*1 Before the court is a Motion to Compel Discovery from Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”) filed by Plaintiff on February 3, 2021. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a dispute over Plaintiff's entitlement to disability benefits pursuant to a long-term disability insurance policy. Plaintiff is asserting claims against defendants for: (1) breach of contract; (2) reasonable expectations; (3) fraud; (4) bad faith; (5) false promise/misrepresentation pursuant to N.D.C.C. 51-15; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) oppression, fraud, actual malice, and bad faith litigation tactics pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11. (Doc. No. 152).

Plaintiff served Hartford with two sets of interrogatories and two sets of requests for production. Hartford served Plaintiff with its response to the first set of interrogatories and requests for production on November 16, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 196-1, 196-2). It served Plaintiff with supplemental responses to the first set of interrogatories on January 8, 2021. (Doc. No. 215-2). It served Plaintiff with its responses to his second set of interrogatories and requests for production on January 19, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 182-4, 189-2, 199).

On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery from Hartford. At issue are Hartford's responses to portions of Plaintiff's first and second set of interrogatories and first and second sets of requests for production. Plaintiff asserts that Hartford has properly respond to his interrogatories and requests for production, including information regarding the compensation it has received for its services and its production of its policy and procedure manual. Further asserting that this information is material and necessary to prosecute his claims for bath faith and exemplary damages, he asks the court to issue an order compelling Hartford to fully answer all of his interrogatories and produce all of the documents that he has requested, including an unredacted copy of the Reinsurance and Administrative Services Agreement (hereafter referred to the as “the Services Agreement”) between American General Life Insurance Company, US Life, and Hartford. He also seeks an award of the attorney's fees he incurred in bringing the instant motion. In so doing, he acknowledges that he has exceeded the limits or constraints on the number of discovery requests to which the parties had initially agreed. He then goes on to stress that these limitations were agreed upon at the outset of this action, that extensive discovery was required in order for him to ascertain the identities of the administrators of his disability claim, that he was subsequently granted leave to amend the pleadings to include these administrators and to assert additional claims, and that the parties continued to conduct fact discovery beyond the original deadlines for doing so. Finally, he asserts that the additional discovery requests are reasonable and warranted under the circumstances. In so doing, he questions whether the same can be said about subpoenas served by defendants on his law firm, another North Dakota law firm, various medical facilities where he has received treatment over the years, his health insurer, and the Social Security Administration. (Doc. No. 191).

*2 On February 17, 2021, Hartford filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel. It asserts that Plaintiff did not fulfill his obligation to confer in good faith prior to filing the instant motion and that his discovery requests are unduly burdensome, disproportional to the needs of this case, not reasonably calculated to result the production of relevant information, call for conjecture and speculation, and/or call for the disclosure of confidential or otherwise proprietary information to which Plaintiff is not entitled. It also asserts that the supplemental responses it provided to Plaintiff's first set of interrogatories in January 2021 renders at least a portion of the instant motion moot and that discovery regarding Plaintiff's bad faith claim is otherwise premature. In regard to this last point, it maintains that Plaintiff's declination to answer deposition questions regarding the $627,000 in attorney's fees and costs he claimed to have incurred and Plaintiff's refusal to respond to Hartford's discovery requests regarding his attorney's fees constitutes an admission that discovery of bad faith damages is premature.

On February 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his motion. Thus, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the court's consideration.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes motions to compel discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(1) (“On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.”). Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the scope of permissible discovery as follows:

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(1).

“The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is extremely broad.” Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 309 F.R.D. 503, 508 (D.S.D. 2015) (citing 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 2007, 3637 (1970)). “The reason for the broad scope of discovery is that ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.’ ” Wright & Miller, § 2007, 39 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947)).

