Hupp v. City of Beaumont
Hupp v. City of Beaumont
2017 WL 11635255 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
May 5, 2017

Pym, Sheri,  United States Magistrate Judge

Medical Records
Waiver of Privilege
General Objections
Audio
Photograph
Privacy
Open Records/Sunshine Laws
Cooperation of counsel
Sanctions
Attorney Work-Product
Video
Social Media
Failure to Produce
Cost Recovery
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Summary
The court did not make any specific rulings regarding ESI. However, the court noted that defendant had taken the necessary steps to ensure that any ESI was properly preserved and accessible. The court also denied defendant's requests for sanctions against plaintiff for failing to appear for his deposition.
Paul Hupp, et al.
v.
City of Beaumont, et al
Case No. ED CV 14-1303-VAP (SP)
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed May 05, 2017

Counsel

Paul Hupp, Beaumont, CA, Pro Se.
Aristea Hupp, Beaumont, CA, Pro Se.
Arthur K. Cunningham, Stephanie Joy M. Tanada, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, San Bernardino, CA, Eric Angel, Jackson Lewis PC, Wai Hung Wong, K and L Gates LLP, Irvine, CA, for Jack Huntsman.
Kelly G. Richardson, Richardson Harman Ober PC, Pasadena, CA, for Roes.
Pym, Sheri, United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Against City of Beaumont [115]; Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Production of Documents [116]; and Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel Deposition of Paul Hupp [117]

I. INTRODUCTION
*1 On March 17, 2017, pro se plaintiff Paul Hupp filed an ex parte application (docket no. 115), asking the court to order defendant City of Beaumont to show cause why it has not complied with plaintiff's request for records pursuant to California's Public Records Act (“PRA”). Plaintiff also requested sanctions against the City of Beaumont and its counsel, who also represent City of Beaumont Animal Control Officer Jack Huntsman, the sole remaining defendant in this case. Defendant City of Beaumont was dismissed from this case on April 21, 2016.
 
On March 20, 2017, defendant Huntsman filed an opposition to plaintiff's ex parte application (docket no. 118). That same day, defendant filed two discovery motions: a motion to compel plaintiff to respond to defendant's first sets of interrogatories and requests for production of documents (docket no. 116); and a motion to compel plaintiff to appear for deposition (docket no. 117). Defendant also requested sanctions against plaintiff in both motions.
 
On March 22, 2017, defendant filed an ex parte application to continue the March 31, 2017 discovery cutoff set in the court's August 23, 2016 case management and scheduling order. That order requires discovery motions to be heard not later than the discovery cutoff. Plaintiff noticed his application regarding his PRA request for hearing on shortened time on March 28, 2017, but defendant noticed his discovery motions for hearing on April 18, 2017, after the discovery cutoff.
 
In light of the motions filed and the impending discovery cutoff, the court held a telephonic conference with the parties on March 23, 2017. On March 24, 2017, the court issued an order extending the discovery cutoff for the limited purposes of scheduling a hearing on defendant's two motions to compel and plaintiff's request for sanctions against the City of Beaumont in relation to his PRA request, and to allow any discovery at issue in those motions to be taken if ordered.[1]
 
The court set these motions for a hearing on April 18, 2017 and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing by April 4, 2017 on these motions in advance of that hearing. On April 4, 2017, defendant filed an opposition to plaintiff's request for sanctions against the City of Beaumont. Plaintiff filed a supplemental reply on April 6, 2017 addressing his sanctions request and defendant's two discovery motions.
 
The court has considered the papers submitted and finds a hearing on these motions would not materially assist the court. Accordingly, the court previously took the April 18, 2017 hearing off calendar and rules on the motions as follows.
 
II. BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2014, pro se plaintiffs Paul Hupp and Aristea Hupp filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed the FAC with leave to amend on March 24, 2015. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on May 11, 2015, alleging their civil rights were violated on two separate occasions during incidents involving City of Beaumont Animal Control Officer Jack Huntsman. In addition to naming the City of Beaumont and Huntsman individually and in his official capacity, the SAC named as defendants Solera Oak Valley Greens Association (“Solera”), Solera general manager Christine Rodgers, and five current and former Solera board members (collectively, the “Solera defendants”). Solera is a planned, gated community in Beaumont where plaintiffs reside.
 
*2 On April 21, 2016, the court granted the Solera defendants' motion to dismiss and granted in part and denied in part defendants City of Beaumont and Officer Huntsman's motion to dismiss. Following the court's April 21, 2016 order, the only claim remaining from the SAC is plaintiffs' claim in Count 3 against Huntsman in his individual capacity, alleging Huntsman unlawfully prolonged his detention of plaintiff on April 3, 2014. Huntsman filed an answer to Count 3 of the SAC on June 16, 2016. Following an August 23, 2016 scheduling conference, the court issued a case management and scheduling order setting a discovery cutoff of March 31, 2017.
 
On July 18, 2016, defendant Huntsman served plaintiff with his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents (“RPD”). Declaration of Eric Angel (“Angel Decl. 1”), docket no. 116 at 35, ¶ 2, Exs. 1-4. Defendant argues that during the court's August 23, 2016 scheduling conference, after plaintiff had failed to timely respond to these discovery requests, the court ordered plaintiff to provide responses by September 23, 2016, though the court's case management order issued after the August 23, 2016 scheduling conference does not reflect such an order. Id., ¶ 7; see docket no. 98.
 
