*1 Plaintiff Vizio, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order for wide-ranging sanctions against Defendants Desay A&V Science & Technology Co. Ltd. (“Desay A&V”) and Desay Corporation (“Desay Corp.”) (together, “Defendants”) for their failure to comply with this Court's prior discovery orders as well as an order compelling Defendants to produce documents which they failed to produce in response to Plaintiff's RFPs. Dkt. 99. Plaintiff seeks terminating sanctions; evidentiary sanctions on the issue of alter ego liability; an order compelling further production of documents; an order compelling further deposition testimony from Jiang, Desay Corp.'s President and Chairman; and monetary sanctions. Dkt. 100 (“JS”) at 19. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

This motion arises out of an order issued on August 28, 2015, in which Defendants were ordered to produce the following documents:

Dkt. 79 at 1-2. Defendants sought review of this order. Dkt. 87. On October 2, 2015, Judge Selna denied Defendants' motion for review and ordered Defendants to produce the documents by no later than October 9, 2015. Dkt. 93-1 at 6.

The Court finds that Defendants violated the Court's orders. The record demonstrates that Defendants produced several responsive documents after the October 9, 2015 deadline. See, e.g., Dkt. 100-15 (identifying corporate resolutions produced by Defendants on February 4, 2016). Defendants' production of documents continued after Plaintiff drafted its portion of the Joint Stipulation in support of this motion. See Dkt. 107 at 3-4 (listing corporate resolutions and other responsive documents produced by Defendants on February 29, 2016).

Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides the Court with the power to issue such orders as are “just” when a party has failed to comply with discovery orders. Such orders may include the following:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii).

The Court need not find bad faith before imposing these sanctions. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We have not required a finding of bad faith on the part of the attorney before imposing sanctions under Rule 37.”); Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. 03-04447, 2008 WL 3833384, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (“Sanctions for violations of Rule 37 ... may be imposed for negligent conduct.”). Moreover, even if a party eventually complied with a discovery order, belated compliance does not preclude the imposition of sanctions. Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, No. 13-0654, 2015 WL 3442030, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2015); see also North Am. Watch Corp. v. Princess Ermine Jewels, 786 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff seeks terminating sanctions. JS at 19. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, “[a] terminating sanction, whether default judgment against a defendant or dismissal of a plaintiff's action, is very severe,” and “[o]nly willfulness, bad faith, and fault justify terminating sanctions.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing the sanction of dismissal as “harsh”); Computer Task Group, Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that where “the drastic sanctions of dismissal or default are imposed ... the range of discretion is narrowed and the losing party's noncompliance must be due to willfulness, fault, or bad faith”).

Courts apply a five-part test to determine whether a case-dispositive sanction is just:

Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1096. The Ninth Circuit has observed that where a court order is violated, the first and second factors support and the fourth factor weighs against case-dispositive sanctions, meaning that the third and fifth factors, prejudice and availability of less drastic sanctions, are often decisive. Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998).

*3 With respect to prejudice, “[t]he most critical factor to be considered in case-dispositive sanctions is whether a party's discovery violations make it impossible for a court to be confident that the parties will ever have access to the true facts.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412 (citing Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). Although delay alone is not enough to show prejudice, a “[f]ailure to produce documents as ordered ... is considered sufficient prejudice.” Id. (citing Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Seaboard Corp., 666 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Here, the Court concludes that terminating sanctions are not warranted. Even though the Court's finding that Defendants failed to produce documents as ordered is enough to show prejudice, it is clear that less drastic sanctions are available. See Matrix Motor Co. Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. 03-601, 2003 WL 22466218, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2003) (“[C]ourts will usually impose a dismissal sanction only when all other less drastic sanctions have failed to make the disobedient party comply with the court's discovery orders.”).

Plaintiff also seeks “issue sanctions as to the alter-ego relationship of the Defendants, or, alternatively, evidentiary sanctions relating to evidence vis-a-vis alter ego liability, issue sanctions as to the alter-ego relationship of the Defendants.” JS at 19. With its request for issue sanctions, Plaintiff in effect seeks an order prohibiting Defendants from contesting Plaintiff's claim that Desay Corp. is the alter ego of Desay A&V. The Court will not order an issue sanction. However, the Court believes that an evidentiary sanction is warranted. The Court accordingly GRANTS Plaintiff's motion in part and prohibits Plaintiff from introducing at trial any responsive documents not produced before October 9, 2015.[1] The Court finds that such an order is narrowly tailored to ameliorate any prejudice caused by Defendants' failure to produce documents in compliance with this Court's order.

Furthermore, the Court finds that Jiang should be produced for a second deposition under the same terms and conditions as previously imposed. Plaintiff should not have been forced to take Jiang's deposition without the documents produced after this Court's deadline, much less spend a considerable portion of Jiang's deposition exploring why documents had not been produced. Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to make Jiang available for a second day of deposition within twenty-one (21) days of this order in either the Central District of California or Hong Kong. To the extent Defendants choose the latter, they are ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for counsel's travel expenses consistent with the parties' previous arrangement as set forth in the Parties' Joint Statement filed on August 25, 2015. See Dkt. 75. Defendants are also ordered to reimburse for counsel's travel time at counsel's full hourly rate, with payment for such fees to be made within 30 days after presentation of an invoice upon completion of travel.

*4 Having found that Defendants failed to obey this Court's order, this Court “must” order the payment of monetary sanctions in the form of Plaintiff's attorney's fees associated with this sanctions motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to pay $22,455.00 as monetary sanctions under Federal Rule 37(b)(2)(C) to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) calendar days of today's date.

Two other aspects of Plaintiff's motion warrant separate attention. First, Plaintiff asks for an order compelling Defendants to produce documents responsive to RFP No. 17, citing Jiang's testimony that he did not search his e-mail for responsive documents. But this testimony does not establish that Jiang's e-mail was not searched, only that he did not do the searching himself, which would hardly be a surprise. This portion of Plaintiff's motion is accordingly DENIED.

Second, Plaintiff complains that certain documents are illegible. To the extent that those complaints remain unresolved, Defendants are ordered to make the original documents available for inspection within seven (7) days of this order.

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Initials of Clerk ts