“Discoverable information itself need not be admissible at trial; rather, the defining question is whether it is within the scope of discovery.” Colonial Funding Network, Inc. v. Genuine Builders, Inc., 326 F.R.D. 206, 211 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). After the proponent makes a threshold showing of relevance, the party opposing a motion to compel has the burden of showing its objections are valid by providing specific explanations or factual support as to how each discovery request is improper. Jo Ann Howard & Assocs., P.C. v. Cassity, 303 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D. Mo 2014) (citing Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992), and St. Paul Reinsurance Co. V. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511-12 (N.D. Iowa 2000)). “The party must demonstrate that the requested documents either do not come within the broad scope of relevance defined pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) or else are of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosures.” Id. (quoted case omitted). Relevancy in this context “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to another matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Jo Ann Howard & Assocs., P.C. v. Cassity, 303 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D. Mo 2014) (citation and quotation omitted); Klein v. Affiliated Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-949 DWF/ECW, 2019 WL 1307884, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Discovery Requests and Responses at Issue

*3 At issue are Hartford's responses to: Interrogatories 2- 12, Set 1; Interrogatory Nos. 1-2, Set 2; Request for Production No. 13, Set 1; and Requests for Production Nos. 1- 4, Set 2. The discovery requests and the responses to them can be found in their entirely at Doc. Nos. 196-1, 196-2, 189-2, 199, and/or 215.

B. Obligation to Meet and Confer

On October 11, 2019, the court issued an order in this case that, among other things, advised the parties of their obligations under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and District of North Dakota Civil Local Rule 37.1. (Doc. No. 30). Rule 37 authorizes parties to file motions to compel discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(1). It also requires that such motions “include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Id. Local Rule 37.1 imposes more stringent requirements or preconditions on such motions. Specifically, it provides:

D.N.D. Civ. L.R. 37.1.

In the instant motion, Plaintiff certifies that he made a good faith effort on December 17, 2020, at the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sean Hammond, Hartford's designated representative, to resolve this matter informally and without court involvement. (Doc. No. 198). He adds that this matter was a topic of discussion during the parties’ December 10, 2021, status conference with the court. (Id.)

In response, Hartford first asserts that it would have been impossible to confer at Hammond's deposition about the discovery requests presently at issue seeing as they were not propounded by Plaintiff until two days after Hammond's deposition. Second, it asserts that Plaintiff not only failed to meet and confer about any alleged deficiencies with its supplemental responses to his interrogatories prior to filing the instant motion, but that Plaintiff has materially misrepresented to the court in his motion that it had not meaningfully or substantively responded to his interrogatories.

In reply, Plaintiff asserts, that, at the 30(b)(b) deposition, Hartford instructed Hammond not to answer questions pertaining to discovery materials it had produced or had objections to producing, that, after some discussion, Hartford assented to Plaintiff filing a motion to compel, and that the aforementioned discussion for all intents and purposes satisfied the meet and confer requirement under the applicable rules.

*4 The discovery process in this case has been very contentious. During the status conferences with the court (of which there have been many), there has been precious little on which the parties have been able to agree. Thus, it comes as no surprise to the court that the parties have divergent opinions on whether there was a good faith effort made by either side to resolve their dispute before involving the court.

Having reviewed the record, the court is not ready to conclude that Plaintiff failed to satisfy his obligations under the applicable rules of procedure prior. It is apparent from the parties’ submissions there was some discussion at Hammond's deposition about Plaintiff's discovery requests, Hartford's issues with them, Hartford's insistence that issues be addressed before it would respond to certain lines of questioning, and Plaintiff's stated intent at the deposition to file a motion to compel. The court further recalls that it held a status conference with the parties on December 10, 2021, and that the court discussed with the parties its inclination to permit Plaintiff to pursue additional discovery. Finally, the court notes that Plaintiff has certified that the parties have conferred as Rule 37 requires. Thus, the court is satisfied that Plaintiff has complied with at least the technical requirements of Rule 37.

In sum, the court will not deny the instant motion due to a failure to meaningfully confer or otherwise make a good faith effort to resolve this matter as required by the applicable rules and this court's order. The court finds it prudent to next address the limits on discovery initially agreed to by the parties.

