*1 Plaintiff Merissa Niewzal has filed ten motions to compel discovery -- one motion to compel further production of documents and one motion to compel further interrogatory responses against each of the five Defendants. Specifically, on March 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a separate Motion to Compel Production of Documents against Defendants City of Simi Valley (the “City”) (Dkt. No. 64); Christopher Hahesy (Dkt. No. 65); Michael Heller (Dkt. No. 66); Austen Schlecht (Dkt. No. 67); and Kevin Vanfleet (collectively, with Hahesy, Heller and Schlecht, the “Individual Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 68). The Parties filed a Joint Stipulation in connection with each Motion (the “Document Production Joint Stipulation” or “Motion”), including the declaration of Jarrod M. Wilfert in support of each Motion and the declaration of Jill Williams in opposition to each Motion. The Motion against the City seeks $4,400 in sanctions, jointly and severally, against the City “and the other four individual officer defendants, as well as their counsel of record ....” (Dkt. No. 64 at 10). The Motions against the Individual Defendants seek sanctions in the amount $6,600, jointly and severally, against the Individual Defendants and their counsel. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 65 at 9). Defendants in turn seek unspecified sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel. (See, e.g., id. at 12). On March 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an omnibus Supplemental Memorandum in support of all of her Document Production Motions. (Dkt. No. 72). On the same date, Defendants filed an omnibus Supplemental Memorandum in opposition to the Document Production Motions. (Dkt. No. 71).

On March 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed Motions to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories against the City (Dkt. No. 76); Hahesy (Dkt. No. 77); Heller (Dkt. No. 78); Schlecht (Dkt. No. 79); and Vanfleet. (Dkt. No. 80). The Parties filed a Joint Stipulation in connection with each Motion (the “Interrogatory Joint Stipulation” or “Motion”), including the declaration of Jarrod M. Wilfert in support of each Motion and the declaration of Jill Williams in opposition to each Motion. The Motion against the City seeks $1,815 in sanctions, jointly and severally, against the City and its counsel. (Dkt. No. 76 at 11-12). The Motions against the Individual Defendants seek $6,600 in sanctions, jointly and severally, against the Individual Defendants and their counsel. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 77 at 8-9). Defendants seek unspecified sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel. (See, e.g., id. at 10). All of the Motions are highly repetitive in content and argument.

On March 29, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the Document Production Motions and the Interrogatory Motions. For the reasons stated below and at the hearing, the Motion to Compel Production of Documents against Hahesy, (Dkt. No. 65), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Similarly, the Motion to Compel Further Responses To Interrogatories against Hahesy, (Dkt. No. 77), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counsel met and conferred during a break at the hearing and resolved their disputes concerning the eight other pending discovery motions, (Dkt. Nos. 64, 66, 67, 68, 76, 78, 79, 80), which are therefore DENIED as MOOT. All of the Parties' respective requests for sanctions are DENIED. Defendants[1] shall serve updated discovery responses and produce responsive documents, to the extent that they exist, as required by this Order and as directed at the hearing within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

A. Motion To Compel Production Of Documents

*2 Plaintiff raises three primary substantive objections to Defendants' responses to her Requests for Production of Documents. (Dkt. No. 65 at 3). First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' responses did not comply with Rule 34(b)(2)(B), which requires a responding party either to affirm that the inspection will be permitted or to state with specificity the grounds and reasons for objecting to the request. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff argues that the responses are “littered” with “boilerplate, meritless objections which Defendant uses to withhold relevant and discoverable documents,” and only vaguely offer to produce “a few documents” “in the spirit of cooperation.” (Id. at 3-4). Although Plaintiff's Motion lacks specific evidence of wrongful withholding, she argues that there is a “clear indication” that Defendants are not producing all responsive documents. Third, Plaintiff contends that many of Defendants' privilege assertions, in particular the right of privacy, have been waived by the filing of this action and the public nature of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims. (Id. at 5).

