*1 Before me is a Motion for Leave to Serve Sixteen Excess Interrogatories filed by Plaintiffs Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham (ECF No. 123). Defendants Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”), Thomas Skinner, Larry Hollier, Jon Harman and Carlton “Trey” Jones III filed timely Opposition Memoranda. ECF Nos. 124, 125, 126, 128. Plaintiffs have also filed a Reply Memorandum. ECF No. 131. Defendants also filed a Supplemental Memorandum. ECF No. 133.

Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham formerly worked for LSU as “General Counsel” to LSU (New Orleans) and a staff attorney at LSU (New Orleans), respectively. On July 22, 2019, they filed suit asserting claims for gender discrimination, unequal pay, wrongful termination, and retaliation under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana's Employment Discrimination Laws. ECF Nos. 1, 31.

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) on April 14, 2020, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory judgment, permanent injunction, front pay in lieu of reinstatement under § 1983, Title IX discrimination and retaliation, § 1983 First Amendment retaliation, § 1983 equal-protection discrimination, and punitive damages under Title IX and directing Plaintiffs to seek leave of court within 14 days to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in their claims for reinstatement against Hollier and Harman under § 1983, § 1983 First Amendment retaliation, § 1983 equal-protection discrimination, and punitive damages under § 1983. ECF No. 45, at 52–53.

Plaintiffs filed their Second Supplemental and Amending Complaint on April 29, 2020, asserting claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII against LSU; gender discrimination under the EPA against LSU, Hollier, Harman, and Skinner; retaliation under the EPA against LSU, Hollier, Skinner, and Jones; § 1983 claims alleging gender discrimination against Harman, Hollier, and Skinner; and § 1983 retaliation claims against Hollier and Skinner. ECF No. 50. In response, Defendants LSU, Harman, Hollier, and Skinner filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 56), Defendant Jones filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 57), and Defendant DeCuir filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 82). The Court granted in part and denied in part the partial motions to dismiss on August 4, 2020, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for front pay in lieu of reinstatement, the § 1983 official-capacity claims, claims for retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief, the § 1983 official-capacity claims against Harman, the § 1983 equal-protection discrimination claim against Skinner in his individual capacity, the § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims against Hollier and Skinner in their individual capacities, and the punitive damages claim against Skinner in his individual capacity. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to proceed on their § 1983 official-capacity claims against Skinner (via his successor DeCuir) or Hollier, the claims for declaratory or injunctive relief accompanying reinstatement, § 1983 equal-protection discrimination claims against Hollier or Harman in their individual capacities, and claims for punitive damages as an available remedy against Hollier or Harman. ECF No. 84. That same day, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss filed by Jones, dismissing the EPA retaliation, injunctive relief and punitive damage claims against Jones in his official capacity but granting Plaintiffs fourteen days to seek leave of court to file a third amended complaint curing the deficiencies set forth in the Order. ECF No. 85. On August 18, 2020, the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by DeCuir. ECF No. 91.

*2 Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on September 14, 2020. ECF No. 99. Defendants responded with a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 100. On November 4, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part that motion, dismissing Winston DeCuir with prejudice, striking “front pay in lieu of reinstatement” as a remedy for official-capacity claims against Hollier under § 1983, dismissing the § 1983 retaliation claim against Skinner, and denying the motion in all other respects. ECF No. 108.

The Court issued a Scheduling Order on December 9, 2020, which among other things, established a July 9, 2021 discovery deadline. ECF No. 111, at 4. Plaintiffs served 21 interrogatories on Defendants on December 16, 2020. ECF No. 123-2. Given the 25 interrogatory limit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1), Plaintiffs seek leave to file an additional 16 interrogatories (ECF No. 123-3). Plaintiffs contend that these interrogatories are narrowly focused, track defenses raised, and do not duplicate their initial interrogatories. Id. at 3.

Defendants object to the additional interrogatories. ECF Nos. 124, 125, 126, 128 & 133. Defendants argue that, despite representing to the Court that this case does not involve extensive discovery (ECF No. 111, at 2), in addition to depositions, Plaintiffs have already propounded 21 interrogatories, 73 requests for production, and over 100 discrete public records requests, one of which included a request directed to 21 different employees. ECF No. 124, at 2–4. They further argue that Plaintiff's 21 interrogatories are actually over 100 interrogatories when discrete subparts are counted. ECF No. 124, at 9–10, 13 (noting Interrogatory Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 19 and 20 equal 87 interrogatories). In short, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have already engaged in extensive discovery via interrogatories and these additional interrogatories are not proportional to the discovery needs of this case and will only add significant burden. ECF Nos. 124, at 18; 125 at 1–2; 126, at 1–2; 128, at 1.

In Reply, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived their objection to the allegedly excessive nature of the initial interrogatories by failing to object based on “subparts” in their responses. ECF No. 131, at 1. Although they initially argued good cause for service of the additional interrogatories, in Reply, they argue that they need only set forth a “particularized showing of need” to justify the additional interrogatories, which they contend has been done. Compare ECF No. 123-1, at 3 with ECF No. 131, at 2. Further, they argue that the interrogatories do not seek documents but are geared to determine whether Defendants will rely on certain defenses, and none of the earlier discovery or public records requests address whether Defendants will rely on those defenses in this case. ECF No. 131 at 3.

Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum outlining Plaintiffs’ additional requests for production, requests for admission and public records requests issued shortly after seeking leave to propound the additional 16 interrogatories. ECF No. 133, at 2. Defendants also object to the inflammatory language in Plaintiffs’ Reply. Id. at 3, 4.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Under Rule 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

*3 While the discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials,[1] discovery does have “ ‘ultimate and necessary boundaries.’ ”[2] Rule 26(b)(2)(C) directs the Court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed, if it determines: (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information; or (3) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).[3] Further, under Rule 33(a), a party may not serve more than 25 interrogatories, including discrete subparts, upon another party unless stipulated or ordered by the court.[4] “Leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2).”[5]

As the comments to Rule 33(a)(1) make clear, a party cannot evade the 25 interrogatory limit through the use of “subparts” that seek information about discrete separate subjects.[6] Although there is no “clear and easily applied rule” for counting discrete subparts, courts look to whether the subparts are logically or factually “subsumed within” or “necessarily related to” the “primary question.”[7]

Courts assess whether subsequent questions within a single interrogatory are subsumed and related by examining whether the first question is primary and subsequent questions are secondary to the primary question or whether the subsequent question could stand alone, independent of the first question.[8] If the subsequent question stands alone or is independent of the first question, it would be considered a discrete or separate question even when joined by a conjunctive word and related to the primary question.[9] However, genuine subparts should not be counted as separate interrogatories. For instance, “a question asking about communications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for each such communication.”[10] In assessing subparts, courts consider “whether the interrogatory subparts are ‘logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary [interrogatory] question.’ ”[11] “[I]f the first question can be answered fully and completely without answering the second question, then the second question is totally independent of the first and not ‘factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question.’ ”[12]

*4 This numerical limitation on the number of interrogatories is intended to protect against potentially excessive use of interrogatories, not to prevent necessary discovery.[13] It forces a party to narrow their requests to the important issues in the case, to avoid cumulative or duplicative requests, and to seek relevant information from more convenient, less burdensome sources, including depositions.[14] In determining whether leave will be granted to serve additional interrogatories, the court is guided by Rule 26(b)(2).[15] The balancing of the burden and expense or the likely benefit of the proposed discovery requires the Court to consider: (1) the needs of the case; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ resources; (4) the importance of the issues at stake in the action; and (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.[16] This determination often turns on whether “the requesting party has adequately shown that the benefits of additional interrogatories outweigh the burden to the opposing party.”[17]

III. ANALYSIS

Initially, whether or not Defendants previously objected to the number of interrogatories is not decisive. Rule 33(a) is clear that a party may not serve interrogatories in excess of the presumptive limit unless it first obtains leave of court.[18] Thus, before addressing the propriety of Plaintiffs’ requests for additional interrogatories, this Court finds it appropriate to determine the actual number of interrogatories previously issued to put Plaintiff's request in context.

Defendants argue that Interrogatory Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 19 and 20 include subparts and should be considered multiple interrogatories. ECF No. 124, at 10. They do not suggest that Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 or 21 count as more than one interrogatory. Further, there are no Interrogatory Nos. 9 or 13 reflected on ECF No. 123-2. Thus, the interrogatories to which Defendants concede constitute single questions comprise only 13 questions. Defendants assert that Interrogatories 4, 6, 7, 8, 19 and 20 each constitute more than one single interrogatory:

*6 Counting all discrete questions and subparts, Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories include 93 interrogatories. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 33(a)(1).

Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Interrogatories (ECF No. 123-3) include eight contention interrogatories (Nos. 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34 & 36), six requests for either detailed explanations of the preceding interrogatory response or production of responsive documents relating to the preceding interrogatory (Nos. 23, 25, 27, 31, 33, & 35) and two requests for explanations of affirmative responses to the preceding interrogatories (Nos. 29 & 37). In determining whether leave should be granted to serve additional interrogatories, the court must balance the burden and expense or the likely benefit of the proposed discovery considering: (1) the needs of the case; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ resources; (4) the importance of the issues at stake in the action; and (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This determination often turns on whether “the requesting party has adequately shown that the benefits of additional interrogatories outweigh the burden to the opposing party.”[20]

In this case, other than asserting that these requests are not duplicative and do not require exhaustive additional searching and reflection to answer, Plaintiffs essentially argue that the information is relevant. Rule 33(a)(1)’s limitation, however, applies to limit excessive use of discovery, even if directed to relevant evidence. It requires a party to narrow their requests to the important issues in the case, to avoid cumulative or duplicative requests, and to seek relevant information from more convenient, less burdensome sources, including depositions. Given the number of interrogatories already propounded in this case (including Interrogatory No. 20 which expressly requested all facts supporting Defendants’ affirmative defenses), Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to articulate a particularized need or good cause[21] to justify leave to serve the Second Set of Interrogatories including contention interrogatories directed to certain affirmative defenses. Indeed, the Second Set of Interrogatories appear to be duplicative of Interrogatory No. 20 as they present contention interrogatories directed to several affirmative defenses while No. 20 seeks facts supporting all affirmative defenses. Further, although an interrogatory is not objectionable simply because it asks for a contention, most courts agree that contention interrogatories are more appropriately used after substantial discovery has been conducted—typically at the end of the discovery period.[22]

*7 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and considering the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Serve Sixteen Excess Interrogatories (ECF No. 123) is DENIED.