*1 This case was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).[1] Before the court are the following motions: (1) Defendants ATI Titanium LLC (“ATI”) and Allegheny Technologies Incorporated's (“Allegheny”) (together, “Defendants”) short form motion regarding subpoenas, for sanctions, and request for order to show cause (“motion for sanctions”);[2] (2) Plaintiff US Magnesium, LLC (“US Mag” or “Plaintiff”) and non-party The Renco Group's (“Renco”) short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Tanner, LLC (“Tanner”);[3] (3) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”);[4] (4) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to John Binko;[5] (5) Plaintiff, Renco, John Binko, and Ira Rennert's short form discovery motion for protective order to quash depositions of John Binko and Ira Rennert;[6] (6) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to Crowe, LLP (“Crowe”) re: The Renco Group documents;[7] (7) Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: financial documents and discovery;[8] (8) Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Renco Group, Inc.;[9] (9) Renco's motion to quash subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and joinder in Plaintiff's motion for protective order;[10] and (10) Defendants’ short form discovery motion to compel responses to interrogatories 1, 6-7, and request for production 3.[11] The court has carefully reviewed the written memoranda submitted by the parties. Pursuant to civil rule 7-1(f) of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Utah, the court has concluded that oral argument is not necessary and will determine the motions on the basis of the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(f).

This case is a commercial dispute arising out of a Supply and Operating Agreement (the “Agreement”) for the sale of magnesium. Plaintiff's second amended complaint (“complaint”) alleges that ATI breached the Agreement by wrongfully declaring an Economic Force Majeure (the “EFM”) and by failing to negotiate revised pricing for the magnesium that would have averted the EFM. US Mag seeks damages in the approximate range of $115 million to $175 million. ATI denies US Mag's allegations and counterclaimed, alleging that US Mag breached the Agreement by, among other things, refusing to negotiate the price of magnesium in good faith and refusing to sell ATI magnesium through 2017.

On September 25, 2018, ATI filed a second amended counterclaim and third-party complaint against Renco asserting claims for intentional interference with contract and economic relations.[12] On October 9, 2018, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the claims against Renco[13] which the court granted on April 19, 2019—terminating Renco as a party to this case.[14] Thereafter, ATI filed a motion for leave to amend pleadings to amend its counterclaims and bring a third-party complaint against Renco, again, this time under an alter ego theory, which the court denied.

*2 The court sets forth the following general legal standards governing discovery. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Although the scope of discovery under the federal rules is broad, however, parties may not engage in a “fishing expedition” in an attempt to obtain evidence to support their claims or defenses. See Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, “the court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

“Generally, a party does not have standing to object to a subpoena issued to a third party, unless the party challenging the subpoena has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter sought by the subpoena.” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00229, 2015 WL 6872333, at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2015) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Richards v. Convergys Corp., No. 2:05–CV–00790–DAK, 2007 WL 474012 (D. Utah Feb. 6, 2007); Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 588, 590 (D. Kan. 2003); Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc.,189 F.R.D. 620, 635 (D. Kan. 1999).

“The district court has broad discretion over the control of discovery, and [the Tenth Circuit] will not set aside discovery rulings absent an abuse of that discretion.” Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd., 600 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).

I. Defendants’ motion for sanctions[15]

Defendants served subpoenas on Tanner and Wells Fargo and attempted to serve a subpoena on John Binko to produce documents. Pursuant to DUCivR 45-1, Defendants gave Plaintiff notice of the subpoenas four days prior to service of the subpoenas on the non-parties. Plaintiff contacted Defendants regarding their objections, but the parties were not able to reach an agreement on the issues. Before the third-party compliance deadline, Plaintiff's counsel sent letters to the subpoenaed parties informing them of Plaintiff's objections to the subpoenas and instructing them “not to comply with the Subpoena until ... otherwise instructed by the Court proceeding over this matter.”[16] Upon receiving notice of the letters, Defendants filed the instant motion requesting the court to sanction Plaintiff for “interfer[ing] with the judicial process by directing the parties to engage in contempt.”[17] Defendants also ask the court to order Plaintiff to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt and to order compliance with the subpoenas.

*3 Rule 11 sets forth mandatory requirements that a moving party must comply with before a court is permitted to order sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); see also Aerotech. Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the moving party must submit the motion for sanctions separate and apart from any other motion or request, and specifically describe the conduct that allegedly violates the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(2). The moving party must serve the motion on the opposing party. See id. If, after twenty-one days, the opposing party does not withdraw the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial, the moving party may file its motion for sanctions with the court. See id.

