*1 This matter comes before the court on Defendant Thomas Schaible's (“Mr. Schaible” or “Defendant”) “Motion to Seal Documents Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2” (“Motion to Restrict” or “Motion”) [#153, filed November 2, 2020]. This court considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order of Reference dated October 9, 2019 [#4], and the Memorandum dated November 2, 2020 [#154].

As discussed in this court's prior rulings on similar motions filed in this action, “ ‘[c]ourts have long recognized a common-law right of access to judicial records,’ but this right ‘is not absolute.’ ” JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Cty. of Montrose, Colo., 754 F.3d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2007)). Judges have a responsibility to avoid secrecy in court proceedings because “secret court proceedings are anathema to a free society.” M.M. v. Zavaras, 939 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1996). There is a presumption that documents essential to the judicial process are to be available to the public, but access to them may be restricted when the public's right of access is outweighed by interests which favor nondisclosure. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, courts may exercise discretion and restrict a public's right to access judicial records if that “ ‘right of access is outweighed by competing interests.’ ” JetAway, 754 F.3d at 826 (quoting Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)); cf. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he question of limiting access is necessarily fact-bound, [therefore] there can be no comprehensive formula for decisionmaking.”).

In exercising that discretion, the court “ ‘weigh[s] the interests of the public, which are presumptively paramount, against those advanced by the parties.’ ” United States v. Dillard, 795 F.3d 1191, 1205 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980)). The presumption against restriction may be overcome if the party seeking to restrict access to records “articulate[s] a real and substantial interest that justifies depriving the public of access to the records that inform [the court's] decision-making process.” JetAway, 754 F.3d at 826 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Pine Tele. Co. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc., 617 F. App'x 846, 852 (10th Cir. 2015) (showing of “significant interest” required). “[A] generalized allusion to confidential information” is insufficient; as is the bare reliance on the existence of a protective order pursuant to which the documents were filed. JetAway, 754 F.3d at 826-27; see also D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2 (stipulations between parties or stipulated protective orders regarding discovery, standing alone, are insufficient to support restriction). But a party may overcome the presumption of public access where the records contain trade secrets, Alcatel-Lucent, 617 F. App'x at 852; “business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing,” Nixon v. Warner Comm'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); information which “could harm the competitive interests of third parties,” Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 550 F. App'x 566, 574 (10th Cir. 2013); or private or personally identifiable information, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, or otherwise invade privacy interests, Huddleson v. City of Pueblo, Colo., 270 F.R.D. 635, 637 (D. Colo. 2010), such as personal medical information, Dillard, 795 F.3d at 1205 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599).

*2 These principles are reflected in D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a). Local Rule 7.2(c) is quite clear that a party seeking to restrict access must make a multi-part showing. It must: (1) identify the specific document for which restriction is sought; (2) identify the interest to be protected and the reasons why that interest outweighs the presumption of public access; (3) identify a clear injury that would result if access is not restricted; and (4) explain why alternatives to restricted access—such as redaction, summarization, stipulation, or partial restriction—are not adequate. D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(c)(1)–(4).

Defendant seeks Level 1 Restriction of Exhibits E [#148-6], G [#148-8], H [#148-9], and I [#148-10] to the Declaration of Kate DiGeronimo (“DiGeronimo Declaration”) [#148-1]; Exhibits C [#148-14], E [#148-16], F [#148-17], G [#148-18], H [#148-19], I [#148-20], J [#148-21], K [#148-22], and N [#148-25] to the Declaration of Thomas Schaible (“Schaible Declaration”) [#148-11]; and Exhibit A [#148-28] to the Declaration of Cynthia King (“King Declaration”) [#148-27]. Defendant also seeks Level 1 Restriction of other documents in their unredacted form and provides proposed redacted versions of the same as attachments to the instant Motion. See [#153-1; #153-2; #153-3; #153-4; #153-5; #153-6]. These documents include Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [#148]; Exhibit F [#148-7] to the DiGeronimo Declaration; the Schaible Declaration [#148-11]; Exhibits L [#148-23], M [#148-24],[1] and O [#148-26] to the Schaible Declaration; and the King Declaration [#148-27].

Exhibit E [#148-6] to the DiGeronimo Declaration; Exhibits C [#148-14], E [#148-16], I [#148-20], J [#148-21], and K [#148-22] to the Schaible Declaration; and Exhibit A [#148-28] to the King Declaration are identical to documents previously granted Level 1 Restriction by this court. See [#65; #127; #131]. Compare [#148-6] with [#118-4]; [#148-14] with [#52-1]; [#148-16] with [#52-1]; [#148-20] with [#111]; [#148-21] with [#52-4]; [#148-22] with [#52-5]; and [#148-28] with [#111-1]. For the same reasons set forth in this court's Minute Orders, see [#65; #127; #131], this court finds Level 1 Restriction of these subsequently filed, identical documents appropriate.