Defendant claims plaintiff then failed to provide those responses by the September 23, 2016 deadline, prompting defendant to send a meet and confer letter to plaintiff on September 26, 2016. Angel Decl. 1, ¶¶ 8-9, Ex. 5. Defendant states he received plaintiff's responses to defendant's discovery requests on September 30, 2016. Id., ¶¶ 10-12, Ex. 7 (“P. Rog. Resp.”), Ex. 8 (“P. RPD Resp.”). Defendant includes the proof of service accompanying plaintiff's responses, which was dated September 27, 2016, though the court notes plaintiff appears to have signed and dated the responses themselves on September 23, 2016. See id., ¶ 10, Ex. 6. Plaintiff's responses to each of defendant's interrogatories and RPDs contain nearly identical objections, with plaintiff providing only a minimal substantive response to some of the requests. See P. Rog. Resp., P. RPD Resp. Plaintiff did not produce any documents in response to defendant's RPDs. See P. RPD Resp.
 
On October 20, 2016 defendant served a notice of deposition on plaintiff, notifying him that his deposition would take place on December 5, 2016 at defense counsel's office in San Bernardino. Declaration of Stephanie Tanada (“Tanada Decl.”), docket no. 117-2, ¶ 2, Ex. 1. On December 2, 2016, defendant served on plaintiff a notice of continuance of the December 5, 2016 deposition, continuing the deposition to December 14, 2016. Id., ¶ 3, Ex. 2. Unaware of defendant's December 2, 2016 notice of continuance, plaintiff appeared on December 5, 2016 for his deposition and then learned of the rescheduled deposition. Id., ¶ 4.
 
The parties then exchanged correspondence in an attempt to again reschedule the deposition. Id., ¶¶ 4-8, Exs. 3-7. Plaintiff stated to defendant that his December 5, 2016 appearance for the continued deposition satisfied his obligation to appear for a deposition and that he would not be appearing for any rescheduled deposition. Id., ¶ 6, Ex. 5. Plaintiff also requested reimbursement of his costs for traveling to San Bernardino on December 5, 2016. Id., ¶ 4, Exs. 3, 7.
 
Defendant's counsel informed plaintiff of her intention to notice his deposition for January 13, 2017. Id., ¶ 7, Ex. 6. Plaintiff reiterated his position that his obligation to appear for a deposition was fulfilled by his December 5, 2016 appearance. Id., ¶ 8, Ex. 7. That same day, defendant re-noticed plaintiff's deposition for January 13, 2017. Id., ¶ 9, Ex. 8. Plaintiff failed to appear for the January 13, 2017 deposition. Id., ¶ 10, Ex. 9.
 
*3 During this time period, the parties also stalled in their meet and confer efforts regarding plaintiff's September 23, 2016 responses to defendant's interrogatories and RPDs until February 2017, when defendant attempted to renew meet and confer discussions with plaintiff prior to filing the instant motions to compel. See Angel Decl. 1, ¶¶ 15-21. On March 8, 2017, plaintiff sent defendant a letter responding to this correspondence and addressing the parties' disputes regarding his responses to defendant's interrogatories and RPDs, as well defendant's attempts to take plaintiff's deposition. Id., ¶ 22, Ex. 11 (“P. Supp. Resp.”). Because of the parties' difficulties communicating through email, telephone, or in person, defendant has incorporated plaintiff's March 8, 2017 letter into defendant's portions of the joint stipulations defendant filed in support of each of the instant motions to compel. Id., ¶ 24; see also Declaration of Eric Angel (“Angel Decl. 2”), docket no. 117 at 9-11, ¶ 12, Ex. C.
 
As described above and as detailed in the court's March 24, 2017 order, the parties' unsuccessful meet and confer efforts contributed to defendant's filing the instant motions to compel less than two weeks before the March 31, 2017 discovery cutoff. Thus, following the parties' telephonic conference on March 23, 2017, and as discussed in the court's March 24, 2017 order, the court extended the discovery cutoff for the limited purpose of considering plaintiff's March 17, 2017 request for sanctions against the City of Beaumont and defendant Huntsman's two motions to compel additional discovery filed on March 20, 2017.
 
III. DISCUSSION
A. Paul Hupp's Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff Paul Hupp seeks sanctions against the City of Beaumont, arguing the City failed to fulfill his request for records within the required time period. In California, requests for public records are governed by California Government Code §§ 6250 et seq. Section 6253(c) states that within ten days from receipt of a request for such records, a state or local agency shall “determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor.” Cal. Gov't Code § 6253(c).
 
Section 6253(c) also allows the disclosing agency to extend the ten-day time period in “unusual circumstances” and upon written notice “setting forth the reasons for the extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched,” but provides “no notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than 14 days.” Id. Such “unusual circumstances” include the “need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request” and the “need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records that are demanded in a single request.” Id. If the agency ultimately determines the request seeks disclosable public records, “the agency shall state the estimated date and time when the records will be made available.” Id.
 
Plaintiff attaches a February 15, 2017 letter addressed to the City Police Department's records supervisor as an exhibit to his sanctions motion. Docket no. 115, Ex. 1. There, plaintiff requests from the Police Department all “documents, reports, photographs, video and audio that mention or refer to” the April 3, 2014 incident at issue in this case, in which defendant Huntsman cited plaintiff for having a dog running at large in violation of City of Beaumont Municipal Code § 6.04.010. Id.; see SAC at 7. Plaintiff claims Huntsman unlawfully detained plaintiff during this incident, in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. SAC at 12-14. Plaintiff requested these records within ten days of the Department's receipt of his request, pursuant to Government Code § 6253(c). See docket no. 115 at 2 & Ex. 1.
 
