*1 On March 5, 2021, Eric Gold, individually and on behalf of his wife Marcy Kaplan Gold (“Plaintiffs”), filed suit against David Kaplan, Hannah Kaplan (collectively herein referred to jointly as “Defendants”), B. Robert Gassman & Associates, the Estate of B. Robert Gassman, Lauren Freedman, and Does 1-50 in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles alleging the defendants engaged in a scheme to wrongfully deprive Plaintiffs of distributions worth millions of dollars from a Family Partnership that Plaintiff Marcy Kaplan Gold co-owned with her sister and parents. Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint”). In summary, Plaintiffs allege that in 2018, defendants distributed partnership funds owed to Plaintiffs to an entity named the “Marcy Kaplan Gold Trust,” an entity of which Plaintiffs had no prior knowledge despite the trust bearing the same name as Plaintiff Marcy Kaplan Gold. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs allege the creation of the Marcy Kaplan Gold Trust is evidence of a larger scheme by defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their share of the Family Partnership funds in light of Plaintiff Marcy Kaplan Gold's Alzheimer's diagnosis. Id. ¶ 41. The Complaint alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy, professional negligence, violations of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and accounting. On April 14, 2021, the action was removed to this Court. Dkt. 1.

On April 21, 2021 and May 3, 2021, defendants B. Robert Gassman & Associates and Lauren Freedman and Defendants respectively filed two separate motions to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for forum non conveniens. Dkt. 12, 15 (“Motions to Dismiss”). On June 21, 2021, the Honorable Fernando Aenlle-Rocha, United States District Judge, took the Motions to Dismiss under submission. Dkt. 43. To date, the Motions to Dismiss remain pending.

On September 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. 51 (“Motion”)) with an accompanying Local Rule 37-2 Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 51-2 (“Joint Stipulation” or “Jt. Stip.”)) and evidence (Dkt. 51-1), originally noticed for hearing on October 14, 2021. In the Motion, Plaintiffs request the Court order Defendants to: (1) produce all documents responsive to Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 1-38[1]; (2) respond to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1-11; and (3) pay Plaintiffs' reasonable expenses in making the Motion, including attorney's fees.

*2 On September 24, 2021, the Court continued the hearing sua sponte to December 2, 2021, ordered the parties to file any Optional Local Rule 37-2.3 Supplemental Memoranda by September 30, 2021, and directed further briefing regarding the request for reasonable expenses. Dkt. 52. Plaintiffs filed their Local Rule 37-2.3 Supplemental Memorandum on September 30 (Dkt. 54 (“Mem.”)), but Defendants failed to timely file an optional supplemental memorandum, instead requesting an extension to so file (Dkt. 53), which the Court denied (Dkt. 55). On October 8, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Declaration of Counsel and evidence supporting their request for a Rule 37(a)(5) award. Dkt. 56 (“Declaration of David Kim” or “Kim Decl.”); 56-1; 56-2. Defendants did not file a timely response thereto.

On December 2, 2021 at 10:00 a.m., the Motion came on regularly for hearing, with counsel making appearances, confirming receipt of a tentative ruling, and were heard. Following such hearing and having considered all of the evidence and argument offered in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court now rules as follows.

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). Relevance under Rule 26(b)(1) is defined broadly. See Snipes v. United States, 334 F.R.D. 548, 550 (N.D. Cal. 2020); V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019) (noting that relevance for discovery purposes remains broad even after the 2015 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, “[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Although relevance for discovery purposes is defined very broadly, it is not without boundaries. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in ‘fishing expeditions.’ ”); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)); Rule 26(b)(2). District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes. Mfg. Automation & Software Sys., Inc. v. Hughes, 2017 WL 5641120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Pursuant to Rule 33, “[a]n interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Rule 33(a)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by examining a party's business records, and “if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party,” the responding party may answer by specifying (and making available) the records in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the propounding party. Rule 33(d). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Rule 33(b)(4); see Moore v. Gipson, 2018 WL 746489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (“[O]bjections should be plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the interrogatories are alleged to be objectionable.” (quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981))).