Procedurally, Plaintiff also contends that Defendants failed to comply in good faith with the meet and confer requirements in Local Rule 37-1. (Id. at 3). According to Plaintiff, her counsel asked for a meet and confer on February 8, but the letter was “ignored.” After counsel sent a second letter, Defendants' counsel claimed to be unavailable until February 22, fourteen days after the initial letter was sent. (Id.). Plaintiff further complains that during the conference of counsel, Defendants' counsel refused to withdraw objections and promised to produce a privilege log, but failed to do so.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Motion is in bad faith. According to Defendants, Plaintiff unreasonably delayed addressing discovery issues,[2] then, on the eve of the discovery cut off, instead of extending routine professional courtesies to afford the Parties the opportunity to resolve the instant disputes informally, Plaintiff “barged” ahead with multiple Motions. (Id. at 6).

Defendants also claim that they produced a privilege log to Plaintiff's counsel.[3] (Id.). According to Defendants, all responsive documents were produced and they are withholding nothing from Plaintiff, with limited exceptions. (Id.). Defendants defend their assertion of objections on the ground that Plaintiff's requests were in fact vague and ambiguous. (Id. at 7).

Defendants maintain that the only documents withheld were (1) correspondence between the Simi Valley Policy Department and the City Attorney's office after Plaintiff filed her claim; (2) the officers' personnel files and (3) materials pertaining to a single internal affairs investigation completely unrelated to this lawsuit. (Id.). Defendants emphasize that the Individual Defendants' personnel files are irrelevant because Plaintiff is not raising a Monell claim against the City for municipal liability or a claim for supervisory liability against any of the Individual Defendants.[4] (Id.). Instead, the only claims against the City are for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, “which are premised on the City's alleged vicarious liability for the conduct of its officers.” Defendants contend that police personnel records are not relevant to these claims. Id.

*3 Plaintiff contends that sanctions are warranted in light of Defendants' boilerplate objections, failure to produce a privilege log, and refusal to supplement their responses. (Id. at 8). Defendants offer evidence of their cooperation in the meet and confer process and argue that Plaintiff is responsible for the failure to resolve the instant disputes informally. (Id. at 10-11). Defendants further maintain that sanctions are not warranted because their responses and objections to the discovery requests were “substantially justified.” (Id. at 11). However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's failure to participate in attempts to resolve the instant disputes formally, and the frivolous nature of Motion, warrant an award of sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel. (Id.).

B. Motion To Compel Further Responses To Interrogatories

Plaintiff's contentions regarding Defendants' interrogatory responses are nearly identical to those asserted in the Document Production Motion. In addition, however, Plaintiff claims that “not one of Defendant's ‘substantive’ responses to the Interrogatories provides a complete, non-evasive response.” (Dkt. No. 77 at 2). Plaintiff also argues that “some” of the privileges asserted by Defendants are state law privileges that do not extend to this action. (Id. at 3).

Similarly, Defendants' Opposition to the Interrogatory Motion largely mirrors the grounds raised in Opposition to the Document Production Motion. In addition, however, Defendants provide further details about their cooperation with and participation in the meet and confer process. (Id. at 4-6). Substantively, Defendants note that they responded to all but two of the twelve interrogatories at issue, and the two interrogatories to which they did not respond “sought information concerning the officers' personnel history -- information that is privileged and not discoverable in this lawsuit in light of the fact that there are not claims for direct municipal or supervisorial liability.” (Id. at 7) (citing Gates v. Rivera, 993 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1993), and Segura v. City of Reno, 116 F.R.D. 42, 44 (D. Nev. 1987)).

The Parties' arguments regarding their respective requests for sanctions in the Interrogatory Motion echo the arguments in the Document Production Motion. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 65 at 8-12; Dkt. No. 77 at 11-13).

A. Scope Of Permissible Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

The Ninth Circuit instructs that “wide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for truth.” Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 54 F.3d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, “[r]elevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998); see also E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 431–32 (D. Nev. 2006) (same).

Nonetheless, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. “A court can limit discovery if it determines, among other things, that the discovery is: (1) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (2) obtainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, 235 F.R.D. 553, 558 (D. Conn. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, as one court explained,

Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016) (quoting John Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6 (Dec. 31, 2015) (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, “[t]he district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” Favale, 235 F.R.D. at 558. The party resisting discovery bears the burden of demonstrating that its objections should be sustained. Id.

B. Official Information Privilege

Where, as here, “there are federal question claims and pendent state law claims present, the federal law of privilege applies.”[5] Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 501; Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where ... the same evidence relates to both federal and state law claims, ‘we are not bound by [state] law’ on privilege. Rather, federal privilege law governs.”) (quoting Agster, 422 F.3d at 839).

“Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information” such as government personnel files. Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990). To determine whether the information sought is privileged, “courts conduct a case by case balancing analysis, in which the interests of the party seeking discovery are weighed against the interests of the governmental entity asserting the privilege.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 612 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-34). Several courts have noted that this balancing analysis raises special considerations in civil rights suits against police departments. See e.g., Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 612; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 660 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Specifically, in weighing the competing interests of the parties, courts should consider that “the policies that inform federal civil rights laws are profoundly important” and that “confidence in our system of justice ... is threatened when relevant evidence is not made available ....” Id. Furthermore, “in civil rights cases against police departments in general, it is not likely that plaintiffs can obtain information of comparable quality from any other source.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616. Accordingly, in such cases, the balancing is “moderately pre-weighted in favor of disclosure.” Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 661; Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 300 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (allowing discovery of police department personnel files, including personnel complaints, training records, and internal affairs investigation files).

Before the court engages in the balancing analysis, however, the party asserting the official information privilege must make a “substantial threshold showing.” Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 669. To make the threshold showing, Defendants must submit a declaration to the court from the head of the department having control over the records and must satisfy certain requirements. Chism v. County of San Bernardino, 159 F.R.D. 531, 532-33 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The declaration must include the following:

Chism, 159 F.R.D. at 533; Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 230-31 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 301. In addition to these factors, “[a] strong affidavit would also describe how the plaintiff could acquire information of equivalent value from other sources without undue economic burden.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613.

C. Privacy

“Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Id. at 616 (citing, inter alia, Breed v. United States Dist. Ct. for Northern District, 542 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1976), and Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992)). “Unlike a privilege, the right of privacy is not an absolute bar to discovery. Rather, courts balance the need for the information against the claimed privacy right.” Lind v. United States, 2014 WL 2930486, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2014); see also E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 395 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he right to privacy is not a recognized privilege or absolute bar to discovery, but instead is subject to the balancing of needs.”); Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616 (“Resolution of a privacy objection or request for a protective order requires a balancing of the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.”). While courts have recognized that privacy concerns raised by the disclosure of police files are “not inconsequential,” these privacy interests “must be balanced against the great weight afforded to federal law in civil rights cases against police departments.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 660).

A. Requests For Production Of Documents

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), a party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Rule 34(b) requires the requesting party to describe the items to be produced with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 219 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 649-50 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Though what qualifies as ‘reasonabl[y] particular’ surely depends at least in part on the circumstances of each case, a discovery request should be sufficiently definite and limited in scope that it can be said ‘to apprise a person of ordinary intelligence what documents are required and [to enable] the court ... to ascertain whether the requested documents have been produced.’ ”) (quoting Wright & Miller, 8A Federal Practice and Procedure § 2211, at 415). “ ‘All-encompassing demands’ that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 256 F.R.D. 151, 157 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

*6 Following a reasonable investigation to locate responsive materials, a responding party must serve a written response to each request either (1) stating that the materials requested will be produced, in whole or in part; (2) affirming that no responsive documents exist in the party's possession, custody or control, or (3) posing an objection to the request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). Pursuant to the revisions to the Federal Rules effective December 1, 2015, if objections are posed, the “objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). The 2015 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34 explain:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, Advisory Committee Notes (2015 Amendment).

A proper written response should also provide sufficient information for the requesting party, and the court, to be satisfied that the responding party conducted an adequate investigation for responsive materials. As one court has explained:

Atcherley v. Clark, 2014 WL 4660842, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2014) (internal citations omitted); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate objections are insufficient to assert a privilege).

However, a court cannot order a party to produce documents that do not exist. A party's mere suspicion that additional documents must exist is an insufficient basis to file a motion to compel. See Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329 (D. D.C. 2003). Rather, the moving party must have a colorable basis for its belief that relevant, responsive documents exist and are being improperly withheld. See Carter v. Dawson, 2010 WL 4483814, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (defendants' representation that they are unable to locate responsive documents precludes the grant of a motion to compel “unless Plaintiff can identify a specific document that Defendants have withheld”); Ayala v. Tapia, 1991 WL 241873, at *2 (D. D.C. Nov. 1, 1991) (denying motion to compel where moving party could not identify withheld documents).

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 1 is DENIED.

Plaintiff admitted that she has received documents in response to this RFP, but argued that certain documents were improperly redacted solely because they involved personnel matters. The Court agrees. Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 2 is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants shall serve updated written responses and unredacted copies of the documents submitted in response to RFP No. 2 within twenty-one days of the date of this Order. However, Defendants may continue to redact social security numbers, phone numbers, and residence addresses from any materials produced.

Defendants explained that all relevant departmental policies potentially responsive to RFP No. 3 were produced in response to RFP No. 2. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 3 is DENIED.

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 4 is DENIED.

Defendants do not argue that the information of the type sought by RFP Nos. 5, 6 and 7, which seek evidence of prior misconduct and complaints in the Individual Defendants' personnel files, is never discoverable in an excessive force case. Rather, Defendants contend that the information sought by these requests is relevant only when there is a Monell claim against a municipality alleging a policy and practice of excessive force, or a claim of supervisory liability against an individual defendant. Defendants note that Plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants are based on their own actions that allegedly directly caused Plaintiff's injuries, not on any purported failure to train or supervise, and that the only claims against the City are for emotional distress, for which the City would be liable vicariously for its employees' torts. See, e.g., Blanco v. County of Kings, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2015 WL 6689529, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (under California Tort Claims Act, local public entities are vicariously liable for torts committed by their employees acting within the scope of employment to the extent that the employee would be liable in his or her personal capacity) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 815.2, 820(a)). According to Defendants, in cases where, as here, individual or vicarious liability are the only grounds alleged, evidence of past misconduct or complaints is simply character evidence, which is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1).

*8 As a preliminary matter, as stated at the hearing, it appears that that the “official information” declaration of Chief Mitch McCann presented to the Court by Defendants during oral argument may satisfy the threshold criteria, as identified in Chism and other cases, for the assertion of the official information privilege. Pending the filing of the declaration for the Court's formal consideration, as directed below, the Court shall tentatively address the substance of the Parties' dispute over the records sought by RFP Nos. 5-7.

The Court agrees with Defendants, as it found at the hearing and as counsel for Plaintiff stipulated, that the information sought by RFP Nos. 5-7 is irrelevant to the emotional distress claims against the City, and therefore DENIES the Motion to the extent it seeks further responses from the City to RFP Nos. 5-7. However, the Court disagrees with Defendants' contention that the information is not discoverable even as to the claims against the Individual Defendants.

As previously discussed, a party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance for purposes of discovery is construed very broadly to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.” Chavez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 206 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, Rule 26(b)(1), as amended, specifically provides that “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Many courts have emphasized the different standards governing the determination of whether information is discoverable, as opposed to admissible. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 343, 349-50 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[T]he concept of relevance is different for purposes of discovery than for admissibility at trial ....”); Phoenix Sols. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 F.R.D. 568, 582-83 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] appears to be conflating the standard for relevance as a discovery threshold with the standard for the admissibility of evidence at trial. ‘Relevancy for discovery is flexible and has a broader meaning than admissibility at trial.’ ”) (quoting Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981)). “Discovery should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of this action.” Jones v. Commander, Kansas Army Ammunitions Plant, 147 F.R.D. 248, 250 (D. Kan. 1993); see also Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Relevant information for purposes of discovery is information ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ”) (citation omitted); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 211 n.1 (D. Kan. 2002) (“[T]he touchstone to the relevancy of documents requested is not that such discovery will result in evidence which is, or even may be, admissible at trial, but rather that such discovery is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).

Applying the distinction between discoverability and admissibility, “courts have found that ‘prior suits or disciplinary proceedings' or ‘prior civilian complaints made against the defendants and incidents of excessive force by individual defendants' to be discoverable when a plaintiff raises claims of the use of force, and complaints of other misconduct to be discoverable when sufficiently similar to claims in the complaint.” Chatman v. Felker, 2009 WL 173515, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (quoting Cox v. McClellan, 174 F.R.D. 32, 34 (W.D. N.Y. 1997), and citing cases). “Even if the material ultimately is not admissible, information about prior similar complaints may lead to admissible information or may be relevant to credibility.” Chatman, 2009 WL 173515, at *5 (citing Renshaw v. Ravert, 82 F.R.D. 361, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1979)). As one court has explained, evidence in a police officer's personnel file of citizen complaints alleging excessive force “has been found to be quite relevant because they may reveal the defendant officers' credibility, motive and patterns of behavior.” Zackery v. Stockton Police Dep't, 2007 WL 1655632, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2007) (citing Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 615, and Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 229 (S.D. Cal. 1993)); see also Jones v. Lundy, 2007 WL 214580, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2007) (granting in part motion to compel production of personnel files in excessive force case because, even though evidence showing defendants' propensity for violence may be inadmissible, “character evidence may be admissible for other purposes and plaintiff is entitled to discoverable information”).

*9 In contrast, the vast majority of the cases cited by Defendants address admissibility, not discoverability. See, e.g., Gates, 993 F.2d at 700-01 (trial court in excessive force case improperly allowed officer to testify that he had never before discharged his weapon); Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming in excessive force case trial court's exclusion of evidence of “police dog attacks on others” from phase of trial addressing individual officer liability); Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing jury verdict in civil rights case where defense was improperly permitted to question plaintiff about his sexual orientation to show that plaintiff acted in conformity with his character); Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 2012 WL 1641712, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (determining, in ruling on motion in limine, that evidence of officers' prior misconduct and citizen complaints is inadmissible to prove the officers' liability, but may be relevant to Monell claim); Brown v. Gutierrez, 2006 WL 3065574, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2006) (ruling, on motion in limine, that evidence of specific incidents of past misconduct for purpose attacking the witness's character for truthfulness is inadmissible). As such, these cases are not persuasive authority as to whether the information sought is discoverable.

Two cases cited by Defendants do, however, involve the discoverability of law enforcement officers' personnel files and internal affairs investigation reports. In Segura v. City of Reno, the court summarily concluded that the “past conduct” evidence requested by plaintiff “could only show a propensity for excessive force” and was “the sort of ‘conduct in conformity with character’ evidence which § 404(b) prohibits.” Segura, 116 F.R.D. at 44. The court therefore determined that the requested “personnel files need not be produced ....” Id. However, the Segura court appears to have conflated discoverability with admissibility, and did not address the possibility that even inadmissible information may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

In Demouchette v. Dart, 2011 WL 679914 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2011), a deliberate indifference case also cited by Plaintiff, the court ordered that discovery involving plaintiff's claims against individual officers, which were limited in scope, be bifurcated from the discovery involving plaintiff's more expansive Monell claims. Id. at *10. However, in Demouchette, the individual and Monell claims addressed different issues entirely. The individual claims turned on whether the officers actually had “a subjective awareness of [plaintiff's medical] needs,” while the Monell claims focused on the County's alleged policy of understaffing. Id. at *9. The Demouchette Court concluded that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by “bifurcation and a stay on discovery” because examination of defendants' personnel files “to determine if CCDC's employees had proper training” was not necessary to proving that the defendants were subjectively aware of plaintiff's needs. (Id. at 11). Here, Plaintiff is seeking production of the Individual Defendants' personnel files for purposes other than the Defendants' training.

The Court is persuaded by the decisions finding that in excessive force cases, law enforcement officers' personnel files are discoverable to the extent that they contain evidence of past misconduct and complaints related to the allegations in the complaint, even if the claims at issue do not allege municipal or supervisory liability. However, RFP Nos. 5-7, as phrased, are overbroad, as they seek information about “any disciplinary action,” “any investigation,” and “any allegation of misconduct,” which could well involve matters with no relation whatsoever to the officers' alleged use of excessive force. Furthermore, the requests as phrased are not limited by time. The Court is unable at present to determine whether the materials sought by RFP Nos. 5-7 contain any information relevant to the particular allegations in this case, and whether Plaintiff's need for whatever information does exist outweighs the Individual Defendants' privacy interest and the government's interest in maintaining official information as confidential. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Defendants, within seven days of the date of this Order, to deliver directly to the chambers of the undersigned Magistrate Judge copies of documents from the Individual Defendants' personnel files for the last three years for in camera review to the extent that the files contain information about any disciplinary actions, investigations, or allegations of misconduct involving the Individual Defendants. If no such information exists, counsel for Defendants shall submit an in camera declaration, stating that a reasonable search was performed and no responsive documents exist for a particular Defendant. Concurrently with delivery of the hard copy documents or declaration to the Court, Defendants shall file a “Notice of Submission of Declaration and/or Documents for In Camera Review.” The Notice shall not include copies of counsel's Declaration or the documents submitted for review. However, Defendants shall attach to the Notice the “official information” Declaration of Chief Mitch McCann, which was presented to the Court and to counsel for Plaintiff at the hearing. See Savoy v. Davis, 2016 WL 589696, at *6 (M.D. La. Feb. 11, 2016) (ordering defendants in excessive force case to produce personnel files, including use of force reports, for in camera review).

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 8 is DENIED.

Defendants stated at the hearing that a prior police report concerning Plaintiff may exist and agreed to produce it. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 9 is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants shall serve updated written responses and any documents potentially responsive to RFP No. 9 that have not already been produced within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 10 is DENIED.

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 11 is DENIED.

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 12 is DENIED.

Defendants represented at the hearing that all documents in their possession, custody or control potentially responsive to this RFP have been produced. In light of Defendants' representation, Plaintiff was unable to identify any additional documents that the Court could compel Defendants to produce. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to RFP No. 13 is DENIED.

B. Interrogatories

Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories as a discovery device in federal courts. The purpose of interrogatories is to limit and clarify the issues for the parties in preparation for further trial proceedings. See Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 587 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Citibank, N.A. v. Savage (In re Savage), 303 B.R. 766, 773 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003) (“The purpose of interrogatories is to allow the parties to prepare for trial and inform the parties what evidence they must meet.”). Like all discovery requests, interrogatories must be “reasonably calculated” to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting generally that district courts “need not condone the use of discovery to engage in ‘fishing expedition[s]’ ”).

*11 Overly broad and unduly burdensome interrogatories “are an abuse of the discovery process” and are routinely denied. See, e.g., Lucero v. Valdez, 240 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D. N.M. 2007) (interrogatories requiring responding party to state “each and every fact” supporting the party's contentions impermissibly overbroad). Furthermore, the court is not obligated to impose limiting constructions on interrogatories that are overbroad, vague, or seek irrelevant information, but may simply deny the request to compel further responses. See, e.g., Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC, 2012 WL 1633178, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2012) (declining to “rewrite” overbroad interrogatories or order supplemental response); Jones v. Home Federal Bank, 2010 WL 996476, at *4 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2010) (same).

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 1 is DENIED.

Defendants admitted at the hearing that their initial disclosures, upon which they relied in responding to Interrogatory No. 2, may not have included all of the individuals involved in Plaintiff's criminal case or all of her medical care providers. Plaintiff is entitled to the names of all relevant persons of whom Defendants may be aware with information material to this litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED with respect to Interrogatory No. 2. Defendants shall serve updated written responses to Interrogatory No. 2 within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

Although Defendants responded to this Interrogatory by referring to their production of documents, as permitted by Rule 33(d), the response was general and failed to specify the documents “in sufficient detail to enable [Plaintiff] to locate and identify them as readily as [Defendants] could.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 3 is GRANTED. Defendants shall serve updated written responses to Interrogatory No. 3, identifying by bates number the documents in which the information requested may be found, within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

Although Defendants responded to this Interrogatory by referring to their production of documents, as permitted by Rule 33(d), the response was general and failed to specify the documents “in sufficient detail to enable [Plaintiff] to locate and identify them as readily as [Defendants] could.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 4 is GRANTED. Defendants shall serve updated written responses to Interrogatory No. 4, identifying by bates number the documents in which the information requested may be found, within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

The Court's discussion about the discoverability of information in a police officer's personnel file in connection with RFP Nos. 5-7 applies to Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 6 as well. In addition, the information sought by Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 6 is either duplicative of or inextricably intertwined with the information sought by RFP Nos. 5-7. In light of the Court's Order requiring Defendants to provide copies of documents potentially responsive to RFP Nos. 5-7 for in camera review, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 6 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewing the Motion as to those two Interrogatories following the issuance of the Court's Order determining whether any of the documents submitted for in camera review must be produced to Plaintiff.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 7. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 7 is DENIED.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 8. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 8 is DENIED.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 9. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 9 is DENIED.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 12. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 12 is DENIED.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 16. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 16 is DENIED.

Defendants' response adequately responds to Interrogatory No. 17. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 17 is DENIED.

C. Sanctions

Rule 37 provides in relevant part:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Conversely, if the discovery motion is denied, the court must require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing the motion. Rule 37(a)(5)(B). Finally, if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Rule 37(a)(5)(C). However, if the non-prevailing party can demonstrate “substantial justification” for its motion, nondisclosure, or opposition, Rule 37 provides that the court must deny sanctions. Id. Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(ii).

*13 Although the Court granted in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and her Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories, the great majority of the requests raised in the Motions were denied. Indeed, Plaintiff's basis for bringing the Motions, at least in part, appears to have been a vague suspicion that additional documents must exist, despite defense counsel's representations that all relevant, non-privileged documents had been produced, or a general dissatisfaction with interrogatory responses that may not have answered Plaintiff's question in the way Plaintiff would have liked. Neither of these is a proper ground for bringing a motion to compel. At the same time, Defendants' repeated assertion of numerous boilerplate objections understandably gave rise to concerns that the productions or responses were not complete. Accordingly, the Court declines to award sanctions to either party. The Parties' respective requests for sanctions are therefore DENIED.

For the reasons stated above and at the hearing, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents against Defendant Hahesy (Dkt. No. 65) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses To Interrogatories against Defendant Hahesy (Dkt. No. 77) is similarly GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All of the remaining Motions to Compel Production of Documents (Dkt. Nos. 64, 66, 67, 68) and Motions to Compel Further Responses To Interrogatories (Dkt. Nos. 76, 78, 79, 80) are DENIED as MOOT. The Parties' respective requests for sanctions are DENIED. Defendants shall serve updated discovery responses and produce responsive documents, to the extent that they exist, as required by this Order within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.

Additionally, within seven days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall deliver directly to the chambers of the undersigned Magistrate Judge for in camera review copies of documents from the Individual Defendants' personnel files for the last three years to the extent that the documents contain information about any disciplinary actions, investigations, or allegations of misconduct involving the Individual Defendants. If no such documents exist, counsel for Defendants shall submit an in camera Declaration as described above. Concurrently with delivery of the hard copy documents to the Court, Defendants shall file a “Notice of Submission of Declaration and/or Documents for In Camera Review.” The Notice shall not include copies of counsel's Declaration or the documents submitted for review. However, Defendants shall attach to the Notice the “official information” Declaration of Chief Mitch McCann, which was presented to the Court and to counsel for Plaintiff at the hearing.

Although the discovery requests and responses cited in this Order are taken from the Motions filed against Hahesy, the Court will refer to “Defendants” in the plural because the Parties' arguments as to each separate Defendant on both sides of the instant discovery disputes are largely the same. Furthermore, although the Court is dismissing as moot the Motions filed against the Defendants other than Hahesy in light of the agreements reached by the Parties at the hearing, it shall be understood that where Hahesy is ordered to serve supplemental discovery responses or produce additional documents, the other Defendants shall do the same, to the extent consistent with the Parties' agreements.

Plaintiff served the discovery at issue on September 23, 2015. Defendants served responses on November 13, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 77 at 9). The Document Production Motions were filed on March 8, 2016.

Attached as Exhibit C to the Williams Declaration is an email exchange between counsel. According to that exchange, it appears that Defendants produced a privilege log on March 1, 2016. (See Williams Decl. ¶ 13 & Exh. C, at ECF/CM page nos. 18, 22-23). Because the exhibits attached to Williams' Declaration are not consecutively paginated, the Court refers to the ECF/CM page numbers on the docketed version of the exhibits.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Pursuant to Monell and its progeny, a local government is liable in a section 1983 action only if the plaintiff can establish that the municipality or county sued “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation he suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95). In Monell, the Supreme Court specifically rejected governmental liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94.

The operative Second Amended Complaint raises civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force and denial of medical care, with pendent state law tort claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See generally Dkt. No. 52).

All RFP references are to the set of requests for production of documents propounded on Hahesy, as reflected in the Joint Stipulation at Dkt. No. 65.

All interrogatory references are to the set of interrogatories propounded on Hahesy, as reflected in the Joint Stipulation at Dkt. No. 77.