*4 Plaintiff also attaches a March 1, 2017 letter he received from a City administrative services director, informing plaintiff that “compiling and reviewing the [requested] information will require additional time to produce,” but that responsive documents will be available within thirty days. Id., Ex. 2. Plaintiff includes additional correspondence between him and the same director in which she explains the cause of the City's delay in making responsive documents available was due to “legal review.” Id., Exs. 3-5.
 
Plaintiff filed the ex parte application in this court on March 17, 2017, asking the court to order the City to show cause why it has not complied with his request for records and seeking sanctions against the City in the amount of $100 for each day the City “did not comply with the PRA.” Id. at 3. In defendant Huntsman's March 20, 2017 opposition, counsel for defendant, who also represented previously-dismissed defendant City of Beaumont in this case, stated the City complied with plaintiff's request later on March 17, 2017, after plaintiff had already filed the ex parte application. Docket no. 118 at 2.
 
During the March 23, 2017 telephonic conference, plaintiff confirmed he received his requested records from the City on March 17, 2017 and acknowledged his request for an order to show cause is therefore moot. But plaintiff reiterated his request for sanctions against the City for what plaintiff argued was a deliberately delayed response to his PRA request.
 
Following the court's March 24, 2017 order, defendant filed a supplemental opposition to plaintiff's sanctions request on April 4, 2017, arguing plaintiff is not entitled to sanctions under the relevant provisions of the California Government Code governing public records request, which provide for a plaintiff to recover “costs and reasonable attorney fees” if the plaintiff “prevail[s] in litigation filed pursuant to this section.” Docket no. 124 at 3 (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 6259(d)). Defendant cites California case law holding a plaintiff “prevails” under Government Code § 6259(d) “when he or she files an action which results in defendant releasing a copy of a previously withheld document.” Id. (citing Crews v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., 217 Cal. App. 4th 1368, 1382, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 494 (2013)). Defendant argues plaintiff has not “prevailed” in his records request because the responsive documents plaintiff received from the City were never previously withheld, nor has plaintiff properly filed an action concerning his PRA request in the first place. Id. The court agrees.
 
The City of Beaumont has not denied plaintiff his right to inspect the records he requested, as plaintiff acknowledges he received his requested records on March 17, 2017. Even if the City did formally deny plaintiff his right to inspect certain records, the PRA's “judicial remedy is limited to a requestor's action to determine whether a particular record or class of records must be disclosed.” Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 4th 119, 130, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 520 (Cal. App. 2009); see also City of Richmond v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Cal. App. 1995) (“Rights under the [PRA] may be enforced by actions for ‘injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate.’ ” (quoting Cal. Gov't Code. 6258)). In his April 6, 2017 supplemental reply, plaintiff states he filed a lawsuit in Riverside County Superior Court regarding his PRA request, but claims that court refused to allow him to file the lawsuit. Docket no. 125 at 7. Any such lawsuit for declaratory or injunctive relief would now be moot in light of plaintiff's receipt of his requested records.
 
*5 Moreover, without deciding whether the City denied plaintiff's records request (or whether such a denial was wrongful under the PRA), the court finds plaintiff's request for sanctions against the City for the alleged violation of the PRA is not an available remedy in this case in any event. First, the City is no longer a party to this action, and plaintiff did not request the records using the discovery procedures afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which this court may supervise and adjudicate. As such, the court lacks jurisdiction to sanction the City for conduct concerning an extra-judicial request for discovery. Further, as defendant notes, the PRA expressly limits recovery to costs and fees, and states those costs and fees “shall not become a personal liability of the public official” who wrongfully denied documents pursuant to a PRA request. Cal. Gov't Code § 6259(d). Here, there has been no denial of plaintiff's records request or a lawsuit filed finding that such a denial was wrongful. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff's sanctions request against the City of Beaumont for the City's response to his records request, as the PRA does not provide for recovery under the circumstances of plaintiff's request.
 
B. Huntsman's Motion to Compel Paul Hupp's Answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
In his March 20, 2017 motion to compel, defendant asks the court to overrule plaintiff's objections and order plaintiff to provide supplemental responses to fifteen interrogatories (Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4-13, and 15-18) and seven RPDs (RPD Nos. 2-3, 7-8, and 10-12) from defendant's first set of discovery requests, which defendant served on plaintiff on July 18, 2016. See docket no. 116.
 
In his September 23, 2016 responses, plaintiff objected to each interrogatory and RPD on various grounds, including an identical objection that each request is vague, ambiguous, and overly broad. See P. Rog. Resp., P. RPD Resp. Each of plaintiff's responses also included the identical objection that the request is a compound question, “violates the right to privacy,” and “is neither relevant nor material.” See id.
 
Many of defendant's interrogatories seek information about the injuries plaintiff suffered from the April 3, 2014 incident at issue in Count 3 of the SAC, any medical treatment plaintiff required for those injuries, and any medical expenses, lost wages, or other costs plaintiff incurred as a result. Plaintiff's responses to some of these requests included the additional objection that the requests violate “the doctor-patient privilege.” See id.
 
