*1 Before the Court is a motion to compel further discovery filed by Plaintiff Valena Allen (“Plaintiff”). (DN 55.) Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) has filed a response in opposition (DN 56), to which Plaintiff has filed a reply (DN 59). Therefore, the motion is ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on October 19, 2020 for claims related to denial of long-term disability benefits under her comprehensive short-term disability policy administered by LINA. (DN 1, at PageID # 4.) Plaintiff's claims against LINA include tortious interference with contract under Kentucky law and breach of contract under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Id., at PageID # 7–9.)

On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff served LINA her requests for production. (DN 55-2, at PageID # 535–36.) In relevant part, Plaintiff seeks production of:

(Id., at PageID # 535.)

On August 6, 2021, LINA served its responses. (DN 55-4, at PageID # 555–61.) In response to Request 4, LINA disclosed that its claims manual “consist of a series of internal online documents that provide guidelines for the administration of disability claims.” (Id., at PageID # 558.) LINA asserted that the manual “only provide[s] internal administrative guidelines for claim handling in general and [is] not plan specific” and that its determination of Plaintiff's benefits claim did not rely on any of the guidelines contained in the claims manual. (Id., at PageID # 559.) Because the claims manual contains information LINA treats as confidential, LINA stated that it would condition any production on the execution of a confidentiality agreement. (Id., at PageID # 558.) Given this, LINA agreed to produce the claims manual table of contents and confer with Plaintiff about producing any individual sections that are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. (Id.) LINA objected to Requests 7 and 8 as overbroad and irrelevant. (Id., at PageID #560.) The same day that she was served with the responses, Plaintiff emailed Defendant regarding the claims manual. (DN 56-4, at PageID # 591.) Plaintiff noted that a confidentiality agreement between the Parties was already in place and asserted that “it would be more efficient use of everyone's time and easier for LINA to simply produce the entire [claims manual]—mitigating arguments over what is relevant and also the odds of a motion to compel unnecessarily delaying the case further.” (Id.) Plaintiff also disputed LINA's “claim of burden, because the [claims manual] is maintained by LINA online as a document that can be easily produced.” (Id.) After several exchanges between the Parties regarding whether the entire claims manual is discoverable, Plaintiff narrowed her request, highlighting around eighty specific sections on the on the table of contents that she sought to discover. (DN 56-6, at PageID # 606–10.) LINA objected to Plaintiff's narrower request but produced a total of thirty-six sections in batches on August 18 and 23, 2021. (DN 56-7, at PageID # 612; DN 56-9, at PageID # 633.) LINA also explained the grounds on which it is withholding the remaining requested sections. (DN 56-9, at PageID # 633–37.) On August 23, 2021, Plaintiff wrote to LINA stating that her narrowed list “was a final effort to meet LINA in the middle” and that if LINA would not produce all documents, she would move to compel production. (DN 56-10, at PageID # 650.) On September 20, 2021, the Court held a telephonic status conference concerning the dispute. (DN 54.) After hearing the Parties’ description of the dispute, the Court granted leave for Plaintiff to proceed to motion practice and stayed briefing on LINA's motion for summary judgment (DN 25) pending a resolution of the dispute. (DN 54, at PageID # 515.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

*2 This Court maintains discretion over the scope of discovery. S.S. v. E. Ky Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981)). Generally speaking, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery responses therefore must be “complete and correct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(A). Upon a motion to compel discovery, “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks to discover the complete claims manual. (DN 55, at PageID # 522.) Plaintiff argues that LINA's unwillingness to produce the limited sections of the manual that she requested and the fact that the sections have “vague titles that do not allow someone to know exactly what information is contained therein” justify requiring LINA to produce all sections of the claims manual. (Id., at PageID # 521–22) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff also cites to two cases in which district courts in Alabama required LINA to produce its entire claims manual over LINA's objection. (DN 55, at PageID # 522–23.) In response, LINA argues that many of the sections of the manual that Plaintiff seeks are irrelevant. (DN 56, at PageID # 574–75.) LINA points to the list of withheld sections and the reasons each was withheld that it provided to Plaintiff and asserts that “Plaintiff has not identified any one of these policies that are necessary for her to respond to LINA's summary judgment motion or are relevant to her claim in general.” (Id., at PageID # 575.) LINA disputes Plaintiff's assertion that producing the manual is not burdensome, noting that the manual “is maintained in a series of almost 250 internal online documents, many of which contain embedded hyperlinks, which are periodically updated and revised.” (Id.) LINA also argues that producing the entire claims manual is not proportional to the needs of the case, citing an Alabama district court case that distinguishes the prior cases in which LINA was ordered to do so that Plaintiff cites because they “predate the 2015 amendment to Rule 26 requiring the assessment of proportionality regarding discovery requests.” (Id., at PageID # 575–76) (citing Order, Walker v. Life Insurance Company of North America, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131453 (N.D. Al. July 15, 2021) (No. 73).

