*1 Plaintiffs Reynaldo Lopez, Eunice Delgadillo, Umberto Mendoza, Aveia Tautolo, and Ladona Narr (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals, allege that Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Defendant”) violated various provisions of the California Labor Code and certain Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Orders by failing to: (1) provide required meal periods (First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Dkt. No. 19) ¶¶ 17-21); (2) provide required rest periods (id. ¶¶ 22-25); (3) pay overtime wages (id. ¶¶ 26-30); (4) pay minimum wages (id. ¶¶ 31-34); (5) pay wages timely during employment (id. ¶¶ 35-39); (6) pay all wages owing to discharged and quitting employees (id. ¶¶ 40-46); (7) maintain required records (id. ¶¶ 47-49); (8) furnish accurate itemized wage statements (id. at 50-53); and (9) indemnify employees for necessary expenditures or losses incurred as a direct consequence of the discharge of their duties, (id. ¶¶ 54-57), and thereby (10) engaged in unfair and unlawful business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200. (Id. ¶¶ 58-63). Plaintiffs seek certification of a class consisting of current and former[1] “non-exempt employees who worked for Delta in the ACS [“Airport Customer Service”]/Cargo Division[s] in the State of California from July 1, 2011 to the present.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 2; see also FAC ¶¶ 60-64).

On January 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 12). The Parties filed a Joint Stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 (“Jt. Stip.”), including the declarations of Serena M. Patel (“Patel Decl. I”) in support of the Motion and Andrew P. Frederick (“Frederick Decl. I”) in opposition to the Motion. (Id.). On January 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum (“P Supp. Memo.”), including the declaration of Ladona Narr (“Narr Decl.”) and the second declaration of Serena M. Patel (“Patel Decl. II”). (Dkt. No. 13). On the same day, Defendant also filed a Supplemental Memorandum. (“D Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 14). On January 22, 2016, Defendant filed “Objections and Motion to Strike the Declaration of Ladona Narr Filed with Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum.” (“MTS,” Dkt. No. 17).

The Court held a hearing on February 16, 2016. That same day, the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion without prejudice to filing an amended motion. (“Order,” Dkt. No. 29). For the reasons stated in the Order, the Court limited the scope of any renewed discovery requests to “non-exempt ACS or cargo employees in Departments 120 and/or 125 at LAX during the purported class period,” without prejudice to later discovery “involving employees beyond Departments 120 and 125 at LAX,” contingent on the proper showing of need. (Id. at 2). The Court relieved the Parties of Local Rule 37's requirements with respect to the amended motion and authorized the Parties to incorporate by reference specific pages of briefs and exhibits already filed in the record. (Id.).

*2 On February 19, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant “Amended Motion to Compel Discovery Responses from Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.” (“Amended Motion”), including the declaration of Matthew J. Matern.[2] (“Matern Decl.,” Dkt. No. 34). Defendant filed an Opposition on February 24, 2016 (“Opp.,” Dkt. No. 36), including the second declaration of Andrew P. Frederick.[3] (“Frederick Decl. II,” Dkt. No. 37). The Court held a telephonic hearing on the Amended Motion on February 26, 2016, after which it took the matter under submission.

In the Amended Motion, Plaintiffs seek an Order requiring Defendant to provide putative class members' contact information and to produce documents consisting of or reflecting: putative class members' payroll and time records; Defendant's internal assessments regarding wage and hour issues; policies and practices regarding the provision of meal and rest breaks and the calculation of the regular rate; employee handbooks; training materials regarding wage and hour issues; meal and rest break premium payments; and edits to time and pay records. (Amended Motion at 7-8). For the reasons stated below, the Amended Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

The Ninth Circuit instructs that “wide access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search for truth.” Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 54 F.3d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, “[r]elevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998); see also E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 428, 431–32 (D. Nev. 2006) (same).

While federal policy broadly favors a party's right to discovery, special considerations apply to discovery during the pre-certification stage of a putative class action. Courts are not required to authorize pre-certification discovery in all circumstances. See Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery will be permitted ... lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ”). “In determining whether to grant discovery the court must consider its need, the time required, and the probability of discovery resolving any factual issue necessary for the [class certification] determination.” Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court has broad discretion to determine and order discovery deemed relevant to the certification of a class. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942 (“District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery will be permitted ... lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ”).