C. Limits on the Number of Discovery Requests

In their original scheduling and discovery plan, which the court adopted, the parties agreed to cap the number of interrogatories and requests for production at 25 and 75, respectively, for each side. In its initial responses to the Plaintiff's discovery requests, Hartford objected primarily on the ground that Plaintiff had exceeded his cap. It later supplemented its responses as noted above.

To the extent that Hartford may have objected or is continuing to object to the number of discovery requests propounded by Plaintiff in excess of what the parties had initially agreed upon, it is denied. The court finds, in its discretion, that good cause exists and the circumstances otherwise warrant expansion of the number of discovery requests to encompass the discovery requests presently at issue. The court appreciates that Plaintiff has exceeded the number of discovery requests originally contemplated for each side by the parties. However, it is not inclined at this point to strictly limit Plaintiff to the number of discovery requests initially agreed upon given how this case has evolved. During a December 10, 2020, status conference, the court suggested that it may allow additional discovery given the circumstances. The court shall next consider Hartford's supplemental response to Plaintiff's interrogatories and whether they, as Hartford asserts, effectively moot a portion of Plaintiff's motion.

D. Interrogatories

In the memorandum filed in support of his motion to compel, Plaintiff reproduces the interrogatories at issue along with Hartford's initial responses to them. He then goes on to argue: “Harford has refused to provide any substantive responsive whatsoever to Fischer's Discovery at issue. Hartford has failed to disclose, answer or respond.” (Doc. No. 198).

*5 Hartford responds that Plaintiff has materially misrepresented its responses to his discovery requests in that he neglects to mention, acknowledge, or otherwise allude to the fact that it had served him with supplemental responses to his interrogatories on January 8, 2021. It further asserts that its supplemental responses to Plaintiff's interrogatories render the motion to compel as it pertains to the interrogatories moot.

In his reply, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was served with supplemental responses on January 8, 2021, that he “failed to notice.” He then goes on to assert that Hartford's supplemental responses were nevertheless deficient and change nothing, incorporating by reference an exhibit in which he elaborates on these alleged deficiencies.

Having read Interrogatory No. 2 along with Hartford's supplemental response to it, the court makes the following observations. First, Plaintiff's assertion that Hartford “refused to provide any substantive responsive” is not accurate. For example, it is apparent from Hartford's supplemental response that it has produced information regarding litigation dating back to 2016 that relates to claims that it handled pursuant to its agreement with US Life. Second, this interrogatory was destined to elicit objection given its expansive scope. Plaintiff asks Hartford to provide him with comprehensive summaries of any and all litigation over disability benefits to which it was a party, asks Hartford to disclose amounts that it paid to settle any of this litigation, and does not confine his request to a specific timeframe. The court agrees with Hartford that this request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. According to the declaration of Cindy Bouchard, a disability claims manager for Defendant United States Life Insurance Company in the City of New York (US Life), Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company took over responsibility for claims administration of US Life's disability claims on June 1, 2016. (Doc. No. 107-2). Hartford, in its supplemental response, disclosed the number of cases to which it has been a party since taking on this responsibility. Insofar as the case(s) identified by Hartford is the only litigation other than the instant case to which it has been named as party in its capacity as US Life's disability claims administrator, the court finds Hartford's supplemental response to be sufficient and will not require further supplementation of it.

The court reaches the same conclusion with respect to Interrogatories 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12. In its supplemental responses, Hartford states that the information sought by Plaintiff is contained in the claim file it previously produced. There does not appear to be any dispute that Hartford produced the claim file, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the claim file does not contain the requested information, and there has been no assertion that Hartford failed to produce the claim file as it is kept in the ordinary course. Consequently, the court finds that Hartford has sufficiently responded to Interrogatory Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12. The court shall next address Interrogatory No. 5.

The court finds Interrogatory No. 5, in which Plaintiff requests Hartford to identify any known federal, state, and local investigation and action regarding its underwriting and claims practices since 2000, to be reasonable. Hartford has responded relevant to its knowledge of any such investigations from 2016 to the present. In need only supplement its response to include 200 to the present.