Here, Defendants filed the motion for sanctions with the court immediately after Plaintiff sent letters to the subpoenaed parties and failed to provide Plaintiff notice of the forthcoming motion for sanctions or an opportunity to address or cure Defendants’ contention with the letters. Therefore, the court concludes Defendants are not entitled to sanctions because the record fails to establish compliance with Rule 11’s cure provision. Notwithstanding, the court is not persuaded that Plaintiff's conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions. It does not appear that Plaintiff intended to interfere with discovery or meant to instruct the parties to engage contempt. Rather, Plaintiff's actions seem harmless and designed only to inform the subpoenaed parties of its objections to preserve its ability to file motions with the court. That said, Plaintiff shall refrain from engaging in such conduct again. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for sanctions[18] is DENIED.

II. Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Tanner[19] and Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Wells Fargo[20]

Plaintiff and Renco move to narrow the scope of the subpoenas to third-parties Tanner and Wells Fargo.

Defendants’ subpoena to Tanner, an accounting firm suggested by Plaintiff to conduct ATI's EFM evidence, seeks, inter alia, all documents, related in any way to Tanner's work, requests for work, or relationship with US Mag, Renco, or Burbidge | Mitchell (the law firm of Plaintiff's legal counsel).[21] Defendants define the term “work” as follows:

Defendants’ subpoena to Wells Fargo seeks, inter alia, all documents related to US Mag's production of titanium sponge, business plans involving titanium, funding of US Mag's facilities,[23] all documents and communications with Renco involving US Mag and titanium sponge,[24] and “all documents and communications exchanged between any Relationship Manager or other account manager associated with accounts related to US Mag or Renco,”[25] including 19 individuals that are not parties to this case.[26]

Plaintiff objects to requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Tanner subpoena and objects to requests 1(a), 1(d)-(e), 2, and 3 of the Wells Fargo subpoena on grounds of relevancy, over broadness, and confidentiality.

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that the court should not consider the motions to narrow the subpoenas because Plaintiffs did not file its objections within the 4-day notice period pursuant to DUCivR 45-1[27] or DUCivR 37-1(a)(4).[28] The court does not find anything in the above cited local rules to indicate a parties right to object is restricted to the 4-day notice period, and Defendants do not provide the court with any legal authority to support such an interpretation. Accordingly, Defendants’ timeliness objections are overruled.

*4 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff and Renco lack standing to object to the third-party subpoenas. As discussed above, a party generally does not have standing to object to a subpoena issued to a third party unless the party has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter sought by the subpoena. Both the Tanner and Wells Fargo subpoena seek documents involving personal financial and business documents of Plaintiff and Renco that are, on their face, highly sensitive. Thus, the court concludes Plaintiff and Renco have standing to assert their objections.

In regards to the Tanner subpoena, Defendants contend “evidence regarding Tanner's prior business relationship with US Mag, its affiliates, and its lawyers is highly relevant to this dispute, as it speaks to Tanner's bias and qualifications to serve as an ‘independent’ auditor.”[29] In regards to the Wells Fargo subpoena, Defendants contend information pertaining to US Mag's operations and financial condition is relevant to assess Plaintiff's alleged damages, efforts to mitigate, and impeach witnesses. Defendants also contend Renco's involvement is relevant because US Mag receives financial support from Renco.

The court is not persuaded that the information sought is specifically tailored to matters relevant to claims at issue. The requests are expansively drafted. They lack proper framing and stray too far from the alleged claims and defenses. While the requests might yield some relevant material, the sweeping nature of the requests presents an opportunity to explore matters that are not central or related to the lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A) (requiring discovery requests to describe what is sought “with reasonable particularity”). Despite the relative liberality of discovery rules, they should not be misapplied to allow fishing expeditions. See Munoz, 221 F.3d at 1169; Martinez v. Cornell Corr. of Texas, 229 F.R.D. 215, 218 (D.N.M. 2005). This lawsuit does not give Defendants a free pass to fish through all of US Mag's and Renco's financial records merely to see if anything interesting turns up which is what the discovery requests as presently drafted appear to do. The requests seek much more material than that required to demonstrate bias or assess damages. Moreover, Renco is no longer a party to this action as the claims against it were dismissed and ATI was not permitted to assert an alter ego claim against Renco. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Renco's motions to narrow the Tanner and Wells Fargo subpoenas[30] are GRANTED.

