to believe any of the defendants altered the Excel files they produced to plaintiff. But defendants must still revisit their searches to look for other copies of those files that may have underlying formulas. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 245 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (metadata is discoverable as long as requesting party asks for it).

Second, plaintiff challenges defendants' objections as boilerplate and inapplicable. Regarding objections unrelated to privacy or privileges, defendants explained they are not withholding any responsive documents on the basis of those objections. See JS at 38. To avoid any misunderstanding, however, defendants must amend their discovery responses to state so.

As for defendants' privacy objections, plaintiff correctly notes that state privacy rights are inapplicable to this federal case. See Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (third party privacy rights under state constitution and laws do not apply to federal claims). Nevertheless, “federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In evaluating privacy objections, courts balance the need for disclosure against the privacy right asserted. Id. (citation omitted). The privacy objection “must be evaluated against the backdrop of the strong public interest in uncovering civil rights violations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A carefully drafted protective order can minimize the impact of ... disclosure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Here, the court is satisfied that the protective order on file is sufficient to safeguard privacy rights. Defendants disagree but they do not explain why. Any case that deals with the rights of individuals who may have had contact with the criminal justice system is bound to implicate privacy rights. But defendants' privacy objections are inconsistent with the strong public interest in investigating civil rights violations. Accordingly, the court overrules defendants' privacy objections.

For these reasons, the court grants plaintiff's motion to compel regarding RFP numbers 30 and 34. Defendants shall supplement their responses and production according to the court's rulings in this section and the previous section on privileges.

5. Interrogatory Number 4 to the City and Sheriff

This is a relatively simple issue, so the court will not dive into the parties' conflicting accounts as to whether they met and conferred about it. The information plaintiff seeks – the identities of the individuals who compiled data for Bentsen – is clearly responsive to its request to identify “all persons involved in identifying and compiling data or information or performing the analyses” related to the Ordinance. Defendants claim they are not refusing to identify those individuals, but it is unclear whether they will only do so if plaintiff concedes the request is compound and agrees to treat it as a separate interrogatory. In any event, the court overrules defendants' compound objections because the identities of those individuals are necessarily included in completely providing “all facts” relating to the suggestion, recommendation, or decision to develop and enact the Ordinance. See Stamps.com, Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 2009 WL 2576371, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2009) (“[R]equests for facts, persons with knowledge of those facts and documents containing those facts should be considered one interrogatory because they are subsumed within the primary question of facts supporting defendants' [claims].”).

*14 Accordingly, the court orders the City and the Sheriff to supplement their responses to interrogatory number 4 to identify “all persons involved in identifying and compiling the data or information or performing the analyses relating to [the suggestion, recommendation, or decision to develop and enact the Ordinance], and all persons responsible for making that decision.”

D. RFP Numbers 11-16 to the County and Sheriff

1. Discovery Requests

RFP numbers 11-14 generally seek police activity and crime records from four different locations in Hesperia: (a) residential owner-occupied properties; (b) residential rental properties; (c) non-residential properties; and (d) no specific property addresses (e.g., roadways). See Nickell Decl., Exs. 7-8. RFP number 11 seeks documents and data regarding service calls in Hesperia. See id. RFP number 12 requests criminal citations or summonses issued by the Sheriff to Hesperia residents or for violations occurring in Hesperia. See id. RFP number 13 seeks documents and data regarding arrests (i.e., arrest reports, incident reports, charging statements, probable cause affidavits, audio and video recordings, and other arrest records) occurring in Hesperia or of individuals then-residing in Hesperia. See id. RFP numbers 11-13 also request information about the race of the individual(s), property addresses, and parcel numbers involved. See id. RFP number 14 seeks documents and data sufficient to show the date and location of homicides in Hesperia from January 1, 2010 to the present, including the property addresses and parcel numbers of the alleged perpetrators. See id.