*3 Under Rule 34(a)(1), a party may serve on any other party requests, within the scope of Rule 26(b), to produce or permit inspection of, among other things, “any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Such requests “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection ....” Rule 34(b)(1)(A), (B). The party responding to a request for production must, for “each item or category,” “either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C).

“Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” U.S. v. McGraw–Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”); Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Further, objections asserted in discovery responses but not raised in briefing on a discovery motion are also waived. MarketLinx, Inc. v. Indus. Access Inc., 2013 WL 12133884, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2013) (noting “objections that were raised in response to a particular discovery request, but were not argued in the [j]oint [s]tipulation, are deemed waived”) (citing Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 662 (D. Kan. 1999) (“When ruling upon a motion to compel, the court generally considers those objections which have been timely asserted and relied upon in response to the motion. It generally deems objections initially raised but not relied upon in response to the motion as abandoned.”)).

Parties responding to discovery should use common sense and attribute ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests. Advanced Visual Image Design, LLC v. Exist, Inc., 2015 WL 4934178, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) (citing Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 606 (S.D. Cal. 2012)); see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 618-19 (D. Colo. 2007) (finding parties have an “obligation to construe ... discovery requests in a reasonable manner”); King-Hardy v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 32506294, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2002) (finding the responding party must give discovery requests a reasonable construction, rather than strain to find ambiguity); McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000) (“A party responding to discovery requests should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized ...” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A party objecting based on vagueness or ambiguity must explain the objection. See NexGen HBM, Inc. v. ListReports, Inc., 2018 WL 6438572, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (rejecting the defendants' objections that numerous terms are “vague or ambiguous” given that they “offer no argument to support the objection,” (citing Jones v. Cooper, 2010 WL 2816323, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (“To the extent that [the] [p]laintiff objects to the request on the ground that it is vague, ambiguous, or overbroad, [he] must explain how the request is vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.”))).

Rule 37 outlines the procedure for filing a Motion to Compel Disclosure or Discovery as well as the potential consequences for failing to comply with a court issued discovery order. Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides that if the motion to compel is granted, the moving party may be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's fees incurred in making the motion. However, the court must not order the payment if (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Id.

*4 For the following reasons, the Court overrules all of Defendants' objections to the requests at issue and grants Plaintiffs' Motion in its entirety for the reasons set forth below.

A. Defendants' Objections Based on the Pending Motions to Dismiss Are, Based on the Current Record, Overruled

Defendants generally object to each request at issue in Plaintiffs' Motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs should be precluded from discovery until the Court rules on Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss. Jt. Stip. at 5. Defendants did not request a stay of discovery from Judge Aenlle-Rocha (id. at 2), nor, in the current circumstances, will the assigned Magistrate Judge now order one. See Rago v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 2020 WL 6162798, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020) (observing that a stay of discovery is a case management issue reserved for the District Judge, requiring any request to stay discovery be filed with the District Judge). Further, Defendants' argument that discovery cannot commence until the Court rules on their pending Motion to Dismiss is inconsistent with Judge Aenlle-Rocha's Civil Standing Order (Revised on 9/30/21) (available at http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/honorable-fernando-l-aenlle-rocha), which states, “[u]nless there is a likelihood that, upon motion by a party, the court would order that discovery be stayed, the parties should begin to propound discovery before the Scheduling Conference. The parties must comply fully with the letter and spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and produce discovery promptly.”

