*1 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs Tinnye Haynes, Kathy Porter, and Sharon Dickens's (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Request for Attorney Fees Per the Court's Order Dated January 23, 2017. (Doc. 34). This case is before the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Parties' consent in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (Doc. 15). After due consideration, Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees shall be GRANTED. (Doc. 34).

The case arises from events which occurred throughout the course of Plaintiffs' employment as Home Care Workers with Defendant Jan J. Otho, doing business as Kind Keepers (“Defendant”). (Doc. 1). On April 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201. (Id. at 1). According to the Complaint, Defendant “fail[ed] to pay its Home Care Workers for all hours worked and for overtime.” (Id.). Defendant answered the Complaint on June 7, 2016. (Doc. 12). On October 11, 2016, the parties assembled for a status conference before the Court. The Court allowed Defendant's attorney to withdraw as counsel and Defendant to proceed pro se. The Court advised Defendant of her obligations as a pro se litigant in this action. (Doc. 25).

The Court also ordered Defendant to make the initial disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) before November 1, 2016. (Doc. 26). To date, Defendant has not complied with this order. On October 26, 2016, Plaintiffs served a set of interrogatories and requests for production on Defendant. (Doc. 32 at 2). After unsuccessfully attempting to communicate with Defendant, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel on January 6, 2017, seeking responses to their discovery requests and attorney fees incurred in the filing of the motion. (Id. at 2–4, 7). Defendant did not respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel on January 23, 2017, and again ordered Defendant to make the disclosures required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) and respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production. (Doc. 33). To date, Defendant has not responded to these discovery requests or the Court's Order.

On February 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a request for attorney fees incurred in the filing of their Motion to Compel. (Doc. 34). Defendant did not respond to Plaintiffs' Request. On March 1, 2017, the Court held a hearing on attorney fees to grant Defendant an opportunity to respond to the Plaintiffs' request for Rule 37(a)(5)(A) fees and expenses, and to explain whether Defendant's failures to respond to the Discovery Requests were “substantially justified” or whether other circumstances make an award of expenses under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) unjust. (Doc. 35). Defendant was ordered to appear in person. (Id.). Despite the Court's allowance of an additional thirty minutes to appear, Defendant failed to attend the hearing. (Doc. 38). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition.

*2 Under Rule 37, a party whose conduct necessitated the motion to enforce discovery generally is required to pay the movant's reasonable expenses and attorney fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) requires that a non-movant have an opportunity to be heard as to the award of fees and expenses, and provides three exceptions under which courts must not order payment of the movant's fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii). The three exceptions are: (1) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (2) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. See id.

In the Fifth Circuit, the “lodestar” method is used to calculate attorney fees for purposes of fee awards. See Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 367–68 (5th Cir 2002). In calculating a lodestar, the number of hours reasonably expended are multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate in the community for such work. See Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 829 (5th Cir.2003). The party seeking reimbursement of attorney fees bears the burden of establishing the number of hours expended through the presentation of adequately recorded time records as evidence. See Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir.1993). The Court then uses this as a benchmark and then excludes any time that is excessive, duplicative, unnecessary, or inadequately documented. See id. The hours remaining are those reasonably expended. Id.

After calculating the lodestar, the Court may either: (1) accept the lodestar figure; or (2) decrease or enhance it based on the circumstances of the case, taking into account what are referred to as the Johnson factors. See La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324, 329 (5th Cir.1995); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.1974). The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of taking the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) the monetary amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and duration of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 448 F.2d at 717-19. However, the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable and should only be modified in exceptional cases. See Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457. Additionally, a party seeking attorney fees may only recover for time spent in preparing the actual discovery motion or otherwise caused by the other party's failure to comply with discovery. See Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368. Any fees and expenses not actually caused by a discovery violation are not assessable. See id. (“Obviously, the fees incurred for the underlying discovery requests were not caused by any failure to comply. Discovery dispute or no, those fees would have been incurred.”).