Plaintiff requests that the court accept its proposed language for narrowing the discovery requests. The court does not find this to be an appropriate way to resolve the discovery request as the court is not in the business of drafting discovery requests. Instead, the parties are directed to work together, for a period of 30 days starting from the date of this order, to find a mutually acceptable parameter regarding the discovery requests at issue. If the parties are unable to agree, Defendants are free to issue new subpoenas and Plaintiff is free to object again.

III. Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to John Binko[31]

Plaintiff and Renco move to quash Defendants subpoena to John Binko, an executive of Renco.

Defendants’ subpoena to John Binko seeks (1) all documents and communications sent to or received from US Mag regarding 17 categories of information ranging from the Agreement, to the EFM provision of the Agreement, to business plans involving the manufacture of titanium sponge, to notes from monthly management meetings with US Mag;[32] and (2) “all documents and communications sent to and received from any manager, member, representative, employee, agent, or affiliate, of Wells Fargo & Company or any of its related entities, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Capital Finance”[33] regarding, inter alia, information such as capital improvements for US Mag, US Mag's efforts to obtain financing for debt, guarantees of loans to US Mag or US Mag's predecessors, ATI's declaration of EFM, pricing of magnesium to ATI, and margins on the sale of magnesium to any customer.[34] Plaintiff and Renco move to quash the subpoena because it seeks confidential information not relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses and the requests are cumulative and duplicative of discovery previously produced in response to a subpoena on Renco in June 2018. For the same reasons cited above, the court concludes Plaintiff and Renco have standing to object to the subpoena.

*5 Defendants assert that “[i]nformation produced in discovery demonstrates that Mr. Binko personally corresponded with US Mag and Wells Fargo regarding US Mag's budget, leases, production forecasts, production numbers, expected sales volumes, budget reconciliations, infrastructure funding, operational issues, and relationship with ATI” and that “[d]iscovery also reveal[ed] that Mr. Binko ... corresponded with US Mag regarding the impacts to US Mag's business plan as a result of ‘lost ATI business.’ ”[35] Defendants argue that the materials sought are “directly relevant” to US Mag's claim for damages, and “are likely to provide information that would assist ATI in rebutting US Mag's economic calculations and assumptions, attempts to mitigate, and representations regarding its business.”[36]

As previously indicated, relevancy is to be “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on” any party's claim or defense. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).

In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., No. 17-MD-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 3620766, at *2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2018). Conversely, when relevancy is not apparent on its face, the requesting party has the burden to show the relevancy of the request. See id.

Here, the requested discovery, specifically the scope and expansive nature of the requested discovery, is not relevant on its face to the assessment of damages. Additionally, the court declines to permit such an intrusion into an entities’ private business dealings on the basis that such information is likely to be helpful. While the requests might yield some relevant material, Defendants are using an exceptionally large net to gather information without clear justification as to the need of the information and do not appear to have exerted any effort to specifically tailor their requests. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor permitting discovery, the court declines to permit the subpoena to proceed in its current form. For these reasons, Plaintiff and Renco's motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to John Binko[37] is GRANTED.

Defendants may issue a new subpoena to John Binko consistent with this decision. Defendants must tailor any new subpoena as narrowly as practicable to relevant topics, to avoid unnecessary intrusion into private information, and to avoid duplicative or cumulative discovery. The court strongly encourages the parties to cooperate in narrowing the scope of requests prior to the issuance of any additional subpoenas.

IV. Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to Crowe re: The Renco Group documents[38]

Plaintiff and Renco move to quash Defendants’ subpoena to third-party Crowe. Defendants’ subpoena to Crowe, a public accounting firm, seeks (1) “[a]ll audit reports prepared by you or any other entity concerning The Renco Group, including but not limited to, independent audit reports of the Renco Group's financial statements from 2016 to the present”;[39] (2) “[a]ll documents obtained from The Renco Group in the course of preparing reports of US Magnesium's financial statements from 2005 to the present”;[40] and (3) “[a]ll documents or communications with The Renco Group, including any of its employees, between 2005 and the present discussing or referring to ATI Titanium, LLC or Allegheny Technologies Incorporated.”[41]