Exhibits G [#148-8], H [#148-9], and I [#148-10] to the DiGeronimo Declaration are transcript excerpts from the depositions of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's expert witness, and Defendant's assistant at Securities Service Network (“SSN”), respectively. Defendant argues that these excerpts should be restricted because, like the documents restricted above, they contain detailed discussions of Plaintiff's and her ex-husband's investments at SSN. [#153 at 5]. Specifically, Defendant argues that the documents require restriction in order for Mr. Schaible to comply with 17 C.F.R. § 248.3 et seq., (“Regulation S-P”), which charges Mr. Schaible (as an investment adviser) and his broker-dealer, SSN, with “protecting and maintaining the privacy of their customers’ financial information and personally identifying information.” [Id. at 3 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 248.3 et seq.)]. Regulation S-P limits the disclosure of “personally identifiable financial information” to third-parties. 17 C.F.R. §§ 248.10, 248.3(t)(1)(i). As contemplated by Regulation S-P, “[p]ersonally identifiable financial information” includes, among other things, information (a) about a consumer via a financial product or service transaction; (b) that a consumer provides on an application; (c) about an account balance; (d) that an individual is or has been a customer; (e) that an individual has obtained a financial product or service; and (f) about the consumer “if it is disclosed in a manner that indicates that the individual is or has been” a consumer. See 17 C.F.R. § 248.3(u)(1)(i-iii) and (2)(i).

*3 Exhibits G [#148-8], H [#148-9], and I [#148-10] to the DiGeronimo Declaration are excerpts of transcripts that discuss sensitive, confidential information about financial transactions carried out by Plaintiff's ex-husband (a non-party) and Defendant argues that these excerpts “constitute ‘personally identifiable financial information’ as it is defined under Regulation S-P because the content discloses the fact that the plaintiff and her ex-husband were customers of SSN and Defendant Schaible.” [#153 at 5]. Upon review, this court agrees that the information contained in the foregoing excerpts constitutes “personally identifiable financial information” under Regulation S-P. Accordingly, I conclude that Level 1 Restriction of Exhibits G, H, and I to the DiGeronimo Declaration is warranted.

Exhibit N [#148-25] to the Schaible Declaration is an excerpt from SSN's Written Supervisory Procedures, which Defendant identifies as “the firm's internal policies and procedures.” [#153 at 5]. Defendant provides the introduction to the Written Supervisory Procedures in the instant Motion for context, and explains that he was granted permission from SSN to produce the document to Plaintiff during discovery in this action but was not given a blanket authorization for the public release of the same. [Id.]. Exhibit N is marked “Highly Confidential” and contains an excerpt titled “Section 4.” [#148-25]. Upon review of the excerpt, and in light of the internal policies and procedures set forth therein, this court finds that Level 1 Restriction is appropriate to protect the confidential commercial information of non-party SSN. See Rickaby v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-00520-RMBNB, 2016 WL 1597589, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2016) (granting motion to restrict where public disclosure of documents would reveal commercial and financial information of both a party and third party); Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 550 F. App'x 566, 574 (10th Cir. 2013) (information which “could harm the competitive interests of third parties” may be properly restricted).

Exhibits F [#148-17], G [#148-18], and H [#148-19] to the Schaible Declaration are email messages between Plaintiff and Defendant for which Defendant seeks Level 1 Restriction because they “were designated as ‘confidential’ by the plaintiff in accordance with the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order....” [#153 at 5-6]. Pursuant to Section 11 of the Parties’ Stipulated Protective Order, Defendant is required to file these documents under Level 1 Restriction and move to designate the document as restricted as contemplated by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2. [#28 at 18]. See also [#153 at 6 (noting his obligations under Section 11)]. Although Defendant offers no additional argument to support Level 1 Restriction of these emails, the court nevertheless finds restriction appropriate in light of the sensitive medical information about non-parties discussed in these messages that appear wholly irrelevant to the instant action.

