*1 Before the court is third-party plaintiff's (“Gonzalez's”) motion for order requiring third-party defendant (“CENLAR”) to produce certain documents. Dkt. 108. CENLAR opposed. Dkt. 113. Also before the court is CENLAR's motion to deem certain matters admitted. Dkt. 111. Gonzalez opposed, Dkt. 112, and CENLAR replied, Dkt. 114. For the foregoing reasons, both motions are DENIED.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that,

Fed.R.Civ.P.26(b)(1). “The scope of discovery is broad, and to be discoverable, information need only appear to be ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ” Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. v. Arlequin, 583 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1998)) (other quotation marks omitted). Parties may challenge the admissibility of documents produced during discovery through a pretrial motion in limine. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor Supply, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 372, 381 (D. Md. 1999).

In his complaint, Gonzalez alleges that CENLAR included an illegal tax charge in an escrow account, leading to a series of problems for Gonzalez, including foreclosure proceedings. See Dkt. 72. Gonzalez asserts that CENLAR, acting as agent of Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Lakeview”) (with whom Gonzalez has settled), was negligent in its escrow account analysis and violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et seq., by requiring tax payments on his tax-free property. Id. ¶ 33.

During discovery, Gonzalez requested (1) copies of communications between CENLAR and other entities related to any real estate taxes added to his monthly payments; (2) copies of all protocols, manuals, or guidelines used by CENLAR from November 2015 to February 2017 to prepare the escrow analysis required by 12 U.S.C. § 2609 and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.17; and (3) a complete copy of the contract or agreement signed between CENLAR and Lakeview by which CENLAR became servicer of Lakeview's mortgage loan to Gonzalez. See Dkt. 108. CENLAR has declined to produce the requested documents, contending that the escrow analysis under 12 U.S.C. § 2609 and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.17 is irrelevant because CENLAR was a subservicer of the loan with limited duties; that any communication with non-parties are irrelevant; that any agreement with Lakeview is confidential and irrelevant to the action; and that Gonzalez's requests tend to suggest that he is in doubt of who the responsible party in this case is, which means the action lacks an indispensable party.

*2 Despite CENLAR's arguments to the contrary, the precise nature of CENLAR's role in preparing the escrow analysis and the possibility that the action lacks an indispensable party are not proper grounds on which to deny a discovery request. Rather, the central question is whether Gonzalez's requests are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant, admissible evidence. Here, all of Gonzalez's requests appear to fit that mold, and CENLAR has done little to invoke any privilege. That the requests seek information involving third parties does not mean that Gonzalez seeks irrelevant information. To the contrary, Gonzalez makes clear that his theory of the case relies on the notion that CENLAR acted as agent of Lakeview, rendering his requests involving Lakeview and its relationship to CENLAR all the more relevant.

Nonetheless, ruling on this motion to compel would be premature. Local Rule 26(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1) require that, before filing a motion to compel, the moving party must certify that it “has made a reasonable and good-faith effort to [try and solve the discovery dispute] with opposing counsel” without the court's intervention. Local Rules of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of P.R. Rule 26(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); Brenford Envtl. Sys. L.P. v. Pipeliners of P.R., 269 F.R.D. 143, 147 (D.P.R. 2010). “An attempt to confer will not suffice.” Local Rule 26(b); Vázquez–Fernández v. Cambridge Coll., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 150, 163 (D.P.R. 2010). Unresolved discovery disputes are to be presented to the court only “[a]fter efforts to resolve the dispute have been exhausted.” Local Rules of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of P.R. Rule 26(b).

Gonzalez does not certify that he made a reasonable and good faith effort to resolve this dispute before moving to compel discovery. CENLAR represents that it answered Gonzalez's interrogatories by explaining why it believed they sought irrelevant information, Gonzalez disagreed, CENLAR supplemented its answers with further explanation of its position, and then Gonzalez moved to compel without any further communication. Dkt. 113 at 1. Gonzalez does not dispute these facts. Gonzalez thus failed to fulfill his obligation to meet and confer in good faith to attempt to resolve this discovery dispute prior to bringing it before this court. Parties are thus ordered to meet and confer within the next ten days to attempt to resolve this dispute without the court's intervention. Should it be necessary, Gonzalez may renew his motion to compel thereafter.

Turning to CENLAR's motion, this, too, is denied. CENLAR served several requests for admission to Gonzalez on August 4, 2020 and did not receive a response until September 28. CENLAR now asks that these items be admitted pursuant to Rule 36(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is denied because the court had approved a request for extension of time to handle certain matters. Dkt. 110. CENLAR claims that said extension corresponded only to an extension of time to file a response to the motion to compel at Docket 108 as well as to file dispositive motions. However, in its request for extension of time, CENLAR included the following language: “[t]his will also allow Mr. Gonzalez time to notify his answers to the discovery propounded by CENLAR.” Dkt. 109 at 2. Such language indicates that parties contemplated providing Gonzalez additional time to respond to CENLAR's discovery requests. The time to respond to requests for admissions may be extended where “stipulated to under Rule 29” or “ordered by the court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3). That is exactly what happened here.

Finally, CENLAR's suggestion that this action fails for want of an indispensable party or that the court must order release of the confidential settlement agreement with Lakeview are matters better handled by separate motion than in an opposition to a motion to compel.

*3 Parties are hereby ordered to meet and confer in good faith within the next ten days to exhaust attempts to resolve this dispute.

Motions denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.