*6 Turning next to Interrogatory No. 8, the court finds Hartford's response, that it has provided the Services Agreement that defines its role and responsibility with respect to the administration of claims to be sufficient.

Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3 largely mirror Request Nos. 3 and 4 in Plaintiff's second set of Requests for Production. Consequently, the court will address the substance of them below in its discussion of the production requests.

E. Request for Production of Documents

Plaintiff maintains that Hartford has no justification for its refusal to produce unredacted copies of its Service Agreement and Policy and Procedure manuals as requested. In so doing he makes the following assertions. First, his claim for exemplary damages is governed by state statute, which provides in relevant part the following:

N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11. Second, Plaintiff claims that unredacted copy of Hartford's Services Agreement and Hartford's Policies and Procedure Manuals bear directly upon Hartford's administration of his claim as well as the profitability of Hartford's alleged wrongful conduct, which is a factor for the jury to weigh when considering an award for exemplary damages.

Hartford responds that it has disclosed all potentially relevant financial information, i.e., the number of claims under the policy at issue since becoming US Life's claim administrator, what compensation it received from US Life for its work, and how its compensation was calculated. It then goes on to assert that Plaintiff has failed to make a threshold showing that the additional information he is requesting has relevance, that Plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the statutory strictures on evidence pertaining to financial condition and net worth, that the cost for it to produce the additional financial information outweighs any benefit it may have for Plaintiff, and that it would be competitively disadvantaged if a competitor, one of whom is a defendant in this case, had access to information regarding its compensation structure.

*7 Plaintiff's request for production of copies of “any and all Hartford Life claims handling policies, procedure manual(s), or guidelines used or available to Hartford Life” is too broad. This case involves a long-term disability insurance policy, a specific type of policy. Plaintiff's request as drafted arguably encompasses the production of every claims manual and related materials concerning its handling of all claims arising under any insurance policies it has ever administered. Documents used or relied upon by Hartford in the administration of US Life's long-term disability insurance policies are relevant and their benefit to Plaintiff outweighs the burden to Hartford. See Hurley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CIV. 10-4165-KES, 2012 WL 1600796, at *5 (D.S.D. May 7, 2012) (ordering an insurer to produce its claims manual, reasoning that the manual could lead to relevant information and provide context for how claims are handled). Further, the court finds specious the notion that such information constitutes Hartford's “secret sauce,” and that its disclosure may place Hartford at a competitive disadvantage. cf. Rounds v. Hartford, No. 4:20-CV-04010-KES, 2021 WL 4150838, at *8 (D.S.D. Sept. 13, 2021) (taking note of Hartford's concession that “claim manuals” may be discoverable). At issue in this case is Hartford's administration of Plaintiff's claim. How it administers such claims necessarily requires an examination of what guidance it provides in the form of written policies, procedures, and/or guidelines to its employees tasked with this responsibility. The fact that assembling these documents may require some work by Hartford is not a valid reason for denying their production given the facts of this case. See, e.g., Brown Bear v. Cuna Mut. Grp., 266 F.R.D. 310, 320 (D.S.D. 2009) (“Under the facts of this case, the fact that producing requested documents requires work and expense does not mean that such a request is unduly burdensome.”). Accordingly, the court will require Hartford to produce unredacted the policy and procedure manuals that pertain to its administration of the disability policy at issue in this this case.

The court shall next turn to Plaintiff's requests for production of an unredacted copy of the Services Agreement. As noted above, Plaintiff has been provided with a redacted copy of the Services Agreement. (Doc. No. 188-6). Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to an unredacted copy as it discloses the compensation Hartford receives in relation to its administration of disability claims. Hartford takes the position that the Services Agreement discloses much more than that and the redactions were necessary and appropriate.