RFP number 15 seeks documents and data classifying or identifying Hesperia properties by address as: (a) residential owner-occupied properties; (b) residential rental properties; or (c) non-residential properties. See id. This includes maps, zoning data, geographic information system (GIS) data, utilities data, and/or tax assessment data. See id.

RFP number 16 requests documents reporting or tracking, by property address, information regarding criminal activity, nuisance activity, Sheriff's activity, and service calls in Hesperia. See id. This includes monthly “crime analysis” reports and other monthly call logs, “CFMHP reports,” “CPRA history reports,” and service calls reports. See id.

2. Plaintiff's Position

Plaintiff's arguments regarding these RFPs are largely the same as its arguments regarding RFP numbers 30 and 34. Thus, the court discusses only new arguments in this section.

First, plaintiff argues the requested documents are relevant and proportional to the needs of this case because: (1) Defendants relied on the requested data in providing the crime-prevention rationale for enacting the Ordinance; (2) defendants asserted as a defense that the Ordinance served a crime prevention purpose; and (3) plaintiff alleges defendants enforced the Ordinance in a manner that disproportionately targets certain groups and parts of the city for reasons unrelated to criminal activity. See JS at 55-56.

Second, plaintiff complains the County and the Sheriff produced only documents related to the Ordinance, even though the requests are not so limited. See JS at 53. According to plaintiff, the Sheriff produced data purporting to show that rental properties had a disproportionate share of service calls and homicides. JS at 56. Plaintiff argues it needs comparative data, unrelated to the Ordinance, to dispute the Sheriff's evidence and show defendants' rationale for the Ordinance was pretextual. See id. Additionally, plaintiff contends the fact-finder will need the requested data to determine whether defendants enforced the Ordinance disparately against African Americans and Latinos; to compare police activity at residential rental properties versus other property types to test defendants' crime prevention rationale; and to ascertain whether the Ordinance was actually effective in reducing crime. See JS at 56-57.

*15 Third, plaintiff claims it has repeatedly attempted to work with the County and the Sheriff to minimize the burden of production. JS at 57. For instance, plaintiff asked for details about the systems and software holding the data in question to determine ways to narrow its requests or export the data. JS at 57-58. The County and the Sheriff have identified some, but not all, of the systems, and have not specified the types of data kept in each system. See JS at 53-54. Plaintiff also proposed taking partial Rule 30(b)(6) depositions to inquire about the data systems. JS at 54. Plaintiff claims the County and the Sheriff ultimately derailed that idea. See JS at 54 & n.10. Finally, plaintiff tried to set up a call or screen-sharing session between the parties's IT staff to discuss efficient ways to obtain the data given the different systems' features. See JS at 58. The County and the Sheriff rejected this request also. Id.

For these reasons, plaintiff asks the court to overrule the County's and the Sheriff's objections and order them to fully comply with RFP numbers 11-16. See JS at 59.

3. The County and the Sheriff's Position

The County and Sheriff's main argument in opposition to plaintiff's position is that RFP numbers 11-16 are overbroad in asking for information unrelated to the Ordinance. See JS at 40. They also argue the requests are vague, extremely burdensome, seek documents outside of their possession, custody, or control, seek non-existent documents, and seek information that is protected by third party privacy rights. See JS at 40-41. The court has already overruled the County's and the Sheriff's privacy objections, so it addresses their other arguments.

4. Relevance of Documents Unrelated to the Ordinance

The court agrees with plaintiff that comparative evidence – in this case, information and documents that defendants did not rely on in developing, enacting, and enforcing the Ordinance – is relevant for at least two reasons. First, such evidence is necessary to assess defendants' crime-prevention rationale, including the data that allegedly attributes higher numbers of service calls and homicides to rental properties. In the FAC, plaintiff essentially claims defendants cherry picked data to reach a pre-determined conclusion consistent with the stated purpose of the Ordinance. It would be unfair to force plaintiff to rely on what it alleges is incomplete and non-representative data.