In Walker, the plaintiff had propounded a request for production that mirrors Plaintiff's Request 4, and LINA, as it did here, agreed to produce the claims manual table of contents and to produce individual sections that it and the plaintiff agreed were relevant. Id. at 3. In ruling on the plaintiff's motion to compel production, the court found that under the 2015 proportionality amendment to Rule 26, “the court must heed defendant's representation that its [claims manual] do[es] not exist in hard copy form; rather, [it] comprise[s] 250 separate online documents, some referencing additional documents embedded via hyperlink.” Id. at 4. The court further noted that the manual “purportedly contain[s] sections regarding topics such as, ‘Accidental Injury Insurance (AI)/Critical Injury Insurance (CI),’ ‘Canadian Claim Handling,’ ‘Child Support and Spousal Payments,’ ‘Common Law Marriages,’ and ‘Competency and Guardianship,’ all of which ostensibly bear no relevance to plaintiff's claims.” Id. However, because LINA did not deny that the claims manual contained some relevant information, the court ordered LINA to produce relevant portions of the manual and to “list for plaintiff those portions of the [claims manual] table of contents from which it did not cull documents due to their irrelevance.” Id. at 5. Here, LINA has already done so. The court in Walker further ordered that “if plaintiff presumes defendant omitted relevant contents of the [claims manual], then the parties shall meet and confer about the supposed omissions.” Id. Here, the Parties have not exhausted this step, because when LINA provided the portions of the claims manual it deemed relevant and the reasons for withholding the remaining requested sections, Plaintiff refused to continue conferring about LINA's supposed omissions. Accordingly, the Court will not order LINA to produce the entire claims manual, and instead will order the Parties to meet and confer regarding the withheld sections addressed in Exhibit I to LINA's response to Plaintiff's motion to compel (DN 56-9). If they are unable to resolve any dispute after a good faith effort, they may request a telephonic status conference with the undersigned to discuss possible remedies.

*3 The Court notes that although the court in Walker expressly distinguished from two cases Plaintiff relies on in her motion based on the 2015 amendment to Rule 26, Plaintiff did not reference Walker in her motion nor did she address the distinction it recognized anywhere in her briefs. This is troubling given that Plaintiff's counsel were counsel of record for the plaintiff in Walker. The Court reminds counsel of their duty of candor to the Court and directs them to exercise diligence in recognizing the existence of pertinent legal authorities moving forward.

Plaintiff seeks production of documents material to LINA's licensing as a third-party administrator with Kentucky and Ohio. (DN 55-2, at PageID # 535.) Plaintiff asserts that LINA's licensing documents are relevant to her tortious interference claim, noting that her complaint alleges that LINA failed to comply with statutory licensing requirements for administrators. (DN 55, at PageID # 524–25) (citing DN 1, at PageID # 7.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]o the extent that LINA does not have the requisite licensing, then it necessarily follows that it was not permitted to administer [Plaintiff]’s claim and its actions resulted in injury to [Plaintiff]—the loss of her STD claims.” (Id., at PageID # 525) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In response, LINA argues that “[w]hether LINA was licensed as a third-party administrator has no bearing on whether it properly administered Plaintiff's STD claim.” (DN 56, at PageID # 577.) LINA also argues that the Kentucky insurance administrator licensing statute does not apply to Plaintiff's plan because “[d]isability benefits are not referenced in the statute.” (Id.) In reply, Plaintiff argues that the licensing requirement for health insurance administrators covers Plaintiff's plan because the statue defines “health insurance” as including “insurance of human beings against ... disablement” and recognizes that covered administrators may administer self-insured plans “such as the STD benefit plan here.” (DN 59, at PageID # 706) (citing K.R.S. §§ 304.9-051(1), 304.5-040, 304.17A-250). Plaintiff further argues that the Court need not decide whether LINA was required to comply with the licensing requirements because “[t]he issue goes to the merits of [her] claim, hence its relevance to her requested discovery.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).

The Court finds that LINA's Kentucky licensing documents are relevant for discovery purposes. Plaintiff alleges that “LINA is not, and has never been, licensed as an administrator with the Kentucky Department of Insurance.” (DN 1, at PageID # 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that “LINA's pecuniary interests were driven in significant by its goal to avoid liability for the long-term disability insurance policy and the life insurance policy disability benefits” and that LINA's failure to comply with administrator licensing requirements served those interests. (Id., at PageID # 7.) In its answer, “LINA admits [that it is not licensed as an administrator in Kentucky] and denies any implication or characterization that it is required to be licensed as an administrator with the Kentucky Department of Insurance.” (DN 9, at PageID # 42.) Thus, documents related to LINA's licensing as an administrator in Kentucky bear on issues in dispute, namely whether such licensing was required and whether the decision not to obtain licensing indicates a broader effort to avoid liability for disability claims like Plaintiff's. The Court notes that based on what has been presented, the importance of the licensing documents to resolving these issues is minimal. However, given that relevance for discovery purposes is broadly construed and that LINA has advanced no other argument as to why it should not be required to produce the documents, the Court will grant Plaintiff request with respect to these documents.

*4 Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish the relevancy of LINA's Ohio licensing documents. Plaintiff's plan was administered in Kentucky, Plaintiff's tortuous interference claim will be governed by Kentucky law, and the wrongful conduct that Plaintiff alleges is that LINA “fail[ed] to comply with Kentucky's licensing and notice requirements for administrators.” (DN 1, at PageID # 3, 7.) Plaintiff has provided no basis for a connection between her claims and LINA's Ohio licensing documents, and the Court sees none. Therefore, Plaintiff's request for these documents will be denied.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

November 22, 2021