The redacted Services Agreement was presumably disclosed by US Life in accordance with Rule 26 at the outset of this litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1)(iv). Given how this case has progressed and how the parties have comported themselves, it stands to reason that if US Life did not believe it was obligated by Rule 26 to disclose the Services Agreement, it would not have provided so much as a redacted copy of it to Plaintiff. With that established, the court cannot conclude at this point that information in the Services Agreement pertaining to long-term disability insurance, that has been redacted, has no relevance or could not lead to other relevant and possibly admissible evidence. Consequently, the court will require Hartford to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the Services Agreement including all articles/provisions/schedules pertaining to long-term disability. The protective order in place, or other version of it, can adequately address any concerns regarding confidentiality.

Plaintiff's primary focus in the motion and supporting brief is the Services Agreement and policy and procedure manuals. There is little substantive discussion of Hartford's responses to discovery requests regarding the litigation hold or reviews of Hartford's operations by American General Life Insurance Company, US Life, or a third party. The court finds that Hartford's responses regarding the litigation hold and semi-annual reviews are sufficient.

The Services Agreement applies to life, accidental death and dismemberment, long-term disability, and short term disability policies, among others. (Doc. No. 186-6). Request No. 3 (Set 2) is problematic in that it is not narrowly tailored or limited in scope to claims, income, and profits arising out of or pertaining to long-term disability policies. Rather, it calls for the production of information regarding the administration of any and all claims by Hartford under the Services Agreement and extensive information regarding any and all of Hartford's profits regardless of whether they are attributable to any alleged wrongful conduct.

In his motion, Plaintiff argues that this request is necessary and appropriate, invoking the aforementioned state law regarding exemplary damages. The court is not swayed by Plaintiff's argument and finds this request to be impermissibly large in breadth and scope. The court finds no plausible basis for requiring Hartford to produce, for example, information regarding the number of claims it processed and any income and/or profits it derived from the administration of an accidental death and dismemberment policies pursuant to the Services Agreement.

*8 Without waiving its objection, in response to Request No. 3 (Set 2), Hartford has disclosed to Plaintiff how much it has received for the claims at issue, on what its compensation is based, and the number of claims administered under the policy. The court finds this sufficient and will not require supplementation or additional document production with respect to this request. The court will now turn its attention to Plaintiff's Request No. 4, Set 2 and Hartford's response to it.

4. Request No. 4, Set 2

19-1Request No. 4, Set 2 pertains to documents identifying which categories or types of income from disability claimants US Life and/or Hartford considered when determining “60% from all sources” income. It mirrors Interrogatory No. 2, Set 2. Hartford objected to this request as calling for speculation and conjecture and being overly broad, unduly burdensome, and disproportionate to the needs of the case. It further asserts that the “60% from all sources” provision referenced by Plaintiff had no application to him as his claim was reviewed and adjudicated based on him being residually disabled. It closed stating that the policy applicable to Plaintiff's claim was previously produced.

In the brief filed in support of the instant motion, Plaintiff did not discuss or otherwise reference the “60% from all sources” provision, his request for documentation/guidance with respect to this provision, or Hartford's response to his request. (Doc. No. 198). Rather, he asserts generally that Hartford produced nothing.

In its response, Hartford reiterates its bases for objecting to this request. (Doc. No. 203). It further maintains that it responded to this request by referring Plaintiff to the governing policy, which sets forth what types of income are subject to reduction and how reductions for income will be applied to disability benefits.

The court finds that Hartford has sufficiently responded to this discovery request. Consequently, it will require anything more from Hartford with respect to his request.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 194) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Hartford shall produce the information as directed above by December 22, 2021. No costs or fees shall be awarded to either party in connection with the instant motion. As it appears that the Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition came to a premature end because of the discovery dispute forming the basis for this motion, the court shall permit Plaintiff to reconvene his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition with the following caveats. First, the deposition shall be limited to four (4) hours, unless the parties agree otherwise. Second, the deponent and counsel may appear and participate via video conference. Third, the deadline to complete this deposition is January 7, 2022, unless the parties can agree to a later date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 8th day of December, 2021.