*1 On November 19, 2014, Mecheal Cabessa, his wife Tova Cabessa, and their children U.C. and A.C., by and through the children's guardian ad litem, Devorah Lapin (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed the instant action raising violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and various state statutory and common law causes of action. Plaintiffs allege that they were wrongfully evicted from their apartment by Defendants, the owners and managers of the Burbank Blvd Apartments complex,[1] solely because U.C. and A.C. played outside in common areas of the complex and were noisy, and due to their familial status. (See Complaint, Dkt. No. 3, ¶¶ 12-29).

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Compel Defendants to Provide Supplemental Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production.”[2] As required by Local Rule 37-2, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation in support of and in opposition to the Motion (“Motion” or “MTC”), including the Declaration of Craig P. Fagan (“Fagan Decl.”) and a Request for Sanctions. (Dkt. No. 36). On August 6, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum.[3] (“Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 38). On August 26, 2015, the Court held a telephonic hearing. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiffs seek supplemental responses to four interrogatories (“Int.”) and six requests for production (“RFP”). The interrogatories seek contact information for all tenants who lived at or moved out of the complex during specified periods (Int. Nos. 1-2) and specifically ask Defendants to identify any such tenants who had minor children living with them (Int. Nos. 3-4). (MTC at 7-16). Defendants asserted boilerplate objections to the interrogatories on the grounds of undue burden, overbreadth, attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, third party privacy and irrelevance. (Id.).

Similarly, the requests for production ask Defendants to produce complete copies of all tenant applications for all residents of the complex at any time during the last three years (RFP No. 1). Plaintiffs also seek for the same period: orders to vacate that make reference to children or “family members of such tenant[s] engaging in various conduct” (RFP Nos. 5-6); any notices or correspondence with tenants for rules violations (RFP No. 9); written warnings based on “riding bikes, skateboards, scooters, or playing” (RFP No. 10); and email, notes and correspondence from the on-site manager at the complex to Defendants that refer to “the child of any tenant at the PROPERTY engaging in various behaviors at the PROPERTY” (RFP No. 13). (Id. at 16-25). Except for the omission of the irrelevance objection, Defendants asserted the same boilerplate objections to the requests for production that they asserted with respect to the interrogatories. In addition, however, Defendants also represented that they would produce documents responsive to the RFPs that were submitted by or delivered to Plaintiffs. (Id.).

*2 Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to learn the names and contact information of other tenants “to help support their claim that the complex was operated [with] a discriminatory practice toward children.” (Id. at 1). According to Plaintiffs, “[i]n fair housing cases like this one, courts permit discovery of information about other tenants.” (Id. at 8) (citing, inter alia, Zuniga v. Western Apartments, 2014 WL 2599919 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014); Marable v. H. Walker & Assoc., 644 F.2d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 1981)). Plaintiffs further contend that the right to privacy is not absolute and that a protective order can adequately protect any third party interests. (MTC at 9). Plaintiffs request as sanctions an award of attorney's fees for the costs of preparing the Motion and Supplemental Memorandum and appearing at the hearing. (Id. at 26).

Defendants primarily contend that the requested discovery violates the privacy rights of non-parties. (Id. at 2). Defendants maintain that the discovery requests seek “enormously private” information, either directly or to the extent included in tenant files, including the names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, number of children, social security numbers, and financial information (such as income disclosures and credit checks) pertaining to each of their tenants. (Id. at 3). Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs have not shown a “particularized need” for the information and complain that the discovery requested is “just a fishing expedition by lazy plaintiffs who have not made any effort to obtain the information through less intrusive means.” (Id. at 4). Finally, Defendants argue that at least 280 tenant files would have to be retrieved and reviewed to respond to Plaintiffs' requests, which would require “600 to 700 hours of clerical time, not counting time for lawyer review, to respond to all of these requests” and cost somewhere in the range of $15,000-$18,000.[4] (Id. at 6). Finally, Defendants contend that sanctions are not warranted because they justifiably challenged the requests based on the privacy rights of their tenants and the disproportionate cost of compliance. (Id. at 26-27).

