*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel the Omega Defendants to Produce Documents and Information (“Motion”) (Doc. 89) and Defendants Ensurety Ventures, LLC d/b/a Omega Auto Care (“Omega”), Ensurety, Inc. (“Ensurety”) and EGV Companies, Inc.’s (“EGV”) (collectively “Defendants”) Response thereto (Doc. 90). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is due to be DENIED without prejudice.[1]

I. Background

This putative class action stems from three phone calls allegedly made by or on behalf of Defendants to Plaintiff in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. and the Maryland TCPA, Md. Code, Com. Law, § 14-3201. In the Revised Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. 63), Plaintiff brings nine causes of action and seeks to certify six classes. Plaintiff alleges generally that Omega markets vehicle service contracts (“VSCs”) nationwide through numerous third-party sellers and marketers. (Id.) These third-parties then allegedly make, or engage other third-parties to make, robocalls to market Omega's VSCs. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are vicariously liable for the robocalls made by these third-parties. (Id.)

Plaintiff previously served his First and Second Requests for Production, which seek, among other things, documents regarding the telemarketing of Omega's VSCs by third-parties.[2] (Docs. 89-2 & 89-3.) The parties met and conferred regarding email custodians and electronic search terms that Defendants would use to search for responsive documents. (Doc. 89 at 3, 8–11; Doc. 89-4.) Following Defendants’ document production, which included only documents related to the two third-parties who purportedly were responsible for calling Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (Doc. 89.)

II. Analysis

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the Motion, which exceeds the 25-page limit set forth in Local Rule 3.01(a), is overly-lengthy, confusing, and does not comply with the Local Rules of this Court.[3] Rather than concisely setting forth exactly what discovery is in dispute and why the subject information is discoverable as required by Local Rule 3.04(a), the Motion focuses primarily on what Plaintiff describes as Defendants’ purported “broken promises and failed representations” throughout discovery. (Doc. 89 at 2–14, 20–22.)

*2 The Motion includes several pages of single-spaced quotes from emails between counsel that do not appear to support Plaintiff's position regarding the parties’ purported discovery agreement. (Id. at 8–11.) Many other pages contain only single-spaced quotations of Plaintiff's entire First Requests for Production of Documents and Defendants’ responses thereto, despite Plaintiff's acknowledgment that those requests have now been “superceded.”[4] (Id. at 14–19.)

Local Rule 3.04(a) requires that each discovery request in dispute and the response thereto be quoted in full, and be “immediately followed by a statement of the reason the motion should be granted.” To the extent any disputed requests have been modified through conferral by the parties, as Plaintiff suggests, the purported modifications to each request must be included in the argument regarding why the Motion should be granted.

Rather than quoting only those requests and responses that are actually in dispute, Plaintiff quotes his entire First Requests for Production and Defendants’ responses thereto. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to immediately follow each request in dispute and response thereto with argument that includes any purported modifications. In fact, Plaintiff does not begin his legal argument regarding the discoverability of the subject information until page 19 of the Motion, and he does not provide sufficient information regarding any purported modifications to the subject requests. Thus, even though Plaintiff has quoted the subject discovery requests and responses, he has not complied with the substance of the requirements of Local Rule 3.04(a). In short, much of the information provided in the Motion appears to be irrelevant and unecessary, and it is difficult to determine exactly what discovery issues are in dispute.

Although it is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to be making primarily two arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to a discovery agreement between the parties, Defendants must produce all documents identified by the parties’ agreed-upon email custodians and electronic search terms without limitation or objection. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiff further argues that the scope of discovery cannot be limited to only those entities responsible for calling Plaintiff because the class allegations and definitions encompass all third-parties marketing Omega's VSCs, not just those who called Plaintiff. (Id. at 5–6.)

As set forth below, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants agreed to produce documents in the manner described by Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently articulate exactly what discovery is at issue or why it is discoverable absent agreement of the parties, the Motion will be denied without prejudice. Thus, the Court need not reach the parties’ substantive arguments regarding the appropriate scope of discovery.