Here, Defendants could have, but did not, seek a stay of discovery from the District Judge. They may not impose a unilateral “self-help” stay by simply objecting and refusing to provide substantive discovery responses while the Motions to Dismiss are pending. See Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 334 F.R.D. 275, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for an automatic stay of discovery when a motion to dismiss is pending.”); Dean v. Gonzales, 2013 WL 4647968, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2013) (“Defendants are not relieved from their obligation to respond to plaintiff's [discovery requests] solely because a motion to dismiss was pending.”); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. NAES, Inc., 2010 WL 2161786, at *4 (D. Nev. May 4, 2010) (“The filing of a motion to dismiss does not automatically stay discovery and was not a valid basis for objection [to plaintiff's discovery requests].”); Holmes v. McMillan, 2009 WL 10673424, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2009) (granting Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery despite Defendant's pending motion to dismiss because Defendants never sought to stay discovery and district courts have discretion to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss) (citing Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1993)).

The Court accordingly overrules Defendants' objections to the discovery at issue in Plaintiffs' Motion predicated on Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss.

B. Plaintiff Eric Gold has Standing to Bring this Motion

Defendants appear to assert that Plaintiff Eric Gold lacks standing to bring this Motion because he does not have an interest in the Family Partnership at issue in the suit. Jt. Stip. at 4. This argument lacks merit because the party seeking discovery has standing to move to compel compliance with a discovery request. Progressive Specialty Ins. v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 2019 WL 956794, at *1 (D. Idaho Feb. 27, 2019) (“Both the Ninth Circuit and the plain language of Rule 37 make clear that only the party ‘seeking discovery’ has standing to move to compel compliance with a discovery request.” (citing Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1997))). Plaintiff Eric Gold propounded discovery requests upon Defendants and thus can now move to compel compliance with those requests. Accordingly, Defendants' contention that Plaintiff Eric cannot sue on Plaintiff Marcy's behalf regarding the contested 2018 distribution because Plaintiff Marcy's power of attorney was not executed until 2020 (Jt. Stip. at 4-5) has no bearing on Plaintiff Eric's ability to bring this Motion when Plaintiff Eric propounded the discovery requests at issue.

C. Plaintiffs' Requests Seek Relevant Information

*5 Defendants generally object to Plaintiffs' Motion to the extent it seeks to compel production of documents dating from 2015-2017, arguing that such documents are not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims centered on the 2018 distribution of the Family Trust. Jt. Stip. at 7-8. Plaintiffs assert documents prior to 2018 are relevant to their claims because “defendants have engaged in unlawful conduct as part of an ongoing scheme to secret away Family LP assets in which Marcy holds an interest in order to ensure that Plaintiff, in light of Marcy's Alzheimer's diagnosis, has no access to those assets.” Id. at 12. Moreover, Plaintiffs further claim that “the full extent of Defendants' misconduct and the resulting injury to Plaintiffs is currently impossible to determine because of Defendants' misconduct and refusal to provide adequate documentation to plaintiffs.” Complaint ¶¶ 41-42.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' proffer of relevance regarding matters dating back to 2015 meets the low threshold of “relevance” as defined in Rule 26, and further finds that Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating why discovery should be precluded on this basis. See Uchytil on behalf of U.S. v. Avande, Inc., 2018 WL 4150889, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2018) (“Defendants also argue that discovery beyond contracts specified in the [complaint] would reach outside the scope of the pleadings... [Plaintiff] sufficiently alleges ‘details of a scheme to submit false claims' along with examples of such claims that indicate that ‘claims were actually submitted’ during the relevant time period [to permit discovery].”). Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants' relevance objections on discovery dating back to 2015, and Defendants are thus ordered to produce documents responsive to Plaintiffs' requests dating from 2015 to present.