*6 Plaintiff and Renco object to the above discovery requests on grounds of relevancy and over broadness. The court agrees. The requests are not tailored, at all, to the claims and defenses of the case as it currently exists. Renco is a private holding company with a diverse portfolio of subsidiaries. US Mag is just one of those subsidiaries. Request no 1. seeks documents that would reveal financial statements for Renco's entire portfolio. This request is unjustifiably intrusive, overly expansive, irrelevant to the claims and defenses, and disproportionate to the needs of the case. Likewise, the scope of request nos. 2 and 3 is in no way specifically tailored to Plaintiff's claim for damages and is greatly disproportionate to the needs of the case. Moreover, as drafted, the requests are unduly burdensome to Crowe and not proportional to the needs of the case.

Indeed, given the expansive scope of the requests, the court is unable to conclude that the purpose of the subpoena was not to annoy or harass Plaintiff and Renco. Motive aside, the court declines to allow the subpoena to proceed as drafted. As stated above, despite the relative liberality of discovery rules, they should not be misapplied to allow fishing expeditions. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Renco's motion to quash Defendants subpoena to Crowe re: Renco documents[42] is GRANTED.

V. Plaintiff, Renco, John Binko, and Ira Rennert's short form discovery motion for protective order to quash depositions of John Binko and Ira Rennert;[43] Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: 30(b)(6) deposition of The Renco Group, Inc.;[44] and Renco's motion to quash subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and joinder in Plaintiff's motion for protective order[45]

Plaintiff, Renco, John Binko, and Ira Rennert move to quash the depositions of John Binko and Ira Rennert (Renco executives), and Renco moves to quash the subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Renco. The court is not convinced that the depositions of the Renco executives or other Renco members are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence as it relates to the issues of the present lawsuit as it currently exists. Instead the depositions appear calculated to investigate previously dismissed claims and explore alternative theories, including the alter ego claim which Defendants are precluded from pursuing as a part of this case. Additionally, the court is not persuaded that John Binko and Ira Rennert possess unique knowledge that has not otherwise been produced or cannot elsewhere be obtained. As such, Plaintiff, Renco, John Binko, and Ira Rennert's motion for protective order to quash the depositions of John Binko and Ira Rennert[46] is GRANTED, and Renco's motion to quash subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and joinder in Plaintiff's motion for protective order[47] is GRANTED IN PART as it relates to quashing the subpoena to testify at a deposition.

Although Defendant is not allowed to pursue its alter ego claim against Renco in the present litigation, nothing in the court's ruling regarding the instant subpoenas for depositions should not be interpreted to say that Renco does not possess any information relevant to the current issues of the case. Defendants are free to renew their deposition requests but must be able to demonstrate that the individuals they seek to depose possess specific knowledge and information that is relevant, proportionate, and narrowly tailored to the claims, counterclaims, and defenses of the case as it currently exists. For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of The Renco Group, Inc.[48] is DENIED and Renco's motion to quash subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and joinder in Plaintiff's motion for protective order[49] as it relates to joining Plaintiff's motion for protective order is deemed MOOT.

VI. Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: financial documents and discovery[50]

*7 Plaintiff moves the court to enter an order precluding Defendants from pursuing discovery regarding the details of the “financial operations of [US Mag]; [US Mag]’s overall ‘profitability,’ or long-term ‘viability;’ and its financial relationship with Renco.”[51] While the subpoenas previously issued by Defendants regarding such issues have undoubtedly been overly broad in scope and not narrowly tailored to the claims, counterclaims, and defenses at issue, the court is not presently in a position to say Defendants are not entitled to conduct any discovery regarding the financial operations of US Mag. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: financial documents and discovery[52] is DENIED.

VII. Defendants’ short form discovery motion to compel responses to interrogatories 1, 6-7, and request for production 3[53]

Defendants move to compel US Mag to provide complete responses to Allegheny's first set of written discovery to US Mag. In the motion, Defendants’ counsel

Plaintiff, in its response, argues that Defendants’ motion to compel was filed “with no meaningful, good-faith effort to meet-and-confer, following a unilateral demand letter made by Defendants two days before Christmas.”[55] Plaintiff explains that it has already produced the contracts and information in its possession but objected to production of information about recent contracts because “any forward-looking Market Price was not prepared and cannot be accurately prepared in retrospect.”[56] Plaintiff also provides that

In an effort to obtain resolution of discovery disputes without court intervention, Rule 37(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a movant to certify that it has conferred with the opposing party prior to filing a motion to compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (“[A] party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery....”). The meet and confer process is essential to the effectiveness of the short form discovery procedure. Local Rule 37-1 specifically requires the parties to meet and confer to discuss the disputed matters, and to “recite the date, time, and place of such consultation and the names of all participating parties or attorneys” in the certification. DUCivR 37-1(a)(4). The purpose of the local rule is to encourage the parties to satisfactorily resolve their disputes prior to resorting to judicial intervention.

Although Defendants sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter regarding the discovery requests that also included an invitation to discuss the issues via phone, it does not appear an actual discussion took place. Here, the court notes, an invitation to discuss is not a discussion. Moreover,

Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. Civ. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2007 WL 1266790, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2007).

Additionally, Plaintiff states that it intends to supplement its responses within a week from date of the motion. Based on the information as provided, the court is unable to decipher the current status of the discovery dispute and declines to entertain the motion when court intervention may not be needed. Thus, Defendants motion to compel[58] is DENIED with the admonition that the court will not consider any future discovery motions absent a certification that sets forth the exact time and date of the parties’ meet and confer.

In summary, and as detailed above, the court ORDERS as follows:

(1) Defendants’ motion for sanctions[59] is hereby DENIED.

(2) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Tanner[60] is hereby GRANTED.

(3) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to narrow Defendants’ subpoena to Wells Fargo[61] is hereby GRANTED.

(4) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to John Binko[62] is hereby GRANTED.

(5) Plaintiff and Renco's short form discovery motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena to Crowe re: The Renco Group documents[63] is hereby GRANTED.

(6) Plaintiff, Renco, John Binko, and Ira Rennert's motion for protective order to quash depositions of John Binko and Ira Rennert[64] is hereby GRANTED.

(7) Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: 30(b)(6) deposition of The Renco Group, Inc.[65] is hereby DENIED.

(8) Renco's motion to quash subpoena for Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and joinder in Plaintiff's motion for protective order[66] is hereby GRANTED IN PART and deemed MOOT IN PART.

(9) Plaintiff's motion for protective order re: financial documents and discovery[67] is hereby DENIED.

(10) Defendants’ short form discovery motion to compel responses to interrogatories 1, 6-7, and request for production 3[68] is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2020.

See ECF nos. 63, 190.

See ECF no. 200.

See ECF no. 201.

See ECF no. 202.

See ECF no. 203.

See ECF no. 213.

See ECF no. 214.

See ECF no. 262.

See ECF no. 266.

See ECF no. 267.

See ECF no. 293.

See ECF no. 100.

See ECF no. 108.

See ECF no. 177.

See ECF no. 200.

ECF no. 200-1 at 2, 15, 29.

ECF no. 200 at 3.

See ECF no. 200.

See ECF no. 201.

See ECF no. 202.

See ECF no. 201-1 at ¶¶ 1-4.

ECF no. 201-1 at 7.

See ECF no. 202-1 at ¶¶ 1(a), (d), (e).

See id. at ¶¶ 2(a)-(d).

Id. at ¶ 3.

See id. at ¶¶ 3(a)-(r).

See ECF no. 207 at 2.

See ECF no. 208 at 2.

ECF no. 207 at 2.

See ECF nos. 201, 202.

See ECF no. 203.

See ECF no. 203-1 at 8-9.

Id. at 9.

See id.

ECF no. 206 at 2.

Id.

See ECF no. 203.

See ECF no. 214.

ECF no. 214-1 at 7.

Id.

Id.

See ECF no. 214.

See ECF no. 213.

See ECF no. 266.

See ECF no. 267.

See ECF no. 213.

See ECF no. 267.

See ECF no. 266.

See ECF no. 267.

See ECF no. 262.

ECF no. 262-2 at 2.

See ECF no. 262.

See ECF no. 293.

ECF no. 293 at 4.

ECF no. 294 at 2.

ECF no. 294 at 3.

Id.

See ECF no. 293.

See ECF no. 200.

See ECF no. 201.

See ECF no. 202.

See ECF no. 203.

See ECF no. 214.

See ECF no. 213.

See ECF no. 266.

See ECF no. 267.

See ECF no. 262.

See ECF no. 293.