Copeland v. C.A.A.I.R., Inc.
Copeland v. C.A.A.I.R., Inc.
2018 WL 11319129 (N.D. Okla. 2018)
November 16, 2018
Jayne, Jodi F., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The Court denied CAAIR's motion to compel with respect to Request for Production 3 – Tax Returns, but granted CAAIR's motion to compel with respect to Request for Production 18 – Employment Records. The Court also approved CAAIR's proposed authorization for use by both CAAIR and Simmons. The Court found that Plaintiffs had waived their objections to Simmons' discovery requests, with the exception of documents that the Court had already prohibited.
Additional Decisions
ARTHUR COPELAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
C.A.A.I.R., INC., a domestic not for profit corporation; et al., Defendants
v.
C.A.A.I.R., INC., a domestic not for profit corporation; et al., Defendants
Case No. 17-CV-564-TCK-JFJ
United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed November 16, 2018
Counsel
Daniel E. Smolen, David Arthur Warta, Robert Murray Blakemore, Smolen Smolen & Roytman PLLC, Mark Allen Smith, Caruso Law Firm PC, Tulsa, OK, Megan Elizabeth Lambert, ACLU of Oklahoma Foundation, Oklahoma City, for Plaintiffs.Denelda Richardson, Nicholas James Foster, Randall Edwin Long, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable PLLC, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant C.A.A.I.R., Inc.
Amy M. Stipe, Gable & Gotwals, Oklahoma City, OK, Christopher S. Thrutchley, John David Russell, Justin Andrew Lollman, Philip D. Hixon, Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, OK, John R. Elrod, Conner & Winters PLLC, Fayetteville, AR, for Defendant Simmons Foods, Inc.
Jayne, Jodi F., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 Before the Court are C.A.A.I.R., Inc.'s (“CAAIR”) Motion to Compel (ECF No. 81) and Simmons Pet Food, Inc.'s (“Simmons”) Motion to Compel (ECF No. 79). During a hearing held on October 23, 2018, the Court heard argument on all issues. The Court accepted Defendants' argument that discovery was not stayed by Judge Kern or the Joint Status Report; denied Plaintiffs' alternative request to stay discovery; ordered the parties to confer regarding a going-forward discovery plan; and took other issues under advisement. In their Joint Report to the Magistrate Regarding Discovery filed November 6, 2018 (ECF No. 90), the parties informed the Court they had agreed to entry of a Stipulated Protective Order (ECF No. 93); agreed to entry of a Stipulated Order for Limited Release of Sealed Drug Court Files (ECF No. 94); agreed to authorizations for release of Plaintiffs' medical records and drug court files; and resolved several issues taken under advisement by the Court. This Order rules on the few remaining issues presented by the motions to compel.
I. CAAIR's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 81)
A. Request for Production 18 – Employment Records
Plaintiffs' objection on grounds of irrelevance is overruled, and the motion to compel is granted.[1] Certain of Plaintiffs' employment records submitted to employers after their time in the CAAIR program may contain information regarding Plaintiffs' representations and beliefs regarding their alleged employment with CAAIR, which are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Specifically, CAAIR cited case law in which courts deemed an FLSA plaintiff's subjective view of his employment status, prior to filing suit, relevant to whether he performed work in “expectation of compensation.” See, e.g., Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, the Court finds CAAIR's proposed authorization to be properly limited in scope, as it is limited to “documents related to Plaintiffs' employment history, skills or training, or criminal history, including but not limited to” applications for employment, resumes and cover letters, statements of work history or previous employment; and background check reports. ECF No. 96-1. It appears the form contains a typographical error and that the word “medical” should be “employment” in the last paragraph. With that change, CAAIR's proposed authorization (ECF No. 96-1) is the form approved by the Court for use by both CAAIR and Simmons.[2]
B. Request for Production 3 – Tax Returns
*2 Plaintiffs' objections are sustained, and the motion to compel is denied. As stated at the hearing, courts have recognized policy concerns surrounding production of tax returns, and courts have imposed greater burdens on parties seeking their production. See Hilt v. SFC Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 189 (D. Kan. 1997) (court must find relevance and compelling need for the returns because the information contained therein is not otherwise readily obtainable). CAAIR argues that tax records are relevant to Plaintiffs' FLSA claims because, if Plaintiffs believed they received “wages” in the form of room and board, they should have reported these “wages” on their tax returns for years they were in the CAAIR program. But CAAIR admits it did not issue W-2s to Plaintiffs. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that, in the absence of W-2s, it is unlikely that any Plaintiff had the necessary information to place a value on the room and board or that any Plaintiff reported the room and board as “wages.”