Defendants deny that they agreed to produce all documents identified using agreed-upon email custodians and search terms without objection, and Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such written agreement between the parties. (Doc. 90 at 2–3.) The emails between counsel, which Plaintiff cites in support of his assertion, indicate that the parties were conferring regarding email custodians, search terms, and other discovery matters. (See Doc. 89 at 8–11; Doc. 89-4.) Although the parties’ negotiations may have altered the scope of information sought in Plaintiff's discovery requests, it does not appear from these emails that Defendants agreed to the wholesale production of documents, without objection, that Plaintiff suggests. (See id.)

*3 Pursuant to Local Rule 4.15: “No stipulation or agreement between any parties or their attorneys, the existence of which is not conceded, in relation to any aspect of any pending case, will be considered by the Court unless the same is made before the Court and noted in the record or is reduced to writing and subscribed by the party or attorney against whom it is asserted.” Plaintiff has failed to produce a writing signed by Defendants or their counsel indicating that they agreed to produce documents in the manner suggested by Plaintiff. Thus, the Court will not order the wholesale production of documents without regard to their discoverability based on this disputed agreement.

Because Plaintiff relies almost exclusively on the parties’ purported agreement in support of his position, he fails to set forth exactly what discovery is in dispute and why the subject information is discoverable. Although Plaintiff references his First and Second Requests for Production in the Motion, he states that these requests have “been superceded by the parties’ production agreement.” (Doc. 89 at 14.) Thus, it appears that negotiations between the parties may have altered the scope of information sought in Plaintiff's written discovery requests. However, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently address this issue. Thus, it is unclear from the Motion exactly what discovery is at issue.

Although Plaintiff requests some specific discovery, primarily in the “Conclusion” section of the Motion, he fails to tie that discovery to specific discovery requests or otherwise sufficiently show that the discovery is “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case” as required. (See Doc. 89 at 24–25.) See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Notably, less than three pages of the 27-page Motion are dedicated to addressing the discoverability of the information sought, and Plaintiff fails to cite any relevant authority in support of his specific positions regarding the subject discovery. (See id. at 22–24.)

In short, the Court will not order Defendants to produce information without knowing exactly what information is at issue, whether such information is discoverable, and what discovery requests encompass such information. Thus, the Court need not decide the appropriate scope of discovery at this time.[5] Because the Court is not ruling on the parties’ substantive arguments, Plaintiff may file a new motion, if appropriate, that cures the deficiencies set forth herein after fully conferring with Defendants’ counsel in person or by extended telephone conference regarding each specific item in dispute.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

The Motion (Doc. 89) is DENIED without prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on April 9, 2019.

Because the Motion will be denied without prejudice, expenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) will not be awarded.

The Court recognizes that not all discovery requests were served on all Defendants. (See Docs. 89-2 & 89-3.) This does not affect the Court's ruling on the Motion. Thus, to avoid unnecessary confusion, unless otherwise noted, the Court will refer to Omega, Ensurety, and EGV collectively as Defendants herein.

This is at least the fourth motion filed by Plaintiff that does not comply with the Local Rules, and the Motion could be denied for this reason alone. (See Docs. 41, 42, 48, 86, 87.) Continued failure to strictly comply with all Local Rules may result in summary denial of future motions.

The Motion also contains numerous lengthy single-spaced footnotes, two of which span over a half of a page each, and the Motion's attachments total 129 pages. (See Doc. 89 at 13, 21; Docs. 89-1–89-8.) Additionally, the Motion improperly requests multiple forms of relief, i.e., an order compelling production of documents and an order vacating certain case management deadlines. Further, the Motion attaches a proposed order which is prohibited by this district's Administrative Procedures for Electronic Filing. (Doc. 89-1.)

Although not deciding the issue, the Court notes that Defendants have cited at least one case from this district regarding discovery pertaining to non-parties that appears to be on point and persuasive. See Mey v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-463-FtM-99MRM, 2016 WL 9110357, at *4–7 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2016) (denying Request No. 4 and other similar requests in part because there were insufficient allegations in the class action complaint regarding non-party telemarketers). Plaintiff has not cited any relevant authority in support of his position. Thus, at this time, the Court is inclined to follow the reasoning set forth in Mey regarding discovery pertaining to non-parties. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff's discovery requests seem overbroad on their face because the definition of “Defendants” and “Ensurety Ventures, LLC” appear to encompass numerous non-parties. (See Doc. 89-2 at 3–4; Doc. 89-3 at 4.)