Defendant also seeks Level 1 Restriction of [#148], [#148-7], [#148-11], [#148-23], [#148-26] and [#148-27] in their original forms, but offers proposed redacted versions of the same. [#153 at 6]. See also [#153-1; #153-2; #153-3; #153-4; #153-5; #153-6]. Documents identical to Exhibit F [#148-7] to the DiGeronimo Declaration and Exhibits L [#148-23] and O [#148-26] to the Schaible Declaration have previously been granted Level 1 Restriction by this court, see [#81; #124], and these documents are already filed in redacted form on the docket, see [#86-2; #135-2; #135-3]. Defendant's proposed redacted versions are identical to those already available on the docket. See [#153-1; #153-2; #153-3]. For the reasons set forth in the court's previous Minute Orders, I find that Level 1 Restriction of the original forms of Exhibit F [#148-7] to the DiGeronimo Declaration and Exhibits L [#148-23] and O [#148-26] to the Schaible Declaration is appropriate. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket: [#153-1] as Exhibit F to the Declaration of Kate DiGeronimo (Redacted Version of [#148-7]); [#153-2] as Exhibit L to the Declaration of Thomas Schaible (Redacted Version of [#148-23]); and [#153-3] as Exhibit O to the Declaration of Thomas Schaible (Redacted Version of [#148-26]).

*4 Defendant further argues that Level 1 Restriction of his Motion for Summary Judgment [#148], the Schaible Declaration [#148-11], and the King Declaration [#148-27], is necessary to protect the “limited and specific sensitive, confidential financial information mentioned in those documents, which derive from documents that are already designated as restricted in this matter.” [#153 at 7]. Defendant attaches to the instant Motion proposed redacted versions of the same documents. See [#153-4; #153-5; #153-6]. Upon review of the foregoing documents and Defendant's proffered redactions, I respectfully agree with Defendant. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket: [#153-4] as Defendant Thomas Schaible's Motion for Summary Judgment (Redacted Version of [#148]); [#153-5] as the Declaration of Thomas Schaible (Redacted Version of [#148-11]); and [#153-6] as the Declaration of Cynthia King (Redacted Version of [#148-27]).

For the reasons set forth above, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to MAINTAIN a Level 1 Restriction for [#148, #148-6, #148-7, #148-8, #148-9, #148-10, #148-11, #148-14, #148-16, #148-17, #148-18, #148-19, #148-20, #148-21, #148-22, #148-23, #148-25, #148-26, #148-27, and #148-28].

Given Defendant's reliance on confidential information throughout his Motion for Summary Judgment, these documents would require heavy redaction in order to protect the privacy interests at issue. Thus, this court finds that wholesale restriction is the more practicable alternative. However, the Parties are reminded that this ruling does not necessarily mean that any decision by the court will be redacted. See Lucero v. Sandia Corp., 495 F. App'x 903, 913 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 8A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2042, at 234 (3d ed. 2010)) (observing that “[t]he strongest arguments for access apply to materials used as the basis for a judicial decision on the merits of the case”). To the extent that one or more of the Parties believes restriction of the court's decisions in this matter is necessary, that Party should proceed to filing a Motion to Restrict, with a proposed redacted public version, for the court's consideration.

In addition, there are a number of filings made on the court's Electronic Court Filing (“ECF”) system that are filed as restricted but not accompanied by a Motion to Restrict, including the following: (a) Declaration of Cory M. Curtis, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [#67] and accompanying Exhibits A through P [#67-1 through #67-16], filed February 4, 2020; (b) Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants’ [sic] Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel [#133], filed September 18, 2020; and (c) Defendant Schaible, Russo & Company, C.P.A.’s, LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment [#145] and accompanying Exhibits 1 through 9 [#145-1 through #145-9], filed October 16, 2020.

Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Practice 7.2(e), “[i]f a document is filed as a restricted document without an accompanying motion to restrict, it shall retain the restriction selected by the filer for 14 days. If no motion to restrict is filed within such time period, the restriction shall expire and the document shall be open to public inspection.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(e). Fourteen days has expired as to these documents and accordingly, by operation of the Local Rule, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to UNRESTRICT [#67, #67-1, #67-2, #67-3, #67-4, #67-5, #67-6, #67-7, #67-8, #67-9, #67-10, #67-11, #67-12, #67-13, #67-14, #67-15, #67-16; #133; #145, #145-1, #145-2, #145-3, #145-4, #145-5, #145-6, #145-7, #145-8, #145-9].

In addition, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to Restrict [#53] directed at Defendants’ Reply in Further Support of Motion to Disqualify [#46] and certain exhibits in support thereof [#43]. This court denied that Motion to Restrict on January 24, 2020 as non-compliant with Local Rule 7.2(e). See [#62]. No further Motion to Restrict was filed in the fourteen-day window and accordingly, by operation of the Local Rule, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to UNRESTRICT [#43, #43-1, #43-2, #43-3, #43-4, #43-5, #43-6, #43-7, #43-8, #43-9; #46].

*5 Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that: