*1 Before the Court is the Motion for Objecting to Magistrate Judge's Rulings; and Motion to Request the District Judge to Rule Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Motion”) filed by Plaintiff Bo Zou (“Plaintiff”). Dkt. No. 76. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, Plaintiff requests the Court to modify Magistrate Judge Jodi F. Jayne's Order entered July 9, 2020. See Dkt. No. 70. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition. Dkt. No. 87. Plaintiff submitted a Reply. Dkt. No. 98.

Judge Jayne ruled on Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Related to Plaintiff's Email to ICC [Dkt. No. 34], Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider [Dkt. No. 38], Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing and Translator [Dkt. No. 45], Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and for Sanctions [Dkt. No. 59], Defendant's Motion for Entry of Protective Order [Dkt. No. 44] and Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to Comply with Order [Dkt. No. 50]. Dkt. No. 70. These motions largely concern discovery matters. Plaintiff contends Judge Jayne's order was contrary to law and clearly erroneous necessitating intervention from this Court.

Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to file objections to a magistrate judge's non-dispositive order within fourteen (14) days after being served with the order. “The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “The district court must defer to the magistrate judge's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997).

“To overturn the magistrate judge's decision as clearly erroneous under Rule 72(a), the district court must have ‘a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Sartori v. Susan C Little & Assoc., P.A., No. CIV 12-0515, 2013 WL 4401383, at *2 (D.N.M. July 30, 2013) (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988) (“to be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong ....”). Under the “contrary to law” standard, the district court conducts a plenary review of the magistrate judge's legal determinations, setting aside the magistrate judge's order if it applied an incorrect legal standard. Sartori, 2013 WL 4401383, at *2. “The burden of proving that the magistrate's discovery ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law is a heavy one, and lies squarely on the party seeking reconsideration of the order.” Hildebrand v. Steck Manufacturing Company, Inc., No. 02-WY-1125, 2005 WL 8160065, at *3 (D.Colo. Oct. 5, 2005) (citations omitted). “In sum, it is extremely difficult to justify alteration of the magistrate judge's nondispositive actions by the district judge.” Id. (citations omitted).

I. Discovery Rulings

*2 Plaintiff argues a number of the discovery rulings entered by Judge Jayne were clearly erroneous and contrary to law. “A district court has substantial discretion in handling discovery requests under Rule 26(b).” Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Group Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010). “Control of discovery is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial courts ....” Punt v. Kelly Services, 862 F.3d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez v. Schock Transfer & Warehouse Co., 789 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1986)). “Broad discovery is not without limits and the trial court is given wide discretion in balancing the needs and rights of both plaintiff and defendant.” Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In conformity with Section 636(b)(1)(A), the Local Rules of this Court provide: “unless otherwise directed by a district judge, disposition of all discovery matters shall be by order of the magistrate judge. Magistrate judge's orders shall remain in full force and effect as an order of the Court until reversed or modified by a district judge.” LCvR 37.2(a). In this case, the district judge has not ordered otherwise. “[A] magistrate judge has broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive discovery disputes and a district court generally grants the magistrate judge great deference and overrules the magistrate's determination only if this discretion is clearly abused.” Cuenca v. University of Kansas, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228 (D. Kan. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, the Court has the inherent authority to control its docket. United Steelworkers of America v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., 322 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003).

First, Plaintiff takes issue with Judge Jayne's refusal to sanction Defendant for obtaining and filing an email Plaintiff sent to a third party. Dkt. No. 76 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends the email is protected by copyright law, is inadmissible and Judge Jayne failed to make a ruling concerning Defendant's copyright infringement. The Court notes that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is based upon allegedly unlawful employment practices. Dkt. No. 13. Plaintiff does not allege a claim for copyright infringement, and even if he did, it would not be proper for Judge Jayne to consider the merits of his claims in ruling on discovery motions. Additionally, the admissibility of the email Plaintiff takes issue with is not of concern during pre-trial, discovery matters. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and Fed. R. Evid. 402. Furthermore, Judge Jayne expressly considered Plaintiff's position in her Order and stated, “[t]he Court finds no legal violations or otherwise sanctionable conduct by Defendant in obtaining the email from ICC or filing it for the Court's consideration.” Dkt. No. 70 at 1. The Court agrees. Judge Jayne's ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Imposing Sanctions on Defendant for Copyright Infringement and Providing “Made Up” Evidence and Allegations [Dkt. No. 34] was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

*3 Next, Plaintiff contends Judge Jayne failed to consider his evidence in rendering her decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider [Dkt. No. 38]. Dkt. No. 76 at 3. Plaintiff steadfastly contends Defendant has engaged in discovery misconduct and misled the Court. “Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). “Thus, a motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.” Id. Judge Jayne concluded none of these grounds were present and granting Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider was unwarranted. Dkt. No. 70 at 1-2. Plaintiff clearly believes that Judge Jayne has misapprehended the facts or his position. However, Judge Jayne has expressly considered Plaintiff's position that the Defendant has engaged in discovery misconduct. Dkt. No. 70 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 109 at 5. Therefore, the Court concludes Judge Jayne's decision denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider [Dkt. No. 38] was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Plaintiff argues Judge Jayne's entry of a protective order was “without good cause” and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Dkt. No. 76 at 6-7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see also Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 829-30. Judge Jayne expressly ruled that “a blanket protective order will facilitate discovery and the flow of information at this stage of the proceedings.” Dkt. No. 70 at 3. The Court concludes Judge Jayne's reasons constitute “good cause.” Additionally, the Court has broad discretion to control discovery and its docket. Murphy, 619 F.3d at 1164; United Steelworkers of America, 322 F.3d at 1227. Plaintiff has not carried his burden to establish Judge Jayne's order on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order [Dkt. No. 44] was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with Judge Jayne's order giving Defendant additional time to supplement its production of documents. Dkt. No. 76 at 7. Generally, documents must be produced within thirty (30) days of being served the request for production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). However, the Court may order a “shorter or longer time.” Id. Furthermore, the Court has broad discretion to control discovery and its docket. Murphy, 619 F.3d at 1164; United Steelworkers of America, 322 F.3d at 1227. Plaintiff fails to articulate how Judge Jayne's order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

II. Motion for Hearing and Translator

Plaintiff contends Judge Jayne erred in not providing him with a hearing or a translator. Dkt. No. 76 at 5. Plaintiff is not entitled to a hearing. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 provides, “[b]y rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 78(b). The Local Rule of this Court states, “[o]ral arguments or hearings on motions or objections will not be conducted unless ordered by the Court.” LCvR 78.1. Further, Plaintiff does not cite any authority that, as a civil litigant, he is entitled to a translator provided by the Court. Plaintiff has not demonstrated Judge Jayne's failure to hold a hearing or provide a translator was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

III. Motion to Strike and for Sanctions

Next, Plaintiff takes issue with Judge Jayne's refusal to sanction Defendant for various alleged misconduct, including failing to timely serve Plaintiff with a response. Dkt. No. 76 at 6. The decision to issue sanctions is within the discretion of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A) (the court may order sanctions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (the court may impose sanctions); see also Klintworth v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-178, 2020 WL 5651651, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 22, 2020) (noting the Court's “discretionary ability to sanction parties”). Plaintiff fails to articulate how Judge Jayne's failure to impose sanctions on Defendant was an abuse of her discretion. The Court finds Judge Jayne did not abuse her discretion in declining to issue sanctions. Judge Jayne's order ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and for Sanctions [Dkt. No. 59] was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

*4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Objecting to Magistrate Judge's Rulings; And Motion to Request the District Judge to Rule Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Dkt. No. 76] is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case remains stayed pending resolution of this Court's ruling on Defendant's Motion for Sanctions [Dkt. No. 112]. See Dkt. No. 130.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2020.