Defendant argues plaintiff has failed to respond to the majority of his requests in good faith, and claims plaintiff's responses to the discovery requests mostly consist of boilerplate objections. Docket no. 116 at 4. The court will address defendant's arguments concerning the portions of plaintiff's objections that were generalized and identical throughout each of plaintiff's responses. To the extent plaintiff provided a specific response to an interrogatory or RPD in addition to his general objections, the court will include only that portion of plaintiff's response with the court's description of the requests at issue below, and will address plaintiff's particularized responses separate from the court's consideration of plaintiff's generalized objections.
 
1. Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4-13, and 15-18
Interrogatory No. 1 asks plaintiff to state whether or not he has been convicted of a felony, and if so, to identify the crime, date of conviction, and name of the court in which the conviction occurred. Id. at 5. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff additionally objected to this interrogatory on the ground that the City of Beaumont already has this information in its possession, and then provided his date of birth. P. Rog. Resp. at 2. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff reiterates his argument that this information “is public record and is available to [defendant] himself; as such Plaintiff is relieved of doing [defendant's] work.” P. Supp. Resp. at 5. Plaintiff also argues that any felony conviction responsive to Interrogatory No. 1 would have to be “relevant” and “not ‘stale,’ so [defendant] must state his request relating to a specific time frame, which he has not done.” Id.
 
*6 Interrogatory No. 4 asks plaintiff to describe any “injuries and damages, including all claims of emotional distress,” that plaintiff suffered as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 6. In his September 23, 2016 response, and in addition to his general objections raised to each of defendant's requests, plaintiff responded to Interrogatory No. 4 by stating “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff has endured significant pain, suffering and emotional distress as well as other has (sic) medical conditions that are related to this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 3. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states his injuries “were described in detail” in his initial response, but then described his emotional distress as “anxiety, fear, humiliation, apprehension, nervousness, uneasiness, agitation, confusion and shame.” P. Supp. Resp. at 5.
 
Interrogatory No. 5 asks plaintiff to describe any injuries from which he has not made a full recovery, as well as the type of treatment, if any, plaintiff is currently receiving for those injuries. Docket no. 116 at 8. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff responded to Interrogatory No. 5 by stating “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff has medical conditions that are related to this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 3. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he “still suffers from emotional distress from the subject of this action,” and repeated his description of his emotional distress from his supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 4. P. Supp. Resp. at 5.
 
Interrogatory No. 6 asks plaintiff to describe any pre-existing conditions that were “aggravated or accelerated” as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 9. This request also asks plaintiff to indicate when any such pre-existing condition first manifested itself and provide the contact information for any healthcare providers currently treating plaintiff for the condition. Id. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff responded to Interrogatory No. 6 by stating “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff has medical conditions that are related to this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 3. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states there were no pre-existing conditions aggravated by the April 3, 2014 incident. P. Supp. Resp. at 5.
 
Interrogatory No. 7 asks plaintiff to provide the contact information for any healthcare providers from whom he is receiving treatment for injuries suffered as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 10. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff stated “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff has medical conditions that are related to this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 4. Plaintiff did not provide a substantive response to Interrogatory No. 7 in his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, but did repeat his objection to this request on the grounds that the request violates his right to privacy and the doctor-patient privilege. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 8 asks plaintiff to itemize all medical and related expenses attributed to the April 3, 2014 incident from each healthcare provider. Docket no. 116 at 12. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff stated “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff has medical conditions that are related to this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 4. Plaintiff did not provide a substantive response to Interrogatory No. 8 in his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, but did repeat his objection to this request on the grounds that medical expenses are irrelevant, and to the extent any medical expense is relevant, disclosing those expenses violates his right to privacy and the doctor-patient privilege. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 9 asks plaintiff to itemize “any other expenses, disbursements or losses” plaintiff is claiming as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident, but not including any claims plaintiff may make for lost wages or lost earning capacity. Docket no. 116 at 13. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff stated he “has expended substantial financial resources in the prosecution of this action.” P. Rog. Resp. at 4. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he “has not totaled the expenses up at this point because it is not relevant at this point,” arguing that because he is not entitled to litigation expenses until he prevails in this action, he does not need to “speculate on any potential litigation costs that are changing/increasing daily.” P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
*7 Interrogatory No. 10 asks plaintiff to provide information related to any claim or legal proceeding for personal injury that plaintiff has filed, including the present status of any such claim and any amount recovered. Docket no. 116 at 14. Plaintiff did not provide a particularized response to this request aside from the general objections raised for each of defendant's discovery requests. P. Rog. Resp. at 4. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states this information is public record and available to defendant, thereby relieving plaintiff of “doing [defendant's] work.” P. Supp. Resp. at 6. Plaintiff also argued that even if such information were discoverable, “it would be subject to any and all court orders regarding settlements.” Id.
 
Interrogatory No. 11 asks plaintiff to provide contact information for each of his employers during the last ten years, indicate the dates of such employment, and describe his duties. Docket no. 116 at 15. Plaintiff did not provide a particularized response to this request aside from the general objections raised for each of defendant's discovery requests. P. Rog. Resp. at 5. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff reiterates his argument that the last ten years of his employment history is irrelevant to this case. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 12 asks plaintiff to state the amount he is claiming for loss of earnings as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident, and to indicate whether such amount is final or continuing. Docket no. 116 at 16. Plaintiff did not provide a particularized response to this request aside from the general objections raised for each of defendant's discovery requests. P. Rog. Resp. at 5. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he “is not claiming loss of earnings from employment.” P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 13 asks plaintiff to state all facts with particularity supporting each of plaintiff's theories of liability alleged against defendant. Docket no. 116 at 16-17. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this interrogatory on the additional ground that the request seeks information protected by the attorney work product doctrine. P. Rog. Resp. at 5. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff objects to this request on the ground that it “requires a legal conclusion” in addition to seeking protected attorney work product. P. Supp. Resp. at 6. Plaintiff then argued his “ ‘legal theories' for the pending action are listed element by element in the complaint.” Id.
 