*3 Where evidence beyond the pleadings is necessary to prove the existence of a class, courts have often permitted at least some pre-certification discovery. See Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1309 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he parties' pleadings alone are often not sufficient to establish whether class certification is proper, and the district court will need to go beyond the pleadings and permit some discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a class may be certified.”); Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611, 615 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Although pre-certification discovery is discretionary, courts generally permit such discovery if it would substantiate the class allegations or if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied.”); Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Company, Inc., 310 F.r.D. 583, 587-88 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (same). Denial of discovery “where [it] is necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses” may be an abuse of discretion. Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313; see also Baldwin & Flynn v. Nat'l Safety Assoc., 149 F.R.D. 598, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[W]here the propriety of class certification cannot be fairly determined without discovery, it is an abuse of discretion to deny it.”). Indeed, courts generally authorize pre-certification discovery in recognition of the fact that “the necessary antecedent to the presentation of evidence [in support of class certification] is ... enough discovery to obtain the material, especially when the information is within the sole possession of the defendant.” Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313.

In contrast, “ ‘[w]here the necessary factual issues may be resolved without discovery, [pre-certification discovery] is not required.’ ” Id. (quoting Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975)); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 625, 630 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (quoting Kamm). The Ninth Circuit has upheld district court decisions refusing to allow pre-certification discovery where plaintiffs failed either to show a prima facie case for class relief or to establish that discovery was likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. See Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 (“[W]here the plaintiffs fail to make even a prima facie showing of Rule 23's prerequisites ... the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures are likely to produce persuasive information substantiating the class action allegations.”); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Although in some cases a district court should allow discovery to aid the determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion.”).

Accordingly, while courts in the Ninth Circuit are not required to condition pre-certification discovery on a prima facie showing that class certification is appropriate, courts may require such a showing, or, in the alternative, a showing that discovery is likely to substantiate class allegations. As one court explained:

Kaminske v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2010 WL 5782995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010).

Finally, while it is not uncommon for courts to conduct class action discovery in phases, the Court notes that the distinction between “certification” and “merits” discovery is rarely clear-cut. Many courts have recognized that “discovery can certainly be relevant both to class certification issues and to the merits.” Ho v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2007 WL 1394007, *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2007). These courts recognize that because certification issues often “cannot be meaningfully developed without inquiry into basic issues of the litigation,” class certification discovery “is closely enmeshed with merits discovery.” Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Nonetheless, the Rules advisory committee recommends that merits discovery in class action lawsuits, while often necessary even in the early stages of the litigation to establish the existence of a class, be “controlled” prior to certification to focus on issues relevant to the certification decision:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Notes to 2003 amendments, ¶ 1.

A. Class Certification Discovery Shall Be Limited To Information About Current And Former Non-Exempt ACS/Cargo Employees During The Covered Period In Departments 120 And 125 At LAX

In its prior Order, the Court limited the scope of pre-certification discovery to current and former non-exempt ACS/Cargo employees during the purported class period in Departments 120 and 125 at LAX only. (Order at 2). Plaintiffs ask the Court to expand the scope of permissible discovery beyond those two Departments at LAX to encompass all such employees statewide. (Amended Motion at 2). However, the Amended Motion fails to identify new evidence that would warrant reconsideration of this issue or the expansion of discovery to cover all of Defendant's facilities in the state. At both hearings, Plaintiffs argued that certain “policies” of Defendant establish uniform California policies and practices, allegedly justifying statewide discovery. However, at each hearing, Plaintiffs only pointed to manuals intended for national use in support of their contention. These manuals merely indicate that “special requirements may be applicable in California,” without further explanation, but do not establish the particular policies followed in California. (See, e.g., Frederick Decl. I, Exh. 30). According to Defendant's 30(b)(6) witness, each facility “could develop a different process” for notifying the company of involuntarily missed meal or rest breaks. (See Frederick Decl. II, Exh. L, at 145:16-20 (Deposition of Vincent Joshua Maxwell, Dec. 15, 2015)). The only evidence of meal and rest break violations before the Court, therefore, is the evidence provided by the representative Plaintiffs involving alleged violations at LAX in Departments 120 and 125.