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A)

In its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, the Court found that Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Compel after attempting to obtain Defendant's initial disclosures and discovery responses without court action. (Doc. 33 at 2). Therefore, the Court need only consider whether: (1) Defendant's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (2) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

*3 Courts have not stated a bright-line test for “substantial justification,” yet have held that “some justification” will not suffice. Alvarez v. Wallace, 107 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D. Tex. 1985). “Rather, the Court's focus must be on the quality of the justification and the genuineness of the dispute; where an impartial observer would agree that a party had good reason to withhold discovery, then such a justification is ‘substantial.’ ” Id. The Court must determine if there is a “genuine dispute” worthy of withholding discovery. Id. at 663. “If a party is forced to make a motion under Rule 37(a) for an order compelling discovery and [the Court] find[s] that opposition to the motion was not substantially justified [the Court] will award costs. Put another way, if the party opposing discovery has acted unreasonably he will pay for it.” SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1976).

Given that Defendant is proceeding pro se, the Court must balance competing interests in determining whether Defendant's nondisclosure was “substantially justified” or if other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. A pro se litigant must be given greater leniency and “should not be punished for her failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies,” but must also be encouraged to obtain counsel and effectively litigate her case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs have requested this pertinent discovery multiple times from Defendant to no avail. To date, Defendant has been ordered by the Court twice to make the disclosures required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1). (Docs. 26, 33). Moreover, Defendant has been admonished verbally and in writing as to the consequences of failing to comply with Court orders. (Doc. 26 at 1–2). Importantly, the discovery requests with which Defendant has failed to comply do not involve any complex legal issues or analysis.

The Court finds that this is not a case of Defendant's inability to comply or her involuntary noncompliance. Rather, the record shows that Defendant has been apprised of her duties to comply with discovery requests and has repeatedly failed to do so, in violation of the Court's orders. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that her nondisclosure was “substantially justified” or any other circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust.

B. Lodestar Amount

Plaintiffs request the Court to award expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in the filing of their Motion to Compel. (Doc. 34). Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he lodestar amount in this case is $2,953.50, which is calculated by multiplying the 10.90 hours identified in the Declaration of Mary L. Scott times the hourly rates for Mary Scott ($325), a twenty-five year trial attorney, and Patricia Haynes ($135), a forty-year paralegal.” (Id. at 2). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he time spent is all time necessitated by Defendant's default on her discovery obligations, which include her refusal to comply with a prior order from this Court, refusal to respond to the discovery requests, and refusal to respond to Plaintiffs' efforts to resolve the discovery dispute without the court's intervention.” (Id.). Further, Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he Court should accept the lodestar in this case because none of the factors in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. (the ‘Johnson’ factors) require an adjustment.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiffs state that “Plaintiffs have reduced the time actually spent in connection with the Motion to Compel by not charging for (1) all office conferences, (2) all time spent researching and preparing the Motion to Compel, and (3) the time spent preparing this Request for fees.” (Id. at 3).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

*4 First, the Court must determine counsel's reasonable hourly rate on the basis of prevailing rates for attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant market. McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). This rate is usually established through affidavits of other attorneys practicing in the relevant community. Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368. The relevant community refers to “the judicial district in which the litigation occurred,” which is the Western District of Texas in this case. See Ramirez v. Lewis Energy Group, L.P., 197 F. Supp. 3d 952, 956 (S.D. Tex. 2016). However, “the district court is itself an expert in assessing these matters.” Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 526 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The court is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of testimony of witnesses as to value.”).

Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $325.00 for Attorney Mary L. Scott and $135.00 for Senior Paralegal Patricia Haynes. (Doc. 34 at 2). Plaintiffs are represented in connection with their Motion to Compel by Ms. Scott, of the law firm Spencer Scott, P.L.L.C. (Id. at 8). Ms. Scott's declaration states that she has been practicing law since 1990. (Id. at 5). Her practice “has been primarily in civil litigation,” and she has “handled many cases in federal court, including cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, age discrimination, gender discrimination, sexual harassment, race discrimination, securities class actions, civil RICO, adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court and cases involving common law claims....” (Id. at 5–6). Ms. Scott states that the firm charges $325.00 per hour for her time. (Id. at 6).