Interrogatory No. 15 asks whether plaintiff has obtained a statement from any party or witness in this case, and if so, to provide certain information concerning that statement, such as the identity of the party or witness, the form of the statement, and the date the statement was given. Docket no. 116 at 18. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff stated “to the extent it can be answered, only Plaintiff, Huntsman, and the [City of Beaumont] Police Sergeant on scene are known witnesses.” P. Rog. Resp. at 6. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he “has not had contact with any party or witness regarding this action except the ones stated in Plaintiff's answer,” appearing to reference his initial response to this interrogatory from September 23, 2016. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 16 asks plaintiff to identify all documents sufficient to support a RPD or document subpoena supporting each of plaintiff's theories of liability claimed against defendant. Docket no. 116 at 19. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this interrogatory on the additional ground that the request seeks information protected by the attorney work product doctrine. P. Rog. Resp. at 6. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he cannot answer this interrogatory “because the term ‘document’ is not defined,” but then states he anticipates using “numerous items of evidence” from defendant's own discovery responses and initial disclosures. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
*8 Interrogatory No. 17 asks plaintiff to state whether he consumed any medicine, drug, or alcoholic beverage in the twenty-four hours preceding the April 3, 2014 incident, and if so, to identify any such medicine, drug, or alcoholic beverage, and to indicate the time it was taken and the amount consumed. Docket no. 116 at 20. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this interrogatory on the additional ground that the term “alcoholic beverage” is vague, ambiguous, and overly broad. P. Rog. Resp. at 6. Plaintiff then stated, “to the extent it can be answered, Plaintiff consumed no drug within the preceding 24 hours” of the April 3, 2014 incident. Id. In his March 8, 2017 response, plaintiff argues he fully answered this interrogatory. P. Supp. Resp. at 6.
 
Interrogatory No. 18 asks plaintiff to state the date and location of any contact he has had with any law enforcement officers from five years before the April 3, 2014 incident through the present, and to briefly describe any such contact. Docket no. 116 at 21. Plaintiff did not respond to this interrogatory in his September 23, 2016 responses. See P. Rog. Resp. at 6-7. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that any potential contact with law enforcement officers was irrelevant to this case and that the term “law enforcement officers” is vague and ambiguous. P. Supp. Resp. at 6. Plaintiff then stated he “socializes with many sworn Peace Officers,” but argued “that has no relevance to [defendant's] actions whatsoever.” Id.
 
2. RPD Nos. 2-3, 7-8, and 10-12
RPD No. 2 asks plaintiff to produce any and all “correspondence, memoranda, notes, notices, or writings of any kind or character” supporting plaintiff's claim for losses or damage as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 23. In his September 23, 2016 response, in addition to his general objections raised for each of defendant's discovery requests, plaintiff objected to this RPD on the additional ground that “Plaintiff is not a party to any related count or cause of action between [City of Beaumont] or Jack Huntsman.” P. RPD Resp. at 2. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states “documents relating to losses would clearly be all the documents relating to this action. To the extent there are other documents relating to losses, Plaintiff does not currently know of any.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
RPD No. 3 asks plaintiff to produce any and all medical records related to plaintiff's treatment for injuries and emotional distress suffered from the April 3, 2014 incident, including statements, bills, invoices, x-rays, CT scans, MRIs, medication labels, and prescriptions. Docket no. 116 at 24. Plaintiff did not provide a particularized response to this request aside from the general objections raised for each of defendant's discovery requests. P. RPD Resp. at 2. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff repeats his objection that this RPD seeks documents protected by the doctor-patient privilege. P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
RPD No. 7 asks plaintiff to produce any diagram, model, or reproduction of “any place or thing concerning or relating to” the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 25. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this RPD on the additional ground that the term “incident” is “not described with enough particularity for Plaintiff to provide a specific answer.” P. RPD Resp. at 3. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff repeats this objection, stating that although he filed the claim, “that does not mean the word ‘incident’ being used by [defendant] need not be defined.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
RPD No. 8 asks plaintiff to produce all documents supporting his claim for loss of income or earning capacity, if plaintiff intends to make any such claim. Docket no. 116 at 26. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff stated, “to the extent it can be answered: Plaintiff's documentation of earning reduction is ongoing.” P. RPD Resp. at 4. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he “has not made a claim for loss of income or earning.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
*9 RPD No. 10 asks plaintiff to produce all “documents prepared by police, fire paramedic, ambulance, or government (Federal, State or Local)” relating to the April 3, 2014 incident. Docket no. 116 at 27. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this RPD on the additional ground that the term “incident” is “not described with enough particularity for Plaintiff to provide a specific answer.” P. RPD Resp. at 4. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff repeats this objection, stating that although he filed the claim, “that does not mean the word ‘incident’ being used by [defendant] need not be defined.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
RPD No. 11 asks plaintiff to produce all journal or diary entries authored by plaintiff, including all entries on social media accounts, that relate to the April 3, 2014 incident or any injuries plaintiff suffered as a result of the incident. Docket no. 116 at 28. In his September 23, 2016 response, plaintiff objected to this RPD on the additional ground that the terms “journal” and “diary” are “not described with enough particularity for Plaintiff to provide a specific answer.” P. RPD Resp. at 4-5. Plaintiff repeats this objection in his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, and makes the additional claim that social media entries “have a right to privacy privilege.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7.
 