At this stage of the litigation, absent any showing that employees in facilities other than LAX were affected by the same practices, statewide discovery would be overbroad. Douglas v. Talk Am., Inc., 266 F.R.D. 464, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Discovery sought solely for the purpose of inviting others to join this litigation ... would not be not relevant to the particular claims and defenses currently asserted in this case.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery where the request was ‘based on nothing more than mere speculation’ ”) (summarizing and quoting Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 885 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Several district courts have concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery from locations where the representative plaintiffs never worked absent some evidence to demonstrate company-wide violations. For example, in Nguyen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 503 (C.D. 2011), this Court examined the representative plaintiff's evidence of wage and hour violations and concluded that she had absolutely no evidence of violations at any location other than the location where she worked. As such, the defendant was not required to produce discovery concerning possible wage and hour violations at other locations. Id. at 507-508. Similarly, in Franco v. Bank of America, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111873 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009), the court limited the scope of discovery to the branch offices where the representative plaintiff worked because he had “not provided sufficient facts to support his claim of a company-wide policy and practice.” Id. at *10-11. See also Martinet v. Spherion Atlantic Enterprises, LLC, 2008 WL 2557490 at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (limiting discovery to the office where the plaintiff worked until plaintiff provided evidence of company-wide violations). Accordingly, the Court finds that pre-certification discovery is appropriately limited here to requests for information relating to current and former non-exempt ACS/Cargo employees during the purported class period in Departments 120 and 125 at LAX only.

B. Interrogatory Nos. 1-2: Putative Class Member's Contact Information

*5 Plaintiff seeks contact information -- the name, position, last known home and business address and telephone number -- for all current covered employees (Interrogatory No. 1) and all former covered employees (Interrogatory No. 2). (Amended Motion at 8; Patel Decl., Exh. 1 at 5). Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs are not entitled to any class contact information, but “has offered Plaintiffs a reasonable and adequate sample of 25 percent random sample of the contact list (subject to the Protective Order, Doc. 11) for employees who worked in Departments 120 and 125 at LAX during the putative class period.” (Opp. at 9).

In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), the Supreme Court found that class counsel in Rule 23 class actions must be permitted communications with potential class members for the purpose of notification and gathering information, even prior to class certification. Id. at 101–02. According to the Supreme Court,

Id. at 101–02. Relying on Gulf Oil, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court order limiting communication with potential class members because the district court failed to make specific findings of potential abuse. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Williams v. United States District Court, 658 F.2d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that a district court's “gag” order was invalid under Gulf Oil because it was not supported by “evidence of any abuse or potential abuse”).

Accordingly, pre-certification communication by class counsel with potential class members may be permitted. The court must then balance the plaintiff's need for the requested information against any objections asserted by the defendant, including the privacy interests of potential class members. Courts have generally permitted the disclosure of contact information when a plaintiff shows a legitimate need. In such cases, courts have also attempted to control or condition the disclosure of such information through the use of appropriate protective orders.

Plaintiffs' counsel request “[a]t a minimum ... that Delta provide[ ] the class list information, without an opt-out procedure,[4] for fifty percent of the non-exempt employees in the ACS/Cargo Division throughout California.” (Amended Motion at 8). The Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to contact information of putative class members, but limited to the departments at LAX described above. Additionally, despite Plaintiffs' concerns at the hearing about the amount of time that would be required for pre-disclosure notification, the Court finds that the proper balance between access to information and privacy rights is accomplished through an opt-out notice. See Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 360, 374–75 (2007) (approving opt-out procedure where “the trial court properly evaluated the alternatives, balanced the competing interests, and permitted disclosure of contact information regarding [the defendant's] complaining customers unless, following proper notice to them, they registered a written objection”); see also Belaire, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 561–62. Requiring an affirmative response before any employee contact information could be disclosed would be unduly restrictive and impair the ability of Plaintiffs' counsel to communicate with potential class members. “Opting out” allows those who may want nothing to do with the case to exclude themselves.

*6 Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for a supplemental response to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 is GRANTED IN PART. Although Plaintiffs' agreement to a fifty percent sampling was predicated on statewide discovery, the Court finds it appropriate nonetheless to permit discovery of fifty percent of the relevant employees, as limited above and subject to the Protective Order, to be selected by a method jointly agreed to by the Parties. Defendant represented at the hearing that the pool of relevant ACS and Cargo employees at LAX during the purported period comprises approximately 1300 current and former employees. A sampling of half of that pool should provide Plaintiffs with the information they need for their class certification motion.