A. Scope Of Permissible Discovery

A party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense -- including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is construed broadly to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.” Chavez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 206 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis added); see also E.E.O.C. v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 343, 349-50 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“[T]he concept of relevance is different for purposes of discovery than for admissibility at trial ....”).

Nonetheless, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. “A court can limit discovery if it determines, among other things, that the discovery is: (1) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (2) obtainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, 235 F.R.D. 553, 558 (D. Conn. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The party resisting discovery bears the burden of demonstrating that its objections should be sustained. Id.

B. Privacy

*3 “Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing cases). “Unlike a privilege, the right of privacy is not an absolute bar to discovery. Rather, courts balance the need for the information against the claimed privacy right.” Lind v. United States, 2014 WL 2930486 at *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2014); see also E.E.O.C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 258 F.R.D. 391, 395 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he right to privacy is not a recognized privilege or absolute bar to discovery, but instead is subject to the balancing of needs.”); Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616 (“Resolution of a privacy objection or request for a protective order requires a balancing of the need for the information sought against the privacy right asserted.”).

A. Interrogatories

Rule 33 governs the use of interrogatories as a discovery device in federal courts. Like all discovery requests, interrogatories must be “reasonably calculated” to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting generally that district courts “need not condone the use of discovery to engage in ‘fishing expedition[s]’ ”). Overly broad and unduly burdensome interrogatories “are an abuse of the discovery process” and are routinely denied. See, e.g., Lucero v. Valdez, 240 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D. N.M. 2007) (interrogatories requiring responding party to state “each and every fact” supporting the party's contentions impermissibly overbroad). Furthermore, the court is not obligated to impose limiting constructions on interrogatories that are overbroad, vague, or seek irrelevant information, but may simply deny the request to compel further responses. See, e.g., Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC, 2012 WL 1633178, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2012) (declining to “rewrite” overbroad interrogatories or order supplemental response).

A party must respond to interrogatories by answer or objection; objections must clearly state the reason for the objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b). General or boilerplate objections are improper, especially when unaccompanied by evidentiary declarations supporting such objections. A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3). A motion to compel may be granted if a party provides an evasive or incomplete interrogatory response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), 37(a)(4).

The Court rules as follows on the four disputed interrogatories:

• Interrogatory No. 1: The name and last known address of each tenant who lived at the COMPLEX ... at anytime between January 1, 2012 and November 19, 2014.

The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Interrogatory No. 1, subject to an appropriate protective order.

• Interrogatory No. 2: The last known name and address of each tenant who moved out of the COMPLEX at anytime in the last 15 months.

The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Interrogatory No. 2, subject to an appropriate protective order.

• Interrogatory No. 3: Please identify the name, telephone number, and apartment number of any tenant at the COMPLEX who has minor children living with them. 

*4 Information disclosing the identities of current tenants with minor children is plainly relevant. However, Plaintiffs have failed to show that their alleged need for the tenants' telephone numbers outweighs the tenants' privacy interest in the same. See Lawrence v. Hoban Management, Inc., 305 F.R.D. 589, 593 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (denying request for tenants' telephone numbers in fair housing action where plaintiffs already possessed the relevant tenants' names and addresses) (citing, inter alia, Zuniga, 2014 WL 2599919, at *3). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Interrogatory No. 3. Defendants shall disclose the name and apartment number of any current tenants at the complex who have minor children living with them, subject to an appropriate protective order. However, Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks the telephone numbers of such tenants. However, Defendants shall not include the tenants' telephone numbers in their response.

For the reasons stated with respect to Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART with respect to Interrogatory No. 4. Defendants shall disclose the name and last known forwarding address of any tenants who moved out of the complex within the last fifteen months who had minor children living with them during the time they resided at the complex. However, Defendants shall not include the tenants' telephone numbers in their response.

B. Requests for Production

Pursuant to Rule 34, any party may serve on any other party a request for the production of documents. Rule 34(b) requires the requesting party to describe the items to be produced with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 219 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘All-encompassing demands’ that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 256 F.R.D. 151, 157 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

Following a reasonable investigation to locate responsive materials, a responding party must serve a written response to each request either (1) stating that the materials requested will be produced, in whole or in part; (2) affirming that no responsive documents exist in the party's possession, custody or control, or (3) posing an objection to the request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate objections are insufficient to assert a privilege).