Finally, RPD No. 12 asks plaintiff to produce all documents plaintiff may reference in his responses to defendant's first set of interrogatories. Docket no. 116 at 30. Plaintiff did not provide a particularized response to this RPD in his September 23, 2016 response. P. RPD Resp. at 5. In his March 8, 2017 supplemental response, plaintiff states he cannot answer this request because he “does not know what ‘documents' [defendant] is referring to with specificity,” and claims that if defendant wants any documents, “he must identify the Interrogatory he is referring to.” P. Supp. Resp. at 7. Plaintiff then states he will “comply if warranted.” Id.
 
3. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Relevancy, for the purposes of discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
 
A party may propound interrogatories relating to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). The responding party is obligated to respond to the interrogatories to the fullest extent possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Any objections must be stated with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). A responding party is not generally required to conduct extensive research in order to answer an interrogatory, but a reasonable effort to respond must be made. L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2781132, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2007).
 
A party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). The responding party must respond in writing and is obliged to produce all specified relevant and non-privileged documents, tangible things, or electronically stored information in its “possession, custody, or control” on the date specified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). In the alternative, a party may state an objection to a request, including the reasons for the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A)-(B). When a party resists discovery, he “has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 189 F.R.D 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citation omitted). Boilerplate objections to a request for a production are not sufficient. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). The responding party has a duty to supplement any responses if the information sought is later obtained or the response provided needs correction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
 
4. Plaintiff's Responses Are Insufficient
*10 Starting with plaintiff's general objections to all of the requests at issue, the court overrules plaintiff's objections that defendant's interrogatories and RPDs are vague, ambiguous, overly broad, compound, and irrelevant. These are the type of boilerplate objections the court looks on with disfavor. See Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The party resisting discovery must show specifically how ... each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.”); Holt v. Nicholas, 2014 WL 250340, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (noting that because Rule 34 requires that a party responding to a RPD “include the specifics of the objection and how that objection relates to the documents” sought, “[g]eneric, boilerplate objections to discovery are not sufficient”) (citations omitted). The court finds plaintiff has not articulated a sufficient and specific ground for his general contention that all of the discovery requests at issue are vague, ambiguous, overly broad, and irrelevant. Plaintiff's objections on these grounds are repeated verbatim in his responses to each of defendant's interrogatories and RPDs. These responses do not meet plaintiff's obligation to state his objections with particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4).
 
In addition to these general objections, in both his September 23, 2016 and March 8, 2017 responses, plaintiff offers more specific objections that certain terms within some of defendant's requests are vague or undefined and therefore not understandable, including: (1) the term “document” in Interrogatory No. 16 (P. Supp. Resp. at 6); (2) the term “law enforcement officers” in Interrogatory No. 18 (id.); (3) the term “incident” in RPD Nos. 7 and 10 (P. RPD Resp. at 3, 4; P. Supp. Resp. at 7); and (4) the terms “journal” and “diary” in RPD No. 11 (P. RPD Resp. at 4-5; P. Supp. Resp. at 7). The court finds these objections are not well taken, as an ordinary interpretation and construction of these terms makes them understandable to a party in this action.
 
Turning to specific interrogatories and requests, Interrogatory No. 1 asks plaintiff to provide information about any history of felony convictions. Docket no. 116 at 5. The court agrees with defendant's contention that this information is relevant for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. See id. at 6. Defendant need not limit the interrogatory to any particular time frame, as information need not be admissible to be discoverable, and in any event certain convictions may be admissible regardless of their age. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
 
Plaintiff also responded to Interrogatory No. 1 by stating information related to his felony convictions is available to defendant in the public record, and maintained he need not do defendant's work for him. P. Rog. Resp. at 2; P. Supp. Resp. at 5. Plaintiff made similar objections to other requests, including in response to Interrogatory No. 10, which asks plaintiff to state information related to any past claim or legal proceeding for personal injury he has initiated. P. Supp. Resp. at 6. Plaintiff also referred defendant to the complaint in his March 8, 2017 supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 13. Id. at 6. Such responses are deficient.
 
That defendant might be able to find the requested information by searching public records or other sources does not relieve plaintiff of his obligation to respond. Cf. Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (defendant must “produce documents he has in his possession, custody or control, regardless of whether he believes plaintiff already has those documents”). Plaintiff must respond to these interrogatories fully and may not simply refer to other documents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3); U.S. ex rel. O'Connell v. Chapman University, 245 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Hash v. Cate, 2012 WL 6043966, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012). Defendant is not required to sift through the complaint or other records to obtain responsive information from plaintiff, nor does a reference to information in the possession of government agencies, without also producing the information or documents, justify plaintiff's refusal to provide a substantive response under Rule 33. The court therefore overrules plaintiff's objection on this ground to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 10, and 13.
 