Defendant's supplemental responses shall be preceded by an opt-out notice sent to the relevant employees. The Parties shall agree to the language of the opt-out notice and the method of delivery (e.g., whether to use a third party vendor, and if so, which vendor). Defendant or, if the Parties agree, the vendor, shall mail the opt-out notice to Defendant's relevant current and former employees within seven days of the date of this Order. Employees shall be given seven days to notify Defendant of their decision to opt-out. Defendant shall serve supplemental responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 within five working days after the deadline for employees to return their opt-out postcards to allow time for mail delivery and preparation of contact information for employees who did not opt out.

C. RFP Nos. 5 & 21: Putative Class Member's Payroll And Time Records

Plaintiffs seek payroll records -- including year-to-date earnings, year-end summaries, ADP payroll reports, and pay stubs -- for all covered employees (RFP No. 5), and electronic timekeeping records and policies showing the hours covered employees worked per day, per week and per pay period (RFP No. 21). (Amended Motion at 9; Patel Decl., Exh. 2 at 11). Plaintiffs “have proposed a limited sample of timekeeping and corresponding payroll data for all non-exempt employees in the ACS/Cargo Division[s] throughout California, for one pay period per calendar quarter during the class period.” (Amended Motion at 9). Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs are not entitled to class discovery on this issue, but have “offered Plaintiffs a 10 percent random sample of timekeeping and payroll data for Department[s] 120 and 125 at LAX on an anonymous basis.” (Opp. at 9).

A fully comprehensive production of the requested materials would be vastly overbroad at this stage of the litigation and unduly burdensome, and is unnecessary to provide the necessary data for Plaintiffs' class certification motion. Accordingly, balancing Plaintiffs' needs, Defendant's burden, and the employees' privacy interest in their payroll data, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' request for a supplemental production to RFP Nos. 5 and 21, subject to the Protective Order. Defendant shall produce the requested data for one pay period per quarter for the purported class period, limited to a random sampling of fifty percent of current and former non-exempt employees in Departments 120 and 125 of the ACS/Cargo Divisions at LAX, within fourteen days of the date of this Order. The Parties shall agree on a method for selecting the pay periods and the pool of employees. However, because Plaintiffs have not shown that they require personal identifying information for the employees at this stage of class certification proceedings, Defendant shall redact employee social security numbers and may redact employee names and other unique, identifying information, such as addresses, telephone numbers, and employee ID numbers, so long as it substitutes another method by which individual employees may be distinguished for citation and analysis purposes without disclosing the employees' actual identities.

D. RFP No. 14: Defendant's Internal Assessments Regarding Wage And Hour Issues

*7 Plaintiffs seek “internal assessments or audits” conducted by Defendant regarding payment of wages, minimum wage, overtime, reporting time pay, 10-minute rest breaks, 30-minute meal periods, reimbursements for employment-related expenses, rounding of time records, timely payment of wages, and the provision of accurate wage statements to covered employees (RFP No. 14). (Amended Motion at 9-10; Patel Decl., Exh. 2 at 10). In the Amended Motion, Plaintiffs state that they are specifically seeking daily “Kronos compliance reports” compiled by Trisha Beals and her staff, “from April 2012 to the present, tracking the percentage of missed meal break punches and short meal break punches, among other things, for each department in the ACS/CGO Division[s] at LAX.” (Amended Motion at 9). Defendant argues that the Kronos reports are not responsive to RFP No. 14 because they are not analyses or audits of its “compliance with California's labor laws,” which would be specifically “in the province of an employment attorney.” (Opp. at 10). Defendant also argues that the Kronos reports are “over-inclusive because they include information concerning employees in other departments beyond Departments 120 and 125 at LAX.” (Id.).

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to a sampling of Kronos reports, and accordingly GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' request for a supplemental production to RFP No. 14, subject to the Protective Order. Defendant shall produce daily Kronos reports for one pay period per quarter for the purported class period, within fourteen days of the date of this Order. The Parties shall agree on a method for selecting the pay periods, which may differ, at the Parties' election, from the pay periods selected for the supplemental production to RFP Nos. 5 and 12.