Defendants also refused to respond to RFP Nos. 33 and 34 seeking discovery concerning distributions from the Family Trust made to Heidi Rubin, Plaintiff Marcy's sister, on the grounds that such discovery seeks irrelevant information because Rubin is not a party to the suit. Jt. Stip. at 148. Plaintiffs counter that the requests indeed seek relevant information because even though Plaintiff Marcy and Rubin each owned a 49.5% ownership stake in the Family Trust, in 2018 the Trust distributed $1 million to Plaintiff Marcy and $1.5 million to Rubin. Id. at 146. A request for documents in a party's possession concerning a non-party to the suit may meet the broad definition of relevance, particularly when the request seeks “comparator” evidence. See Lauer v. Longevity Med. Clinic PLLC, 2014 WL 5471983, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2014). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' communications and documents relating to distributions made to Rubin may demonstrate Defendants' motive in making unequal distributions as well as the existence of other unequal distributions between Rubin and Plaintiff Marcy. Jt. Stip. at 146. The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs' proffer of relevance crosses the low threshold established under Rule 26, and that Defendants' argument that discovery should not be allowed on this matter lacks merit because information in their possession, custody, or control regarding Rubin is relevant for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants' relevance objections to RFP Nos. 33 and 34.

D. Plaintiffs' Requests Are Proportional to the Needs of the Case

Defendants generally object to each request at issue in Plaintiffs' Motion on the basis that producing documents responsive to the RFPs at issue dating from 2015-2017 would result in a “fishing expedition” and be disproportional to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b). See, e.g., Jt. Stip. at 8, 150. The responding party must demonstrate that the discovery sought would be unduly burdensome to produce. Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 306 F.R.D. 293, 301 (S.D. Cal. 2015). In order to satisfy this burden, the responding party must provide sufficient detail regarding the time, money, and procedures required to produce the requested documents. Id. Conclusory, unsupported statements of expense and burden are insufficient to demonstrate why the requested discovery is objectionable. Sung Gon Kang v. Credit Bureau Connection, Inc., 2020 WL 1689708, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020). Here, Defendants argue that discovery dating back to 2015 would be unduly burdensome to produce when Plaintiffs' claims are centered on distributions made in 2018, but Defendants offer no further explanation or evidence as to why such a request is burdensome. See, e.g., Jt. Stip. at 16. Defendants thus have only made conclusory statements that discovery from 2015-2017 is disproportional to the needs of the case and have not made any specific allegations regarding the time, money, and procedures required to produce the requested documents. Conversely, Plaintiffs have articulated why such discovery is proportional to the needs of the case by analyzing each proportionality factor stated in Rule 26(b). See, e.g., id. at 13. Furthermore, as stated above, discovery dating back to 2015 is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims alleging an ongoing scheme orchestrated by Defendants. Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate why producing discovery dating back to 2015 would be unduly burdensome and because such discovery is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, the Court finds that the requested discovery is proportional to the needs of the case after carefully balancing the factors set forth in Rule 26(b). See Voelker v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2020 WL 6149553, at *4 (D. Mont. Oct. 20, 2020) (finding that a request for “comparator data from 2015 to the present is a sufficiently narrow timeframe”); Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 2018 WL 6164271, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2018) (finding the requests at issue proportional to the needs of the case as the requests were limited to documents dating between a period of six years and were relevant to plaintiff's claims, and the defendant had not provided any specific information to show that responding to the requests would cause undue burden).

*6 Furthermore, with respect to RFP Nos. 15, 26, 31, and 32, which respectively seek discovery of “all bank account statements of the Kaplan Family Limited Partnership from January 1, 2015 to present,” “documents relating to distributions, disbursements, transfers, or other monies paid by the Marcy Kaplan Gold LP Trust to or on behalf of its beneficiaries from January 1, 2015 to present,” “documents relating to any entity ... in which Marcy Kaplan Gold currently owns an interest,” and “documents relating to any entity ... in which Marcy Kaplan Gold previously owned an interest from January 1, 2016 to present,” Defendants claim these requests are overbroad to the extent they seek production of “all documents” or documents depicting “every” transaction. Jt. Stip. at 82, 127, 141. Although the unrestrictive use of omnibus terms such as “related to” or “concerning” may in some circumstances cause requests for production to be overly broad or stated without reasonable particularity, a request will not be objectionable solely because of the use of such terms if they modify a sufficiently specific type of information or group of documents. Moser v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., 2018 WL 6735710, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018). Here, the subject matters of the listed RFPs are sufficiently narrow so as to not render them facially overbroad. Thus, because Defendants offer no evidence of undue burden, the Court does not find the RFPs to be overly broad or disproportional to the needs of the case.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants' proportionality objections with respect to all the RFPs and Interrogatories at issue in the Motion.