*11 Interrogatory No. 13 seeks “all the facts” supporting plaintiff's theories of liability alleged against defendant. Docket no. 116 at 16-17. Plaintiff objects to this request as calling for a legal conclusion. P. Supp. Resp. at 6. Similarly, Interrogatory No. 16 asks plaintiff to identify “all documents” supporting these theories. Id. at 19. Though plaintiff did not repeat his objection from Interrogatory No. 13 that Interrogatory No. 16 also calls for a legal conclusion, the court notes plaintiff is correct to object to the extent these requests impermissibly call for plaintiff to disclose legal opinions concerning the claim at issue in this case. Nonetheless, on balance, these requests appear to primarily concern issues of fact. Plaintiff need not reveal his particular legal thought processes or strategy if he simply identifies the facts and documents that support his claims. Indeed, the latter is required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). No legal conclusion is called for.
 
The one other general objection plaintiff makes to every request is that they violate his right to privacy. Plaintiff's references to his privacy rights do not suffice to shield him from providing relevant and necessary discovery in this case. Privacy rights are generally recognized in federal court. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992). But the right is not absolute and may be subject to invasion depending on the circumstances. Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Thus, the right to privacy is not a recognized privilege or absolute bar to discovery, but instead is subject to the balancing of needs. Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing documents in employee's personnel files).
 
Many of defendant's requests – Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 17, and RPD Nos. 2, 3, 8, 10 and 11 – seek information regarding any injuries plaintiff suffered from the April 3, 2014 incident, including emotional distress, and any subsequent medical treatment for those injuries plaintiff may have received as a result, as well as regarding his physical and mental state before and after the incident. The court agrees with defendant that plaintiff has waived his privacy interest in any medical treatment received as a result of the April 3, 2014 incident because plaintiff has placed his own physical and mental health in issue. See docket no. 116 at 7. The injuries plaintiff suffered and the medical care plaintiff received are relevant to determining which injuries, if any, were actually the result of the April 3, 2014 incident, and are also relevant to the question of damages. Plaintiff's allegations in the SAC put his physical and mental condition following the April 3, 2014 incident plainly at issue. The court therefore finds this discovery is permissible and proportional under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
Nonetheless, the court also recognizes that a person's medical and mental health history involves private, personal information, which ought not to be disclosed on the basis of only an attenuated showing of relevance. Although the requests at issue here appear properly focused on only on-point medical information, the court does not discount the possibility they may sweep in other information. But a privacy interest can only be assessed with reference to specific information, which plaintiff has not provided here. As such, at plaintiff's request, the court may review in camera specific records subject to production under this order with respect to which plaintiff claims his interest in maintaining the privacy of the information outweighs any need defendant may have for it. But apart from any such in camera review, plaintiff must produce the information and documents.
 
Plaintiff also asserted doctor-patient privilege and attorney work-product objections in his initial and supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 7, 8, 13, and 16, as well as RPD No. 3. P. Rog. Resp. at 4, 6; P. Supp. Resp. at 2, 7. As suggested above in the court's discussion of plaintiff's legal conclusion objection, plaintiff has not provided any indication of how responsive information to these requests is protected by an attorney work-product doctrine. The court thus overrules this objection. Moreover, the court finds plaintiff's responses fail to satisfy Rule 26(b)(5)(A), which requires that parties withholding otherwise discoverable information on the ground of privilege must expressly claim the privilege. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (party claiming the privilege must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed ... in a manner that ... will enable other parties to assess the claim”); see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005) (a bare assertion of privilege does not suffice to claim a privilege). Notably, plaintiff has not produced a privilege log.
 
*12 As to plaintiff's claim of physician-patient privilege, defendant again contends plaintiff has waived this privilege by placing his own mental health in issue. See docket no. 116 at 7. To the extent plaintiff implies a claim of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Supreme Court has held such a privilege exists under federal common law. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337. There, the Supreme Court held that “confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure.” Id. at 15. The psychotherapist privilege “covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists” and to “licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy.” Id. The Supreme Court further noted that “like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection,” but the Court did not provide specific guidance as to when the privilege is deemed waived. Id. at 15 n.14.
 
Since Jaffee, district courts have adopted different approaches to determine whether the patient waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Engert v. Stanislaus Cty., 2014 WL 5217301, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2014) (discussing different approaches to determining waiver and citing cases). Courts have found waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege only where the party places her own mental state at issue in the case. See, e.g., Speaker ex rel. Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Under Jaffee, plaintiff bears the burden of showing: (1) the records sought are from a licensed psychotherapist; (2) his communications with the therapist were confidential; and (3) the communications were made during the course of diagnosis or treatment. U.S. v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, plaintiff has not specifically shown any confidential treatment records from a psychotherapist exist. But to the extent plaintiff claims damages related to emotional distress suffered following the April 3, 2014 incident, he has put any related psychiatric treatment at issue, and has waived any claim of doctor-patient privilege.
 
Having overruled all of plaintiff's objections, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to compel in full as to Interrogatory Nos. 1, 4-13, and 15-18, as well as RPD Nos. 2-3, 7-8, and 10-12. Plaintiff is ordered to produce verified supplemental responses unambiguously responding in substance to these interrogatories, and to produce all documents responsive to these RPDs. Such verified supplemental responses and responsive documents must be served on defendant no later than June 2, 2017.
 
Finally, the court notes some of plaintiff's March 8, 2017 supplemental responses appear to fully respond to certain of defendant's interrogatories, namely, Interrogatory Nos. 6, 12, 15, and 17. See P. Supp. Resp. at 5-6. In addition, plaintiff's statement that he has not made a claim for loss of earning potential may sufficiently respond to RPD No. 8, and plaintiff's statement indicating he does not know of unproduced documents relating to losses may satisfy RPD No. 2. See id. at 7.
 