The Court rules as follows on the six disputed RFPs:

Some, but not all, of the information sought is relevant to the matters at issue in this litigation. Plaintiffs' Motion is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART with respect to RFP No. 1. Defendants shall produce copies of its tenants' applications for the period requested, but shall redact any reference to the applicants' social security numbers, birthdays, financial information, telephone numbers, or other protected information.

*5 The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to RFP No. 5.

Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED with respect to RFP No. 6. The Interrogatory, as phrased, is impermissibly vague, ambiguous, and potentially overbroad. Accordingly, Defendants are not required to supplement their responses to RFP No. 6.

The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to RFP No. 9.

• RFP No. 10: All written warning notices that were given by YOU to any tenant at the PROPERTY for house rules violations at anytime in the last three years, which warning makes reference to someone riding bikes, skateboards, scooters, or playing.

The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to RFP No. 10.

The information sought is relevant and appropriately circumscribed. Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED with respect to RFP No. 13, as amended by the following clarification. Defendants shall produce emails, letters, notes, or correspondence that specifically describe or refer to the behavior of the child of any tenant sent during the period requested by an on-site property manager at the complex to any named Defendant.

C. Sanctions

Plaintiffs seek sanctions of attorney's fees incurred for the time spent preparing and arguing the instant Motion to Compel. (MTC at 26). Defendants contend that sanctions are unwarranted because they “showed proper loyalty to their tenants by asserting privacy claims on behalf of those tenants.” (Id.).

Rule 37 provides in relevant part:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Conversely, if the discovery motion is denied, the court must require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in opposing the motion. Id. 37(a)(5)(B). Finally, if the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Id. 37(a)(5)(B).

*6 However, if the opposing party can demonstrate “substantial justification” for its nondisclosure or opposition, Rule 37 provides that the court must deny sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii). “There is no bright line standard for ‘substantial justification,’ and courts must use discretion when deciding whether opposition to a motion to compel is substantially justified.” Brown v. State of Iowa, 152 F.R.D. 168, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1993). “[C]ourts have generally focused on ‘the quality of the justification and the genuineness of the dispute [and whether] an impartial observer would agree that a party had good reason to withhold discovery[ ]’ when determining whether opposition is substantially justified.” Id. (quoting Alvarez v. Wallace, 107 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D. Tex. 1985)). In addition to a party's substantial justification for opposing a motion, the court may also deny sanctions if the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery without court action or if other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i) & (iii).

Here, Plaintiffs' Motion is granted in part and denied in part. While Plaintiffs are entitled to some of the information sought, Defendants appropriately objected to certain of Plaintiffs' requests, or parts of Plaintiffs' requests, to protect their tenants' privacy interests. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court ORDERS the parties to submit a joint proposed protective order within fourteen days of the date of this Order. Defendants shall serve supplemental responses to Interrogatories Nos. 1-4 and Requests for Production Nos. 1, 5, 9, 10 and 13, as required by this Order, within fourteen days after the Court approves and issues a protective order. Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions is DENIED.

Defendants Burbank Blvd Apartments Owner, LLC; Premier Burbank Fee Owners, LLC; JB Partners Group, Inc. (erroneously sued as “JB Partners Group, LLC”); and The Laramar Group, LLC jointly answered the Complaint on December 30, 2014. (Dkt. No. 17).

Although the Motion as captioned suggests that it seeks further responses from “Defendants,” and Defendants collectively opposed the Motion in the Joint Stipulation, the Notice of Motion states that Plaintiffs are moving to compel supplemental discovery responses specifically from Defendant The Laramar Group, LLC. Accordingly, all references to “Defendants” in this Order shall be understood to mean The Laramar Group, LLC.

Defendants did not file a supplemental memorandum.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs challenged Defendants' estimate of the total number of files to be reviewed on the ground that 280 tenant files would mean that every unit in the complex would have turned over almost six times during the three-year period for which discovery is requested.