Even if relevant to Plaintiffs' subjective beliefs regarding their employment status, the Court finds the relevant information can be obtained through less invasive means, such as requests for admission or interrogatories. As discussed by the Court at the hearing, the Court would be ordering production of tax returns to prove a fact Plaintiffs likely stand willing to admit. If and to the extent any Plaintiffs fail to admit they did not report room and board as wages on relevant tax returns, or CAAIR can identify a more particularized and compelling need for tax returns in relation to individual Plaintiffs, CAAIR may seek further relief from the Court.[3]
II. Simmons' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 79)
Plaintiffs responded to all of Simmons' discovery requests with this identical objection:
Responding Party objects to this request as premature, improper, and impermissible because: The parties to this action agreed that discovery would not commence until after the Court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss, which has yet to be decided, and, accordingly, Defendant's discovery requests are premature and not permitted by the parties' joint agreement; the Court confirmed the parties' agreement referenced above and Defendant's discovery requests are premature and in violation of the Court's order; the discovery is premature because, until the Court rules on Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss it is not possible to determine relevance for discovery purposes and the discovery cannot, logically, be appropriately crafted or responded to; the volume of the discovery propounded by Defendant is oppressive (involving more than 5,000 items requiring responses) and requires that the parties work together to reach a mutually agreeable discovery schedule (plaintiffs have offered to engage in this process); and many of Defendant's discovery requests explicitly target specific language in plaintiffs' operative complaint, which Defendant has sought to dismiss by a fully-briefed, but unresolved, motion to dismiss.
Responding Party further objects to this request insofar as it is overbroad, vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Responding Party further objects to this request insofar as the burden of responding to the request outweighs the likely benefit, the request is duplicative and cumulative, the request is compound, and the request seeks information obtainable from sources that are more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Responding Party further objects to this request to the extent it seeks information already in the possession of defendants. Responding Party further objects to this request because it is premature, in that the time for discovery has not yet commenced. Responding Party further objects to this request as contrary to Responding Party's right to privacy under the constitutions of the United States and the State of Oklahoma. Responding Party further objects to this request to the extent it calls for disclosure of information protected by the work product doctrine, and by any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the clergy-penitent privilege, the confidential marital communications privilege, the spousal adverse testimonial privilege, and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Responding Party further objects to this request to the extent that it exceeds, by the inclusion of subparts or otherwise, the limitation on the number of interrogatories under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a).
*3 See, e.g., ECF No. 79-10.
With respect to the first paragraph of objections, the Court ruled at the hearing that discovery had not been stayed. More importantly, as discussed at length in the hearing, Plaintiffs had ample time and opportunity to seek a protective order or file other motions with the Court to address the issue of whether discovery was indeed stayed. Instead, Plaintiffs fully participated in discovery with CAAIR and elected to submit entirely deficient discovery responses to Simmons. In other words, Plaintiffs made a tactical choice to lodge the issue of discovery being stayed as a written objection to Simmons' requests, along with a list of boilerplate objections, rather than promptly seek affirmative relief or clarification from the Court. For similar reasons to those explained at the hearing, including Plaintiffs' conduct following the alleged “stay” of discovery, the Court finds the first paragraph is not a valid objection to the discovery requests.
The second paragraph consists of “general or boilerplate objections, offered without explanation,” that may, in the Court's discretion, result in “waiver of the responding party's right to object.” Howard v. Segway, Inc., No. 11-CV-688-GKF-PJC, 2013 WL 869955, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2013). It is simply a “litany of general objections,” which would require the Court to sift through and determine which objection applies to a particular topic. Id. Such objections are “insufficient to meet the responding party's burden in substantiating its objections to discovery.” Id. Although prepared by Plaintiffs' former counsel, current counsel also represented Plaintiffs at the time the deficient objections were submitted. This is not a case where current counsel lacked an opportunity to correct the deficient responses. Therefore, the Court also rejects the second paragraph as preserving any valid objections and deems all objections waived.
The Court imposes one exception to this waiver. If and to the extent waiver would result in Plaintiffs being forced to produce documents that the Court has already prohibited based on Plaintiffs' objections to CAAIR's discovery requests, such as the tax records discussed above, Plaintiffs will not be required to produce such records. The Court recognizes this limitation on the waiver is a windfall to Plaintiffs. But the Court finds this to be the most practical way to proceed in light of Plaintiffs' inconsistency in responding to the two sets of discovery requests.
Defendants' motions to compel (ECF Nos. 79, 81) are granted in part and denied in part as stated at the hearing and set forth in this Order.
SO ORDERED this 16th day of November, 2018.
Footnotes
Because Plaintiffs agreed to execute authorizations for other types of records, rather than requiring Defendants to propound subpoenas under Rule 45, the Court does not reach the legal issue raised in the original briefing regarding obtaining a third party's documents via authorizations rather than subpoenas. The Court assumes the remaining dispute relates to the relevance of the employment records.
Simmons' proposed authorization is facially overbroad and includes requests for irrelevant documents. See ECF No. 79-1 at 7.
As noted in CAAIR's brief, this Court recently compelled production of plaintiffs' tax records in another FLSA case. See Goodly, et al. v. Check-6, et al., 16-CV-334, ECF No. 271. However, that case involved more complex financial issues regarding “employee” versus “independent contractor” status. Id. Even in that case, the Court noted that some courts had found tax records irrelevant to the employee versus independent contractor issue. See id.