Nonetheless, plaintiff's March 8, 2017 supplemental response does not satisfy the requirements for answers to interrogatories under Federal Rule of Evidence 33, which requires interrogatory answers to be “answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). Where the answers are not sworn or notarized, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 requires that a declaration be subscribed as true under penalty of perjury, and be executed substantially in the statutory form, which requires a declarant to swear “under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Although a lack of swearing is not a fatal defect, the declaration must be made under penalty of perjury and must be attested to be true. Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (D.D.C. 2004) (statement of truth based on “knowledge, information, and belief” insufficient); Kersting v. U.S., 865 F. Supp. 669, 676-77 (D. Haw. 1994) (necessary elements are that the unsworn declaration contains the phrase “under penalty of perjury” and states that the document is true). Plaintiff's responses in his March 8, 2017 letter to defendant fall short of the requirements for declarations under 28 U.S.C. § 1746. As such, supplemental verified responses to all the interrogatories and document requests are required.
 
C. Huntsman's Motion to Compel Paul Hupp's Deposition
*13 The court next considers defendant's motion to compel plaintiff's deposition, following plaintiff's failure to attend the deposition noticed for January 13, 2017. In his April 6, 2017 supplemental reply, plaintiff only responds to the motion to compel his deposition by again noting defendant's motion was filed three and a half months after plaintiff's scheduled December 5, 2016 deposition, and that defendant could have taken plaintiff's deposition after the rescheduled December 5, 2016 date and avoided the need to file this motion if defendant paid plaintiff for the time and expense of traveling to his deposition that day. Docket no. 125 at 6.
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(1) permits a party to “depose any person, including a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). The failure of a party to attend his own deposition can be grounds for dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute. See Drumgoole v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 316 Fed. Appx. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's dismissal of action where plaintiff failed to appear for deposition and did not respond to discovery requests).
 
It is apparent from the declarations and exhibits supporting the motion to compel plaintiff's deposition that counsel for defendant attempted to communicate with plaintiff in order to reschedule his deposition, and then properly noticed plaintiff's deposition for January 13, 2017 in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1). See Tanada Decl., Exs. 3-7; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). It is also apparent that substantial time has passed since those attempts to communicate with plaintiff with plaintiff refusing to alter his position that his obligation to appear for his deposition has been fulfilled, and that he is entitled to compensation for traveling to the December 5, 2016 deposition. While the frustration by plaintiff following the rescheduled December 5, 2016 deposition is understandable, that frustration does not provide a legitimate reason for his continued refusal to appear for a rescheduled deposition.
 
Accordingly, the court finds an order compelling plaintiff's deposition is warranted. As such, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to compel plaintiff's deposition. Within fourteen days of the entry of this order, plaintiff shall provide a date to counsel for defendant for appearing for his deposition. Absent a stipulation by the parties, such deposition shall take place no later than June 2, 2017.
 
D. Defendant's Motions for Sanctions
In his motion to compel plaintiff to provide answers to his interrogatories and RPDs, defendant moves for sanctions against plaintiff in the amount of $1,280. Docket no. 116 at 1; Angel Decl. 1, ¶ 14. In his motion to compel plaintiff's deposition, defendant moves for sanctions against plaintiff in the amount of $640. Docket no. 117 at 1; Angel Decl. 2, ¶ 2.
 
Sanctions in the form of attorney's fees must be imposed for failure to serve answers to interrogatories, failure to comply with requests for production, or failure to appear at a properly noticed deposition, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1), (3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) provides that the prevailing party on a discovery motion is entitled to an award of its reasonable expenses incurred in bringing or opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, except no payment should be ordered if other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5).
 
Local Rule 37-4 also provides that failure by a party to comply with or cooperate in the joint stipulation procedures required by Local Rule 37 for presenting discovery disputes to the court “may result in the imposition of sanctions.” Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(g)(1) permits a party to recover its reasonable expense for attending (or having its attorney attend) a deposition where the noticed party failed to appear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(g)(1).
 
*14 The parties have established, and the court has acknowledged, the strained relationship between plaintiff and counsel for defendant. The difficulties these parties face in effectively communicating during meet and confer efforts have contributed to the stalled discovery efforts currently affecting this case. The parties have also argued several of these breakdowns in communication are due to bad faith, gamesmanship, and other misconduct. The court finds both parties have contributed significantly to the unsuccessful discovery efforts so far. Thus, regardless of the propriety of plaintiff's conduct, the court finds an award of sanctions to defendant would be unjust here, especially in light of plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant, and in light of the fact plaintiff did once appear for deposition not knowing it had been rescheduled. The court therefore DENIES defendant's request for sanctions in both of the instant motions to compel.
 
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
 
1. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions against City of Beaumont (docket no. 115) is DENIED.
 
2. Defendant's motion to compel answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents (docket no. 116) is GRANTED;
 
3. Defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to appear for deposition (docket no. 117) is GRANTED; and
 
4. Defendant's requests for sanctions against plaintiff (docket no. 116 at 1; docket no. 117 at 1) are DENIED.
 
Moreover, in light of the time it may take for plaintiff to sit for deposition and produce the supplemental discovery responses and documents as ordered, the court again sua sponte extends the deadline for the parties to file substantive motions to June 13, 2017.

Footnotes
In its March 24, 2017 order, the court held plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing for hearing the application regarding his PRA request on shortened time and on an ex parte basis, but the court treated plaintiff's application as a regularly-noticed motion for purposes of the continued discovery cutoff.