E. Defendants' Objection that RFP No. 7 Fails to Describe the Documents Sought with Reasonable Particularity Lacks Merit

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' request for “Communications relating to Marcy Kaplan Gold's interest in any entity in which you have any direct or indirect control from January 1, 2015 to present” fails to describe with reasonable particularity the records sought as required by Rule 34. Jt. Stip. at 33. The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not. Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012). A request for all documents related to specified subjects does not necessarily violate Rule 34's reasonable particularity requirement if the specified subject is sufficiently narrowly and clearly defined. See Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2017 WL 1101799, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017). Here, Plaintiffs' request for all communications relating to a narrow subject matter, limited in two distinct ways, sufficiently describes the documents sought with reasonable particularity. The objection is overruled.

F. Defendants' Limited Production of Responsive Documents Does not Render the Motion Moot as to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2

Defendants contend that part of the Motion is moot as to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 because Defendants produced documents sufficient to respond to the interrogatories for the tax years of 2018, 2019, and 2020. Jt. Stip. at 164-65, 171. A motion to compel may become moot when the moving party concedes that the responding party has responded to the propounded discovery requests. See Brown v. Diaz, 2018 WL 6112553, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2018). Plaintiffs concede that Defendants produced a limited amount of documents on September 17, 2021, after Plaintiffs served their portion of the Joint Stipulation, consisting of tax returns and Forms K-1 for the 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax years, but argue this production was “simply insufficient” to respond to their discovery requests. Mem. at 4-5.

Rule 33(d) authorizes, in limited circumstances and with several qualifications, a party responding to an interrogatory to answer by specifying, in its verified response, business records from which the answer may be ascertained, if the burden to ascertain the answer is substantially the same for both the propounding and the responding party. See Rule 33(d). Here, Defendants did not cite to Rule 33(d) in response to Interrogatory Nos. 1 or 2, nor does Defendant cite to Rule 33(d) in the Joint Stipulation. As Defendants do not purport to rely on Rule 33(d), their belated effort to point to records does not “moot” the dispute as to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2. Defendants' “mootness” objection is overruled. Defendants must substantively respond to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2.

G. Defendants' Vagueness Objection as to Interrogatory No. 3 Lacks Merit

*7 Special Interrogatory No. 3 states, “Describe in detail the formula or method used to determine how distributions, disbursements, payments, or transfers of assets out of the Kaplan Family Limited Partnership are made.” Defendants object on the grounds the request seeks irrelevant information relating to distributions not alleged in the Complaint and disproportional to the needs of the case, and that the terms “formula” and “method” are vague and unclear. Jt. Stip. at 171-72. As stated above, the interrogatory seeks relevant information regarding an alleged ongoing scheme, and the request is proportional to the needs of the case in light of the Rule 26(b) proportionality factors. Regarding Defendants' vagueness objection, “[t]he party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show vagueness or ambiguity by demonstrating that more tools beyond mere reason and common sense are necessary to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases.” Local.com Corp. v. Fry's Elecs., Inc., 2013 WL 12139096, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (quoting Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1030 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). Here, Defendants have not articulated how these terms are vague. To the contrary, the terms used can be understood by applying common sense definitions to the supposedly vague terms. Accordingly, the Court overrules Defendants' relevancy and vagueness objections to Interrogatory No. 3 and orders Defendants to respond using common sense definitions of the terms “formula” and “method.” See Bell v. Mahoney, 2021 WL 4551863, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2021) (observing that the responding party must interpret requests in a “common-sense fashion”).