Ms. Haynes, a Senior Paralegal at Spencer Scott, P.L.L.C., assisted Ms. Scott in the filing of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. (Id. at 14). According to her declaration, Ms. Haynes has “been a paralegal for forty (40) years,” and has “specialized in civil litigation cases, both in federal and state court, from initial case planning to attending trial.” (Id.). Spencer Scott, P.L.L.C. charges $135.00 per hour for Ms. Haynes's time. (Id. at 7).

According to the 2015 State Bar of Texas hourly rate survey, the median hourly rate for attorneys with over 20 years of experience, like Ms. Scott, ranged from $275 to $306 in the relevant community.[1] Based upon this evidence and the Court's knowledge of rates in the relevant market, the Court finds Mary L. Scott's hourly rate of $325.00 to be reasonable considering the prevailing market rate in this legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation. Similarly, the Court finds Patricia Haynes's hourly rate of $135.00 to be within the proper range of prevailing market rate in this legal community for similar services by paralegals of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.

2. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended on the Litigation

The next step in the lodestar analysis is to determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. As part of the reasonableness inquiry, the fee applicant has the burden of demonstrating the exercise of billing judgment. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. Billing judgment refers to the exclusion of hours that are excessive, redundant, or unproductive. Id. The remedy for a lack of billing judgment is a reduction in hours “by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” Id.

*5 Plaintiffs seek an award for attorney fees for 7.80 hours of attorney work and 3.10 hours of paralegal work in connection with Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. (Doc. 34 at 8). This consists of 7.80 hours at a $325.00 hourly rate and 3.10 hours at a $135.00 hourly rate, for a total of $2,953.50 in legal services. (Id.). Ms. Scott declares that in addition to performing legal research, drafting, and editing of the Motion to Compel and attached exhibits, she repeatedly contacted Defendant and Defendant's then-counsel via email and telephone regarding Plaintiffs' discovery requests. (Id. at 6–8). Ms. Scott states that “[t]he fees Spencer Scott billed for the activities relating to discovery and the Motion to Compel are reasonable and were necessary for the Motion.” (Id. at 8).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' submissions of Ms. Scott and Ms. Haynes' declarations and billing statements detailing the date, timekeeper, description, hours, rate, and total for the work performed are adequate to demonstrate the time that Plaintiffs' counsel spent in connection with the Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that 10.90 hours were expended in connection with the Motion to Compel and are recoverable under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) by “present[ing] adequately documented time records to the court.” Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457.

“Using this time as a benchmark, the court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. The hours surviving this vetting process are those reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. The Court finds that the time expended by Ms. Scott and Ms. Haynes in connection with the Motion to Compel was not excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. The Court further finds that spending 10.90 hours on the successful Motion to Compel was reasonable and necessary.

3. Calculations

The Court calculates the lodestar as 7.80 hours of legal services by Ms. Scott at $325.00 per hour ($2,535.00), and 3.10 hours of legal services by Ms. Haynes at $135.00 per hour ($418.00) for an overall of 10.90 hours, totaling $2,953.50. The Court further finds that this lodestar of $2,953.50 reflects the reasonable number of hours expended in connection with the Motion to Compel and the reasonable hourly rates charged by Spencer Scott, P.L.L.C. This lodestar is supported by evidence as the amount of time reasonably expended in connection with Plaintiffs' successful Motion to Compel. The Court further finds no reason, based on any of the Johnson factors, to modify the $2,953.50 lodestar amount, of which there is a strong presumption of reasonableness. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $2,953.50.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees is GRANTED. (Doc. 34). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A), Defendant is ORDERED to pay $2,953.50 in attorney fees incurred in the filing of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. Full payment must be made to Plaintiffs no later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order.

It is so ORDERED.

SIGNED this 8th day of March, 2017.