E. RFP Nos. 1-3, 8, 10 & 30: Policies, Practices, Handbooks And Manuals Regarding Meal And Rest Breaks, Wage And Hour Issues, And Payments

Plaintiffs seek documents evidencing: policies relating to the provision of meal periods and rest breaks (RFP No. 1); employee handbooks and manuals concerning compliance with California wage and hour laws (RFP No. 2); materials used to train managers and supervisors on compliance with California wage and hour laws (RFP No. 3); policies and practices relating to the calculation of the regular rate of pay, including bonuses, shift differentials, and meal and rest period premium payments (RFP No. 8); policies and practices relating to when meal and rest period premium payments are owed and due, what efforts Delta takes to ensure they are being paid properly, how employees are notified of their entitlement to the payments, and the number of these payments made during the purported class period (RFP No. 10); and policies and practices relating to the alteration and editing of time records, pay stubs and reimbursements of covered employees (RFP No. 30). (Amended Motion at 10; Patel Decl., Exh. 2 at 7-9 & 13).

Plaintiffs state that Defendant should supplement its responses to these production requests to encompass “the proposed class of all non-exempt employees who worked for Delta in the ACS/Cargo Division[s] in the State of California during the relevant period.” (Amended Motion at 10). In the alternative, Plaintiffs state that if Defendant has already produced all of the relevant documents for a statewide class, it should amend its responses to indicate that all relevant documents have been produced. (Id. at 10). Defendant states that it has produced responsive documents “applicable to Department 120 at LAX during the relevant period,” and “will review its responses to these requests and provide supplemental responses to include Department 125 at LAX,” now that “Plaintiff Narr has been added as a named plaintiff.” (Opp. at 10).

Plaintiffs' request for a supplemental production responsive to RFP Nos. 1-3, 8, 10 & 30 is GRANTED IN PART. Defendants shall supplement their production to encompass the documents relevant to Department 125 at LAX during the purported class period, subject to the Protective Order within fourteen days of the date of this Order. If the documents relevant to Department 125 are identical to the documents Defendant has already produced relating to Department 120, Defendant shall supplement its written response to these RFPs by affirming that all relevant documents in Defendant's possession, custody, or control relating to Departments 120 and 125 have been produced.

*8 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant shall serve supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 for a pool of fifty percent of its current and former non-exempt employees in the ACS/Cargo Departments at LAX for the purported class period after providing the employees an opportunity to opt out. The Parties shall agree to the language of the opt-out notice and the method of delivery (e.g., whether to use a third party vendor, or which vendor). Defendant or, if the Parties agree, the vendor, shall mail the opt-out notice to Defendant's relevant current and former employees within seven days of the date of this Order. Employees shall be given seven days to notify Defendant of their decision to opt-out. Defendant shall serve supplemental responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 within five working days after the deadline for employees to return their opt-out postcards to allow time for mail delivery and preparation of contact information for employees who did not opt out.

Defendant shall produce documents and data responsive to RFP Nos. 5 and 21; 14; and 1, 2, 3, 8, 10 and 30 as limited by this Order within fourteen days of the date of this Order. If parties cannot reach an agreement on matters referred to in this Order, parties are directed to contact Marlene Ramirez, courtroom deputy to Judge Segal, to arrange a telephonic conference with the Court.

Lopez, Delgadillo, Mendoza and Tautolo are former Delta employees; Narr is a current Delta employee. (FAC ¶¶ 3-7).

On February 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Errata re: Exhibit J to Declaration of Matthew J. Matern” to correct a docketing error. (Dkt. No. 35). The corrected Exhibit J filed with the Notice of Errata at Dkt. No. 35 shall be deemed to have been filed with Matern's original declaration at Dkt. No. 34.

The Court will refer to the declarations and attached exhibits filed in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' original Motion to Compel as though they had been filed in connection with the Amended Motion to Compel.

In California, the “opt-out” procedure is known as a “Belaire notice,” from Belaire–West Landscape Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554. The term describes an “opt-out” notice that is sent to potential class members to inform them of the lawsuit and to explain that if they do not want to have their contact information sent to plaintiff's counsel, they can complete and return an enclosed postcard. See id. at 557–58. The Belaire court found that this notice adequately avoided an invasion of potential class members' privacy interests. Id. at 561–62.