H. Objections Not Asserted in the Joint Stipulation as to RFP Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 and Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, and 7 Are Waived

Defendants objected to RFP Nos. 9 and 10 on relevance grounds and RFP Nos. 11 and 12 for failing to describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity. Defendants also objected to Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, and 7 on the grounds that these interrogatories seek information subject to the attorney-client privilege. Jt. Stip. at 185, 188-89. However, in their sections of the Joint Stipulation discussing these RFPs and interrogatories, Defendants did not argue the relevance objection with respect to RFP Nos. 9 and 10, the reasonable particularity objection with respect to RFP Nos. 11 and 12, or the privilege objection with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, and 7. All objections that are raised in response to a particular discovery request that are not argued in the Joint Stipulation are deemed waived. Herbalife Int'l of Am., Inc. v. Ford, 2009 WL 10715605, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009) (overruling objections not argued in the Joint Stipulation); see also Anders v. United Airlines Inc., 2020 WL 8575132, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2020) (assuming that responding party waived the objections it did not argue in the Joint Stipulation). Accordingly, because Defendants did not argue the stated objections in their respective portions of the Joint Stipulation, the Court deems these objections as waived.

As all objections to the RFPs and Interrogatories at issue that were properly asserted and argued by Defendants have been overruled, the Motion is granted in its entirety as to the discovery requests at issue.

I. An Award of Reasonable Expenses Is Warranted

Plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in bringing the Motion. Motion at 2. Plaintiffs have also submitted evidence in support of the request. See generally, Kim Decl. Defendants filed no response to the Kim Declaration despite being provided an opportunity to do so. See Dkt. 52 at 2 (“If an opposing party files a such declaration seeking an award of reasonable expenses including attorney's fees in connection with the Motion within 14 days of the date of this Order, any party opposing such request shall file an Objection within 7 days thereafter, setting forth any challenge to the propriety or amount of such request, including any argument that the opposing party did not meet and confer in good faith before the filing of the Motion, or that the party against whom an award was sought acted with substantial justification, or that other circumstances exist that would make such an award unjust.”). At the hearing, Defendants argued they acted with substantial justification in standing on objections based on the pending Motion to Dismiss and time period restrictions.

*8 Under Rule 37(a)(5), if a motion to compel is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” As noted, the Court provided Defendants an opportunity to oppose the request, including by making a written showing as to why Defendants “acted with substantial justification,” but Defendants did not do so in writing. Defendants did argue at the hearing that two of their objections, based on the pending Motion to Dismiss and based on the timeframe of the requests, were made with substantial justification, but for the reasons stated above, the Court finds those objections, in this context, were without merit and do not constitute substantial justification for Defendants' failure to properly respond to the discovery requests at issue.

As Plaintiffs prevailed on the substance of the Motion, and Defendants, having had an opportunity to be heard, have not shown that Plaintiffs failed to properly meet and confer before filing the Motion, that Defendants acted with substantial justification, or that an award would be unjust under the circumstances here, the Court finds an award of reasonable expenses is warranted. The Court turns to the reasonableness of the amount of such an award.

Reasonable attorneys' fees are generally calculated based on the traditional “lodestar” method. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the lodestar method, the Court determines a reasonable fee by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” by “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The reasonableness of hours expended depends on the specific circumstances of each case. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. A prevailing party in a discovery dispute seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of proving that the fees and costs taxed are reasonably necessary to achieve the result obtained. Laub v. Horbaczewski, 2020 WL 10817057, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020).

The Court “has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee and, as a general rule, [an appellate court] will defer to its determination ... regarding the reasonableness of the hours claimed.” Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In reviewing the hours claimed, the Court may exclude hours related to overstaffing, duplication, and excessiveness, or that are otherwise unnecessary. See, e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Cruz v. Alhambra School Dist., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (observing “the Court must eliminate from the lodestar time that was unreasonably, unnecessarily, or inefficiently” spent); Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. Co., Ltd., 2013 WL 5324787, *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013) (“While attorneys and their clients are free to staff matters as they see fit [citation], they are not entitled to recover fees as a sanctions for hours that are deemed to be excessive.”).