Second, the data plaintiff seeks is relevant to its selective enforcement claims. Plaintiff can use comparative evidence to establish that defendants intentionally targeted African Americans and Latinos with harsh eviction rules. See U.S. v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (comparator evidence is relevant in selective enforcement cases); cf. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 2020 WL 1318792, at *17 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2020) (comparator evidence is critical to show a causal connection between discriminatory action and the protected characteristic in disparate treatment cases).

5. Electronically Stored Information and Databases

The amount of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in this case is significant. To complicate matters further, it appears the ESI is stored in a variety of databases, some of which defendants may not have possession, custody, or control over. Yet, instead of working with plaintiff to address this complicated issue, defendants have obstructed its efforts to ascertain the exact number of relevant databases and whether extraction of data from them is possible. As a result, the court is not convinced defendants have made a good faith effort to respond to, at least, RFP numbers 11-16.

Accordingly, the court orders that no later than five court days after the date of this order, defendants shall identify each database, software, and system they know of that contains information responsive to plaintiff's RFP numbers 11-16. Defendants shall further identify the types of relevant information found within each of those databases, software, and systems, as well as clarify whether they have possession, custody, or control over the information in those sources. See U.S. v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand.” (citation omitted)). After that is done, defendants shall work with plaintiff to promptly set up a call or video session between the parties' IT staff to discuss the feasability of extracting relevant data from those databases, software, and systems. If these steps are insufficient to accomplish the goal of facilitating ESI discovery, the parties may need to meet and confer about taking Rule 30(b)(6) depositions regarding this issue.

6. Other Issues: Non-Existent Evidence, Vagueness, and Privilege Claims

*16 The County and the Sheriff argue plaintiff seeks documents that do not exist or would require compilation of information in a format they do not keep in the normal course of business. See JS at 60-62. The court cannot order defendants to produce non-existent documents. It may be that evidence that could have been included in a single document is actually spread out into multiple. If so, that raises questions of proportionality and burden, which the County and the Sheriff also raise.

At this point, the County's and the Sheriff's proportionality and burden objections are too speculative and unsupported to be actionable. Defendants have yet to share complete details about the universe of ESI in this case. If the County and the Sheriff intend on maintaining these objections, they must make a more particularized showing once further investigation and discovery consistent with this order takes place. See A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper – especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” (citation omitted)).

Next, the court overrules the County's and the Sheriff's boilerplate vagueness objections. The County and the Sheriff have already produced responsive documents related to the Ordinance. There is no reason why they should not be able to apply the same interpretation of the RFPs in searching for a broader set of responsive documents.

Finally, as previously discussed, the status of the County's privilege claims is unclear. In response to plaintiff's arguments regarding RFP numbers 11-16, the County and the Sheriff argue plaintiff “is not entitled to – and no justification has been proffered – compelling Defendants to provide information that is subject to law enforcement privilege or third party right to privilege.” JS at 41. But no such privileges appear in their privilege logs. See Nickell Decl., Ex. 30. As already ordered, the County and the Sheriff must clarify these inconsistencies.

Accordingly, the court grants plaintiff's motion to compel regarding RFP numbers 11-16. The County and the Sheriff shall supplement their responses and production according to the court's rulings in this section and the previous section on privileges.

E. Defendants' Production Practices

Based on what it argues is a pattern of incomplete discovery responses, plaintiff asks for an order requiring defendants to describe with specificity the steps taken to search for information responsive to its RFP numbers 11-16, 30, and 34. See JS at 34, 59. Defendants counter plaintiff's request is unnecessary and lacks legal merit. See JS at 39. They argue such measures are only applicable in cases where a party fails to produce any documents. See id.

Based on the record and defendants' sometimes unsupported and convoluted arguments, the court has reservations over whether they have conducted reasonable searches for responsive evidence. This order requires defendants to produce a significant amount of additional documents, and so the court will not order defendants to describe their searches at this time. Ordering defendants to describe their searches with more discovery to come is premature. Accordingly, plaintiff's request is denied without prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's motion to compel (docket no. 43) is granted in part as set forth above.