Here, Plaintiffs' counsel attests he is an associate with an hourly billing rate of $540. Kim Decl. ¶¶ 1, 2. Based on the Court's knowledge of the prevailing rates for legal work in this area, the Court finds that such an hourly rate for the work performed is not unreasonable for this legal market. Counsel also set forth the amount of hours incurred in connection with the Motion, including in drafting the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, and the Declaration in support of the fee request. Further, Counsel appeared at the hearing involving recoverable time. At the hearing, Plaintiffs reduced their requested award to $7,500. Counsel for Defendants at the hearing, although contesting whether a fee award was warranted generally, as discussed above, agreed that a fee award in the amount of $7,500 was not unreasonable. The Court independently finds the request for expenses, including attorney's fees, of $7,500 is reasonable. Such an award represents, at a billing rate of $540 per hour, a total of less than 14 hours spent on drafting the more than 200-page Joint Stipulation, the 5-page Supplemental Memorandum, the Declaration of counsel in support of the fee award, and attending the hearing.

*9 Having reviewed the billing entries and having independent knowledge of the quality of the work performed by counsel in connection with the Motion, the Court finds an award of expenses, including attorney's fees, of $7,500 is reasonable and warranted here under Rule 37(a)(5).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion (Dkt. 51) in its entirety and accordingly ORDERS Defendants David Kaplan and Hannah Kaplan to, within 14 days from the date of this Order: (1) Serve upon Plaintiffs verified fully responsive answers, without objections, to each Interrogatory briefed in the Joint Stipulation; and (2) Produce to Plaintiffs all documents in their possession, custody, or control responsive to each Request for Production briefed in the Joint Stipulation (see fn. 1, supra), excluding documents withheld based on a claim of privilege not addressed in the Motion or this Order.

In addition, as discussed above, the Court also finds an award of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, in the amount of $7,500 is warranted and ORDERS Defendants David Kaplan and Hannah Kaplan to deliver payment of such amount to counsel for Plaintiffs within 14 days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____ : 15

Initials of Clerk: mba

The Court notes that the 203-page Joint Stipulation is internally inconsistent with respect to what RFPs and Interrogatories are at issue, presenting complications to the Court. For example, at page 24 of the Joint Stipulation, a heading refers to RFP Nos. 3-5, but immediately thereafter RFP. Nos 4-6, and the responses thereto, are presented, without RFP No. 3. See Jt. Stip. at 24-26. The very next heading refers to RFP No. 6, but immediately thereunder the body of the Joint Stipulation refers to the text and response to RFP No. 7. See Jt. Stip. at 32-33; see also Jt. Stip. at 101-102 (heading referring to RFP Nos. 19 and 25, but body referring to RFP Nos. 19 and 20); 108-09 (heading referring to RFP No. 21, but body referring to RFP No. 22); 114-15 (heading referring to RFP Nos. 21 and 27, but body referring to RFP Nos. 23 and 24); 121-22 (heading referring to RFP Nos. 22 and 28, but body referring to RFP Nos. 25 and 26); 127-28 (heading referring to RFP Nos. 23 and 29, but body referring to RFP Nos. 27 and 28); 131-32 (heading referring to RFP Nos. 24 and 30, but body referring to RFP Nos. 29 and 30); 188-89 (heading referring to Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 9, but body referring to Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7); 192-93 (heading referring to Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 10, but body referring to Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 9); 196-97 (heading referring to Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 11, but body referring to Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11). In ruling on the Motion, the Court relies upon and rules upon only the text of the discovery requests and responses contained in the body of the Joint Stipulation and not references in headings, in the table of contents, or in the Notice of Motion.